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SUVANNABHUMI means "The Land of Gold" in Pali, which location implies Southeast Asia.
Cover Photo: One Pillar Pagoda in Hanoi, Vietnam

Articles

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Articles

"Local" vs. "Cosmopolitan" in the Study of Premodern Southeast Asia

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[*Abstract*]

This paper analyzes the scholarly approaches to the problem of "local" vs. "cosmopolitan" in the context of the cultural transfers between South and Southeast Asia. Taking the "localization" paradigm advanced by Oliver Wolters as its pivot, it reviews the "externalist" and "autonomous" positions, and questions the hermeneutical validity of the fuzzy and self-explanatory category of "local." Having discussed the geo-environmental metaphors of "Monsoon Asia" and "Maritime Asia" as alternative paradigms to make justice to the complex dynamics of transregional interaction that shaped South and Southeast Asian societies, it briefly presents two case studies highlighting the tensions between the "local" and "cosmopolitan" approaches to the study of Old Javanese literature and Balinese Hinduism.

Keywords: Indianization, Indicization, Sanskritization, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Localization, Local, Cosmopolitan, Indigenism, Area Studies

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Ⅰ. Introduction: Oliver Wolters and the "Indigenistic" Paradigm in Southeast Asian Studies

According to a popular view, Southeast Asia is the definite geographical stage where complex dynamics of cultural layering, which began in remote historical periods and continued into the present, can be discerned. Scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds and methodologies have long since tended to analyze the region's rich culture in terms of a "synthesis" or "hybridization" between foreign elements (or "influences") and "local" or "indigenous" elements.[1] This discourse has often been applied to the "region" at both the micro- and macro-level—that is to say, to any circumscribed, specific locality in Southeast Asia, and to Southeast Asia as a whole—in both the premodern period (think, for instance, about "Indianization" and "Islamization") and the modern and contemporary periods (think about "Westernization"). According to this narrative, "foreign" religions, languages, scripts, etc. found in Southeast Asia a fertile ground to flourish along localized lines, becoming embedded in local geographical and socio-cultural contingencies. Thus, Southeast Asia has been perceived as an inherently pluralistic region that would owe its cultural richness to the inclusive attitude of its societies. Furthermore, the foreign or outside elements have often been regarded as intrinsically cosmopolitan, as opposed to intrinsically "local,"—i.e. embedded, place-bound, vernacular, and indigenous—elements.

The above-described model may be defined as "stratigraphic," insofar that it first assumes a distinction between the foreign and the indigenous, and then describes cultures and societies as "layered" structures, presupposing a "core," "base," or "substratum" that would represent the original or authentic (like the *genius loci*), and some superimposed element, not infrequently defined as "uppercrust" or "overlay." Reynolds effectively describes this model in this manner:

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[1] Craig Reynolds (1995: 434) rightly notes that the "sloppy language that often accompanies discussion of Southeast Asian cultural diversity—'mixing', blending', 'syncretism', 'eclecticism'—... makes a complex historical process sound like a fisherman's catch".

The notion of "layers" of influence, the "inside-outside" dichotomy, and the all-important role of "the local" are as prominent as ever in the early historiography. Even if not named as such, "local genius" has been a regular motif in political, economic, and cultural studies of the early period (Reynolds 1995: 432–433).

Underneath layers of subsequent—and foreign?—accretions lies a bedrock of the *echt* Southeast Asia. Moreover, it is this real Southeast Asia that provides the agency in historical processes. (ibid.: 424)

According to this view, elements of Indic/Sanskritic, Sinitic, or Islamicate high culture would have been appropriated by the natives of Southeast Asia and "localized"—that is, adapted to the prevalent place-specific socio-cultural and linguistic coordinates.

The "localization" paradigm (and, indeed, the very term "localized") were popularized through the influential monograph *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives* (1999, first ed. 1982) by historian Oliver Wolters, who became one of the founding fathers of Southeast Asian Studies within the Area Studies disciplinary framework. Focusing on the premodern and early modern periods, and taking into account both written sources and phenomena going beyond texts and inscriptions, Wolters insisted on Southeast Asian agency and its dynamic processes, that is the different regional localizations and re-configurations of Indic or Sinitic cultural elements—like the Sanskritization and Hinduization of Java and Cambodia, or the Sinicization of Vietnam. Introducing an intra- regional comparative element, for example when contrasting Old Javanese literature with Cambodian Sanskrit inscriptions, Wolters regarded the Southeast Asian region as a "broadly based community of outlook," or a distinctive "mosaic of literary cultures characterized by foreign and local features fitting into various text-like wholes" (ibid.: 65). Localization of foreign materials was perceived as a purposeful process that validated local statements, and was considered one of the distinctive features of the cultural matrix characterizing Southeast Asia as a whole. Wolters (1999: 55) defined localization as follows:

> Indian materials tended to be fractured and restated and therefore drained of their original significance by a process which I shall refer to as "localization". The materials, be they words, sounds of words, books, or artefacts, had to be localized in different ways before they could fit into various local complexes of religious, social, and political systems and belong to new cultural "wholes". Only when this had happened would the fragments make sense in their new ambiences.

Southeast Asian societies were able to consciously choose the Indian models, adapting them to the existing pre-conditions of their social and cultural lives. According to Wolters, Hindu religious conceptions brought ancient local beliefs "into sharper focus." This is the case, for instance, of the lasting influence that theistic cults of Śaivism (most notably that of the Pāśupata sect) and Vaiṣṇavism exerted, through the religious model of "Hindu devotionalism," on the development of the notions of political authority in Southeast Asia, most notably in the ancient—and eminently "Southeast Asian" —conception of the King as "man of prowess" endowed with superhuman abilities and worshiped by his entourage in terms of *bhakti* relationships (1999: 22). Furthermore, in defining the features of the Southeast Asian cultural matrix, Wolters introduced the concept of modernity, assuming that "news of developments in India certainly reached Southeast Asia fairly promptly and continuously" (ibid.: 46). In other words, the principle of "hierarchy," just in the same way it was tied to "purity" in India, seems to have been connected to "modernity" in Southeast Asia.

Historiographically, Wolters' model may be seen as the logic outcome of certain factors, namely: a quest for the "local" and the "autochthonous" that became fashionable after the Second World War and decolonization; geopolitical trends that reflected the division of Asia into the geographic macro-regions of South, East, and Southeast Asia, each linked to a corresponding "civilization;" and the compartmentalization of knowledge that became normative under the Area Studies paradigm in global academe. Furthermore, it may also be regarded as a reaction against the India-centric paradigms and academic cultures that were prevalent during the first half of the 20th century, such as the "Greater India" paradigm

elaborated in intellectual and nationalist circles in Kolkata, and other paradigms elaborated in French Indological and colonial circles. Besides rehabilitating Southeast Asian agency, Wolters' influential model has provided a theoretical basis for the perception of Southeast Asian as a well-defined, distinctive region that underlies the modern Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) geopolitical project. In a way, Wolters has contributed to shape the manner in which modern Southeast Asians perceive their identities in the context of a dialectic relationship between post-colonial nation-states and such a supra-national entity as ASEAN.

Clearly, Wolters' insights—and the term "localized"—still remain useful today. Yet, as contemporary scholarship increasingly emphasizes intra- and trans-regional connections and moves away from both the boundaries of nation-states and of the equally artificial divisions of Asia into geographical "Areas," it is legitimate to revisit—as some scholars have done recently—some of Wolters' basic assumptions, and their reception in Asian studies circles and global knowledge. Taking Wolters' model as the pivot of this essay, I survey the historiography of "Indianization" of premodern Southeast Asia, and present the paradigm that I have advanced in recent publications on the socio-spatial groupings of "Monsoon Asia" and "Maritime Asia." I then proceed to a critique of the long-lasting "localist" viewpoint in Southeast Asian studies, mainly through questioning the fuzzy boundaries of the "local," and then apply my critique to case studies focusing on Old Javanese literature and Balinese Hinduism. My conclusion is that, in order to grasp the complex dynamics that have shaped cultural layering in Southeast Asia over the centuries, it is essential to transcend arbitrary geo-political and disciplinary contingencies, and move towards a wider-ranging, and truly "borderless," connected history.

Ⅱ. Defining Southeast Asia—Between the "Externalist" and "Autonomous" Viewpoints

Since the beginning of the scholarly study of premodern Southeast

Asia, a tension may be discerned between the opposing views emphasizing either transregional or local dynamics. This situation has been described by Lieberman (2009: 6-15) as displaying a contrapuntal logic that implies a dichotomy, and alternance, between the "externalist" and "autonomous" viewpoint in the historiography of Southeast Asia. The former view, especially at its inception in the early decades of the 20th century, has revolved around the trope of "indigenous incapacity/external benefaction," springing from "the belief that Southeast Asia, unlike India, China, or the Mideast, had never engendered its own civilization" (ibid.: 7); the latter has sought to correct that view proposing a more nuanced historiography and a more sympathetic approach to indigenous agency (ibid.: 9), as well as a greater attention to cultural specificities.

2.1. Cosmopolitanism Ante Litteram: From "Inde Transgangétique" to the "Greater India" movement

The scientific and empirical study of the Southeast Asian past began in European—mostly French and Dutch—"empirical orientalism" of colonial institutions, as well as in Indological circles. These circles upheld the wider geographical and cultural idea of *Inde transgangétique*, in contrast to the narrower focus on "Classical" India embodied in the Vedic texts of "Aryan" pedigree characterizing German and British Indology (Kwa 2013: xxi–xxii). The pioneers of this school were Abel Bergaigne, Eugène Burnouf, Sylvain Lévi, Jean Przyluski, Jules Bloch, Paul Mus, and George Coedès. The last scholar, while upholding a "Trans-Gangetic/Farther India" perspective, also elaborated a pioneering unitary vision of Southeast Asia, which would pave the way to subsequent scholarship focusing on the region, including that of Wolters. Indeed, Coedès' *Les états hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (1944) became a fundamental stepping stone for the study of the Indianized societies of premodern Southeast Asia. The important work by Coedès emphasized peaceful cultural influence rather than colonization, initially triggered by commercial contacts and later associated to the development of Indian-inspired kingdoms in Southeast Asia.

To describe the peculiar "hybrid" nature of Southeast Asian civilizations, Coedès (1966: 55) adopted a biological metaphor, regarding

> The early civilizations of Indochina and Indonesia as branches springing directly from the main trunk of Indian civilization . . . that India supplied much more than a graft, . . . that it was the whole plant that was exported, and that according to the nature of the ground where it flourished, the same plant bore fruits of varying flavor.

Elsewhere, Coedès refers to this process as "osmosis" between Indian and local elements. The "nature of the ground" metaphorically refers to the autochthonous substratum that Coedès, following the doctrine of his predecessors Jean Przyluski, Sylvain Lèvi, and Paul Mus, hypothesized as forming the pre-historical culture of the region of Monsoon Asia, extending from India through Southeast Asia to South China (Coedès 1944: 8–9).[2] This ancestral cultural substratum —labeled "Austric" or "Austroasiatic"—was inferred on the basis of evidence from linguistics, mythology, art history, and archaeology. This culture or civilization would have been characterized by the cult of ancestors, the worship of gods on high places, the figure of the "Lord of the Land," similar funerary practices related to megalithic burials, matrilineal dualism, and structural analogies of myths; its technology would have included the use of complex irrigation systems for growing rice, and advanced skills in navigation. In the 1930's, Paul Mus elaborated the idea of "Monsoon Asia" as an area characterized by an underlying cultural unity, which would explain the existence of some shared religious practices across it (1975: 8–9).

Mus' position in the historiography of Southeast Asia is peculiar. He can be counted among those scholars who had a more nuanced grasp of local realities, and combined the social sciences with textual studies. Far from analyzing Southeast Asian phenomena uniquely in the light of Indic prototypes, he interpreted Khmer and

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[2] For an elaboration of these ideas, see Coedès (1953) and (1954).

Javanese monuments, like the Angkor temple complex and Borobudur, as tombs for the ancestors that would reflect a local rather than Indic paradigm; yet, at the same time, he championed a translocal approach that extended the geographical and temporal parameters of the "area" to Monsoon Asia in the *longue durée*. Indeed, he had an expertise in the ethnography of contemporary Southeast Asia, and belonged to that exceptional generation of French savants who had an Indological training, but were nonetheless sensitive to non-Indic (and non-Sanskritic, non-Brahminical) elements, such as Austroasiatic and Tibeto-Burman languages, and who did not stop within the boundaries of the Subcontinent but extended their research to Sanskrit material from Bali, Cambodia, and Campā.[3] Mus' research constituted, therefore, a gesture towards a "cosmopolitan" paradigm, a pioneering attempt to look at the "big picture" to explain South Asian phenomena in the light of Southeast Asian ones (and not the other way around) – for example, by studying the Austroasiatic influxes into Sanskrit and Indian religions, or individuating shared cultural elements through a comparative methodology.

The transregional model advanced by the French scholars mentioned above became a stepping-stone for the "Greater India" perspective that was becoming popular in intellectual and nationalistic circles of Kolkata. This model stressed the civilizing role of India, and explained the phenomenon of "Indianization" as a predominantly peaceful transfer of linguistic, religious, and cultural elements from India to the rest of Asia. Scholars like S.C. Mukherji and R.C. Majumdar did not refrain from speaking about "Indian colonies" in the "Far East" (that is, Southeast Asia), yet stressed how the colonization, "in contrast to the violence of European colonialism to subjugate the colonised… was peaceful, humane, benign and welcomed by the pre-literate natives" (Kwa 2013: xxix). According to Majumdar, Southeast Asians, like the Cams, "cheerfully

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[3] See, for instance, Lévi's pioneering work *Sanskrit texts from Bali*, and Bergaigne's and Coedés' pioneering work on Cambodian and Cam inscriptions. Another (non-French) figure of eclectic scholar was the Dutch Hendrik Kern, whose domains of research included, besides Indian languages and religions, Old Javanese, Old Khmer and Malay languages, Austronesian linguistics, etc.

submitted to their foreign masters and adopted their manners, customs, language and religion" (ibid.: xxx). As noted by Kwa, such views suggest that the Greater India writers introjected and appropriated the colonial metanarrative of fair-skinned Aryan invaders and dark-skinned "savages" natives of India, extending it "to explain and justify an Indian colonization of the Far East" (ibid.). Interestingly, the region that today we call "Southeast Asia" seems to have been perceived either as a sort of "vacuum," at best a crossroads between the "civilizations" of India and Iran in the west and China and Japan in the east. To be sure, Indian scholars knew about the work of Lévi, Przyluski, and Bloch on Austroasiatic and Austronesian cultures of Southeast Asia, yet did not consider them as real "civilizations"; on the contrary, they regarded them as figments of Indian (Vedic) culture.[4]

The Indo-centric focus, cultural chauvinism, and Indological disciplinary bias of the greater India school no doubt reflect the state of production of knowledge of the time, when Southeast Asia had not yet emerged as a separate field of study, let alone as a world-region. It is also apparent that the champions of the Greater Indian model appropriated the views of French Indologists, but put much less emphasis on the process of mutual cultural interaction. Their scholarly endeavors were tinged by current discourses on Indian "internationalism" and various forms of Asianisms, stressing the civilizational achievements of colonized countries as opposed to the crisis of Western ideals at the eve of the colonial status quo. In spite of its gesture towards cosmopolitanism, the Greater India perspective was (mis)appropriated by Indian nationalists, who

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4 For instance, S.K. Chatterjee (1965: 153) refers to "certain remarkable agreements between the cosmogony of the Polynesians and that of the Nāsadīya hymn in the Ṛg Veda (X.129)," and to some astronomical ideas and terminology, e.g. the enumeration of the days by the phases of the moon, the "Austric" names for the two phases of the moon, the creation of the world from an egg, and Nāga-lore (see ibid.: 149–167 for a wider discussion of Austro-Asiatic and Austronesian loan-words and cultural tropes). Some of these views are clearly the product of the nationalistic milieu of the Greater India Society, and have been long since discredited. Majumdar's (1936) speculative reconstruction of an Indian homeland for the Malays was based on the hypothesis of a pre-Aryan and pre-Dravidian link between the Austroasiatic languages of India and the Austronesian languages of island Southeast Asia and Oceania proposed by Lévi and Przyluski, among others.

superimposed the category "India" to the rest of Asia, and especially Southeast Asia. This shows their inability to transcend the paradigm of the nation-state (whether yet-to-be-formed or newly-formed) and even the colonial model (albeit an alternative, "Asian" form of colonialism).

2.2. The "Autonomous" Paradigm

As opposed to the externalist or transregional paradigm, we may individuate an "autonomous" or "indigenistic" paradigm, mainly championed by European scholars of the ancient cultures of the colonial possessions of French and British Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. The emphasis on India characterizing the perspective of the exponents of the Greater India Society inevitably led to a counter-reaction by scholars who were starting to detach themselves from the academic field of Indology and promote a separate and highly specialized discipline devoted to the study of Southeast Asia. While many of its exponents had been themselves trained in Sanskrit, they did not emphasize the Indic elements at the expenses of the local, Southeast Asian ones; on the contrary, they analyzed cultural phenomena in the light of the local cultural specificities. Thus, it was deemed desirable to study, for example, ancient Javanese culture on its own terms, without taking into account the Indian influences, which were considered incidental or even capable of preventing a real understanding of the local culture. I may refer to the studies on premodern Javanese architecture by Stutterheim (1956), underlining the fundamental indigenous character of the Javanese Candi, which he regarded as the successor of the previous terraced religious sites widespread in Southeast Asia and Melanesia; and by de Casparis (1950), viewing Borobudur as a monument devoted to a local cult of ancestor-worship and inspired by indigenous ideas of the "sacred mountain." Thus, for Stutterheim and de Casparis, Javanese architecture expressed long-lasting local beliefs and practices about ancestors and deified kings, and displayed an Indic overlay. A textual scholar like Rassers analyzed motifs in local literatures of Indonesia not in the light of Indian prototypes but in terms of indigenous mythologemes (1959); in a similar fashion, Rassers described the peculiar "blend" of Hinduism

and Buddhism in Old Javanese literature and art in terms of local background and ancestral myths of the Malayo-Polynesians, especially as reflected by the popular Balinese tale of Bubhukṣa and Gagaṅ Akiṅ (1926). Another exponent of this school was C.C. Berg, who took great pains in systematically re-interpret the Javanese past in the light of specifically Indonesian tribal dualistic framework (1965, 1969). Berg (1936) openly criticized Himanshu Bhusan Sarkar for having over-stressed the Indian elements in his *Indian Influences on the Literature of Java and Bali*, which the Greater India Society published in 1934.

Another exponent of the "indigenistic" viewpoint was H. Quaritch Wales. Describing the Indian influences on ancient Burma, in his *Making of Greater India,* Quaritch Wales spoke of a multiphase process where indigenous elements (*local genius*) were suppressed by an Indian overlay, only to re-emerge later; this view may be defined as a "principle of cultural resurgence" (1961: 14). According to Quaritch Wales (ibid.: 18), local culture (or local genius) does not represent an immutable essence, but rather a local choice of, and reaction to, aspects of Indic culture; hence his attention to psychological dynamics. He also affirmed that, despite the waves of Indic influence, the cultures of Java and Cambodia were not hybrid, but retained a distinctive character as Indo-Javanese, Cam, or Khmer.

French historian Denys Lombard may be regarded as an epigone of the "localist" movement, and especially of Wolters, for making claims of indigenous primacy with respect to Java, and for his idea concerning the rise of a "Southeast Asian culture" during the first millennium, which could provide the region a solid geohistorical foundation (1990). Even if Lombard allowed a role for translocal phenomena such as Sanskritization, he still stressed that Sanskrit was used in Java to refer to Javanese realities, and should therefore be studied on its own terms.

The idea of "local genius" has continued to live on in Southeast Asian nationalistic historiographies: consider, for instance, the forum on "Local Genius and Indonesian Culture" sponsored by the Republic of Indonesia to promote a clearer definition of national

identity, or the buzzword "local intellect" *(phumpanya)* that has become the rationale for centers of Thai studies; Reynolds' statement that "In Southeast Asia 'local genius' is taken to be something that needs to be both respected and nurtured" (1995: 432) is as true today as it was two or three decades ago.

2.3. Towards a Change of Paradigm

The 70's, 80's, and 90's witnessed the emergence of a series of studies that did not only take into account the evidence of the results of Indianization but also how this process unfolded, and also attempted to refine the theoretical parameters of both extremes—the India-centered and Southeast Asia-centered perspectives—adding a new element of complexity. An important state-of-the-art review of the issue of Indianization of Southeast Asia was produced by Ian Mabbett, who published two separate articles focusing, respectively, on the pre-historical (1977a) and historical period (1977b). Firstly, Mabbett individuated two different phases of Indianization— Indianization I and II. The former, taking place around the first centuries CE, was characterized by "the appearance of principalities or city states with Indian culture" (Mabbett 1977a: 13). The latter took place much later, around the last quarter of the first millennium CE, and witnessed "the growth of peasant societies supporting civil, priestly and military elites" (ibid). Furthermore, Mabbett pointed out that the previous theories, either supporting the idea that an actual colonization took place or emphasizing the role of trade and commerce along with peaceful migration, were based on speculation rather than being supported by data. Approving the view of van Leur, Wheatley, and Bosch, he accepted the idea of "native genius" as an indigenous initiative to appropriate Indic elements (Mabbett 1977b: 144). Then, given the lack of a single most convincing theory, he advocated the need for an eclectic explanation taking into account all the possible factors which intervened simultaneously (ibid.: 158). Perhaps Mabbett's most ground-breaking idea, which opened the way to further analysis in this direction, is that the terms "India," "Indianization," etc. are anachronistic and inaccurate, for an homogeneous cultural entity called "India," let alone "Indonesia," never existed in practice.

Further, the idea that "Indianization of Southeast Asia" is a "confusion of categories" suggests that South and Southeast Asia already shared common socio-cultural traits before "Indianization"; therefore, the dichotomy between an autonomous Southeast Asia and a civilizing Indian culture was a false one.

A major contribution to the discussion was published by the Dutch epigraphist de Casparis in 1983. De Casparis, himself an exponent of the Leiden "autonomous" school, argued that the process of cultural exchange called "Indianization" had been hitherto analyzed in too simplistic a way, and advocated a new paradigm envisaging "a complicated network of relations, both between various parts of each of the two great regions and between the two regions themselves" (ibid.: 18–19). He further considered that in analyzing the phenomenon of Indianization, one could hardly avoid focusing on either India or Southeast Asia, implying that one area "gave" and the other "received," whereas the picture is much more complicated by the mosaic of different cultures which characterized both regions (ibid.: 2).

The theoretical implications of de Casparis' analysis were developed by historian of India Hermann Kulke in his study on the changing image of India's role in Southeast Asia (1990). On the basis of the findings of archaeological campaigns carried out during the last decades, showing the high technological level of mainland Southeast Asian civilizations in prehistoric times as well as in the historical period, Kulke suggested that Southeast Asian cultures were already culturally, socially and technologically refined in the early historical period, sufficiently rich to support developed centralized political organizations. These centralized kingdoms were able to undertake gigantic architectural projects unprecedented even in India: as is well-known, monuments such as Borobudur, Prambanan, and Angkor Wat stand unrivaled, surpassing in scale, building-skill, and richness of reliefs everything that has been built in India, and possibly outside India, before and after them. Such ambitious architectural projects were evidently sustained by a class of highly productive peasants who cultivated extensively the fertile volcanic soil of the islands making use of an advanced system of cultivation of rice characterized by a highly developed large-scale

hydraulic engineering. Kulke (1990: 16) went on saying that "we may have to interpret the congenial acceptance of India's influence and the subsequent 'Hinduization' as the final stage or even culmination of South-East Asia's indigenous pre- and protohistory." This process of Hinduization or Indic influence is therefore to be considered in terms of "status raising." Indeed, the presence of Brahmins in local courts contributed to raise the status of the whole community, for they were seen as "extra legitimators of a new and more advanced type of authority" (ibid.: 21). Having made important considerations on the nature of the ancient Southeast Asian "states," the boundaries of which were not clearly defined and which consisted of nuclear areas in the lowlands centering around the figure of the King, he then introduced an important change of paradigm: Indianization did not involve any "act of 'transplantation' but 'a complicated network of relations' between partners of mutual 'process of civilization' which comprised both sides of the Bay of Bengal" (ibid: 28). Citing as an example the almost simultaneous creations of stone-temples in both India and Southeast Asia, Kulke states that "the socio-political development of Eastern India during the first half of the first millennium AD... resembles in many respects the development in parts of Southeast Asia" (1990: 24). The key idea is an (independent) socio-cultural and economic "convergence" between South and Southeast Asia that enabled similar solutions to similar problems of social change. Kulke's model of convergence between South and Southeast Asia, which redefines the process of Indianization as a "misnomer," would seem to imply a shared cultural complex—not confined to Southeast Asia, as Wolters would believe, but spanning South and Southeast Asia, which is remindful of Mus' ideas. In fact, Kulke did not explain whether the cultural affinities and parallel developments on both sides of the Bay of Bengal originated from a shared prehistoric cultural matrix, or were the outcome of independent origination.

The intellectual contributions by Mabbett, de Casparis, and Kulke are significant in that they problematized the false dichotomies elaborated by previous scholarship and re-oriented the field toward a more balanced appreciation of the translocal dynamics involved in the process of exchange of ideas between

South and Southeast Asia. They also remind us of the dangers to reify and essentialize the field of study by too strictly compartmentalizing the regions and academic disciplines.

2.4. The "Externalist" Reaction: The Sanskrit Cosmopolis

A recent trend in contemporary scholarship has been the emphasis on cosmopolitan phenomena. Such is the case of the "Sanskrit Cosmopolis" (and the related "Vernacular Millennium") model advanced by Sanskritist Sheldon Pollock (1996, 2006). Starting from the analysis of the use of Sanskrit language by premodern Southeast Asian civilizations, Pollock has hypothesized the existence of a trans-regional system of cultural exchange of great complexity and dynamicity, extending from Afghanistan to Bali. Supposing that the spread of the Indian culture in ancient Southeast Asia was due to the migrations of "traditional intellectuals and religious professionals, often following the train of scattered groups of traders and adventurers, and carrying with them disparate and decidedly uncanonized texts of a wide variety of competing religious orders" (Pollock 1996: 168), he has defined the cultural phenomenon of Sanskrit Cosmopolis or Sanskrit Ecumene as "what may be the most complicated—and as a totality least studied—transregional cultural formation in the pre-modern world" (ibid.: 197). He has noted that the Sanskrit language articulated politics not as material power—the power embodied in languages-of-state for purposes of boundary regulations—but politics as aesthetic power in all the areas belonging to the Sanskrit Cosmopolis, including the Indian Subcontinent itself. Indeed, besides documentary and political purposes, Sanskrit was used in Southeast Asia, as in the Subcontinent, as a learned and literary language of the elite. This means that Sanskrit was thus exclusively the cosmopolitan language of elite self-representation.

Sanskrit was used in the royal inscriptions of Kalimantan (the oldest of which dates back to the 5th–6th century CE), and Java; however, unlike in Cambodia, Sanskrit inscriptions in Java were gradually outnumbered by the first inscriptions in Old Javanese, which were invariably royal edicts. According to Pollock, Sanskrit

seems to have come to an end as a major form of public expression by the mid of the 9th century; concomitantly, we find an extraordinary and sudden efflorescence of belles-lettres in Old Javanese. Moreover, if Sanskrit inscriptions in Cambodia were largely unaffected by Khmer words and syntactical structures, the Javanese records present a bureaucratic jargon using local names and expressions. The above-mentioned features are not evidence of the emergence or resurgence of a "local genius," but rather of vernacularization, which could be regarded as the same shift to the vernacular for representing epic allegories of local political power that happened at around the same time in India.

Pollock has echoed the same concerns advanced by Mabbett and Kulke about the inconsistency of modern terms used for describing homogeneous political and cultural entities—like "India"—which did not exist in the past, noting that the problem of "Indianization" paradoxically applies to India itself. Since civilizations are not closed and self-contained but are often the result of transcultural dynamics, we should speak of an "Indianization" or "Sanskritization" of Java in the same way that we speak of an "Indianization" of South India. Pollock's contribution has been important for analyzing the problem of Indianization from a translocal perspective, showing that Sanskrit linguistic, religious and aesthetic canons were taken as a source of inspiration by the elites in both India and Southeast Asia. This does not amount to an untimely revival of the Greater India perspective or even of the "Indianization" paradigm, for to Pollock, the adoption of Sanskrit by Southeast Asian rulers represents participation in the cosmopolitan culture of Sanskrit; this process was, thus, driven by Southeast Asian agency.

Pollock's ideas go hand in hand with a vehement critique of what he calls the "civilizationalist indigenism" of Wolters and any "defensive indigenist" approaches that see an undeterminable cultural matrix in Southeast Asia. Pollock has criticized Wolters' view of an *echt* "Southeast Asianness" that presupposes an essential and ahistorical cultural substratum, mainly by pointing out that for allegedly Southeast Asian re-elaborations of ideas, such as universalist sovereignty and the ruler's intimate relationship or

identity with a supreme god through *bhakti,* there is "a lot of Indian evidence but… none from non-Indian Southeast Asia" (2006: 531); in spite of the conceptual framework of Wolters' argument, which grants primacy to continuity with "ancient and persisting indigenous beliefs," it is from the Sanskrit evidence that Wolters derives much of his interpretation of Southeast Asian kingship and political systems. Furthermore, he states, "[i]t is very hard, for the Sanskritist at least, to identify the slightest Cambodian inflection in the Sanskrit inscriptions Wolters analyzes beyond the occasional localism with respect to gender relations or sectarian practices" (ibid.). Thus, what Wolters regarded as "local" seems to be not so local (or "Southeast Asian") after all. Besides targeting Wolters, Pollock has also criticized the earlier view—representing an academic consensus and ultimately stemming from Weber's theories—that ascribed to "legitimation" purposes the adoption of Sanskrit in Southeast Asia, defining it as a banal, tautological, and poorly argued model (ibid.: 516–517).

However elegant and revolutionary, Pollock's model has not been exempt from criticism. For instance, Daud Ali, a historian of South Asia with a sound expertise on Southeast Asia, has noted Pollock's lack of reliance on the copious historical and archaeological secondary literature on Southeast Asian state formation, as well as the fact that his theory remains within the boundaries of the fictive realm of literature (2011: 281). Furthermore, on closer scrutiny, India and Southeast Asia do not neatly conform to Pollock's theory of "division of labour" between Sanskrit and vernacular languages— the former being used for political representation, and the latter for administrative and worldly purposes (ibid.: 283). A more nuanced reading of early epigraphic documents from Southeast Asia has shown the deep entanglement of Sanskritized "Cosmopolitan" elements with local use, that is Old Malay language and local ideologies of power, which have highlighted the diversities instead of similarities with their South Asian counterparts, thereby suggesting varieties of local "reactions" and usages instead of a uniform meaning (ibid.: 289, 291).

According to Ali (2009: 16), "the full implications of Pollock's theory have yet to be explored and may still help us

re-conceptualize the nature of linkages between South and Southeast Asia in ways perhaps consonant with Kulke's suggestive remarks." This suggests that Pollock's ideas will have to be tested and complemented by realigning them to social realities rather than keeping the discourse in the realm of literary imagination.[5] To Ali, Pollock's "apparent neglect for the ideological substance, cultural practices, and socio-economic processes which 'underwrote' the Sanskrit Cosmopolis" limits the usefulness of his work for historians (2009: 16).

Besides advocating the need to fine-tune some of the conclusions of Pollock on (the "death" of) Sanskrit in Java,[6] I should like to point out that Pollock's model is limited to Sanskrit and literary history, and therefore biased towards "high cultural," top-down phenomena; the supralocal dynamics shaping bottom-up —and highly productive and resilient—cultural phenomena that do not fit the model, such as e.g. magic, "folk" practices, religion, ritual, and performances, remain to be investigated. Pollock's neglect of the category of "religion" and its foundational textual corpora (such as the Sanskrit-Old Javanese *tutur* and *tattva* texts from Java and Bali, which I will discuss below) is a case in point.

Ⅲ. The New Wave: An Emphasis on Networks and Synchronisms

Such concepts such as Subhramanyam's "connected histories", favoring flexible and fluid cultural zones rather than "civilizational"

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[5] See Kulke (2014) for a commentary on Pollock's theory, Ali's response, and his own updated reflections on the "convergence" theory. See also Bronkhorst (2011) for a critique of Pollock's dismissal of the "legitimation theory" and of a link between Sanskrit and Brahmins in Southeast Asia.

[6] Wrestling with Pollock's view that "Sanskrit begins to die in Java the moment Old Javanese begins to live" (Pollock 1996: 229), Hunter (2001: 90) argues that the composition, as late as the early 16th century, of the Old Javanese poem on meters *Vṛttasañcaya* by Mpu Tanakuṅ "suggests that for the courts of East Java the dates of the transnational phase of this 'cosmopolis' must be pushed ahead nearly two centuries." Sanskrit-Old Javanese *tutur* and *tattva* texts support Hunter's critique, pushing ahead the "survival" of Sanskrit on Bali to the modern period, as suggested by the Sanskrit verses included in *tutur* texts composed in the early 20th century—like the *Śivāgama* by Pedanda Ida Made Sidemen.

fixed representations,[7] have laid the foundation to a new wave of historical scholarship focusing on complex translocal dynamics and processes. Research produced in the past two decades has increasingly relied on the concept of “networks” to elucidate the dynamics of cultural transfer between South and Southeast Asia on the one hand, and re-oriented the geographical focus towards a maritime, “Indian Ocean” dimension on the other. The idea of networks is not new, as it builds on and develops the idea of proposed by de Casparis as early as 1983. It was revived by Lombard, who, in spite of his “autonomist” perspective and emphasis on the autochthonous elements in Javanese culture, as well as the consideration of Southeast Asia as a culturally well-defined region, was in favor of the study of the history of maritime Southeast Asia in terms of “Chinese,” “Muslims,” and “Christian” networks, and also introduced the new concept of “synchronism.” Lombard lamented that “it is truly not easy to write a ‘well integrated’ history of Southeast Asia.... The main difficulty is in fact to transcend the heaviness of regional, colonial and then nationalistic histories which have strongly partitioned off the historical space” (Lombard 1995: 10).[8] He also hoped that one day the historical reconstructions made by archaeologists, linguists, geneticists, and scholars of culture “will give way to a true consideration of synchronisms, that is to say to a comparative theory, which will examine parallels between the evolutionary paths of the different ‘layers’ or ‘sectors’” (ibid.: 15).

The concept of “synchronism” may be compared to Lieberman’s (2003, 2009) “strange parallels,” i.e. synchronous developments between geographically distant regions in Southeast Asia and the wider Eurasian area. Lieberman, emphasizing the early modern

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[7] See Subhramanyam’s (2016: 22) critique of the four civilizations existing across the Indian Ocean region, namely “Islam,” “Sanskritic India,” “South East Asia,” and “Chinese,” distinguished by Chaudhuri (1991: 49–66).

[8] Lombard, downplaying the fact that “a vast majority of Southeast Asians have no interest in any other cultural area of their region”, asks: “How then is it possible to lay the foundations of comparativeness in such (bad) conditions? How is it possible to reach the vision of a Southeast Asian ‘Mediterranean Sea’, which could escape the notion of ‘outside influences’ being such a perturbation for the local historians, but without denying it for all that?” (ibid.: 11).

period, and marrying the maritime perspective with the study of overland Eurasian networks and of landlocked mainland Southeast Asian highlands, attempts to link Southeast Asian history to Eurasian and global history. Focusing on "internal" processes of change, and at the same time upholding a comparative perspective taking into account external factors, he describes the dynamics of cultural integration in Southeast Asia from the 15th century onwards (Lieberman 2009: 10). Lieberman asks whether premodern Eurasia can be regarded as part of a coherent, integrated Ecumene connected to Southeast and East Asian appendices and that, through a comparative study, reveals parallel but independent social adaptations, climatic shifts, and commercial links. In doing so, he argues "less for a single lockstep pattern than for a loose constellation of influences whose local contours must be determined empirically and without prejudice" (2003: 45). He positions himself between the "autonomous" and "externalist" positions, insofar that he disaggregates Southeast Asia and refuses to grant automatic priority to maritime factors, yet emphasizes material as well as cultural dynamics, describes linear change, and acknowledges the critical impact of global currents (ibid.). Lieberman contrasts himself to Reid, whose work he sees as representing a "third wave" succeeding the externalist and autonomous paradigm with his idea of "Age of Commerce" historiography. To Lieberman, Reid's famous two-volume *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce* (1988, 1993*)*, being richer and more sophisticated than any externalist work, shifted the balance away from indigenous cultural forces towards external maritime influences "in a move that reversed the 'autonomous' shift that began in the 1960s" (2003: 16).

Following an increasing recognition of the predominant role played by the sea routes (the so-called "Maritime Silk Roads") in shaping premodern intra-Asian connectivity, a dearth of studies analyzing the circulatory dynamics of cultural, religious, diplomatic, and economical transfer among India, Southeast Asia, and China through the maritime routes has appeared in recent years. A critique against the predominant land-based approach in the spread of Buddhism across Asia has been advanced by Tansen Sen (2014: 40), who in an earlier work has unveiled the multi-directional

connections existing between Asian Buddhist centers in the 7th century and their integration in the wider Asian Buddhist world in the 8th century, characterized by overlapping networks of relations that were religious as much as economic, diplomatic, and political in nature (2003). Based on the same premises, Jason Neelis applies a "networks approach" or "networks model" to the study of such a multifaceted, trans-regional phenomenon as the patterns of Buddhist transmission across South, Central, and East Asia. Advocating the need to transcend the oversimplified metaphors of "flows" and "influences" in a single direction along a fixed route, he highlights the multifaceted links between religious, economic, and political nodes along multiple lines of communication that enhance possibilities for cross-cultural contact and transfer (2011: 319).

The continuums extending from the Sanskrit Cosmopolis to the Persianate and Islamicate worlds, which overlapped with, and then replaced, the Indic circuits of cultural exchange have been described in recent scholarship. Consider, for instance, the circulation of Tamil, Arabic, and Malay materials across South India, Sri Lanka, and the Malay-Indonesian world explored by Ronit Ricci (2011), or the movement of an Arabo-Malay diaspora across the Indian Ocean over the past five hundred years studied by Engseng Ho (2006).

Ⅳ. Redefining the Region: Monsoon Asia and Maritime Asia

Capitalizing on recent scholarship on religious and cultural networks across Asia, and taking inspiration from the exciting possibilities offered by maritime history, I have attempted to re-conceptualize the geopolitical configurations of Asia as framed by the current Area Studies paradigm in two recent edited volumes, the one on Esoteric Buddhism in medieval Maritime Asia (Acri 2016a) and the other on cultural transfer in early Monsoon Asia (Acri, Blench and Landmann 2017). My approach aims to transcend and re-balance the "autonomous" and "externalist" paradigms by extending the geographical and chronological coordinates of the "Region." Thus, by reviving and refining the Monsoon Asia perspective elaborated by

early 20th century French scholarship, I propose to re-frame the field of study through the geo-environmental metaphors of "Monsoon Asia" and "Maritime Asia," conceived as dynamic macro-regions of intersecting discursive fields across which networks of cultural brokers travelled since time immemorial. Influenced by similar environmental and climatic factors, such as the seasonal monsoons, these macro-regions formed an ideal theater for the circulation of people, goods, languages, and ideas. Spreading across the superimposed geopolitical boundaries of modern nation states, and transcending such equally arbitrary and historically constructed geographical entities as South/Southeast/East Asia, Monsoon Asia and Maritime Asia are conceptualized as forming a single interconnected network, and arguably even an integral cultural ecumene with a shared background of human, intellectual, and environmental history. More than mere (and static) geographical expressions, these macro-regions may be conceptualized as socio-spatial groupings or world regions constituted by a pattern of ever-changing relations dominated by basic underlying affinities that may help make sense of circulatory cultural phenomena across Asia.

My main hypothesis is that Monsoon Asia in the proto- and early historical period, and Maritime Asia in the medieval period, constituted integrated systems of littorals where crops, goods, ideas, cosmologies, and ritual practices circulated via sea-routes governed by the seasonal monsoon winds. Thus, by imagining Monsoon Asia and Maritime Asia as geographical arenas with a shared history of human migration, long-distance trade, linguistic contact and dispersal, and cultural transfer, we may capture the highly fluid translocal dynamics transcending the artificial geography of the nation states or world regions, and thus move beyond the artificial divides fragmenting what were in origin shared cultural processes. For instance, we may study the flows and interactions across the Indo-Pacific area, such as the migration and socio-linguistic "layering" of Austroasiatic and Austronesian language-speaking people across South China, Southeast Asia, and South Asia from the proto-historical period to around 1000 AD; the cultural dynamics before (and beyond) "Indianization"; or the circulation of Indic religions across Asia.

My work intends to encourage an "oceanic turn" and a *longue durée* approach to the study of the translocal dynamics which govern historical processes transcending the boundaries of both nation-states and macro-regions as they are commonly framed in the current academe—as if those concepts were actual distinctive entities, with intrinsic, clear-cut and enduring geographical and ethno-linguistic boundaries. Thus, I programmatically advocate a widening of the geo-historical framework through which cultural phenomena, linked by a shared history going back to a remote past, are to be investigated, as well as a disciplinary de-parochialization. It is worth stressing here, once again, that the Area Studies segregation of region-bound separate and self-contained fields of study is a modern construct. It creates imagined boundaries and, as rightly noted by Ali (2009: 11), obscures rather than reveals:

> When speaking about pre-modern cultural interactions… the ways we conceptualize these often has as much to do with the "onward historical developments" which culminated in the formation of modern nationalism as with the cultural, economical and political flows which traversed the pre-colonial world.

We need to constantly remind to ourselves that the current histories and geographies of Southeast Asia are largely the result of colonial and post-colonial national narratives, or of post-Second World War global academe, which has framed the "Area Studies Paradigm" and (arbitrarily) divided Asia into the quadrants of South-, Central-, Southeast-, and East-Asia. I cannot but agree with Farish Noor who, noting the myopic and narrow intent of official histories, argues that

> The people of South and Southeast Asia today… are the descendants of communities and nations that were open to external influences to a far greater degree that we perhaps realise, and this is borne out by the fact that the culture, religions and vocabularies that were used in the ancient past demonstrate an easiness with cosmopolitanism that would embarrass most of us today (2013: 252).
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> … What took place in Southeast Asia during the pre-Islamic and pre-colonial eras can only be understood in the context of an age

where geo-political boundaries were fluid, porous and interpenetrating; and local developments took place against a backdrop of transcultural exchange and translocal evolution (ibid.: 254).

In a thought-provoking essay, Andrew Abalahin (2011: 664) attempts to reframe "a series of world-historical developments that bring together histories that have customarily been viewed apart" by connecting—and at the same time dissolving—early Southeast Asia and Inner/North/East Asia into the macro-region called "Sino-Pacifica" on the basis of their shared non-Sinitic, i.e. (proto-) Austronesian identity in the pre- and proto-historic periods. Geoffrey Samuel, noting the "arbitrary nature of regional traditions of intellectual inquiry," tries to redefine the "area" when calling for a change of perspective in trying to look at Tibeto-Burman-speaking societies of Tibet, Ladakh, Nepal, and Sikkim as part of Southeast Asia rather than Central or South Asia—the rationale being that the Tibeto-Burman linguistic family has been biased towards South and Central Asia, yet Eastern India belongs culturally more to Southeast Asia than South Asia (2005: 199–200). A similar argument was advanced by Kunstandter (1967: 205), who included Eastern India in Southeast Asia on account of linguistic and cultural similarities: "Just as the southern boundary of China does not mark a cultural or linguistic division, the eastern border of India does not mark off a cultural or linguistic area." Warning us not to confuse analytic categories with reality, and expressing the need to move beyond restrictive parochial concerns, Samuel (2011: 348) further notes that

> India as we know it today is a very recent entity. It is all too easy to think of the development of "Hinduism" or at least of "Indian religions" as a process that took place within a territory called "India" and which corresponds roughly to present-day India or even to the rather problematic wider region called "South Asia" for purposes of Western academia…. the adoption of Brāhmaṇical religion was an ongoing process and that Cambodia was in much the same position in relation to this process, if at a slightly later date, than Bengal or South India.

Samuel then invokes a "common frame," and a "quite different sort of geography," to make sense of the complex religious and

cross-cultural processes that occurred over an extended period of time throughout a large swathe of continental and maritime Asia. It is relevant for the present discussion to stress that the separation between South and Southeast Asia for studying premodern phenomena is artificial, and that we need to reposition Southeast Asia not as a periphery but as the pivot of the Maritime Asian networks. Indeed, as pointed out in a recent wave of scholarship on Buddhism, Southeast Asia—and large areas of what are now the Malay peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago in particular—were not only crucial in terms of the transfer of maritime technology and crews, but also played an important, Asia-wide role as both a crossroads and terminus of Buddhist cults. Hiram Woodward (2004: 353) has advanced an argument for "treating Indonesia and India as an integral unit well into the ninth century," making "a case for possible influence of Borobudur Buddhism upon subsequent developments in India"; the contribution of Southeast Asian agents to Tibetan and Indian Buddhism is supported by an increasing amount of evidence (Acri 2016b: 11). In a similar way, Skilling (2009: 42) re-evaluates the important participation of premodern Siam in a much wider world of Buddhist cultural interchange than is usually assumed at present, questioning "whether 'India' should always be the 'centre', Siam the periphery—a passive recipient of 'influence.'" Sen (2003: 11) argues that during the Tang period Chinese Buddhist monks ceased to suffer from a "borderland complex": hence, China ceased to be a "frontier" and became a terminus, and center of diffusion, of Buddhism in its own right. These recent works reflect the need of scholarship to move beyond the paradigm envisaging a "diffusionist" spread of Indic religious traditions from a South Asian "heartland" or "motherland" to East and Southeast Asian "peripheries," for cults were transmitted from multiple centers, and by no means followed a mono-directional pattern.

In focusing specifically on religious networks, I have proposed to transcend the artificial spatial demarcation and imagined boundaries of macro-regions and nation-states, as well as to bridge the arbitrary divide between (inherently cosmopolitan) "high" cultures or "civilizations" (e.g. Sanskritic, Sinitic, and Islamicate) and (inherently embedded) "local" or "indigenous" cultures. My

perspective posits the occurrence of circulatory dynamics of globalization and diverse cross-cultural human relations that have configured the trajectories of cultural patterns in the area. These were formed and accommodated in prehistoric and early historical times, and constitute processual continuities that are still being negotiated in the modern period. By focusing on agency, interaction, and multi-directional transfer, this perspective aims at avoiding both essentialism and extreme fragmentation, thereby achieving greater depth in historical analysis.

More evidence of prehistoric contacts between South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia has turned up in recent years. The presence of jar burials, Dongson drums, Sa-Huynh ornaments, and agate and carnelian beads along the Indo-Pacific arc (Theunissen, Grave and Bailey 2000) suggests the possibility of interactions and transfer of religious ideas and practices from East to South Asia, while studies on the distribution of ceramics, cultigens, and nautical terms and devices, have highlighted the regular maritime links between early farming communities in South and Southeast Asia since at least the 1st millennium BCE (Gupta 2005: 22; Hoogervorst 2013: 102). The continuous presence in the Indian Subcontinent of Austroasiatic-speaking people, who most likely shared an early core of socio-cultural features with their "cousins" in Southeast Asia, suggests that these contacts and transfers are not a mere theoretical possibility. On the basis of recent archaeological findings, archaeologist Pierre-Yves Manguin talks about a "millenium-long phase of exchange" (2011: xvi) that predates the beginnings of "Indianization" in the 3rd–5th centuries CE, when "the relationship between Southeast Asian and Indian societies had already come a very long way." Hopefully, these realizations will contribute to rectify such historical aberrations as the modern narrative around *pribumi*s invoked to differentiate the "children of the soils," that is the Austronesian language-speaking Malays from "newcomers," such as Chinese, Indians, etc., in the Malay-Indonesian world. This narrative does not take into account the fact that the Austroasiatic-speaking Orang Asli were, indeed, the earlier inhabitants of the region (yet not "aboriginals" themselves!). This is comparable to the concept of *ādivāsin*s (another Sanskrit neologism) in India, referring to the

Munda-/Austroasiatic-speaking ethnic groups that were not "aboriginals," but the "creolized" heirs of Southeast Asian ancestors who spread into India about 10,000 years ago (Chaubey et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2015)

In my "Tantrism Seen from the East" (Acri 2017a), I have argued that, as far as the study of the phenomenon of Tantrism in South and Southeast Asia is concerned, the prevalent attitude among contemporary Indologists towards the manifestations of Indic religions and cultural traits in Southeast Asia has not gone beyond the uncritical subscription to a monodirectional "Indicization" paradigm; on the other hand, the majority of Southeast Asianists have tended to stress Southeast Asian agency in the "localization" of Indic ideas and practices. Concomitantly, Indologists have championed an orthogenetic paradigm to explain the emergence of the phenomenon of Tantrism in South Asia from a (late) Vedic matrix. However, as rightly noted by Brighenti (2009: 95), to explain the various stages of the process of tribal-Śākta interactions in the Indian Subcontinent, we "may necessitate moving beyond the ancient limits of Vedic India." In fact, one may even include the Vedic "antecedents" of Tantrism in a wider-ranging analysis that approaches the study of Indic religions "from the East," so to speak, as partaking of a shared cultural matrix out of which parallel developments originated across the Bay of Bengal, in the context of a millenia-long shared history. In particular, the appreciation of the Austroasiatic imports into Sanskrit and both Hindu and Buddhist tantric traditions remains a desideratum. By extending the field of study to the wider macro-region of Monsoon Asia, the synthesis advocated here would regard seemingly "convergent" religious and cultural phenomena as the outcome of multi-directional and circulatory processes rather than separate, self-contained entities, and propose a possible shared ancestry.

To conclude, I believe that the metaphors of Monsoon Asia and Maritime Asia are powerful tools for capturing the dynamics across space and time that connect seemingly disconnected phenomena, actors, geographies, and historical trajectories, so as to form a coherent historical narrative.

Ⅴ. Revisiting the "Local"

In spite of the appearance in the last two decades of a series of studies emphasizing cosmopolitan dynamics and partially reviving the "externalist" viewpoint, the academic discourse is still dominated by context-specific regional approaches to the study of premodern cultural and religious phenomena across South and Southeast Asia. These approaches focus on regions and/or nation-states, and emphasize local genius and cultural specificity. Whenever supra-local ("cosmopolitan") cultural phenomena are taken into account, they are often described through the lens of the Indic and Sanskritic high culture—as opposed to a (by definition) "local" or indigenous (i.e. *deśi*) culture. With respect to Islamization, Ali (2009: 18) has noted that this concept has obstructed the exploration of the networks because it presents itself, by its very definition, "as the interaction of a set of 'transposable' religious practices and beliefs with a set of 'local', rooted, 'indigenous' ones". Therefore, according to Ali, there is a tendency to perceive Islam as a universal abstract entity superimposed on the "local." The same considerations may be applied to "Hinduization".

Even when the hermeneutical paradigms accord a higher degree of agency and dynamism to the pre-existing civilizations of Southeast Asia, those "civilizational" configurations are too often vaguely defined through such self-explanatory labels as "local" or "indigenous"—without a clear definition of what is to be understood as local or indigenous. For instance, the concept of "local genius" has been popular among Indonesianists, especially art historians, who generally speak of an "indigenous Indonesian spirit" (Holt 1967: 29); yet, it is not entirely clear what exactly this indigenous spirit consists of, and where its "local" boundaries lay. Edi Sedyawati, when referring to premodern Central Javanese dance, rightly notes that "the adjective 'local' and 'indigenous' are ambiguous terms used to denote anything which does not belong to 'standard' classical Hindu (*sic*) dance style" (1982: 69). Similar considerations can be made with respect to the scholarship on Southeast Asian varieties of imported religions and their mixture of Indic (or Sinitic)

elements and pre-existing indigenous (e.g. "shamanic" or "animist") cultural features, which often has invoked such vague notions as "hybrid," "assimilated," or "syncretic," yet hardly ever explained them. No detailed comparative research has unravelled whether there had been or not a common civilizational configuration prior to "Indianization/Indicization," and what the features of such a civilizational configuration might have been. In short, there is a need to realize that features often perceived as "local" or "indigenous" turned out to be the product of circulatory dynamics, whereby local developments took place against the background of translocal exchanges. In other words, the "local" was already, at least in part, "cosmopolitan" (compare Pollock's concept of "Cosmopolitan vernacular"). This is the case, for instance, of the Austronesian and Austroasiatic "cultural packages" that early seafaring voyagers spread as they gradually settled through Southeast Asia, and which were eventually localized. Thus, we are no less entitled to speak of an "Austroasiaticization" and "Austronesianization" of Southeast Asia than of an "Indicization" or "Sanskritization" of Southeast Asia.

The emphasis on the dichotomy "cosmopolitan" and "local" has dominated not only the study of "Indic" phenomena in premodern Southeast Asia, but also the study of "non-Indic" Southeast Asia. For instance, Fox (1996: 1) lamented a "localization" of interests and disciplinary/areal parochialization reflected in the current academic paradigm of Austronesian Studies:

> Thus researchers in Indonesia, in the Philippines, in Melanesia, in Micronesia and the Pacific islands had each developed their own research concerns. Many of these research concerns reflected the interests of previous research that had been based on established traditions of inquiry within each area. Moreover, for a large area such as Indonesia, there was even greater "localization" of interests with specialization tending to foster a focus on specific islands or subregions, with a deep bifurcation between the eastern and western halves of the archipelago.

Going against this trend, Bellwood, Fox, and colleagues, in many publications stemming from the "Comparative Austronesian

Project," have drawn together different disciplinary approaches for the study of the Austronesian-speaking populations in order to elaborate a general framework for the interpretation of the complexities of the Austronesian heritage across Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean. They have compared features traceable to a common heritage beyond language despite millennia of interaction and change, namely a "Southern Mongoloid" genetic ancestry for Austronesian- speakers. These include widespread cultural features such as tattooing, use of outriggers on canoes, features of ethnographic and prehistoric art styles, and social norms concerning siblings' rank and a reverence for ancestral kin group founders (Fox 1996: 6). In spite of these common features, however, "there is little which can be characterized as exclusively and uniquely Austronesian held widely today in common among all the Austronesian-speaking regions" (ibid.: 3). This state of affairs suggests that a polythetic approach is needed to evaluate the complex issue of origin, dispersal, and transformation of the so-called "Austronesians" and their "cultural package(s)" through millennia.

The last two decades witnessed the emergence of a focus on a linguistically and archeologically defined Austronesian shared background of the people inhabiting mainland and insular Southeast Asia, as well as Oceania. New findings from genetics and physical anthropology point to a more nuanced model of migration. A combined approach to reconstruct the history and evolution of ideas that integrates (and moves beyond) linguistics, archaeology, and genetics, could produce and connect new insights by delving into the hitherto little explored domains of production and transfer of knowledge, mythologies, ancestral legal systems and religious beliefs, as well as aspects of material culture such as architecture, trade, navigation technology, etc. In the short manifesto "Towards an integrated comparative study of Austronesian Cultures," Edi Sedyawati (2011: 54–5) has noted that by comparing cultures and their respective culture bearers, it would be possible to discern whether they are related, and therefore presumably share the same origin. Blench (2012: 135), discussing the pervasive and highly distinctive set of iconographic elements in figurative art that is widely spread across the Austronesian-speaking areas, argues that

this strongly religion-associated imagery may be "a manifestation of *adat*, the traditional religion of I[sland] S[outh] E[ast] A[sia] prior to the spread of world religions."

Imran bin Tajudeen (2017) has recently elaborated on the interplay between the cosmopolitan and the local in Southeast Asia and the wider Western Malayo-Polynesian/Austronesian worlds, investigating the nature of the interplay between autochthonous and Indian elements in the formation of Southeast Asia's Indic cultures. The author has described the translations of *śāstric* sources into architecture and art forms according to patterns that integrated Indic and Austronesian paradigms; thus, early architectural examples from Central Java, Sumatran sites, and Kedah prompt us to reconsider some current ideas on the processes and phases of "Indianization" resting upon a dichotomous conception of Indian and indigenous elements that assume a separation between them and their juxtaposition as distinct elements accessible to "stratigraphic" scrutiny.

Ⅵ. The Local vs. Cosmopolitan in Old Javanese and Balinese Studies

As a conclusion, I offer some reflections on the current trends in the study of two closely interconnected domains, namely Old Javanese literature and modern Balinese Hinduism. This will provide us with a useful case study to evaluate some of the historiographical issues discussed in this essay, as well as bring forward some empirical evidence to corroborate my critique of the "localist" paradigm.

The place held by Old Javanese literature in Southeast Asia is outstanding, since no other literature of the region may claim a literary tradition and a number of ancient manuscripts comparable to the Javanese and Balinese. The majority of these manuscripts were written in Old Javanese language, a "cosmopolitan vernacular" so replete with Sanskrit words (more than 40 percent) that it was even considered to be Sanskrit by linguists of the 19th century, until around 1840. W. von Humboldt demonstrated definitively that it was an (Austronesian) language by its own. The adoption of Sanskrit by

the Javanese, as well as other people in Southeast Asia, constitutes one among the most outstanding linguistic and cultural phenomena in the history of mankind. The extent to which the Sanskrit language influenced Old Javanese has been stressed by Zoetmulder (1974:12) in this passage:

> Sanskrit was so much part of the new culture which they wanted to make their own and to which they wanted to adapt themselves, that the inclination to adopt its modes of expression must have come naturally to them, even where their own was already adequate and there was no real need for change.

The adoption of Sanskrit by the Javanese and Balinese did not entail a passive absorption of foreign influence but a conscious activity of re-elaboration. Sanskrit influenced Old Javanese, and the other way around; but the "Javanization" of Sanskrit should not be confused with the "corruption" of Sanskrit, for an almost parallel, hybrid language emerged: a mixture of Sanskrit and Old Javanese called "Archipelago Sanskrit." Dutch Indologist Jan Schoterman (1979: 333) challenged the general opinion claiming that a great part of the Balinese Sanskrit was just "bad Sanskrit": as a scholar of Tantric literature, he argued that the kind of Sanskrit found in Balinese Śaiva texts (*tuturs*) and *stuti*s shares most of the linguistic features and technicalities found in the Indian Tantras, including a series of "regular" irregularities. Thus, the language reflects a situation that is also found in the majority of the Tantric texts from India, which were mostly composed in semi-literate, non-Brahamnical milieux, and which feature a non-Pāṇinian kind of Sanskrit. Thanks to a series of text editions and studies that appeared in the past two decades, "Tantric Sanskrit" is now accepted as a separate idiom, just like the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit described by Edgerton. The Sanskrit featured in Old Javanese *tutur*s, therefore, does not constitute an isolated example of "local" or "quintessentially Javanese/Balinese" Sanskrit, but a Sanskrit that shares many of the mechanisms of change and adaptation that the language underwent in diglossic linguistic milieux in the Indian Subcontinent itself (such as Eastern India, Nepal, and South India), thereby reflecting dynamics shared across the Sanskrit Cosmopolis.

Given the extent of the Sanskritic imports into Old Javanese, it is not surprising that the study of Old Javanese literature has provided an ideal battleground for scholars upholding the "externalist" and "autonomous" perspectives. The earliest generation of scholars like Kern, Lévi, Sarkar and Majumdar received an Indological training, and were eager to study Old Javanese literature through the lenses of Indology. From the 1960's, the indigenistic viewpoint rose to prominence thanks to the so-called "Leiden school", according to which Old Javanese literature deserved to be studied on its own terms. But in the 1990's, Max Nihom, who has produced a series of stimulating and highly critical studies attacking the indigenistic viewpoint, provocatively stated that "the 'Greater India' perspective of pre-war Dutch scholars should be revived" (Nihom 1994: 14), and that "an Indological approach to the 'high culture' of the classical period in the Archipelago is an academic *sine qua non*":

> these [Old javanese] works of literature are so pervaded by Indic culture, both linguistically—through the medium of Sanskrit loan words—and ideologically—in the sense of notions pertaining to religion, governance and the like—that an approach which is not fundamentally Indological runs the risk of being unproductive and misleading (ibid.).

In two of his works, focusing respectively on passages of the Buddhist *kakavin Kuñjarakarṇa* (1994) and the Śaiva *kakavin Śiwarātrikalpa* (1997), Nihom described examples illustrating instances of misunderstandings and faulty translations by scholars of Old Javanese, mainly due to their "insufficient familiarity with the primary and secondary Indological literature" (Nihom 1997: 103). A similar critique was lodged against the translators of the *Kuñjarakarṇa* by Indian scholar Lokesh Chandra (1983, 1986).

Having been trained in Indology, I myself have approached Old Javanese Śaiva texts from and Indological perspective, showing them to be highly interesting for a comparative study, and more systematic than previously supposed. Like Nihom, I have come across a lack of engagement of Old Javanese scholars with Sanskrit material that could have been useful to illuminate aspects of

"indigenous" literary and religious texts. The refusal to engage with this issue reflects the tendency of a generation of Old Javanists to treat Old Javanese texts as works to be read exclusively on their own terms and not as part of a wider cosmopolitan phenomenon. While that generation of (mainly Leiden-trained) scholars has rightly sought to rectify the previous Indocentric paradigms and rehabilitate Southeast Asian agency and cultural specificity, this has too often meant turning a blind eye to the complex dynamics of cross-cultural exchange that contributed to shaping Old Javanese literature (and, more generally, Javanese culture). An example of this very peculiar scholarly attitude is the conscious leaving out of the Sanskrit model of the Old Javanese *Rāmāyaṇa kakavin* by two foremost scholars of Old Javanese, Willem van der Molen and Stuart Robson (van der Molen 2015 and Robson 2015). Besides ignoring a source whose heuristic relevance has been demonstrated, several passages in Robson's translation reveal his hesitation to let his work be informed by knowledge of the Indic-derived Śaiva religiosity that permeates the poem.[9]

In our contributions to an edited volume on the *kakavin Rāmāyaṇa* (2011), Arlo Griffiths and myself used a system to Romanize Old Javanese that deviated from the supposedly "standard" system used in text editions published thus far by KITLV in Leiden in order to conform to the internationally established system to transliterate Sanskrit and a variety of Indic languages across Asia. When criticizing our choice, Dick van der Meij (2012) explicitly attacks the "Cosmopolitan" perspective to defend the "localist" viewpoint:[10]

> I see no reasons why students of Indonesian literatures and manuscripts need to turn to India for inspiration for transliteration systems of Indonesian scripts…. More importantly, I fear that these spelling changes herald a return to the deplorable situation where Indonesian cultural phenomena are not considered in their own rights but rather in those of a so-called "Sanskrit Cosmopolis" (quoted in Acri and Griffiths 2014: 366).

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[9] See my review essay (Acri 2017b).

[10] A rejoinder replying to van der Meij's arguments is Acri and Griffiths 2014.

The fact that van der Meij regards as "deplorable" the study of Indonesian cultural phenomena (we would rather say: premodern cultural phenomena of maritime Southeast Asia), in the light of the notion of the Sanskrit Cosmopolis elaborated by Pollock, is indicative of how the study of the Southeast Asian past is still fraught with sensitivities. If anything, this shows how many Southeast Asianists are either ignoring Pollock's work or refusing to acknowledge it (in spite of his imperfections) as constituting a fundamental theoretical advancement that greatly furthered our understanding of the cultural dynamics at work in the premodern and early modern cultural spheres of South and Southeast Asia, and which has significantly contributed to rendering obsolete the politically-charged notion of Greater India, and the equally political principle that anything Indonesian should be studied from a purely local perspective. It would seem that this attitude is running into the intellectual walls erected along the boundaries of contemporary nation-states, which stand in the way of recognizing the translocal, connected histories of different parts of South and Southeast Asia.

The same "localist" paradigm has dominated the study of modern Balinese Hinduism and its relationship with the premodern corpus of Old Javanese Śaiva texts of the *tutur* and *tattva* genre in the past four decades. In his influential essay "'Internal Conversion' in Contemporary Bali," anthropologist Clifford Geertz posited that Balinese religion, in contrast to the "rationalized" World Religion that is Indian Hinduism, was thoroughly "traditional," being characterized by "metaphysical nonchalance," its ritual and religious specialists being "more professional magicians than true priests," and traditional Balinese palm-leaf manuscripts being "more magical esoterica than canonical scriptures" (1973: 176–179). Following Geertz, Frederik Barth (1993: 216–217) has argued that Balinese religious texts do not constitute a "literary heritage allowing reference, comparison, and a critical scholarship of establishing a shared authentic knowledge," but rather "separate, independent sources of authority to their priestly possessors, at best read for their unique and place-and-person-specific knowledge." Jean-François Guermonprez (2001), denouncing the Indo-centric approach of previous scholars and orientalists, argued against the existence of a

meaningful link between South Asian Śaiva texts and Balinese texts, and stated that Balinese religion was not Hinduism, but rather a religion of "holy water" (*agama tirtha*). Guermonprez concluded that the "singularity" of Bali consists in an "Indianization without Hinduization (sic)." Having declared that Bali is not Hindu, and that there only occurred a "Balinization" of religious practices borrowed from India, we are left in the dark as to what the religion of Bali actually is, and what was its historical development.

Such views contribute to perpetuate the false perception of a peculiarly Balinese, "unique," almost "exotic" element that is irreducible to analysis and comparison, and that could not be defined besides invoking such vague concepts as "ancestor cults", "holy water religion," and a purely local form of ritual and "folk religiosity". In this connection, it is important to note that many or most scholars of Bali—whether anthropologists, philologists, or historians—have openly advocated the theoretical (and methodological) position stressing the insistence that Balinese religion and its foundational textual materials must be understood exclusively on their own (i.e. Balinese) terms, and that comparisons with South Asia and other areas of the Sanskritic world are bound to remain fruitless, or ill-advised. These scholars have also refrained from embarking on a comparison of features of Balinese religion(s) and ancient South Asian religions and philosophies, which since the first millennium CE have contributed to shaping the religious discourse on Bali. This perspective has favored a "parochialization" of Balinese culture, and denied the translocal, and intellectual, dimension by which it was shaped since its early history. The consequence of this view is that any translocal, intellectual, and "universalizing" elements of the religious discourse has been regarded as going back to the colonial and post-Independence period (via reformed Neo-Hinduism or contact with monotheistic religions such as Christianity and Islam) rather than to the premodern and early modern past. Thus, by treating Balinese Hinduism as an almost pre-literate religion, i.e., one primarily consisting in embedded village-rituals and ancestral spirit-cults with an uppercrust of newly-imported universalizing beliefs modeled upon Semitic religions and Indian (Neo-)Hinduism, scholars have

tended to impart an ahistorical characterization of it, which has effectively hampered a full understanding of Balinese religion and its foundational texts. Reacting to this paradigm, my research (Acri 2013) has shown that the *tattva* and *tutur* corpus was not an uniquely local, embedded and place-and-person-specific Balinese product, but partook of a complex translocal cultural phenomenon that flourished along the networks of intra-Asian contacts at an intra-regional level (for example, between Java and Bali, as suggested by the circulation of manuscripts of religious texts well into the 16th century) as well as trans-regional level (between India and Java-Bali, as suggested by the Sanskrit material traceable to Śaiva Sanskrit texts from the Subcontinent). *Tattva*s share a similar agenda of "translation" of Sanskrit doctrinal elements into a local linguistic and intellectual framework, displaying a similar degree of faithfulness to the common and prototypical Sanskrit canon—the corpus of South Asian Siddhāntatantras. At least as far as the earliest texts are concerned, *tattva* literature displays remarkably little—if any—localization, apart from very rare references to local geography, flora and fauna, etc. Localization becomes discernible in the texts composed after the 15th–16th century, yet not in the form of a purely Balinese phenomenon but as a wider regional phenomenon that included Java.[11]

Ⅶ. Conclusion

In this essay I discussed the problem of the "local," especially as framed by Oliver Wolters, in the context of the scholarly dialogue between the "externalist" and "autonomous" positions. In particular, I criticized the hermeneutical validity of the fuzzy term "local," often invoked by scholars as a self-explanatory category whose historico-geographical boundaries are left undefined. I also

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[11] It is undeniable that certain texts feature a higher degree of localization, that is the presence of regional re-configurations and distinctively "vernacular" cultural elements, such as the Old Sundanese Śaiva literature that flourished in 15th–17th century West Java; however, since a detailed comparative study of this corpus vis-à-vis Sanskrit as well as Javanese and Balinese texts remains a desideratum, it is necessary to postpone our judgment until a more clear picture will emerge.

presented the extended geo-environmental metaphors of "Monsoon Asia" and "Maritime Asia" as alternatives to the previous paradigms, advocating the application of the concept of networks and a maritime approach. My findings suggest the need to move beyond the top-down phenomena described by Pollock into the direction of "convergence" and "cultural affinities" sketched by Kulke, and perhaps extend the "shared cultural matrix" elaborated by Wolters beyond the (constructed) geographical, social, and linguistic borders of Southeast Asia. When applying my critique to the study of Old Javanese literature and Balinese religion, I noted that a fuzzy-edged "localist" approach makes it difficult to do justice to the wider cultural dynamics at stake, and that to further our understanding of the phenomena in question, we need to move beyond the context-specific cultural instances and realize that civilizations cannot be understood solely in terms of internal dynamics but are a result of long-lasting circulatory processes and translocal interactions.

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Affective-discursive Practices in Southeast Asia:
Appropriating emotive roles in the case of a Filipina domestic helper in Hong Kong who fell to her death while cleaning windows

Alwin C. Aguirre*

[*Abstract*]

The paper demonstrates the potential contribution of integrating discursive and affective analytic regimes in framing the study of Southeast Asia. I examine the "emotional possibilities" available to migrants with particular focus on the experience of Filipino domestic helpers in Hong Kong thrown into relief in 2016 by news of maids falling to their deaths while cleaning windows of their employers' above-ground apartments. First, I situate the study in recent calls for Critical Discourse Studies and Migration Studies to transcend foundational methodologies in their respective fields in order to apprehend formerly disregarded aspects of the human condition, including affect and emotion. I then briefly present the debate in the affective turn in social analysis, which has to do with rethinking the attachment of affect and discourse. My own inquiry is premised on the assertion that emotion is multidimensional. I specifically explore the usefulness of taking emotion as "affective-discursive practice" by focusing on an analysis of the appropriation of the victim role by foreign domestic helper employer groups that could be seen in pertinent news reports of selected online Hong Kong

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newspapers. In the end, I also emphasize the necessity of reflexivity in projects that take affect as central object of inquiry.

Ⅰ. Introduction

Since the 1970's, contemporary Southeast Asia has become a significant area for anthropological inquiries of "bodily and emotional control" furthering the argument that understanding emotions should be within the context of an analysis of culture (Boellstorff and Lindquist 2004: 438). Emotions are tricky, both as an actual experience and as an academic object of study. Conventional notions of emotion place it in the easy dichotomy of the "individual" (physiological or psychological) and the "cultural" (or social). Going against this polarizing direction, Ian Burkitt (1997, 2012), for one, posits that emotions should be seen as "multidimensional"－neither just personal nor just social. Such a viewpoint drives a rethinking of the place of emotions in the changing social, political, and economic landscape of Southeast Asia. Byron Good (2004), in his cogent remark about the need to sharpen how emotion and culture are theorized on both an individual and social level, compels anthropologists to find ways of taking into account the meeting points of psychological research and the critical frameworks of social theories. Although he was addressing practitioners in a specific academic field, it will benefit the entire academic enterprise of understanding the human condition to place emotions, emotional experience, and the politics of emotions in both the individual and the social. On the other hand, Analiese Richard and Daromir Rudnyckyj (2009) proffer an alternative way of framing inquiries of emotional life in order to get out of "individualism" as a convenient trap for viewing emotions. Constructing the idea of "economies of affect" as a conceptual tool to investigate the limits of rationality as a mode of subjectivity in the area of economics, they insist that moving from emotions to the more encompassing notion of "affect"

provides a multifaceted lens of understanding not just emotional moments but "powerful embodied practices" (Richard and Rudnyckyj 2009: 61). It is important to note that their outline of the concept includes, but does not limit to, discursive or meaning-making events in the honing of "proper" economic subjects to fulfill the neoliberal agenda. This point, as will be made clearer in the theory section below, espouses a strand of looking at affect that does not reject language, meanings, and representations entirely in contrast to an extreme view that considers affect and semiosis as mutually exclusive processes in an individual.

My paper aims to contribute in the effort of bringing emotions out of the person, so to speak, in order to see its social and political underpinnings while recognizing the fact that experiences and meanings of emotions are as much personal as they are social. As an entry point into the matter, I respond to two challenges that come from two distinct but undoubtedly intersecting fields of inquiry: critical discourse studies and migration studies－both of which have recently been part of my personal research interests. Merging critical studies of discourse and a more cultural take on the phenomenon of migration, with all their potentials and shortcomings, is an opportune academic moment for investigating emotion and affect as particularly practiced in Southeast Asia. The specificity of placing affective practice in the region implicates it as a site of specific cultural, political, and economic development despite the overarching effect of late modern or globalizing trends.

In particular, I would like to demonstrate the value of *affective-discursive practice* (Wetherell 2012) as a framework for social and cultural analysis. I do this by outlining the theoretical premises and methodological proposition of integrating affect and discourse in the study of emotion in migration before focusing on a small sample of news reports about foreign domestic helpers in Hong Kong plunging to their death while cleaning high or mid-rise apartment windows. News reports here are taken from online sources, or the digital version of newspapers, which offer certain affordances unique to online media such as a ready archive of past articles, immediate references to related articles through suggested links, and more diverse semiotic resources (e.g. images and video

clips). These online news media are considered in the study as "affective-discursive channels" (Wetherell et al. 2015; McConville et al. 2014) that do not only convey events of certain news value but also has the potential to "fix" subject positions by configuring emotional conventions allowed or precluded particular social actors in the context of particular events. I reference once more Richard and Rudnyckyj in employing a notion of affect that is closer to a Foucauldian formulation of "conduct," which is the ability to structure the possible courses of action of others without losing sight of the fact of these conducting efforts' indeterminacy－possible but not definite, hence, creating contingent subjects (2009: 61). The news reports, then, serving as a particular means of delivering affective-discursive patterning possess the potential to "regulate" emotional and bodily performances consistent with ideal subject positions.

To achieve my main objectives, I first take time to present the theoretical and methodological basis of the call for critical discourse studies (CDS) and migration studies－my current disciplinal belonging－to find more potent and creative avenues of understanding their respective objects of analysis－including a turn to affect and revaluation of emotions. The next section considers the theoretical footing of the study prior to presenting details about the data in hopes of laying down the grounds for moving towards the affective course in social analysis more productively by apprehending its contribution in concert with discourse. I then proceed with providing a brief backdrop of Filipino labor migration in general and in Hong Kong in particular before focusing on my reading of the news materials and their potential affective-discursive maneuverings, the emotions they evoke, and the subjectivities evident "feelings structure" (Richard and Rudnyckyj 2009: 62). Due to space constraints, I am only focusing on the single thematic thread pertaining to domestic helper employers and their representatives in my discussion to exemplify the possible form an affective-discursive analysis might take. I couple this with a brief section on reflexivity that I deem an indispensable component in affect-inclined projects.

Ⅱ. Facing disciplinal challenges: Affect and emotion in CDS and migration studies

Krzyzanowski and Forchtner (2016) recently issued a call to critical discourse analysts to expand their theoretical and methodological remit in search of new directions for thinking and doing analysis of discourse in late modern neoliberal conditions. The need for post-foundational lenses to fill in the gaps created by a largely textualist and linguistic outlook is imperative in attempting to understand the human condition in an ever-evolving world. For instance, they suggest that pioneering paradigms in critically engaging discourse in society, notwithstanding their contribution to critical social analysis with a focus on the role of language, no longer suffice if the aim is to cover the complexities of living in what is considered as the post-crisis era (Krzyzanowski and Forchtner 2016). In sum, although language still plays a big role in how we construct and apprehend personal and social reality, a focus on the linguistic or even the semiotic alone fails to offer full understanding when it comes to questions that escape the web of words, signs, symbols, and representation. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a strand of European discourse analysis that emerged in the 1980's and considered to be the origin of CDS, had to contend with such criticism. After about two decades of establishing the CDA practice, the assessment by Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000) centered on two striking critiques: first, a lack in serious consideration of "context" when making sense of particular texts, a remedy to which, they suggest is a careful ethnographic accounting; second, the over-dependence of CDA on linguistics which prevents the field from effectively considering the intersections of linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of semiosis. To be fair, proponents in the field have responded to these challenges in various ways as evidenced by projects that take into account the further theorizing of context (Van Dijk 2009) along with the integration of ethnographic research in CDA projects (see for instance Krzyżanowski 2011), and the development of "multimodal" models of critical discourse analysis that take into account the use of different semiotic resources in daily meaning-making (Kress 2009; Kress and van Leeuwen 2006; van Leeuwen 2003; Machin and Mayr 2012).

Recently, an interrogation of the value of a critical discourse paradigm has been dispatched that seems to question its very core. The so-called "affective turn" in social and cultural analysis not only brings to the fore the limits of a language-centered paradigm; it also seeks to undermine the legitimacy of learning about social life by reading human experience as if it were a text. Although there is not enough space in this paper to comprehensively lay down the arguments for and against both the discursive and affective turn in socio-cultural analysis, the theory section is an attempt at a brief explanation of the nature of the polarizing debate and the actual paradigm I favor because of its potential in integrating－as opposed to dividing－aspects of the human experience that are usually assigned to distinct arenas of the semiotic and the sensual.

The call to recalibrate an academic endeavor's basic assumptions and refocus theoretical and methodological lenses to capture previously ignored aspects of an analytic object is also true for other disciplines such as migration studies. For instance, Paolo Boccagni and Loretta Baldassar (2015) recently signaled the need to address the challenges of the "emergent" field of migration and emotion. Although they do not claim that dealing with the emotional aspect of moving across the globe has been non-existent before their efforts, they insist nonetheless that the social sciences has generally overlooked emotions in migration studies. Ann Brooks and Ruth Simpson (2013), in fact, earlier issued the similar observation that although it may appear quite obvious the natural link between migration and emotions, it has been largely ignored in migration analyses that tend to focus on neo-liberalist projects that restructure sites of production and consumption.

There can be no over-emphasizing the necessity of bringing into the center stage the role of emotions in migrant life. At the most basic level, notions and actual lived experiences of being uprooted as well as rekindled hopes of new beginnings－familiar and prevalent components of the migration situation－are all "potent sources of emotions" and have strong "emotional connotations" (Skrbiš 2008: 236). What an emotion-focused lens affords us is a unique viewpoint that goes beyond the reification of migrant subjects as *homo economicus,* defined only by rational

choices to gain advantage or suffer the "natural" consequences of structural factors that define transmigratory practices. Boccagni and Baldassar in the aforementioned article underscore the exciting and pivotal insights that could be gained from investigating migrants' emotional experiences as these happen in shifting personal and social contexts, cultivate channels for emotions that extend beyond the self and conventional connections, and engage other "actors" in various forms without necessarily being limited by physical distance.

In both the CDS and migration studies disciplines, the call to redirect attention is made to open avenues for more creative and more daring work. These efforts to explore hitherto untrodden grounds compel practitioners of the designated fields to break boundaries set by foundational tools and go beyond conventional ways of understanding society and the human condition, not by abstaining from them every inch but by integrating them, if only to interrogate and eventually dismantle, in more complex, nuanced, and textured inter and trans-disciplinary ways instead of relying on specialist, discrete, and unwieldy disciplinal silos.

Ⅲ. Not a zero-sum game: Theorizing affect and discourse

Proponents of a turn to affect such as Brian Massumi (2002, 1995) and allied efforts of a "non-representational" model of studying social life as outlined by Nigel Thrift (2008) are convinced that the richness of human experience in general should be rescued from the reification and reductionism imposed by the textual, semiotic, and representational frames of investigation. Further, they assert that such modes of inquiry unjustly focus on language and meaning at the expense of the more primary and therefore "truer" and more important dimension of human experience－embodied, extra-linguistic, and precognitive: the affect. Massumi gears the affective turn based on the premise of semiosis (meaning-making) and affect (embodied experience) being disengaged registers of an experience in an individual wherein the former as an "autonomous or semi-autonomous stratum run[s] counter to the full registering" of the latter (1995: 89). This manner of explaining affect as an

epistemological paradigm sees meaning-making as separate from the realm of the senses. In accordance with such logic, emotions cannot even be considered an affective instance since they are made real by words and made significant by meanings. Emotions, then, much like discourse are derivative and secondary to affect, which should be construed as intensity felt by the body and is capable of unconsciously (pre-consciously) acting on the body and in effect making the body act through uncontainable force, beyond words and cognition, as excess.

Margaret Wetherell (2013, 2012, 2015), among many others, has responded to such claims with critical caution. Perhaps, the most relevant of her arguments for the purposes of the paper is the point about affect and meaning-making not being autonomous registers on the body but actually integrated eventualities, as shown by research in neuroscience and psychobiology. She mentions, for example, advances in emotion research in experimental psychology that demonstrate strongly how affect involves mobilizing both "somatic and mental resources" at the same time (Scherer as cited in Wetherell 2013: 355). In this sense, although there is value in distinguishing affect from emotion as an academic exercise, in actual experience, these two happen in synchrony, such that bodily reactions during emotional moments cannot be neatly isolated from meanings attached to feelings.

Wetherell makes another very important point regarding the attempt at this divorce, creating a turn away from discourse to privilege affect as excess: the move is, in the final analysis, theoretically and methodologically unsustainable. She cites this time attempts of the non-representationalists to do away with language altogether in the study of the experience of the body since words supposedly tend to water down embodied registers of intensity. For example, Wetherell critiques an effort to document the force of bodily expression in Dance Movement Therapy (DMT) without resorting to conventional modes of documentation and representation. Ultimately, what the attempt shows is that the nonrepresentational agenda of "dividing affect from discourse" acts as a "straitjacket" when making empirical accounts of how the body expresses beyond language (Wetherell 2013: 357). Since the only way that the

experience of the body can be made intelligible to interested readers is by putting what the senses apprehend into words, using the capacity of language to convey embodied happenings ironically demonstrates how the experience of the body and meaningful processing of such are intertwined as opposed to being cut off from each other.

Because empirical work, even of the affect and of the non-representational, renders abandonment of discourse and language an unhelpful, if not impossible, methodological agenda, Wetherell proposes a thoughtful placement of affect in the arena of social practice. In what she calls an analysis of *affective-discursive practice,* she recommends the fruitfulness of going back to the detailed investigations of discursive projects that account for not only words and utterances but more "embodied" aspects of communicative acts, in other words, "embodied semiosis" or "embodied meaning-making" (Wetherell et al. 2015: 59).

Social practice in this case is defined in reference to Schatzki's elucidation: "a nexus of doings and sayings" (Schatzki cited in Wetherell et al. 2015: 60), which for this paper is deployed as the patterning of emotive spaces that social actors can occupy in the unfolding of particular socio-historical events and conveyed through the affordances of particular affective-discursive channels. More particularly, I take inspiration from the works of Wetherell et al. (2015) and McConville et al. (2014) which employ the notion of affective-discursive practice in print news that act as conduit of "not just a cognitive or intellectual experience but also an emotional one" in the process, setting "the kinds of emotions on offer," which inevitably "will be bound up with broader power relations" (McConville et al. 2014: 5). Although the corpus I consider is smaller in size, narrower in scope, and more limited in generic type (i.e. I focus on news reports only), I similarly explore the "ordering" of subjects' conduct or actions that are mediated through the news as channel of "the articulation of affective-discursive positions to speak and emote from, affected and affecting identities, and positions for others who are spoken about" (Wetherell et al. 2015: 61).

Another departure I wish to make is in the matter of

interpretive model through which the data is processed. Whereas the two cited studies employed the discursive analytic approach of deducing "interpretive repertoire" from the data set, I am reading affective-discursive positionings from my chosen corpus through the concept of *nodal points,* defined by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) as "master signifiers" around which other signs gather to temporarily "fix" discourse, that is, meanings and as regards this paper, "emotive roles" that could either widen or narrow down the emotional path afforded certain social actors. Emotive roles, as mentioned above, I define as emotional conduct capable of forming subject positions when articulated. *Articulation* here is also understood as a form of social practice that, to Laclau and Mouffe, involves pinning down "discourse" by "establishing relations among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice" (1985: 105). For instance, "hope" and "guilt" have been endorsed as composing the "emotion canon" (Wetherell et al. 2015; McConville et al. 2014) or established and expected emotional experience of migrants who leave the homeland in search of a better lot in life (e.g. to provide a better future for the family) but cannot fully shake off the feeling that leaving is not entirely a good thing (e.g. abandoning the family that one ironically seeks to support). To cite a more incisive example, Filomeno Aguilar Jr. (1996, 2014) argues that the feeling of "shame" and "embarrassment" as a Philippine national sentiment attributed to the unabated entry of Filipinos into the transnational labor market as predominantly low-pay service workers signals a "loss of face" not so much for the entire nation as for the country's elites who imagine suffering a tarnished national identity in the international stage. The cases demonstrate how the articulation of particular emotional conduct also constructs emotive roles for particular actors who take on the performance of *feeling* the emotion as a defining moment in establishing their identity. It is as if to say that to be a proper migrant, one has to feel hope or guilt as contradictory but merited emotional episodes in leaving, or as a Filipino, one's class attachment conducts the self to possibly adopt shame as the warranted feeling towards branding Filipinas as domestic workers or worse, slaves, for instance. In both cases too, there appears to be a narrowing of emotional leeway by making "hope," "guilt, or "shame"

as the nodal points through which Filipino migration could be affectively apprehended.

Ⅳ. The data: Of dirty windows and maids falling to their death

Five data sets accessed online are used in the study. News reports from two English-language newspapers in Hong Kong－*South China Morning Post* (SCMP) and *The Standard* (TS)－gathered from August 2016 to December 2016, the period of coverage of a Filipina maid plunging to her death while cleaning the exterior high-rise windows of her employer's apartment and the resulting clamor for foreign domestic helper welfare and rights in the city voiced through the organized actions of migrant labor groups, the reaction of state parties, employment agencies, and employer support groups. The online versions of the two newspapers were the sources of the news reports and only "news" articles are considered at the moment (i.e. opinions, editorial, features are not included). The SCMP and TS are two of the most popular and established Hong Kong newspapers catering to an English-speaking audience and have constantly been viewed as credible news agencies (*Public Evaluation on Media Credibility* 2016). Starting 2007, TS took on a free distribution model although both newspapers provide general access to their digital content without need for subscription. In April 2016, SCMP removed the paywall for its digital content, a move that Alibaba Group Vice Chairman Joe Tsai explains as the first step in realizing a global readership, delivering objective and in-depth report on China from the unique vantage point of Hong Kong (see http://www.scmp. com/faqs).

Supplementing these news articles are some write-ups on the incident by the "not-for-profit, free-of-charge, and completely independent" media agency *Hong Kong Free Press* (HKFP) that like the first two sources caters to an English-speaking market and digital in distribution (https://www.hongkongfp.com/about/). The fourth source of data is the Chinese-language tabloid-format *Apple Daily* (AD), known for its pro-democracy stance (Chan et al. 2007). Only one news item was considered from the online version of the said

news agency although accompanying this lone article is a short video clip that departs from the coverage of the other three news agencies. As will be revealed in the discussion below, the *Apple Daily*'s report of the incident contains details, small as they are, that struck me as of consequence given my general position as reader, particularly as an academic, and especially as Filipino. The final data samples are two news reports picking up the window-cleaning incident from online versions of two Philippine local newspapers－ *Philippine Star* (English-language "quality" daily) and *Abante News Online* (Filipino-language tabloid). In total, 25 news articles (SCMP: 13, *The Standard*: 6, HKFP: 3, *Apple Daily*: 1, *Philippine Star*: 1; *Abante*: 1) were analyzed in the study. Added to this are multimodal data such as images and a short video clip relevant to the objectives.

The news articles considered in the paper are primarily seen as affective-discursive conduits through which emotional possibilities are enacted. Although the "identity" of news agencies becomes relevant in the assessment of their credibility, objectivity, and trustworthiness as sources of factual information especially, since "news" as a particular journalistic genre is supposedly typified by impartiality, such detail is not fully considered in the paper. What is more relevant at this point is the premise that even in news and the news-making practice in journalism, objectivity and impartiality are unattainable stances. The belief that news is an unbiased reporting of hard facts is challenged by the idea that language mediates the construction of reality where accounting for news values, making choices, executing representations of different groups through stereotyping for instance, and editorial voice make objectivity in news more of a myth than a reality in actual practice (Fowler 1991).

Ⅴ. Affect and migration in context: Filipino labor migration in Hong Kong

Though Filipino emigration for labor has long been in existence, its immensity as seen at present was initiated in the 1970's and was promoted in the 1980's when the government recognized the huge

economic potential of trading its human capital abroad (Alcid n.d.; Bello 2011; San Juan 2000). It was in fact during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos that the government institutionalized exporting labor to mitigate the economic slump. Deployment increased in spectacular fashion in the following years, and this was not unrelated to the program of structural adjustment dictated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on the country in the 1980's in order to "free market forces" and improve economic performance (Bello 2011). This reveals the complexity of Filipino labor diaspora that is camouflaged by discourses of personal agency, individual decisions, and natural tendencies on the part of the migrant worker.

Roughly 11 percent of the Filipino population lives abroad, 20 percent of the workforce is deployed overseas and nearly half of the population depends on Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) remittances of relatives (Bello 2011; POEA 2011). In 2014, the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency deployed 2.14 million Filipinos to various host nations, the highest record in its history, whose remittance contribution of US $ 24.3B broke the previous record (POEA 2014). OFW is now a category of citizens in the Philippines and in so-called "receiving" societies from Hong Kong to Yugoslavia (San Juan 2009, 2000). These Filipinos are bestowed identities that have largely been defined not by their inherited culture and history but by their occupation and, in many cases, lower status as a group of people in host nations.

Occupations that take the top spots among land-based OFWs include service work, production work, and professional and technical work – more than 46 percent are in service while 32 percent are in production (POEA 2011). Although each receiving country is unique, there are common problems and issues that OFWs have to confront such as discriminatory, xenophobic, and racist policies; laws and practices that legitimize violations of migrants' rights (e.g. gender-based violence); the lack of effective redress mechanisms; and, illegal recruitment and trafficking of girls and women (Alcid 2003; Quina 2010). Rhacel Parreñas (2001), in probing the imagined global community of Filipina migrant workers, highlights the issue of "partial citizenship" that haunts them daily in

a foreign land where they are left vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, given that they are considered of a lower race and unwanted citizens. Although few nations seem to be relatively more accepting by granting foreign workers a chance at full citizenship (e.g. New Zealand, Spain, Canada, and the USA), political and social inequalities still hound them.

Foreign domestic workers, in particular, are not entitled to permanent residency even after working for decades in Hong Kong. This is despite the fact that what the Basic Law requires is that persons not born in the territory need just consider Hong Kong as one's only residence for at least seven years to qualify for a permanent resident status. In a landmark legal battle over immigration rights to the right of abode, the Court of Final Appeal in 2013 ruled against granting foreign domestic helpers (specifically, Filipinos Evangeline Vallejos and Daniel Domingo) such a status stating that the nature of their employment as domestic helpers denies them the right to be considered "ordinary residents," a prerequisite to permanent residency. Mark Daly, the lawyer who represented the domestic helpers in the case, asserted that the decision was an unfortunate reinforcement of their "second-class" status (Bradsher 2013).

Still, Hong Kong has been among the top destination sites for Filipino labor migration (Philippine Statistics Authority 2015) and Filipinos are acknowledged as one of the more prominent foreign nationals in the city ("Hong Kong : The Facts" 2015). The vast majority of Filipinos in the region are females and most are employed as "unskilled" workers (Philippine Statistics Authority 2015), in particular, as Household Service Workers (a more palatable alternative to the former term DH or domestic helper). In Hong Kong too, the domestic worker as an enduring stereotype of Filipino women is not easy to dismiss. The former president Macapagal-Arroyo's pronouncement in 2006 of establishing intensive training programs to produce "super maids" did not help in quelling the longstanding image. Recently, however, the news of a young Filipino domestic worker being awarded a fellowship to the New York University's Tisch School of the Arts for her photographic skills appeared to take the HK-based Filipino migrant discourse in a

different direction. The 27-year old Xyza Cruz Bacani became the case for a discursive counterpoint to perennial stories of abuse suffered by many in her position. Regardless, foreign domestic helpers, due to their low status and lack of opportunities in the city, generally are left to suffer a vulnerable state. The ethnographic research of Nicole Constable (1997) details this situation and possible future. Focusing on the daily lives of Filipina domestic helpers in the city in and outside their designated role as foreign employees, Constable puts a spotlight on the "regulation" of their bodies, practices, and aspirations from influences emanating from both their attachment to the homeland and the conditions of the host culture that on the whole leave them with little chance for self-improvement.

Despite abject living conditions, the subclass treatment, and risk of abuse and human rights violation, Hong Kong remains one of the most popular destinations for Filipinos, as shown earlier. In the 2011 Hong Kong Population census, Filipinos, along with Indonesians, were the two largest non-Chinese ethnic groups (Census and Statistics Department 2012). In 2013, 50 percent of the 320,000 domestic workers in Hong Kong were Filipinos (Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong 2015). Although there are Filipinos in other professions or industries, such as education and teaching, banking and finance, information and communication, manufacturing and trade, an overwhelming majority (94.9%) belongs to what the 2011 Hong Kong population census terms as "miscellaneous social and personal services," which also covers foreign domestic helpers. Of this proportion of Filipinos in the said occupation, 97 percent were women (see http://www.census2011.gov.hk/).

Ⅵ. Discussion

6.1. *Who dies of cleaning?* A sequence of events and an assemblage of incidents

On August 9, 2016, a Filipino domestic helper fell to her death while cleaning the exterior windows of her employer's apartment on the

49th floor of a Lohas Park housing complex in Tseung Wan O, Hong Kong. The incident ignited a series of actions from foreign domestic workers represented by organizations composed of workers and those that support their cause (e.g. Asian Migrants Coordinating Body). They took to the streets in September of the same year issuing a call that centered on the need for the Hong Kong state to recognize the welfare, protection, and security of foreign domestic helpers by, first and foremost, and as triggered by the aforementioned incident, banning employers from requiring them to clean specifically the exterior part of the windows of above-ground apartment units. The demands however had expanded to cover other issues that concern domestic helper rights such as higher wages, standard working hours, and an end to the "live-in" policy (i.e. requiring them to reside with their employers).

Said case however was the fifth during the year of helpers falling to their death either while fulfilling their tasks or in apparent acts of suicide. This was probably the reason for concerned groups urging Hong Kong government to seriously consider foreign domestic helper psychological wellbeing in connection with other pertinent concerns. The pattern of incidents prompted the Philippine consulate in October to unilaterally issue a directive "pushing employers to stop forcing Filipina domestic helpers to clean windows" (SCMP September 22).

The Hong Kong state party represented by the Labor Department enters the scene as an arbiter between parties in dispute whose goal is to come up with a "winwin situation" (sic) (SCMP October 14) that will satisfy the demands of both the workers and the employers (represented by groups such as Employers of Domestic Helpers Association). As a result, the implementation of the ban issued by the Philippine consulate was delayed and a series of consultations with affected groups were held with the aim of introducing clauses in new domestic helper contracts that will ensure their safety in the line of duty, specifically when cleaning apartment windows. Within the months of October and November, the drafting of the clauses became one of the main tasks of the efforts headed by the Hong Kong labor department in dialogue with concerned parties for although in principle, all agreed that worker

safety should be ensured, "proper wording" of to-be‑introduced terms was also paramount. On November 14, 2016, the Hong Kong Information Services Department posted on its website news about the new clauses to be included in foreign domestic helper contracts beginning January 2017:

> The new clause stipulates that when the helper has to clean the outside of any window which is not located on the ground level or adjacent to a balcony or common corridor, the window must be fitted with a grille which is locked or secured.
>
> No part of the helper's body can extend beyond the window ledge, except the arms. (Hong Kong Information Services Department 2016)

It is important to note that in earlier drafting, another clause was being considered that requires helpers to clean windows under adult supervision. This apparently did not make it to the final version, supposedly due to opposition of employer groups. In addition, there will be no criminal liability for employers who violate the rules. Migrant workers' organizations expressed dismay over the finalized terms since, according to Shiella Estrada of the Hong Kong Federation of Asian Domestic Workers' Union, for instance, "It's a very weak protection. Very poor" (TS November 15).

In December, migrant domestic workers staged another rally to commemorate International Migrants Day declaring "We are not slaves" and demanding uninterrupted rest, meal breaks, safe working conditions, pay rise, among other concerns.

Recounting the stories that surround and was prompted by the death of the Filipina maid who fell off a building while cleaning windows has two purposes. It is obviously a way of providing a brief outline of events based on an assemblage of news reports from different sources in the hope of providing a clear enough picture of what transpired following the accident. At the very least, it shows that the incident inspired a network of related events because it brought different interests into play. But also, my efforts at summarizing the succession of happenings that the news stories

provided is to be regarded as yet another assemblage, drawing on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987), the connections of which are not natural but "reterritorialized" in terms of my own agenda. This moment of reflexivity is of course a vital component of any research project especially of the qualitative and interpretive kind that relies on the notion of trustworthiness, sensitivity, and openness to outside assessment as a measure of its contribution to knowledge creation (Shenton 2004). Reflexivity, however, gains a special consequence in affective-discursive projects since the main object of analysis has something to do with feelings, emotions, and the reaction of the senses to *things* that may prove relevant to the research aims. My own reflexivity has been made obvious earlier when I mentioned that I read the data sets from three viewpoints: as a news reader, as an academic, and as Filipino ─ again, an assemblage that for all its fluidity tends to be a recurring identification that gives me comfort. The value of this reflexive practice in the study with an affective trajectory still has to be made more prominent later but suffice to say for now that this entire search to make sense of the news about the death of a Filipina maid, because she was cleaning the windows, was prompted by the *feeling* that something's awry upon initial encounter with the story.

6.2. Breaking a thousand hearts: Appropriating vulnerability and victimhood

In order to detect the emotive nodal points that potentially install an emotive role with which people can identify, or in Richard and Rudnyckyj's words: establish "a way in which affect serves as a medium in which different types of subjects are formed" (2009: 63), I employ the concept of "salience" as used in the multimodal analysis framework and defined by Kress and van Leeuwen (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006; van Leeuwen 2003) as the means by which one element of a composition (i.e. an entire text or discursive event) is made more noticeable than others. The best way to deploy this analytical technique, as I have learned through reading the news items, is to rely on frequency, repetition, or consistency of nomination of specific affective stances or evocation of emotional

states that are attached to particular social actors or situations. Hopefully, these instances prove relevant to the objective of establishing forms of subjectivities that are allotted particular subjects who are spoken of. If, for instance, "joy" is consistently mentioned as an emotional state inhabited by particular persons or groups in different news articles, then I take it as a strong indication of pinning the emotive role of "joy" on the supposed group. The next question is *why* or *what for?*

One of the most noticeable affective disposition gathered from the news articles is occupied by employers who are often represented by employer groups as mentioned above and mostly given voice by the chairwoman of Employers of Domestic Helpers Association Betty Yung Ma Shanyee or Support Group for Hong Kong Employers with Foreign Domestic Helpers convenor Joan Tsui Hiutung. Although their names were nominated the most among other employer organizations and their representatives (e.g. employment agencies), giving their opinions space in the news reports was most likely the means of the newspapers to represent the employer side of the issue. What is most striking is how the feeling of fear, disposition of worry, and state of concern are attached to the employers and employer groups making these emotive roles resonant whenever they are addressed. The following excerpts from the news reports demonstrate this point:

1. "The SAR's immigration and labor departments have not taken their stance yet," Liu said. "Employers should not worry too much at this stage." (TS October 13)

2. However, she is concerned this will set a precedent, with more conditions to come and more countries doing the same. (TS October 31)

3. Employers of Domestic Helpers Association chairwoman Betty Yung Ma Shanyee said she feared that employers would have to bear criminal liability if their helpers fell to their death while they were under their supervision. (SCMP October 30)

4. The move sparked uproar among employers, who protested

> against the lack of consultation. There were also fears there may be bans on other chores. (TS October 31)

5. However, she (Joan Tsui Hiutung) expressed worries on the insurance arrangements. (TS November 15)

6. Speaking on local radio this week, Support Group for Hong Kong Employers with Foreign Domestic Helpers convenor Joan Tsui Hiutung said the ban could serve as an excuse for domestic helpers to leave their job. (SCMP November 19)

Although most of these samples use actual emotion words to convey the affective state of the employers (e.g. worry, concern, fear), there are also instances when instead of an actual emotion-related term, an entire situation is described to signal the said emotional state, such as shown in Excerpt 6. While I am highlighting at this point particular emotions repeatedly mentioned alongside the mention of employers, I do not mean to say that these are the only affective space they occupy. The recounting of events above presents their "pushy" side when they apparently "force" maids to clean the windows. In other cases, a different word is used to convey the same behavior, as shown by this extract:

> … the two governments had agreed that "as a matter of principle" employers should not compel their workers to clean the outside of windows if the environment was "unsafe." (SCMP October 17)

The existence of the presumption that employers are (capable of) forcing their foreign helpers to engage in "unsafe" domestic tasks such as cleaning the exterior part of windows, even when they are located above ground, is a good cause for performing the affective position of vulnerability. By "affect of vulnerability," I pertain to the moments when unpleasant emotions caused by outside forces are articulated in order to embody susceptibility thus the need for special attention or care. Employers being abusive or unjust are common enough narratives in the case of foreign domestic helpers not only in Hong Kong but in other receiving countries as well. The vulnerable role as appropriated by the employer groups, at least

based on its articulation in the news write-ups, deflects the attribution of an expected role in the employer-employee relationship conveniently provided by particular dominant narratives. Taking on the underdog persona in situations where power disparities are clearly in place guarantees agreeability and sympathy, or at least a better chance at getting on the good side of a potential public. The articulation of fear, worry, concern, and anxiety are components that cement the emotive role of vulnerability, which potentially creates the proper response of care, support, and protection from others. This affective practice is probably most pronounced in the online campaign the Support Group for Hong Kong Employers with Foreign Domestic Helpers launched in response to the proposed ban on window-cleaning by foreign maids.

As reported by the HKFP on October 20, the campaign was a result of a "crushing" emotion endured by the employers at the turn of events: *'The Philippines Consulate General's hasty decision on the 'window cleaning ban' broke the hearts of hundreds of thousands of employers,' the petition said* (Leung 2016). The highly emotional state is actually introduced in the headline "'Heartbroken': Domestic worker employer group decries window cleaning ban," clearly demonstrating an affective-discursive practice that aims to enact a particular position from which to conduct or elicit some action from others. In fact, the HKFP reported that the petitioners had several demands, a couple of which is to review the unilateral ban on window-cleaning and "monitor the quality of domestic workers" (Leung 2016).

Although the use of "broke the hearts" purportedly suffered by "hundreds of thousands of employers" is daring in its attempt to shift the issue from the safety and security of foreign helpers in performing their duties to the worries and concerns of employers of foreign domestic helpers about their own interest and welfare, a visual analog (see Figure 1) of such sentiments makes for a more powerful impact and from an analytic point of view, provides a clearer emotive agenda the campaign wishes to make and identifies the audience the petitioners attempt to speak to.

As to the question of audience, it is easy to realize that by

using Chinese as the medium of expression, the visual campaign's target is specific, if limited. Judging by this image alone, it is safe to say that the employers' group is speaking to the local Chinese-speaking Hong Kong public－other local employers included－by virtue of this code choice and the locality of the incidents involved. It could also be argued that the employers the petitioners represent do not include foreign (non-Hong Kong local) residents who also employ foreign domestic helpers. Naturally, non-Chinese speaking foreign employers of foreign helpers are not the audience the petitioners seek. If not for the caption supplied by HKFP, the statement on the image will not have made sense outside the Chinese-speaking world. I hazard to claim then that the visual campaign in Figure 1 desires to speak to a local Chinese Hong Kong audience and the local employers of domestic help possibly to garner support for the cause they promote. What this could also imply is that the Support Group imagines the local employers as the real target of the ban on window-cleaning of employed helpers. In this case, the affect of vulnerability is further emphasized by donning the victim role.

<Fig. 1> Image for the online campaign by the Support Group for HK Employers with Foreign Domestic Helpers as used in the HKFP news article. Original image in full color. (https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/10/20/ heartbroken-domestic-worker-employer-group-decries-window-cleaning-ban/)

"The victim stance is a powerful one" as the person taking on such a position tends to be seen as "morally right, neither responsible nor accountable, and forever entitled to sympathy" (Zur 2008: 17). Activating the "broken heart" status indicates this appropriation of the victim stance by the employers' group. A few other multimodal details correspond with this claim demonstrating further how design choices is seen to deliver a potential affective register, that is, a sensual experience, in the audience. For instance, the image of the red heart being sliced in half with a knife on the right side of the composition somewhat repeats the "broken heart" idiom. This time, however, the pain supposedly brought on by a received offense is denoted more graphically by the act of slicing (there must be a supposed perpetrator) naturally causing the heart to bleed. The closed fist at the right end of the first line, on the other hand, is a clear deployment of the conventional symbol for struggle or crusade propelling the message that the employer group is fighting for a worthy cause. It is also imperative to note that allocating this militant identity to the group is an attempt to arrogate upon themselves the role easily bestowed on migrant workers in events that throw into relief rights and welfare issues, in effect granting them an empowered position in contrast to the low status they experience structurally and interpersonally. By the same token, the color choice of red characters over a black background confirms the impassioned plea. Through high color contrast coupled with the conventionally attributed connotations of red (passion) and black (tragedy), the entire image "loudly" expresses the feelings of pain, misery, and perhaps, indignation. The affect of being pained or scorned is, thus, a performance of moral evaluation (van Leeuwen 2008) where matters of "good" and "bad" need to be resolved through perhaps some form of recompense.

In contrast, the image of a woman on the left, appearing to hold a cleaning implement while also managing to keep a smile on her face is strategically placed below an image of a window. Where these details are trying to take the reader should not be hard to explain. The image of the window indexes the incident that inspired the series of events. It is not farfetched to say that this representation of domestic helpers being "happy," or at least

content, is a discursive counterpoint to the alleged hardship and distress they endure in fulfillment of their employment duties, including the risk of falling off a building when cleaning windows. While the norm is that foreign maids are given a subclass treatment in many host nations, this visual aid aims to dampen such an observation. Just as all the other elements in the composite image work toward allocating the emotive role of victimhood to the employers, I would argue that it is at the same time dissipating the dominant notion of domestic helpers being underserved, which proves especially relevant in the case of Hong Kong. The window placed above the image of the helper's head is a "snide remark" at the uproar created by recent incidents of maids falling to their deaths. Contentment or joy as an emotional state is a role assigned to the helpers. The message seems to be a visual reiteration of the employer groups' claims that employee safety is their priority, as evidenced by this excerpt:

> Betty Yung Ma Shanyee, chairwoman of the Employers of Domestic Helpers Association, said she believed employers in the city would be happy to provide such safety measures mentioned in the discussions between the two governments, and that therefore a ban was unnecessary. (SCMP October 17)

Even as the employers suffer the pain and heartbreak delivered by the "selfish" act of the Philippine consulate or its proxies, so the campaign claims, they still manage to deliver joy in their helpers' faces by being concerned for the latter's safety. In a moment of magnanimity, I could probably view the campaign as a critique of the automatic assignment of the "antagonist role" to the employers in sensitive cases of worker abuse and suffering. By claiming the emotive role of the victim, the employers are capable of assuming the position of sufferance as the conduct of a "proper" employer: enduring hardship while fighting for a good cause; upholding what is right even when undergoing emotional distress.

The dramaturgy is provocative but ultimately inimical. First, by turning the tables on efforts that give currency to worker safety, the "real" victims－the domestic helpers－who are relegated to

marginalized positions on a daily basis fail to achieve larger structural change to better their status and are perhaps denied more fulfilling interpersonal relationships with their employers on a daily basis. This second point leads to the other danger that possibly comes out of employers taking on the victim role in this particular context−the continued antagonism between foreign domestic helpers and their employers. Wanning Sun (2009) is able to paint a disheartening picture of employer-domestic helper relationship in China, which is likely to also be the case in Hong Kong and other contexts. The employer-helper connection is defined by "a paradox of intimacy and distance," Sun claims, as "many employers display little interest in their maid as a person" despite having close proximity, "and often behave as if she were invisible" (Sun 2009: 14). The image of an uncaring or indifferent employer is hard to counter when campaigns such as that launched by the Support Group for HK Employers with Foreign Domestic Helpers espouse a claim to vulnerability and victimhood instead of, for instance, performing the role of supportive or just employer. It will be beneficial for all parties to see depictions of employers in mainstream media, such as the news reports covering the window-cleaning incident, that run counter to an antagonist position.

The reaction from the migrant workers' groups that could be gathered from the HKFP write-up on "heartbroken" employers proves relevant at this point. Eman Villanueva of the Asian Migrants' Coordinating Body asserted that instead of making counter demands, the employer group "should think of ways for workers to have enough rest, to have proper pay, to have proper treatment in order to increase productivity.' (Leung 2016). In addition, Villanueva claimed, "Many employers in Hong Kong don't share the same beliefs as this support group" (ibid). Unfortunately, at least based on the news samples in this paper, these "differently" positioned employers were not heard.

Ⅶ. Coda/reflection/confession: It would be funny if it were not too tragic or does the nameless lifeless have no right to feel?

In demonstrating how the affect of vulnerability and victimhood were appropriated by the employers/employer groups as the issue of foreign domestic helper safety and welfare unfolded, I hope to have shown how the affective-discursive channel of online news potentially enact an "emotive role" that those who are talked to and talked about can occupy. Further, I endeavored to illustrate how an analysis of affective-discursive practice is capable of bringing to light the construction of subjects and subjectivities by articulating certain emotion-focused dispositions as "affective practice" or more particularly "routine that social actors can drop into" (Wetherell et al. 2015: 58).

Even with these assertions, however, I do not claim determinacy to affective subject positions or emotive roles, far from it. In addressing the charge of determinism, Wetherell explains that "affective practices are pervasive but with cultural limits," thus, providing space for emergent and necessarily contingent articulations of affective or emotional positions that "typically play out with performative and situated variabilities－a sketch, then, rather than a recipe or rulebook" (2015: 58). Nonetheless, these "sketches" are choices on offer, the potential enactment of which are realized in the first instance by their articulation, considering the many other possible sketches that never get articulated.

As a means to close the paper, I am forwarding a proposal to further develop the affective-discursive project. Since affect, feelings, and emotions form the crux of this academic venture, I reiterate the special and indispensable place of researcher reflexivity in all efforts that claim to *see* issues from an affective lens. In other words, critical consciousness about one's own feelings and emotional involvement in a particular project must be taken as a fundamental researcher disposition. Interpretive projects, such as those in the field of critical discourse studies, put a premium on reflexivity since meaning-construction is always performed from a particular place. I imagine this "positionality" to be doubly tricky to navigate in

affective-discursive work as one would have to contend with an interpretive stance and emotional stance at the same time (or perhaps, they are not really disconnected). This means that the processing of data would also have to be carried out and conveyed by opening oneself up to scrutiny from an academic and affective standpoint.

Hence, my little confession. The first news articles that acquainted me with the incident of a Filipina maid who fell to her death while cleaning the windows of her employer's apartment were from the SCMP. What prompted me to search further was not so much academic interest as personal emotion: I was saddened by the namelessness of the person whose tragic death ignited events that ultimately became bigger than herself. I felt that it was adding insult to injury (pardon the insensitive idiom) that she was not even recognized as a person whenever she was spoken of in the news reports but just a mere 35-year-old female body that fell from a high-rise window. I felt the need for some form of closure by obtaining a name to call the body and, in a sense, give her a certain strand of humanity.

My search led me to the two Philippine online newspapers that, thankfully, gave me what I wanted, and more. The *Abante News Online* report of August 11 was picked up from the *Apple Daily* story dated August 9 and it mentioned "Dulluog" as the name of the helper (Abuel, 2016). Upon checking the latter's website, I confirmed that it was indeed the actual name (translation from Chinese sought). The *Philippine Star* August 28 article did not indicate a source but it gave more information by providing a full name: she was "Renalyn Dullog" (Santos 2016).

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Things Fall Apart? Thailand's Post-Colonial Politics

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[*Abstract*]

This paper argues that Thailand's internal colonial model is facing severe challenges: no longer is it so possible to suppress local and regional identities, or to submerge ethnic difference in an all-embracing but potentially suffocating blanket of "Thainess." In recent decades, Thailand's diverse localities have become increasingly assertive. This is most acutely the case in the insurgency-affected southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, but also applies in the "red' (pro-Thaksin) dominated North and Northeast. As the old ruling elite faces serious legitimacy challenges, Thailand's emerging post-colonial politics may require a radical rethinking of the relationship between center and periphery.

Keywords: Thailand, post-colonial, center, periphery, insurgency

"Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold," is a classic quotation from "The Second Coming," by the Irish poet William Butler Yeats (1865–1939); the first part of the quotation was used by Nigerian

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writer Chinua Achebe, for his eponymous novel (Achebe 1962). In the Achebe novel, the phrase "things fall apart" conveys the sense that a bankrupt political order can no longer remain unchallenged; local Nigerian officials sent by the British colonial state to administer communities turn out to be venal and inept. The British themselves do not loom very large in the plot of the novel: although both missionaries and the District Commissioner do make appearances, the day-to-day operations of colonialism do not require any direct European agency. Rather they are subcontracted to African "court messengers":

> Many of these messengers came from Umuru on the bank of the Great River, where the white men first came many years before and where they had built the centre of their religion and trade and government. These court messengers were greatly hated in Umuofia because they were foreigners and also arrogant and high-handed (Achebe 1962: 156).

Partha Chatterjee refers to a speech made by Indonesia's President Sukarno at the 1955 Bandung Conference. Sukarno declared:

> I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skillful and determined enemy, and appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily (Sukarno, quoted in Chatterjee 2011: 235).

In this rather eerily prophetic speech, Sukarno anticipated the post-colonial politics of many soon-to-be-independent states, in which "a small but alien community within a nation" would capture dominant economic and political power in a way that echoed the form and arguably the substance of European colonialism. What precisely Sukarno meant by the rather pejorative term "alien" is a matter for debate; this could refer to an ethnic community (such as "overseas" Chinese in Southeast Asia), or to a community alienated from the masses by questions of class, identity, or cultural attributes,

such the English-speaking elite in certain African countries, or a military elite in various Latin American ones.

Siam, of course, was never formally colonized, and numerous objections have been raised to reading Thailand through the lens of post-colonialism (see, for example Jackson 2010: 37–41). Scholars have argued that Thailand might be best viewed in terms of "semi-colonialism" (Jackson 2010: 44-46) or even "crypto-colonialism" (Herzfeld 2002). But these labels are concerned with trying to capture what Harrison and Jackson term "the ambiguous allure of the West" (Harrison and Jackson 2010), Thailand's complex relationship with Europe and America. Much more salient here is the sense in which Siam was self-colonized by a Sukarno-esque "small but alien community within a nation." Naturally, Thai elites– whether royal, military or bureaucratic–would deeply resent being tagged as "alien." These elites imagine themselves as the embodiment of Thai-ness, and construct the alien as the non-Thai– including anyone Burmese, Chinese, Lao, Malay, Mon, Muslim, or Vietnamese. From the late nineteenth century until around the end of the twentieth century, the self-proclaimed Thai core was able to compel and cajole the non-Thai periphery to embrace the values and behaviors associated with Thai-ness. Around the onset of the twentieth century, the rising tide of Thai-ness peaked, and has since started very slowly to recede. In recent years, identities such as Lao and Malay have sought to reclaim their authenticity, placing the Thai center on the defensive for the first time in over a century. Quite suddenly, the ruling elite faced allegations that the periphery is more authentic than the core; in short, that the real "aliens" are the people running the country, not those being sought to control. This article will argue that Thailand's metropolitan elite belongs to a political culture that is profoundly challenged by the country's provinces.

Thailand is currently in the grip of a politics of anxiety. Superficially, Thai anxiety hinges on fears about the future of the monarchy–fears that have hardly yet been assuaged by the momentous passing of King Bhumibol in October 2016, and the subsequent installation of King Vajiralongkorn–not to mention concerns that tensions between those who support and oppose the

controversial former premier Thaksin Shinawatra may at some point lead to further bloodshed. Thailand's military seized power in May 2014, promising to "restore national happiness"–but after three years, the nation remains rather unhappy. To state the obvious, all recent Thai coups have ended badly: why should this one be any different?

Yet on another level, these national anxieties are concerned with much larger questions than current political polarizations: can Thailand survive in anything resembling its present form? The borders of the Siam/Thailand have been repeatedly re-drawn since the nineteenth century, and presently include many areas to which present-day Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia might legitimately lay claim. However, the primary source of anxiety is not a literal loss of territory to a neighboring state. Rather, it is the fear of devolution: abandoning the model of capital-city centralization and mistrust of potentially rebellious regions on which Thailand's internal colonialism has long been based, and moving in the direction of a more diverse, accommodating and pluralistic state. In the same 1955 Bandung address, Sukarno also declared:

> We are living in a world of fear… Perhaps this fear is a greater danger than the danger itself, because it is fear which drives men to act foolishly, to act thoughtlessly, to act dangerously (Sukarno in Chatterjee 2011: 252).

Parallel fears to those which confronted the leaders of newly emerging nations in the 1950's, as they shook off the mantles of European colonialism and emerged into a world bitterly divided by the cold war, are now experienced by Thais who see the beginning of the end of internal colonialism in its current form. For Thai elites –the monarchy, the military, elite bureaucrats and capital controllers –the ultimate fear is that they will wake up to find themselves branded as the other, the aliens, by the mass of the country's population.

An image of a group of Thai soldiers manning a checkpoint offers a metaphor for the country's wider politics. The photograph, taken in 2006 by Ryan Anson in Sungai Padi, Narathiwat, shows five

soldiers in camouflage. All the soldiers are looking in the same direction, some sitting, some standing, but none of them alert to dangers from the militants who have killed thousands of people in a virulent insurgency since 2004. Anyone who regularly visits Thailand's Southern border provinces will observe similar checkpoints that do not move in years, manned by personnel whose lack of alertness makes them profoundly vulnerable. The Patani checkpoint is a symbol of a complacency that borders on paralysis. Under the circumstances, it is quite surprising that more Thai police officers and soldiers have not been killed in the Deep South. This image is a metaphor for the ongoing situation in the trouble region, and arguably also a metaphor for Thai politics in a broader context. To avert crisis, calamity and violence, planning and preparedness are extremely important; by engaging in acts of collective denial about impending dangers, those dangers can readily be magnified.

When people are fearful, anxious, and frustrated, they cannot think clearly as to what to do, how to plan, and when to make a move. This is the problem currently facing Thai politics. The politics of anxiety operates at different levels and dimensions. At its core is the anxiety over the new direction for Thailand/Siam as a nation-state. During the nation-building period in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Bangkok or Central Thailand took possession of a range of territories, including those regions now called the North, Isan, and the South. Many of the native of these lands were not "Thai." They included the Lao in Isan, the higher class Lao (or "Lanna") in the North, and Malays in the South. The effort to build a nation-state during the reign of King Rama V relied on the suppression of these ethnicities in order to create a sense of modern nation-state, purportedly in order to save the state from being colonized by the West. In essence, Bangkok deployed policies of internal colonialism to create the country that eventually became "Thailand" (see Brown 1996: 109-117). The legacy of internal colonialism can still be seen today, in a country where only those in the capital city have the right to elect their own governor, and where all other governors are dispatched to the provinces by the Interior Ministry.

The process of internal colonization not only involved

governors being appointed and sent from Bangkok, it also involved creating regional elitism whereby locals were recruited and sent to study in Bangkok, and whose mindsets were reprogrammed to accept the Bangkok norm–an ideological change–and later sent back as appointees to administrative positions. Also created was a core national identity, based on an education system in which Thai was the only acceptable medium of instruction, and the systematic suppression of both secular and religious regional leaders. A trinity of "Nation, Religion, and King' was introduced by Rama V1, one which came hand in hand with constructed notions of "Thai-ness." Making people loyal to these national institutions involved inculcating in them a sense of being Thai and thus suppressing their other, pre-existing local and linguistic identities (for a definitive account see Connors 2007, especially pp. 128–52).

Nevertheless, serious concerns about the sustainability of the internal colonial model are now emerging. The dominance of the center has been shaken, as can be seen from the outbreaks of resistance to Bangkok's power in different parts of the country. Regional populations are less willing to accept Bangkok's longstanding hegemony. Bangkok's colonization may soon begin to unravel, at least in its present form: and that is something Bangkok elites cannot readily accept.

Thai politics have gone through an ongoing cycle of crisis and revitalization in the past 12 years, dating from the time when Sondhi Limthongkul staged his first anti-Thaksin protests in late 2005. Thailand has witnessed the center's various fights to retain control: the first incarnation of the People's Alliance for Democracy [PAD] in early 2006, the crisis over the April 2006 election, the rise of judicialization, the September 2006 coup d'état; the dissolution of Thai Rak Thai and the banning of 111 politicians in 2007; the rise of PAD 2 in 2008, with the ensuing occupations of the Government House and Suwannabhumi Airport, and the demise of the Somchai Wongsawat government; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit debacle at Pattaya and 2009 red shirt protests (see Montesano 2009); the huge 2010 redshirt protests and their violent suppression by the military (Montesano, Pavin and Aekapol 2012); from 2011 to 2014, the return to power of pro-Thaksin forces, and

a would-be prime-minister-in-exile trying to run the country from Dubai; and since the coup of May 2014, the struggles of the National Council for Peace and Order to impose military-style discipline on a restless and divided nation, while continuing to claim that democracy will shortly be restored. During this constant succession of crises and calamities, central power has struggled to hold on.

Thailand's pervasive national anxiety operates on several levels. On one level, national anxiety is a day-to-day problem–how will the latest crisis or cliffhanger be resolved? On another level, national anxiety is linked to concerns and ceaseless whispers about the politics of royal succession. But most deeply of all, national anxiety reflects concerns that Thailand's over-centralized state is unsustainable, that the country as a whole needs to be re-imagined if it is to survive in anything like its present form. While such anxiety is most clearly seen in the restive Deep South, where a militant movement is openly challenging the legitimacy of the Thai state through violence, the problem goes much broader and deeper. The southern conflict is an extreme form of the problem, but the social fabric of the country is badly frayed in numerous respects.

While Tamara Loos rightly warns against glibly equating the historical struggles of Patani with contemporary conflicts in Bangkok, she also notes that "interrogating Siam's imperial past at this moment in time is essential" (Loos 2010: 91)–and any such interrogation requires a discussion of the South. The three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat have a total population of 1.8 million–marginal in relation to Thailand's total population of around 69 million. Malay Muslims, broadly defined (for a critical discussion of the term, see Montesano and Jory 2008) account for around 80 per cent of the population. Despite their formal status as Thai citizens, many Malay Muslim call themselves "Malay" (*melayu, nayu*) and tend to reserve the term "Thai" for Thai Buddhists. After a longstanding tributary relationship with Ayutthaya and Bangkok, the region formally became part of Siam in 1909, just over a century ago. Since the theft of an arms arsenal from a military camp in January 2004, more than 6000 people have met violent deaths in insurgency-related violence in the Deep South. Former counter-terrorism advisor to President George W. Bush,

David Kilcullen, argued that at least between 2004 and 2007, Thailand's Deep South was ranked the world's third most intensive insurgency after Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively (2009: 121). Yet despite the intensity and severity of the violence, it has attracted relatively little international diplomatic or media attention

Attacks have been launched at key localities, including government offices and military targets, but the majority of those killed have actually been civilians. Contrary to what the general Thai public believes, more Muslims have been killed than Buddhists. Some of them were killed by government security forces while some by allies of the insurgency itself. Given how insurgencies operate in other countries such as Algeria, this should not come as a surprise (see Hafez 2003). Militants frequently target those Muslims perceived as collaborating with the Thai state. Typical of the Muslims targeted have been teachers at government schools, elected local politicians such as village headmen or sub-district administrative organization members, and business owners, such as those who supply food to the military or had any ties with the Thai authorities. It boils down to the insurgents' belief that they need to have complete control of their own people before waging war against their enemy. They are convinced that killing Muslims who work for the government will undermine the functioning of the Thai state, which would eventually be doomed to fail.

If Muslims in the region were asked which provinces they disliked the most, Nakhon Sri Thammarat would probably be ranked first, closely followed by Surat Thani, Pattalung, and Songkhla, suggesting a conflict between upper southern and southernmost provinces. When I visited Pattani in January 2009, a number of Malay Muslims expressed a wish that newly-installed prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, a Bangkokian, would take personal control of the southern conflict, rather than delegating it to deputy premier Suthep Theuksuban (from Surat Thani) or deputy interior minister Thavorn Sennium (from Songkhla) (see Srisompob and McCargo 2010: 171–72). Abhisit's decision to delegate authority over the Deep South to Suthep and Thavorn reflected a longstanding pattern, whereby Bangkok uses the predominantly Buddhist upper South to govern the Muslim-majority lower South. Most Malay Muslims would rather

have Bangkok send governors from the Northeast or North than from any of the upper southern provinces. Within the internal colonial system, the conflict not only involves a clash between Bangkok and peripheral regions, but also involves "middlemen," such as elites from these power broker intermediary provinces, who are usually regarded by distant regions as their arch enemies, given that they help to perpetuate the system.

In a report written by Chaiwat Satha-Anand for the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC, 2005–06) chaired by Anand Panyarachun, while "reconciliation" and "justice" were repeatedly mentioned, there was no discussion of autonomy or decentralization of power (NRC 2006). Rather, the focus was on depicting Thailand as an already benevolent state which should provide more access to justice. When the people are granted neither control over their own budget nor the right to choose their representatives, what sort of justice was possible? The discourse of "reconciliation," which has recurred at various junctures in Thai public life since 2005, is terribly vague. Analyzed from a political perspective, the Southern conflict is a power struggle, reflecting a lack of legitimacy for the existing system of rule in the region. Malay Muslims have their own cultural, religious, and political traditions, which they would like to see accommodated by the Thai state through a reorganization of power. Unfortunately, the NRC report simplistically viewed the problem in terms of a "good versus evil" dichotomy. According to the report, the Southern violence was caused by a few "bad people" and troublesome government officials (National Reconciliation Commission 2006: 3). Therefore, if bad government officials are moved out of the region and replaced by good officials, relatively small adjustments in policy–such as recognizing the use of Patani Malay as a second language–could produce dramatic results. Fairness would be achieved by listening to all parties involved. But the NRC's approach was extremely idealistic and moralistic. A central focus on good versus bad people would not suffice to address the problem seriously. Consulting all parties, as suggested in the NRC report, would only address superficial worries while leaving deep rooted structural problems–which often went unspoken–untouched (for a critique see McCargo 2010b).

There is a widely held assumption that the Thai state is fundamentally good and governed by virtuous rule since it is governed by virtuous entities: virtuous Bangkok, virtuous political institutions, and the virtuous three pillars of Thai society–Nation, Religion, and King (on virtuous rule see Streckfuss 2010). Therefore, any conduct by the Thai state must be deemed righteous. Problems only arise with a few "bad" individuals who do not follow the prevailing moral codes and thus need to be removed from positions. This view reflects a pervasive kind of pseudo-Buddhist discourse: the concept of good versus evil is deeply ingrained in Thai society. But in reality, "bad" or "thuggish" individuals are only a symptom of Thailand's political problems, not the core reason why abuses of power occur.

Many Thai people want to believe that the southern conflict is not a political problem. If Thais were willing to acknowledge that some Patani Muslims do not like the Thai state and Bangkok Thais, and nor do they especially venerate the country's traditional institutions, they would need to acknowledge that Thailand is facing a very serious set of issues. Since they prefer to deny the seriousness of the situation, they instead blame the ongoing violence on drug traffickers, goods smugglers, and common criminals. In reality the core problem is ethnic identity, not religion. This ethnic issue, however, must be examined in its political context. The southern conflict therefore is a political problem arising from the people's resentment toward Bangkok's historical colonialism. The locals want the Thai state to grant them more control over their own affairs. However, this is the very last thing that the Thai state wants to do. Rather, the state demands that all Thais–especially those from ethnic and religious minorities–to proclaim their loyalty to national institutions and to participate enthusiastically in government initiatives. Indifference or merely passive support are not enough: active engagement is demanded. It can be concluded that both the Thai state and the Patani Muslims take pride in their history and identity, and neither one of them is willing to lose face.

To do away with the colonial model would require a new approach to restructuring the power system. In recent years, a wide range of figures from across Thai society have proposed or

expressed support for different forms of decentralization (McCargo 2010a). These figures range from people associated with the monarchical network, to others firmly at the pro-Thaksin end of the political spectrum. For instance, Dr. Prawase Wasi, former royal physician and prime mover behind the 1997 "people's constitution" has spoken of reviving regionalization across the country, not just in the South. Former Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and current deputy premier Chalerm Yubamrung have at different times called for a special administrative region in the South. Former Democrat Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has referred to a special cultural region. Even the late Samak Sundaravej, another former prime minister, once talked positively about an "Aceh model." These models have not found their way into the mainstream discussions, however. Behind closed doors, those who have studied the conflict seriously understood that it is a political problem in urgent need of a political solution, along the lines of some form of decentralization of power (see McCargo 2010a). An important exception is the work of Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri of Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani, who works closely with a network of civil society organizations in the region. He has proposed a series of options for decentralizing power in the South, ranging from a special ministry for the area, to an elected regional assembly and an elected regional governor. But mainstreaming these ideas is very difficult: Thailand's intense political divide makes it almost unthinkable for those who had advocated decentralization of power to the South to sit in a room together, let alone debate their ideas in a public forum.

The southern conflict has helped to exacerbate anxieties among Thai Buddhists both in the South itself, and in other parts of the country. Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng examined online postings on web forums such as that hosted on www.pantip.com, to see how forum members reacted to news about attacks on Buddhist laypeople or monks (Phrae 2009, 2012). She found that online commentators expressed their opinions using profane language, professed hatred towards Muslims, and sometimes peppered their postings with virulent negative statements. The Southern violence was regarded by many forum posters–who were predominantly Buddhists from Bangkok and central Thailand–as a threat to the

trinity of Nation, Religion, and King.

The number of monks in Bangkok temples has declined dramatically, while most abbots in temples across the country are elderly, and not well attuned to the changing nature of Thai society. Buddhist fears clearly manifested themselves in 2007 during the new constitution drafting process. At that time, a group of campaigners demanded that the new constitution specify Buddhism as the national religion. This move demonstrates many people's insecurity and anxiety over the country's future, fear of the emergence of Islam, and fear of restiveness in the South. Buddhist groups therefore tried to look for something to hold on to, something which gives them a sense of security. The great majority of Buddhist monks who support the idea of making Buddhism a national religion, believe that to do so would upgrade their status in Thai society. Few Buddhist monks seem able to understand that officially nationalizing their own religious institutions would harden social divisions and militate against the values of tolerance that Buddhism is supposed to embrace. Ironically, the sangha is pervaded by deep internal conflicts between two rival *nikai* (sects), which in many respects parallel the wider political divide between pro and anti-Thaksin forces in Thai society as a whole.

The Thai state tries hard to control and manage Islamic affairs. The establishment of the Sheikh ul-Islam Office (Chulajamontri) has long served the main purpose of controlling the nation's entire Muslim population. Ironically enough, the elections for provincial Islamic committee members themselves are plagued by many conflicts, accusations of outside manipulation and vote-buying, as in ordinary local elections. In recent years, the attempts of the Thai state to micro-manage Islam and subordinate it to the control of the majority have proved largely unsuccessfully, and indeed counter-productive.

In addition to the Southern conflict and to fears about the future of the Buddhist sangha, national anxiety is reflected in several other phenomena, especially the clashes of political ideals and identities that have been reflected in color-coded protest movements since 2005. These are most vividly seen in the redshirt, and

yellowshirt movements, though at various times other colors, including pink, blue, and even "multi-colored shirts, have assumed political connotations and salience.

T-shirts proclaiming *lukchin rak chat* [People of Chinese Descent Love the Nation] were briefly popular among the yellow shirts of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) movement during their 2008 occupation of the Government House (see Kasian 2009). The PAD's anti-Thaksin demonstrations in both 2006 and 2008 reflected their shared anxieties over the nation's future in response to the former Prime Minister as a domestic threat to the monarchy; these anxieties were clearly projected onto Thaksin. The yellow shirts challenged Thaksin's claims–as a prominent Sino-Thai who had never sought to conceal or play down his ethnic origins–to speak on behalf of Thailand's *lukchin*. The PAD was a coalition of people from disparate backgrounds: Chamlong Srimuang who was an army officer and Sondhi Limthongkul, a media proprietor, teamed up with a union leader, an NGO activist and a Democrat MP to spearhead the movement. But both Chamlong and Sondhi were also well known as Sino-Thais who had made good by accommodating themselves, especially in later life, with the interests of the royalist Thai elite.

The t-shirts suggested a tussle for the loyalties of Sino-Thai citizens and voters who had been torn in competing directions by the rise of Thaksin. Thaksin had presented himself as the representative of the entrepreneurial Sino-Thai who were frustrated by the inefficiency and ineptitude of the bureaucratic elite, adopting a "can-do" attitude to the country's problems. The PAD asserted that there was no incompatibility between celebrating a Sino-Thai identity and maintaining a high level of loyalty towards the monarchy and the nation. But the very fact that Sino-Thais felt the need to assert such sentiments–and to support moves such as challenges to Cambodian plans to declare the disputed Preah Vihear (Khao Phra Viharn) temple complex a UNESCO World Heritage site–arguably illustrated underlying feelings of insecurity about their identity and the future integrity of the Thai nation (Pavin 2010: 112–13).

Another fascinating feature of the PAD rallies was their demographic base. Typically, political protests are led and dominated by the young, as was the case with the huge student 1973 and 1976 rallies in Bangkok. But on more than one occasion in 2008, I dined out with Thais in their thirties who phoned their parents at around 10 pm to determine what time they would come home from PAD demonstrations. The phenomenon of protesting parents and concerned kids was a curious reversal of the normal pattern of political demonstrations, illustrating the extent to which the older generation was animated by a fear of losing the world and the nation with which they had grown up. The same prospect was viewed by younger people with equanimity or perhaps resignation, testifying to a generational divide that cuts across the color-coded divides of the protest groups. Chatterjee argues that the anti-democratic politics of the PAD, which demonized Thaksin and at various times called for the ouster of elected governments through monarchical or military interventions, are examples of "counter-democratic forms in the domain of civil society of the middle classes" (Chatterjee 2011: 25). For him, they reflect the fact that "the urban middle classes show a marked lack of faith in the efficacy of elections," (2011: 25) a phenomenon also to be found in India and many other postcolonial democracies.

Majority of PAD supporters are beneficiaries of the existing political order. They range from retired and serving government officials, the lower middle class, and the average middle class with more access to privileges. They try to protect their privileges from attacks by new societal forces represented by Thaksin, the redshirts, and those who make up the core of the pro-Thaksin electorate and movement.

The identity of those who make up and support the redshirt movement is crucial to any understanding of Thai national anxieties. Naruemon and McCargo (2011) interviewed and surveyed demonstrators who participated in the redshirt rallies between March and May 2010. They found that the redshirts could best be termed "urbanized villagers" who vote in their home provinces, but often live and work for much of the year in greater Bangkok and other cities. Are these people "poor farmers," as they have been

widely depicted? Yes and no. They may not be financially secure but they often do have some farmland. But their daily lives are not devoted to agriculture: they work largely in the service and industrial sectors. They are not poor in terms of income or assets; however, they are chronically insecure because their major earnings come from informal businesses, such as small-scale vending activities which do not produce steady income. Not only are the redshirts not very radical, they also aspire to have a secure middle class lifestyle. They are eager to swap motorbikes for pickup trucks and to support their children through higher education; accordingly, they reject or ignore the romanticized, royally-inspired discourse of the sufficiency economy, and they do not want to return to live in villages and revert to subsistence agriculture.

Redshirts have a number of key political stances. They regard Thaksin as the champion of their interests; his Thai Rak Thai Party became the first political party explicitly to address their needs. They are frustrated over the issue of "double standards," a catch-all phrase embracing a number of perceived issues of judicial unfairness. These include what they see as kid-gloves treatment for PAD leaders involved in the 2008 airport and Government House occupations, and harsh sentences handed down to redshirt figures convicted on lese majeste and other charges. They want to bring Thaksin back to power through electoral means. They are also opposed to military coups d'état and so-called *amatayatippatai*–rule by bureaucrats or aristocrats. However, their illiberal stances on social issues have been evidenced on several occasions: Chiang Mai redshirts' (by the name *Rakchiangmai 51*) attack on a gay rights parade in February 2009, Ubon Ratchathani redshirts' opposition to the Santi Asoke Buddhist sect, and the redshirts' hostile attitudes towards foreign laborers. The red shirts are characterized by relatively low levels of social tolerance. Within the movement itself, there is a wide range of views toward violence. Some of those interviewed expressed the view that behaving a little thuggishly (*nak leng nit nit*) was good for the movement, an echo of Chatterjee's notions concerning the "criminalization of politics" and the routinization of violence:

> …when a situation has to be demonstrated as intolerable or outrageous, there is frequently a spectacular show of violence, usually involving the destruction of public property or attacks on government institutions or personnel. Violence here is not mindless or blind, but rather, event in its most passionate expressions, calculated to elicit the desired response from the government and the public (Chatterjee 2011: 21)

Incidents such as the May 2010 burning down of Bangkok's Central World Department Store–or the parallel arson attacks on provincial halls in the Northeast–need to be understood in this light. "Political society," in Chatterjee's terms, is much more rough-and-ready than liberal notions of "civil society": political society is concerned with "jobs, housing, living conditions in the slums, prices of essential items of consumption, dealing with the police and the authorities" (2011: 20). Those who gain power within political society have regular recourse to criminality and to the threat of violence.

Yet Bangkok Thais have struggled to emphasize with or even to understand the redshirts, who are typically parodied in the mainstream media as "mobs for hire," with limited education, who are ignorant about politics, and are prone to mindless vandalism. In fact, the view that the redshirts were paid protesters is simplistic, partly because providing food and covering transport costs are a widespread practice for large mass rallies of all kinds–including those of the PAD. While some protestors undoubtedly did receive payments to join redshirt demonstrations, those payments did not define the nature of their participation. Instead of a nuanced understanding of the redshirt protestors, they have come to represent for many Bangkok Thais "the people as a figure of fear"– the topic on which Michael Connors originally planned to write his PhD thesis (Connors 2007: x).

Other authors have attempted to describe the kinds of villagers who support the redshirts using different terms. In a recent book which draws heavily on Chatterjee's notions of political society ("the informal and unorthodox connections that people create with sources of power," 2012: 24), Andrew Walker has described his subjects as "middle income peasants" (2012: 6–10), a rather tricky

oxymoron: critics might argue that once you are middle income, you are no longer a peasant.[1] Charles Keyes, on the other hand, calls the same group "cosmopolitan villagers" (Keyes 2012: 348-53). The problem with this reading is that such villagers are not sophisticated enough to be regarded as "cosmopolitan." Cosmopolitans are able to move between different social settings with an easy and self-confident fluency; they are not people bused off to work on Singaporean building sites. The term "urbanized villagers" has been coined in a deliberate attempt to challenge the urban vs. rural dichotomy. The theory of a dual system of democracy as proposed in the "Tale of two democracies" (*songnakara prachatippatai)* by Anek Laothammathat, based on a clear division between urban and rural is no longer applicable, if indeed it ever was (Anek 1996). Since as long ago as the 1950's, Thailand has been experiencing "countrified cities," (for a classic discussion see Textor 1961), while in recent decades the urbanization of rural areas, illustrated by such trends as the booming numbers of municipalities, has grown apace. These trends have been examined in a number of recent studies (see Anek 2010, Apichat et al 2010).

Six million people are registered residents of Bangkok, but twice as many people actually live there. The other six million remain legal residents of their home provinces, the majority in Isan. When a large proportion of those six million people return "home" during the annual Songkran festival, Bangkokians often struggle to find food on the streets. These six million people have "dual identities"–they are neither exclusively urban nor rural; they are simultaneously both. They are urbanized villagers, who are striving to become even more urban (Naruemon and McCargo 2011: 1000–09). As modernity has crept into rural areas, it has become harder than ever to tell where the city limit is; the divisions between a municipality and the adjoining areas of the associated town district (*amphoe muang*) are no longer easily visible. Many sub-district administration organizations yearn to be upgraded into municipalities. The collapse of the traditional urban-rural demarcation line is a key to the reconfiguration of Thailand's

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[1] A similar criticism is made by Chris Baker in his review "Force of the Farmers," *Bangkok Post*, March 9, 2012.

identity. If its colonial politics has always been about the city's (Bangkok's) colonization of the rest of the country, now the reverse is occurring. People originally from rural areas are keeping Bangkok functioning. Without these so-called rural people, the Thai capital would be paralyzed. Yet the elite see these groups as a threat to the future of Thailand, rather than an asset – much as secular urban-dwellers in Ankara and Istanbul view the electoral empowerment of those from the villages (McCargo and Zarakol 2012: 74–75).

Electoral power rests in the hands of urbanized villagers who account for approximately 20 million out of the entire Thai population; they are the largest group of voters, and the decisive group in determining electoral outcomes, should they choose to vote largely as a bloc–as has happened in recent general elections. A candidate cannot become prime minister without their votes. Thus, urbanized villagers are the most politically significant group in Thailand, although the Thai elite has not accepted or recognized their electoral strength. Instead, Bangkok's ruling class wants urbanized villagers to reside–at least formally and psychologically–in rural areas, to behave themselves and to refrain from causing any trouble. In reality, urbanized villagers increasingly do not remain in rural areas, refuse to be subservient, and do indeed regularly cause trouble. Their capacity to mobilize through what both Chatterjee and Walker term "political society" (Chatterjee 2011: 25) is formidable. Under these circumstances, the center simply cannot hold. Things are falling apart.

When I visited a self-proclaimed redshirt village in Mukdahan in January 2012, I was surprised to see a huge red banner on display along the main road, declaring this to be a "Pro-Democracy Village," and stating that the banner had been produced under the sponsorship of a local Pheu Thai MP. The MP's name had later been painted over, but was still legible. Red flags fluttered alongside the banner and along the roads in the community. When I held a meeting with the villagers, they claimed that more than 80 per cent of them were redshirts. What did the district officer think about the big banner, I asked them? He had sent a letter several months ago to the village headman, asking him to remove the banner. The

headman, a redshirt sympathizer, passed the letter to those who had erected the banner, who threw it away. The district officer had not made a personal visit to ask that the banner be removed, let alone sent his men along to take it down. In previous decades, rural villagers in the Northeast would not have dared to make such a bold challenge to the authority of the Interior Ministry and the Thai state. Here was a palpable symbol of the withering of state power, of changes to the Thai power structure in which citizens no longer feared government authorities. Instead, the opposite is true. State authorities are scared of citizens and dared not issue them orders that might provoke them.

Similar villages have been mushrooming throughout Isan and the North. On March 25, 2012, Jun district in Phayao declared itself Thailand's first redshirt district (*Matichon* 2012). The claiming of territorial jurisdiction by a political movement is in many ways more threatening than calling a demonstration or even seizing a public building. Are these redshirt villages still part of Thailand? Of course they still are. These villages want to challenge Bangkok-based centralized power and to claim their space in the Thai political landscape. Some redshirt commentators declared online that if there was another military coup, the redshirt zones would proclaim their independence from Thailand. In a similar vein, some conservative Bangkok Thais have suggested to me that Thailand should simply say goodbye to the North and Northeast if the residents continue to cause problems for the country as a whole. They argued that the two regions would not be able to support themselves because they are landlocked.[2]

The 2011 election results showed the continuing political divisions of the country, where Pheu Thai dominated the North and Northeast, and the Democrat Party dominated the South: more evidence for the unraveling of centralized power and its internal colonial instability. The Democrat Party has not convincingly won a general election since 1986, although it was able to scrape together a government in September 1992, and then to secure office by

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[2] Those making such arguments appeared unfamiliar with countries such as Switzerland.

non-electoral means in 1997 and late 2008. Pro-Thaksin parties have decisively won five elections in a row (in 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2011), demonstrating a deep divide between the old power elite and the majority of voters, one that shows no sign of declining.

How much longer can the myths of Thai-ness hold different parts of the nation together? Not only is it becoming more and more difficult to define "Thai-ness," the notion itself has also become an issue. David Streckfuss has argued that twentieth century views of Thai history are no longer sustainable: "A centre based history cannot ultimately make sense without its periphery. Rather than continuing with a century of the centre occasionally looking out, the time has come for a history of the periphery looking in" (Streckfuss 2012: 324). The potential for a "tearing apart of Thailand" has reached far beyond the Deep South. Internal colonialism no longer works, and Thailand is entering a new post-colonial order. The current problems facing the country can no longer be reduced simply to a struggle between two competing power networks–the royalist and pro-Thaksin groups (McCargo 2005).

Could the Southern conflict possibly lead to the formation of a new nation? Neither the United Nations nor the world community more generally would want to see the birth of a small, new state squeezed between Malaysia and Thailand. It is unlikely that the idea of creating a new nation will gain international support. Similarly, how many people would predict a new country being formed in Thailand's current North or Isan? This seems even less likely. The key question is not whether there will be a new country called Patani or Isan in the near future, but what political alternatives Thailand faces today. The internal colonial style of administration in which governing authorities are sent from the center to rule the provinces no longer works in the globalized twenty-first century. The answer cannot be, as the post-2014 military junta has done, to suspend local elections across the board. A new system is urgently needed which addresses political needs of the people in Bangkok, central Thailand, and all of the country's regions. The precise nature of any such new system would need to be debated and agreed by Thais themselves, but some form of substantive decentralization is likely to be at its core.

What might appear to be separate phenomena–the Southern conflict, the PAD, the Preah Vihear dispute, the redshirt movement, the polarized nature of electoral politics–are all part of a broader legitimacy crisis in Thailand that is fueled by, but is not synonymous with, growing national anxieties over the country's future in the new reign. The center can no longer hold, at least not in the same ways Bangkok did during the long twentieth century. The inexorable rise of political society seen in the growing confidence of urbanized villagers has undermined the claims of the Thai elite to their place at the core. Through their fear of the people and their anxiety about the outcomes of electoral politics, the Thai elite are becoming alienated from the rest of Thailand; indeed, Bangkokians risk becoming aliens in their own land, as the values and beliefs cherished by the Thai elite are progressively undermined by seismic social and political change.

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Articulations of Southeast Asian Religious Modernisms:

Islam in Early 20th Century Cambodia & Cochinchina

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[*Abstract*]

This article is about the emergence of Islamic modernism among Cham Muslim communities in Cambodia and Cochinchina during the early 20th century. Based on a combined critical reading of existing scholarship, historicized first-hand anthropological accounts, as well as archival sources from the National Archives of Cambodia and the Vietnam National Archives II, it argues accounts of modernists in these sources were either (1) cast through a French colonial reading of a Buddhist state lens and (2) cast through a Malay lens, based upon the Kaum Muda/Kaum Tua divide. First, it proceeds with a historical explanation of the emergence of Islam and the discourse used to describe Muslim communities in Vietnamese, French, and Cham language sources. Then, it turns the narrative toward an examination of the emergence of the "Kaum Muda" or "New Group" of reformist-minded modernist Muslims in early 20th century Cambodia. Delineating the networks of these intellectuals as they stretched across the border through Cochinchina, also highlights a pre-existing transnational element to the community, one that well predates current discussions of twenty-first-century transnationalism. Through

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a combination of the study of multiple language sources and historical methods, the article highlights the importance of polylingualism in the study of the history of Muslims in Southeast Asia.

Ⅰ. Introduction to the Islam of the Cham: Until the 20th century

Scholars of Southeast Asian religions have produced an incredible breadth of studies that have delineated standard religious practices as a form of regional identity. They tend to see all of the following as common, region-wide, characteristics of traditional Southeast Asian religions: Ancestor worship and veneration; an emphasis on practice over belief; popularization of spirit possessions and belief in ghosts or spirits; emphases on sacred spaces and sacred time; the development of individual and communal ethical codes; the maintenance of sacred rites of protection, healing and transformation; cosmic dualism; and syncretism. Additionally, there is an in-depth body of literature that has already studied the development of modernist/traditionalist discourse as articulated throughout the Southeast Asian Buddhist world, as well as in the Islamic world of Island Southeast Asia. Few studies, if any, have argued that an emerging modernist-traditionalist discourse is a unique aspect of "Southeast Asian Religion," writ large, that must be set within its deep assessment of Southeast Asian history, culture, and languages. This paper takes on just that angle, drawing evidence from the microcosm of early 20th century colonial Cambodia into connection with the macrocosm of regional dynamics. It, therefore, seeks to contribute uniquely to the scholarly study of Southeast Asian religion, history, and modernisms.

Soon after the *Hijra* [622 CE], Arabic and Chinese source materials record the "Champa Sea" as an integral avenue between Arabia and China. Five Arabic texts (7th–13th centuries), Tang [618 – 960 CE], and Song [960 – 1280 CE] dynasty records all suggest very

early Islamic influence in the area. Nearly contemporaneously, a large community of Chamic *Hui Hui* moved to Hainan in the 10th century. They are not ethnolinguistically related to China's contemporary *Hui* minority, although both *Hui Hui* (also: Utsat) and *Hui* derive their names from the same classical Chinese character.[1] Hence, the character *Hui* in pre-colonial times should be interpreted to mean anything from "Persian" to "Arab" to "Muslim" and even "resembling Muslims" (Manguin 1979: 258–59, Ali 1991: 124; Houben 2003: 153; Zain Musa 2004: 47; Ba Trung Phu 2006; DeFeo 2007; Ba Trung Phu 2008: 28; VNA II: Hồ sơ 3001). The evidence suggests that there was at least some form of Islamic practice in what is now Vietnam and Cambodia by the 10th century. Similarly, there is a Cham history of a *Po Ualah* who traveled to Mecca in the 10th century and returned to rule at least a portion of the Champa civilization. The reign of *Po Ualah* is the origin of a particular religious community: the Cham Bani according to many local interpretations. Until recently, the Bani were viewed as a form of "syncretic Islam," although fieldwork by the author (2013-2014) suggested that not all "Bani" identify as Muslims. Between China and Arabia, "being Muslim" was rooted in local, rather than global, interpretations.

The Chinese character *Hui* also took on new meanings in a Vietnamese context where it is pronounced *Hồi*. *Hồi* became the root for the word "Islam" (Vn.: *Đạo hồi*) and "Muslims" (Vn.: *người theo hồi giáo*). Additional local variations of *Hui* appear as *Hồi Hồi,* a common name for the "Bani" in 1940's and 1950's Vietnam. As in Chinese, reduplication of a Vietnamese term can either add or reduce emphasis. For example, *Đã đã* means "a very long time ago, " and *nhỏ nhỏ* means "rather small." The case of *Hồi hồi* in 1950's Vietnamese society appears to be the latter of the two, although scholars have hypothesized about possible Shīah origins to the Bani (Cabaton 1906: 31; Ba Trung Phu 2006, 2008) as well as the possibility of Sufi and Buddhist influences (Thành Phần 2013). Deeper examinations of *ta'rikh* Arabic historiographical material and Cham manuscripts may make it possible to more clearly delineate early Islamic influences, giving greater insight into the cacophony of

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[1] The character is: 回

individual practices among mainland Southeast Asian Muslims today. Although the clear majority of Muslims in Vietnam and Cambodia today are Cham Šāfi'ī Sunnī practitioners,[2] Variations of interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence allowed for the individual *Cam Biruw*, Malay, Indonesian, Bawaen, Cham Islam, Khmer Islam, Tablighi Jamaat,[3] One can find Salafī, Sufī, Ḥanafī, Šāfi'ī, Sunnī, and Shīa influences throughout Muslim and non-Muslim communities in these two states. All potential historical evidence suggest that this significant variation developed most distinctly in the 20th century, concurrent with urbanization and increasing migrations of Middle Eastern, African and Indian Muslims to mainland Southeast Asia.

By comparison with other colonial affairs, French archival sources in the NAC and VNA II [XIXth c. – 1950s] make scant mention of Muslim populations. When they do, they rely predominantly upon the previous taxonomy of French colonial administrator, Chamophile, and orientalist Etienne Aymonier. For Aymonier, Siam, Cambodia, and Cochinchine (Saigon, Tây Ninh, and An Giang provinces) were of a single cultural space. Here, all Cham were Muslim; the second largest Muslim population were Malays. There were also many Cham-Malay families. Meanwhile, the areas that are now Ninh Thuận and Bình Thuận in Annam were a separate cultural space. Privately, Aymonier even advocated reviving sovereign Cham political power here as a "buffer state." Finally, Aymonier reported that the Cham were divided between "Brahmanists"–known alternatively as *Bà la môn* in Vietnamese or *Cam Jat* in Cham–and the *Bani*. In his view the Bani were not necessarily Muslims, although they did perform some "adulterated practices," while the "Brahmanists" were also called *akaphiér* or *kafir*, a Cham term derived from the Arabic for "non-believer,"[4] sans the pejorative connotations in the local context (Aymonier 1891: 20 –24, 27, 38; Zain Musa 2004: 49).

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[2] There are four schools of Sunni Islam: Ḥanafī, Malikī, Ḥanbalī, and Šāfi'ī. Only the Shafi'i is indeed popular among Southeast Asian Muslims (Riddel 2001: 54‒55).

[3] The Tablighi Jamaat, who originated out of the Uloom Deobandi offshoot of the Hanafi school, arrived in Cambodia via Kelantan (Malaysia) in 1993.

[4] From Ar.: *Kafir* - /kfr/ "to cover." This should not be confused with the term *kufur*, an Arabic and Malay world, which means "without thanks," as has been done in some recent publications and online essays in the field of Cham Studies.

There have been some claims that the Cham community in late 19th and early 20th century Cambodia was split between "Bani and Murni," although these claims are contested by other assertions that the term "Bani" only became popular in Cambodia in the 1950's. Furthermore, they have relied upon a citation of Etienne Aymonier's primary sources, and a critical rereading of the sources provides no evidence that Cham in Cambodia used the term "Murni." Some credence may be added to the claims that this term was used, given that the meaning of the word is "pure" in Malay. However, there is yet no confirmable written use of the word from the sources that secondary scholarship cited (see: Zain Musa 2004: 51; Zain Musa 2011: 89; Aymonier 1890: 145–46; Aymonier 1891, 1893, 1900). The term may have been upstreamed, that is, read back into history by later scholarship. Stockhof (2008) admits that he may be accused of the same in his assertions of reading *Bawaen* (from the island of Bawaen, Java Sea) identity in the colonial records of Malay Muslims of Saigon, although he, at least, attempts to back these claims with citations of oral historical evidence. Indeed, there is scant proof of any community other than "Malay Muslims" near Saigon before the 20th century.

One account suggests Malay Muslims first migrated to the Saigon delta area in the 1850's. Then, *Masjid Al-Rahim* at what is now Nam Kỳ Khởi Nghĩa Street was constructed with a land grant to "Indian Muslims" in 1863 although it took 22 years to complete the project (1885) (Goucoch divers 2995, 1933). It was the city's first mosque. Another migration of Malays, some supposedly from Bawaen Island, appeared throughout the 1880's and 1890's (Stockhof, 2008: 34–46). Until the mid-20th century, however, there were few Cham Muslims, if any, in the vicinity of the city. Rather, most Cham Muslims were concentrated in the "Cham-Malay" communities of Cambodia, Tây Ninh, and Moat Chrouk/Châu Đốc. Rare late 19th and early 20th century documents suggest that the Cham in these areas at the time had a sound knowledge of Indic-based Cham script and only a scratch knowledge of Jawi. However, "Malayization" was persistent and the Cham of Châu Đốc and Tây Ninh today often report that they have "lost" the Cham script, preferring "Jawi Cham."[5] Later, "Cham Rumi"[6] As they

Islamicized in the 19th century, the Cham at Moat Chrouk/Châu Đốc and Tây Ninh became known as "New Cham"[7] (EM Durand, 1903; Phan Văn Dốp 1993: 129–32, 162; Trần Nam ʻTiến 2005: 127–35; Phú Văn Hẳn 2005: 101; Phú Văn Hẳn 2013: 26). Their Imams were subordinate to the ORMTCC[8] outside Phnom Penh because there was no Mufti-like figure in Cochinchina or Annam, until Mufti Hj. Omar Ali was raised to the position in the 1960's. This development was one factor in the increased complexity of the taxonomy "Cham religions in Vietnam," which seem to have multiplied during the 20th century.

The combined analysis of Aymonier (1891) and Sakaya (2013) demonstrates that the Cham community in Vietnam developed a more complex internal taxonomy of religious identity over 100 years of discourse. Sakaya (2013) clarifies that Aymonier's (1891) single category of Hindu-influenced "Brahminists/Bà la môn/Cam Jat" is now considered to be two types: 1) *Cam Jat* – those Cham who only practice ancestral worship and 2) *Cam Ahiér* – Śiavite-Hindu influenced Cham. Sakaya (2013) also classifies two communities influenced by Islam: 1) *Cam Awal* or "Bani"[9] – Hindu, Muslim, ancestral worship and folk belief practitioners – and 2) *Cham Islam* – Šāfiʻī Sunnī Muslims. I do not wish to propose that either Sakaya's or Aymonier's classifications are "wrong" or "inaccurate." I do, however, want to argue that differences reflect profound social changes, as well as critical discourses between Islam and the state in the middle of the twentieth century. For example, two new terms appear in VNA II archival documents as of the 1950's and 1960's describe the Bani as "Old Islam"[10] and the Cham Islam as "New

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[5] "Jawi Cham" is script derived from Malay-Jawi, which is a mundane Arabic script adapted by the Malay language. Cham and Malay Jawi forms are slightly different.

[6] Romanized Cham developed after Malay Rumi was fully standardized in the mid-late 20th century.

[7] C.: *Cam Biruw*

[8] The Oknha Reachea Montrei Thippedy Chruoy Changvar (ORMTCC) was essentially the senior cleric in Cambodia.

[9] Sakaya (2013) uses the terms *Awal* and *Bani* interchangeably. However, as previously mentioned in this article, members of the Bani community tend to state that the *Awal* are only the cleric class, while the *Bani* are the believers.

[10] Vn.: *Hồi giáo cũ*

Islam."[11] These distinctions directly parallel earlier Malay language differences between conservatives[12] and reformists/modernists[13] who made waves in the beginning of the 20th century around the Gulf of Thailand zone, with intense religious debates reaching Siam by the 1930's and Cambodia by the 1950's. The arrival of the Kaum Muda in Cambodia was, therefore, a critical precursor to a later shift in discourse in Vietnam.

Ⅱ. Kaum Muda Arrive in Cambodia

Imam Tuan Hj. Ali Musa (Ly Mousa) [b. 1916– d. 1975] and Imam Hj. Mohammed Ahmed India (Son Math) [d. 1975] were two of the most critical members of the Cham Muslim community in Cambodia and therefore two of the first executed by the Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) regime in 1975. They were also two of Cambodia's most prominent "Kaum Muda" figures who advocated "reformism."[14] Cham, Malay, Cham-Malay, and all other Muslims in pre-colonial Cambodia were known under the blanket term *Cam-Jvea* (Mak 1988). It follows that Khmers may have recognized Islam as "*Sasana Cam-Jvea.*" The term means "Religion of the Cam-Jvea," which we may conclude was dominantly Islam, given the socio-historical context. By the 20th century, Islam would have been classified as a "Religion of the Others," as opposed to "Khmer Religion" (i.e. Theravada Buddhism). By the 1940's, to be specific, "Mahanikaya" Theravada Buddhism was considered the "National Religion," as colonialist and royalist forces partnered in an attempt to stave off "Thai-Thammayuti reformism" (Hoeffel 1932; Edwards 2007: 15; Jammes 2013).[15] Because reformism and modernism were associated with anti-colonial sentiment, it would be no surprise that

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[11] Vn.: *Hồi giáo mới*

[12] M.: *Kaum Tua*

[13] M.: *Kaum Muda*

[14] Ar.: *al-ʾIṣlāḥ*

[15] Hansen (2007: 116) notes that the fear was that the Dhammayuti–which was founded by King Monkut–would have significant influence and a "deluge" of monks were studying in Bangkok, although this path is better characterized as a "steady trickle."

the French colonial stance was anti-Islamic reformism, following the general policy of being anti-Buddhist reformism. Regardless, this did not equate to a "pro-Cham" and "anti-Malay" stance throughout the colonial period.

Much colonial policy seems to have "overwritten" the Cham Muslim populations of Cambodia, ignoring them or, perhaps intentionally, not granting them the same recognition as other minority groups. Education policy set in 1924 mandated only "state-narratives" of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The Cham were therefore classified as a "conquered people" by the French, whose history was covered only under the "victories of the Lê dynasty" section of the history curriculum. Language policy set in 1933 recognized Tieu Chieu, Hakkanese, Akha ("Burmaine"), Malay, and Arabic minority languages, but not Cham (NAC Box 438: 13; NAC Box 745, RSC File 8465). These policies would have implicitly encouraged a "Malayization" and "Islamicization" of the Cham population in colonial Cambodia. Then, perhaps due to a recognition of this trend, and, in a seeming rhetorical turn, French Resident Superior Thibaudeau foolishly declared that *all* "Malays" living in the Kingdom of Cambodia were "in reality Cham who were installed in Cambodia after the conquest of their country" (NAC Box 3674, RSC File 35468).

Thibaudeau's claims were laden with political implications. If all "Malays" were "in reality Cham," his declaration disassociated them from the Malay world, staving off an apparent trend of increased, and potentially anti-colonial, Malay influence in late colonial Cambodia. Based on the analysis of a precious series of Resident Superior of Cambodia (RSC) documents at the NAC, scholars have widely hypothesized about degrees of "Malayization" and "Jawization" during the 1930's and 1940's (Guérin 2004; Farouk 2008: 70–73; Bruckmayr 2013; Weber 2013). Granted that there may have been more historical documents that were destroyed by the civil war, the Khmer Rouge, or that simply, they have all been lost to time, a close examination of the RSC collections suggests that "actual Jawization," measured by literacy in Jawi was minimal at best. Based on an analysis of public petitions, the broadest evidence of sample literacy among mosque educated males, a mere 10% of

men, at most, could affix their signatures. Only two pages of legible Jawi can be found in the RSC (NAC) collections, among several thousand in the NAC as a whole on the "Cham, Malay, Cham-Malay, and Muslim" populations. This does not mean that there was no Malay influence. However, it does indicate that any influence was "top down" descending from the intellectual elite. Regardless, there was a discernible increase of Kaum Muda-like discourse that emerges in 1930's and 1940's Cambodia that originated from across the Gulf of Thailand. The location and timing of these origins are critical since it would later allow the Bani group in Vietnam and the Kaum Imam San group in Cambodia to represent "local" or, in contemporary times "indigenous" adaptations of Islam, as opposed to "foreign Malay" or "foreign Arabic" forms.

The Kaum Muda/Kaum Tua divide appeared in Muslim communities in British Malaya and Singapore as early as 1906.[16] Kaum Muda leaders Shiek Tahi Jalauddhin and Muhammed Yuno relied upon print outlets such as *Al-Iman* (1906 –), *Nercha, Utusan Melayu,* and *Lembaga Melayu* (Singapore), as well as the *Al-Iknhwan* magazine of Syed Sheik al-Hadi (1925 –) (Pulao Penang) to spread their ideas regarding reforms. In response, the Kaum Tua published *Lidah Benar* out of Selangor, debates spread through Cham-Malay communities in Kota Bharu, Kelantan, and Baan Krua, Bangkok. Cham had been in these communities since the 17th century when a Cham-Malay lineage merged into the royal line of the Sultanate of Kelantan and up to three brothers of the Champa sovereign, Po Saut arrived in the royal court of Narai at Pata Ku Cham, Ayutthaya. From the 17th to the 20th century, a network of royalty, traders, teachers, texts, and philosophies forged connections between Kota Bharu (Malaysia); Baan Krua (Thailand); Battambang, Kampong Cham, and Phnom Penh (Cambodia); as well as Moat Chrouk/Châu Đốc, Tây Ninh, Phan Rí, and Phan Rang. Each large

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[16] Rashid Rida, founder of *The Lighthouse* (*al-Manar*). The Kaum Muda looked up to him as the predominant "modernist" reformer. He used *al-Manar* to advocate the teachings of Mohammed Abduh [1849-1905]. These included several criticisms of Sufi practices, which were widespread throughout Southeast Asia (Abaza 1998: 96).

town and rising urban center became its node of Islamic influence (Ner 1941: 164; Scupin 1988, 1989, 2000; Zain Musa 2004: 51; Weber 2005; Zain Musa 2008: 61; Zain Musa 2011: 90–92; Noseworthy 2013; NAC Box 745; NAC Box 811).[17]

The Kaum Muda arrived in Baan Krua, Bangkok in 1926 with the teachings of Minangkabau Malay teacher Ahmad Wahab and Thai-Indian/Pakistani teacher Direk Kulsiriwad. Kulsiriwad's Kaum Muda stances were as simple as favoring translation of the Qur'an into Thai and studying a reformed set of *ḥadīt*–collections of phrases or sayings with the tacit approval or disapproval of the prophet Mohammed. Translation in the Malay world was not limited to "producing a faithful rendering of the original text alone, but at the time created a very free rendering, seeing fit both to reduce and expand the original, drawing on various Arabic commentaries as the occasion demanded" (Ridell 2001: 185). So, we can expect that translation in Baan Krua followed this model and was viewed skeptically by Siam's *Chularajamontri* Tuan Suwannasat, who took a Kaum Tua stance in *Rua Sunnī Islam* (1935). Nevertheless, the Kaum Muda continued to spread and at least one "Thai Muslim," possibly actually Malay or Cham in origin, traveled from Baan Krua through Cambodia, to Mỹ Thơ in the Mekong Delta to teach in the 1930's. There were also several teachers who travelled from peninsular Malaysia to Cambodia (Scupin 1988, 1989, 2000; Riddel 2001: 211; Zain Musa 2004: 51; Gilquin 2005: 116; Zain Musa 2008: 61; Zain Musa 2011: 90–92; NAC Box 745; NAC Box 811). The Kaum Muda's influence was spreading.

Although French civil servant and ethnographer Marcel Ner (1941: 187) objected to referring to the ORMTCC as the "Mufti" of Cambodia, as archival evidence suggests that the ORMTCC was indeed a "Mufti-like"–if not actual "Mufti"–position, held at the time by Hj. Ismael. As the ORMTCC Hj. Ismael, like Siam's Mufti-*Chularajamontri* and the head clerics of Selangor, initially took a Kaum Tua-like stance. Admittedly, it is only through later scholarly implication that these stances were "Kaum Tua-like" (since

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[17] Sheik Daud bin Abdalla bin Indris al-Fatani even reportedly took refuge in Cambodia, fleeing the expansion of Siam in the 19th century (Guérin 2004: 39)

we have no record of Kaum Muda having a direct role in Cambodia until the 1950s). However, we can suggest an earlier presence of modernist and reformist tendencies through NAC records that recorded, through a Buddhist, Khmer and French lens, the presence of "Thammayuti Muslims."[18] Buddhicization is a greater trend in the colonial record at the time. *Haj* is replaced by records of "journeys to *Jetavana*"–the famous school where the Buddha gave many lectures in northern India. Knowledge of *fiqh*, *sharī'ah,* and *ḥadīṯ* were rephrased as "Muslim precepts" or "Muslim Vinaya." Mosques were registered as *Wat* or *Vihear* in Khmer, although they were simultaneously classified as *Mosquée* in French. Additionally, clerics were given Khmer titles. *Hakem* were given the title *Takaley* and Imam, *Mekhum* (NAC Box 2968; NAC Box 3052, RSC 27641; NAC Box 3310, RSC 30380). The *Mekhum* held the additional responsibility of collecting paddy land tax for funds to be filtered upward through the *Takaley,* the *Balat,* and the *Oknha*–all the way to the Khmer monarch (NAC Box 3052). Even as the Kaum Muda influence began to spread, the Muslim community was incorporated into a Khmer royal and French colonial state complex. By comparison, the process of state incorporation would not be paralleled among Muslim communities in Vietnamese territories until the post-colonial period.

As a new precedent to the spread of legal reform, a case came before the office of the ORMTCC in 1924. As of April 24, Malays [and Chams] living in the 6th quarter of Phnom Penh [Chruoy Changvar] noted that their religion dictated that a corpse should be laid tranquil at death and that no procedures should be made to mummify or conduct autopsies on the dead body. All 97 male signatories, signed a petition supporting the juridical ruling against autopsies.[19] The responding correspondence from Dr. Bouvaist to the mayor of Phnom Penh stated that the procedure was merely a

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[18] Thammayuti Buddhists were reformist Buddhists in Thailand. Therefore, "Thammayuti Muslims" seems to have clear implications.

[19] The "front" signatures were remarkably uniform, suggesting a scribe was used. Followed by increasingly rough Jawi, then 'xxxs' and 'thumbprint' signatories for the back pages. See: Petition to the resident superior in Phnom Penh: Dated: April 24, 1924. In NAC Box. No. 138. RSC No. 1347. Classification S. 41; S. 9. Autopsie de cadavres des Morts Chams.

routine test of the femoral lymph nodes to ensure that bacterial infections, such as the plague, were not spreading in the city. The doctor assured the mayor that the test had been going on for some years and that all the Europeans, Indians, Muslims, Annamites, Cambodians, and Chinese in the city were being subjected to it. He further assured the mayor that this was not a unique requirement specific to the inhabitants of the 6th quarter [Chruoy Changvar] and that it was principally for research.[20] However, three days later, more than 300 Cham Muslims addressed the Council of Ministers increasing their demands, stating that the administration should additionally consider the removal of acupuncture, the practice of autopsy, and the inspection of "intimate parts" from the repertoire of acceptable medical practices. The issue was then forwarded directly from Minister of the Interior and Cults, Phanuvong, to the office of the Resident Superior.[21] A final response letter by Dr. Bouvaist recorded that for internments, Muslims resorted to alcohol ["beer," but more likely rice wine] when they massaged the stomach to clean the bowels and to remove the intestines and liver quickly. It reiterated the argument that Muslims should follow the request of Dr. Bouvaist as these were the only means of conducting research on bacterial infections and detecting whether the plague was present in the cadaver.[22] Although the stance of the community had been clear, and the colonial administration had maintained its resolve, it is also evident that the community at Chruoy Changvar maintained a relatively conservative stance about Muslim burial practices.

The state's partnering with Muslim clerics created a traditional institution similar to the Kaum Tua in Malaysia or Siam. Under the ORMTCC in Cambodia, as many as 13 *Oknha* regents were considered conservative. The most important were Oknha Reachea Phakdei Montrei Sop (9 stripes of dignity – the highest available to Muslim clerics) and the Oknha Reachea Res Hj. Sen. Nevertheless,

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[20] See: Letter from Dr. Bauvaiste to the Resident Mayor of Phnom Penh No. 22, April 22, 1924. In NAC Box. No. 138. RSC No. 1347. Classification S. 41; S. 9. Autopsie de cadavres des Morts Chams.

[21] An Un-numbered document from the office of the 2eme, dated 28 April 1924

[22] No. 152. Bulletin de Soit Communique. Date 28, April 1924 – Signed by Dr. Bouvaiste. All documents from this case can be found in NAC Box. No. 138. RSC No. 1347. Classification S. 41; S. 9. Autopsie de cadavres des Morts Chams.

support for reformism spread through Kandal province in 1929. Five years later, in Battambang, a similar debate resulted in the appointment of Hj. Salai Man to *Hakem* and Hj. Sam Sou to *Imam* of Masjid Naparat Boum Bo Chantrea, based on their superior knowledge of *ḥadīṯ* and *sharī'ah,* in contrast to the previously "uneducated" heads of the mosque (NAC Box 653; NAC Box 3310, RSC File 30380). Haji Salai Man was one of only six *hajis* in Battambang and the widely traveled. He had studied in Mecca, visited the Dutch East Indies, Kota Bharu, Penang and other parts of British Malaya. There was another "reader,"[23] also a *haji* who had spent two years in Kota Bharu, but it appears that Sam Sou was the most discernible Kaum Muda-leaning figure. By 1948 his curricula included lessons in Islamic brotherhood selflessness; recitation; *ḥadīṯ;* jurisprudence (fiqh); Arabic and Malay languages; and Sufism. The entire curriculum influenced by 19th-century Patani scholar Mohammed bin Ismael Daud Al-Fatani (Ner 1941: 171; Blengsi 2009: 179; Kiernan 2010: 177).

By the 1940's there were many *islahī* reformists and modernist Cham Muslim clerics. Three key figures were Haji Osman of Kampong Trea, Kampong Cham; Hj. Abdulrahman of Chroy Changvar; and (later: Mufti) Hj. Omar Ali of Moat Chrouk/Châu Đốc, An Giang province, Vietnam. Occasionally, however, their tendencies were reformist without necessarily being modernist. For example, Hj. Abdulrahman and Omar Ali would go on to become senior patriarchs of Cambodia and Vietnam, respectively, and a later generation would refer to them as "Kaum Tua." However, once in the Vietnamese sphere, Omar Ali would swing back to a "modernist/reformist" stance. There were also many Cham and Malay Muslims of Cambodia who studied in Peninsular Malaysia at the time. Hj. Mathsales (Muhammed Salih of Chruoy Changvar), for example, spent 11 years in Mecca, by repute, held two certificates from Kelantan, corresponded with Sheik Ahmad bin Muhammed Zain Mustafa Al-Fatani [b. 1856 – d. 1908] and composed his sacred commentary on calculating the proper direction for prayer based on the stars during Ramadan.[24] Another "Mat Sales" was an old rival of

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[23] Ar.: *khaṭīb*

[24] This work is recorded by Bruckmayr (2013) as "M. Soleh Kamboja, *Pedoman*

Hj. Osman, but had spent ten years in Kelantan and developed a mixed curriculum with his father, Hj. Roun to contest Hj. Osman's purely religious curriculum (Ner 1941: 157–87; NAC Box 3310, File 30364; NAC Box 3310 File 30285; VNA II: Hồ sơ 31692).

Moving outward from Phnom Penh toward Kampot, in the 1940's, one would have found a community that was under greater Malay Muslim influence than in the center of Phnom Penh. Kampot's population had been mostly Malay until the end of the 19th century, although Cham increasingly moved there from Kampong Cham and Kandal by the mid-20th. By the 1940's there was a significant Cham and Cham-Malay population here, although most of the clerics were still Malay *guru* from Kelantan and Terengganu such as Tuk Guru Nik Daud bin Nik Mat, who travelled to Cambodia to spread Islam; a Malay community from the Kaum Muda stronghold of Singapore moved to nearby Phnom Penh. Consequentially, senior Cham *grus* in central and southern Cambodia studied in Malaysia, like Haji Abupaka of Phum Soai (six years in Kelantan). There were also up to 30 Cambodia-Cham who had been students of Tuk Kenali Mohammed Yusuf [d. 1933], himself a student of Shiek Ahmad Al-Fatani [d. 1906/8]. There were also some Cham, such as a teacher in Svay Chrum (nearby Chruoy Changvar), who had been to Kelantan, "but still knew a bit of Cham letters," and Hj. Males Mohammed, the senior patriarch of Prek Pra, who taught in both languages. However, the overwhelming influence in Kampot was Kaum Muda-leaning (Ner 1941: 157, 165–69; Bruckmayr 2013: 27–28).

The spread of the Kaum Muda influence and an increase in unregistered *surau* in Cham, Malay, Khmer, and Thai Muslim communities helped the Kaum Muda make early inroads into Cochinchina (Vietnam) in the 1930's and 1940's. Populations began to move around increasingly among Battambang, Kampong Cham, and Chruoy Changvar, spreading *dakwa* invitations to reform, as well as moving toward Cham communities in Vietnam. The Malay community of Châu Đốc increased their influence in Saigon, constructing the new *Jamia Masjid* at what is now 641 Nguyễn Trãi

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Bahagia pada Menyatakan Sukatan Waktu dan Masa, Kota Bharu 1934."

Street in 1932. The next year, a debate over the spending habits of the *Masjid Al-Rahim* attracted the attention of colonial officials tracking Malay influence. After they had resolved the debate, construction plans began on a nearby mosque: *Masjid Đông Dư* was built in 1935. In the 1940's, following Malay connections, Cham and Cham-Malay families from Châu Đốc began to urbanize. First, they built bamboo and thatched houses nearby Cầu Kho Bridge in the Nancy area, District 1. Then, larger migrations arrived between 1945 and 1946, especially since Cham families entered the southern war against France on September 9, 1945. New Cham Muslim neighborhoods emerged nearby Gia Định and Chợ Lớn (Goucoch 1933; Nguyễn Văn Luận circa 1960: 1; Phan Văn Dốp 1993: 129, 131– 32, 162; Trần Nam Tiến 2005: 127–35; Phú Văn Hẳn 2005: 101; Phú Văn Hẳn 2013: 26). As reformist and Malay influence additionally spread into *Cochinchine*, Imam Tuan Hj. Ali Musa (Ly Mousa), a Cham from Kampong Cham, returned to Cambodia from Malaysia and became the leader of the Kaum Muda in Cambodia.

Musa [b. 1916 – d. 1975] was born and raised in the village of Ampil, Khum Peuh, Srok Kroch Chmar, Kampong Cham province, Cambodia. He was the oldest of three boys and four girls in his farming family and so when a Thai-Muslim named Hj. Ismael offered to become his benefactor, he left to study in Bangkok, and later on, in Pattani. In Pattani, he became the classmate of Pek Yeh, from nearby Phum Poeuh, Kroch Chmar, Kampong Cham, and Imam Hj. Mohammed India (also from Kampong Cham). Pek Yeh had studied in Kota Bharu (1936) before arriving in Pattani, while Ahmed India received a BA from Kelantan before he had received his MA from the Uloom Deoband, Uttar Pradesh, India. Ahmed India's association with the Deoband may have been a primer for the influence of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) in Cambodia, two generations of students later (from 1993 onward) since the TJ were themselves a Deobandi offshoot. Both India and Musa, however, were most clearly both reformists and Kaum Muda-modernists. In 1948, Musa returned to Cambodia, before founding the *Sankum Ly Mousa* in 1953 and the first "state-school" to teach Islam in Phum Prek Krot, Svay Khleang, Kampong Cham. Ahmed India then partnered with Musa, after he returned in 1955/56. The school was

initially only funded by profits from rice fields, but later on became one of the most influential in Cambodia. Many of the elite figures of the 1970's onward were educated here or were otherwise tied to Musa and India's school via their teachers (Zain Musa 2004: 51; Zain Musa 2008: 60–64; Blengsi 2009: 180; Zain Musa 2011: 89–92).

The teachings of Ali Musa appear to be better recorded than those of Ahmed India. He was a reformist and modernist. More specifically, he argued that there were 23, not 25, messengers (Ar.: *rasūl*), supported the translation of the Qur'an, and studied a selection of *ḥadīṯ* with which his elders were not familiar. Omar Ali of Moat Chrouk/Châu Đốc changed his position. He aligned with Tuan Kachik of Chmin and Tuan Hj. Ali of Speu, as the three, issued a *fatwa* that India, Musa, and their colleagues were *kafir*, in the Arabic–not in the Cham–sense of the term. They also proclaimed that Musa's keeping a dog at his home was *haram*. Since Norodom Sihanouk had just founded the state-religion of "Khmer Islam," a formal Qur'anic debate was held in 1955. As they had done in Selangor and Bangkok, state aligned clerics took a Kaum Tua-like stance, proclaiming that this was right for "Khmer Islam." There were two reactions. First, the community built side by side Muda/Tua *surau* prayer halls. Second, in response to the ethno-nationalist notions that were included in Khmer Islam, several Cham leaders, mostly Kaum Muda oriented, founded a Cham Islam movement. The central claim to Cham Islam was that the Cham could maintain their piety while also keeping their Cham ethno-linguistic identity. Cham Islam spread rapidly between the nodes of Battambang, Phnom Penh and Kampong Cham, before moving across the border to Tây Ninh, An Giang, and Saigon, backed by refugee immigrations of Cham Islam believers fleeing from the Second Indochina War in Cambodia (Zain Musa 2004: 51; Zain Musa 2008: 60–64; Blengsi 2009: 180; Zain Musa 2011: 89–92; Phú Văn Hẳn 2013: 24). Whereas Khmer Islam became the "state-Islam" in Cambodia, Cham Islam was on its way to becoming the official "state-Islam" in the Republic of Vietnam, a development that hinged upon the internal discourses of the Cham community.

Ⅲ. CONCLUSIONS

Islam had an influence on the Cham population in what is now Vietnam and Cambodia as early as the 11th century. Many different schools of Islamic jurisprudence developed, although differences were often simplified in both Cham and non-Cham sources. Anti-colonial Islamic modernism and reformist schools of jurisprudence that were popular in turn of the century Egypt and the Levant influenced Malay Islamic schools, which in turn brought reformism and modernism to 20th century Cambodia. However, when the modernist and reformist tendencies arrived, they were either 1) cast through a French reading of a Buddhist state lens or 2) cast through a Malay lens, based upon the Kaum Muda/Kaum Tua divide. However, modernism and reformism were not, on the ground, so simplistic. Single figures tied to the office of the Oknha Reachea Thippedy Chruoy Changvar (the equivalent of the Mufti of Cambodia) frequently changed positions depending on the debate at hand. Nevertheless, the British Malaya-state vision that interpreted Islamic modernism as an easy divide between "conservatism" and "reformism," was additionally applied in French colonial Cambodia.

Over time, the insistence by French and Khmer Royal officials that Islamic communities increasingly institutionalize, for their purposes of surveillance, in fact, may have had the opposite impact that French colonial officials intended. The legal discourse and institutionalization, both encouraged by the French for colonial surveillance, reified "reformist" and "modernist" tendencies of Muslim communities in Cambodia. The long-term impact of this reform, in an even greater irony for Muslims living in Cambodia, was that various trends of jurisprudence increasingly became divided along ethnic lines by the 1960's, leading to another split: between Khmer Islam and Cham Islam. Islamic modernism and reformism as discourses were hence coopted by colonial and royal authorities, but both simultaneously worked to undermine authorities. Nevertheless, the discourse of modernism also eventually weakened the position of Cham Muslims in Cambodia as they were no longer viewed as partnered with the Khmer Royalty and hence, considered a threat to the "Cambodian-ness" of society.

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An Overview of Southeast Asian Area Studies in the Philippines

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[*Abstract*]

In spite of being one of the first countries in Asia to establish an institution devoted to the study of the Asian region, area studies in the Philippines has languished over the years. In contrast, area studies programs of her neighbors have grown by leaps and bounds, invigorated by both public and private support. This observation becomes more glaring as Filipino scholars have made a name for themselves in the field of Southeast Asian Studies abroad. The paper is an appraisal of the current state of Southeast Asian area studies and the extent of its operation by the Philippines' top four universities, namely: the Asian Center of the University of the Philippines, the Ateneo de Manila University, the De La Salle University, and the University of Santo Tomas. Starting from the inception of area studies in the mid-1950s leading to a template patterned after the North American – European model, the paper then describes the challenges and its decline in the 80s toward its progression on a paradigm defined by the growing importance of, and actors within, the region. The paper expresses the view that one, the role of the government was both a boon and a bane in the development of area studies;

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and two, that the rapid economic growth and immense integration in the region in the last two decades gave a new impetus to Southeast Asian area studies, an enormous opportunity to capitalize on for Philippine universities.

Keywords: Southeast Asian Studies, area studies, Asian Center, Programs and Degrees on Southeast Asian Studies, Philippine Center for Advanced Studies

Ⅰ. Introduction

The Philippines was one of the first Asian countries to establish an institute solely devoted to area studies on the region. Starting in the 1950′s, the Institute of Asian Studies, now the Asian Center, was created ahead of many of its counterparts in the region. The Philippines has also produced respected scholars in the field of Southeast Asian Studies such as Reynaldo C. Ileto, Caroline S. Hau, Patricio N. Abinales, Filomeno V. Aguilar, and Vicente Rafael. Yet, area studies on Southeast Asia has languished, or regressed, over the past few decades. Today, students wanting to specialize on the region may have to go abroad for in-depth training. If previous generations went to the United States for this purpose, Singapore and Australia have now become the destinations of choice for the younger generation of students. But how about other serious students not fortunate enough to be granted opportunities? Where does one go to pursue Southeast Asian Studies in the Philippines especially when Filipino scholars trained in Southeast Asia area studies are to be found in foreign universities?

This essay is an overview of the current state of Southeast Asian area studies and how it is currently operationalized. Specifically, the paper shall focus on the top four Philippine universities who have the resources to pursue Southeast Asian area studies, namely, the Asian Center at the University of the Philippines (UP), the Ateneo de Manila University, the De La Salle University and the University of Santo Tomas. After tracing the development of area studies in the 50′s and 60′s, the paper then narrates the transition to the Asian Center and looks at the challenges in teaching

Southeast Asian area studies. The essay proceeds to discuss the other universities mentioned and enumerates the concerns and challenges in the formation and enrichment of Southeast Asian area studies.

Ⅱ. Area studies and the Asian Center

The Asian Center at the UP's main campus in Diliman, Quezon City traces its roots to the Institute of Asian Studies (IAS) established within the Liberal Arts Program of the College of Arts Sciences on November 28, 1955. A brainchild of then President Ramon Magsaysay, the University Board of Regents established the IAS to "develop among scholars and students of Asia a stronger kinship and solidarity and to preserve and advance a common heritage" (Asian Center 1968). The IAS was meant to provide an Asian perspective to the otherwise very Western-oriented curricula of all departments within the University, especially in the social sciences and humanities. To fulfill this task, the Institute set out to introduce the teaching and research of Asian societies and cultures which most Filipinos were unaware of. As the creation of the IAS was by way of a presidential directive, the IAS functioned as a separate unit and had a separate budget outside from that of the University's. This made it easier for IAS to fulfill its mandate. IAS subsequently sent a team of faculty to American, European, and other universities in the region to observe academic programs on Asia for the drafting of a curriculum (Isleta and Espinas 1981: 109).

The Institute received a big boost when the Philippines' foremost diplomat, Carlos P. Romulo, was appointed President of the University of the Philippines in 1962. Known for his scholarship on postcolonial Asia and advocacy for the promotion of Asian solidarity (Claudio 2015), Romulo gave his total support to the Institute. Under a five-year plan, Romulo set out to develop the Institute's academic staff and its material assets with ample support from foreign donors such as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. Select staff were sent to study abroad while foreign scholars were invited to teach. A new curriculum was set up which emphasized the teaching and research of three regions-East Asia, South Asia,

and Southeast Asia. The Institute offered a graduate degree, the Master of Arts in Asian Studies, while the Philippine Studies Program was reverted to an undergraduate degree. Interdisciplinary approach was used as the primary mode of analysis in area studies. Patterned after the area studies programs in the US and Europe, the program boasted of faculty trained to handle the graduate program designed to produce specialists on particular countries. In 1967, the Institute awarded the Master's degree in Asian Studies to its first graduate (Isleta and Espinas 1981: 110).

With the passage of Republic Act 5534 in 1968, the Institute of Asian Studies was reorganized into what is now the Asian Center. The Asian Center was given a new space within the University and with it, a new building, Romulo Hall, named after its most ardent supporter who had returned to the Department of Foreign Affairs as Secretary after his stint as UP president. The new law declared the policy of developing closer and broader contact with Asian neighbors in order to reorient the country's national identity. Language and cultural studies were strengthened and the Center's academic journal, *Asian Studies*, was launched. Collaboration with similar institutions in the region was fostered: Kyoto University's Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Indonesia, Chulalongkorn University, and the University of Malaya. (Isleta and Espinas 1981: 112). This made the Asian Center the only academic unit in the Philippines with a regional area of specialization.

The declaration of martial rule saw another metamorphosis for the Center. In 1974, Marcos signed into law Presidential Decree 342 creating the Philippine Center for Advanced Studies (PCAS) which absorbed the Asian Center. PCAS was created to aid the government in foreign policy formulation. This was after all a time when the Philippines had to grapple with a growing Marxist insurgency, secessionism in Mindanao, the success of communist revolutions in the former Indochinese states, the opening of relations with China, the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries, and a host of other concerns. Therefore, the thrust of area studies also had to change. The previous stress on history, society, and culture studies, was focused towards security. It was not enough for the Center to provide support in opening relations with other Asian countries,

there was also a need to assess their capabilities and structures (Malay 2003: 39). Consequently, library acquisitions were now diverted on specialized and pricey publications such as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (or FBIS) published by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS) of the US Department of Defense.

Inside the PCAS, new centers were created, among them the Islamic Center, the Institute of Security Studies, and the Institute of Philippine Studies. The Islamic Center produced some of the major works on Muslim identity in the southern Philippines (Majul 1973; Jocano 1983). In the Southeast Asian Studies Program of the Asian Center, Indonesian Studies was initially handled by a faculty who trained at Cornell's Southeast Asian Studies Program and did work on Indonesian politics (Rocamora 1975). By the mid-70's however, Rocamora had to leave the PCAS for his involvement in radical politics. Interest on Southeast Asia was also driven to great extent by the dramatic events unfolding in Vietnam as well as the growing interest among academics and activists who wanted to analyze the nature of revolutions that engulfed the former Indochina region. The same may be said of the Asian Center faculty. Two faculty members handled courses on the region, one for Vietnam (Malay 1993, 1981) and another one for Cambodia (Ragos-Espinas 1983). As King (2012: 323) has observed, "Area studies have been sites of conflict as much as much as they have been sites of common purpose."

A year after Marcos was deposed in 1986, the PCAS was abolished and reverted again to the Asian Center. However, the status and prestige of the Asian Center declined dramatically, its close association with Marcos worsening the situation. Even within the UP community, the Asian Center was scoffed at for it was an oddity – a Marcos-created institution separate from the University but at the same time occupying space and granting graduate degrees. Besides, the scholarship was considered very empirical, almost atheoretical by traditional and well-established disciplines. Moreover, the Cory Aquino years were a time for introspection, putting much attention to the country's many ills and finding ways to undo the legacies of the dictatorship (Bautista 2000). Thus, area studies was considered not only out of fashion, but more so as a

first world luxury that the Philippines can do without in the meantime (Malay 2003: 42).

I came to the Asian Center when it was perhaps at its lowest ebb. The Center attracted a few number of students compared to the disciplinal degrees in the social sciences. Even then, Southeast Asian Studies was a far third behind Japanese and Chinese Studies in terms of choice for new students. In our batch of eight students, seven chose to study Japan (thanks largely to a grant for a study tour the following Summer). I was the only one who ventured into Southeast Asia.

External funding windows may partly explain the popularity of Japanese and Chinese Studies. However, there are other reasons for their popularity. The phenomenal rise of Japan as a world economic powerhouse, and at the same time its popular culture, may be contributing factors that made Japanese Studies appealing. In the case of China, the opening of diplomatic relations made travel to China imperative for Filipinos with Chinese ancestry to reestablish ties with family and kin from the mainland. Before the advent of Confucius Institutes, the Chinese government already saw the need to extend its Track Two diplomacy by way of cultural cooperation and educational exchanges. After all, Chinese Studies appealed to another type of student- local activists influenced by Maoism and the Chinese Revolution. Chinese Studies was also boosted by recruitment of a former University of the Philippines student activist who visited China shortly before martial rule was declared in 1972 but could not return for security reasons. He would spend the next sixteen years in China before returning to the Philippines in early 1987 (Miclat 2010). His expertise on the Chinese language and society appealed greatly to many would-be applicants.

The same could not be said for Southeast Asian Studies. There were still no funding opportunities available such as the Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program (SEASREP) and the Asian Public Intellectuals (API). Foreign language training was limited to Bahasa Indonesia whose instructors were furnished by the Indonesian Embassy. To study the former Indochina region was even more challenging. The long and protracted war in the region

precluded any form of exchange, with studies based only on archival research. Moreover, the holdings at the Library were very limited. Furthermore, the required language course was substituted with the colonial lingua franca, French, as this was the only related language available on campus. Even after the formalization of relations between the Philippines and Vietnam in 1977, bilateral scholarly exchanges were difficult to come by.

By the late 1990s, a rethinking of area studies was in order. Following all the vicissitudes that area studies had undergone, the core issue that needed to be addressed was its *raison d'etre*- the nature of area studies itself and how to make it relevant. The answer as to whether Southeast Asian Studies should have an area studies or disciplinal approach became clearer. After all, Southeast Asian studies could benefit from related courses taught in the different departments. Besides, the so-called country experts lacked the training, skills and resources in the tasks they are expected to perform. Also, because of the unevenness in the teaching Southeast Asia, there was a need to shift to thematic approaches-conflict and security, ethnicity, religion, gender, migration, among others-which abound in the region (Malay 2003: 40).

Similar trends outside the Philippines made the Asian Center veer away from the country-specialist approach which was not sustainable to begin with. Consequently, faculty who were grounded on the disciplines but have worked on an Asian sub-region became the priority in recruitment. The curriculum was likewise overhauled and new courses were introduced. Core courses and previous electives were retained but modified to reflect a more thematic approach (Asian Center 2015). Today, the increase in the overall student population, and in Southeast Asian studies in particular, may be attributed to the prominence of ASEAN and the adjustments made.

Ⅲ. Southeast Asian Area Studies in other universities

Next to UP, it is Ateneo de Manila University that has the most potential and experience in offering area studies. Ateneo has one of

the most number of Southeast Asia specialists, some of which were alumni of the Southeast Asian Studies Program at Cornell University, while a greater number graduated from the University of Hawaii. Its younger generation of specialists received training in similar institutions in Singapore, Australia and Hong Kong. Before internationalization became the norm in universities today, many Southeast Asian nationals came to the Ateneo in the 1990s to train in the social sciences with financial support from the Asian Scholarship Fund of the Ford Foundation. The University also hosts the Philippine Office of the Asian Public Intellectuals (API), a colloquium of Southeast Asian universities and research institutions whose format is similar to SEASREP, except that its recipients were mostly intellectuals outside of unviersities. Moreover, Southeast Asian area studies have benefitted indirectly with the creation of the Ateneo Center for Asian Studies (ACAS) in 2001. Though a research center and not a degree-granting unit, ACAS continues to offer language courses in Bahasa Indonesia, Vietnamese and occasionally, Thai. ACAS also published papers on Southeast Asia from the international conferences it organized, and hosted scholars doing research on the Philippines or the region through its Visiting Fellowship Program. Lastly, Ateneo continues to train many Southeast Asian journalists taking up graduate studies through the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Asian Center for Journalism Program (or ACFJ).

However, Ateneo has not maximized the opportunity to create a Southeast Asian area studies program early on, its potential and resources notwithstanding. One reason may have to do with its identity and tradition. Taken from Athena, the Greek goddess of reason and intellect, arts and literature, coupled with the Jesuit emphasis on Catholic doctrine (as reflected in mandatory Theology and Philosophy courses) Ateneo's educational bent is steeped in the ascendancy and preeminence of Western civilization. Thus, a reorientation of this educational icon towards its more Asian roots would take a little more time. Also, Southeast Asia area studies was overshadowed by country-specific programs - Japan and China, and of late Korea,[1] whose external funding platforms were key

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[1] Ateneo is home to the oldest Japanese Studies Program in the Philippines. It was

ingredients to their birth and longevity.

An undergraduate program for Southeast Asian Studies was introduced in the early 70s but was closed shortly thereafter. In the mid-80s, there was also an attempt to offer Asian Studies at the undergraduate level but was abandoned even before it could be introduced. What may be considered Southeast Asian Studies in the interim period consisted of graduate and undergraduate courses on History, Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology and Economics. Bahasa Indonesia is offered by another unit, the Department of Modern Languages at the School of Humanities.

It was only in 2013 when the School of Sciences, with Filomeno V. Aguilar as dean, pursued this initiative again but subject to the approval of university officials. His training and experience would naturally point towards the introduction of this program.[2] However, the program could only be offered as a minor given the disproportionate number of similar programs vis-à-vis the number of students at the School of Social Sciences. Like other private universities, the viability of course offerings, i.e. the number of enrollees required for a course, is always a major consideration in designing a program.

With a new dean and director, the Southeast Asian Studies program began to take off in early 2017. The minor program, a joint undertaking with the School of Humanities, has a prerequisite of 5 courses (or 15 units/credits) - 3 required and 2 electives for completion. Three tracks are offered to the prospective student-Language and Literature, Politics and Economics and History and Culture. Save for two courses, the Southeast Asian

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also the first university in the country to set up a Confucius Institute. Housed within the School of Social Sciences is the Ricardo Leong Center for Chinese Studies. Started in 2005, the Center is also devoted to promoting cultural cooperation between the two countries. The Korean Studies Program, launched in 2015, was made possible with strong support from Korean educational institutions, punctuated by a visit by then President Lee Myung-bak in 2012.

[2] F.V. Aguilar graduated from the Cornell's Southeast Asian Studies Program in 1994 and recipient of the Lauriston Sharp Award. He taught at the National University of Singapore and James Cook University in Australia before moving to Ateneo. For examples of his work, see Aguilar (2014) and (1998).

Studies Minor Program does not offer its own courses, but rather draws upon area-related courses offered by the various departments. The two courses it offered were electives which covered 6 units or credits and only given during the Summer Term. Southeast Asian Studies (SEAS) 101 is an In-Country Field Study where students are immersed in the history, culture and language of a particular country (Brunei Darussalam being the first) while SEAS 102 (Philippine–ASEAN Summer Internship) aims to expose students to the workings of the regional organization.

Ateneo also took other steps to anchor itself closer to the Southeast Asian region. It began to participate actively in the ASEAN University Network (AUN), a major program in the field of education, science and culture with the end in view of promoting integration among the peoples of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It has also revised its academic calendar to synchronize with the rest of the universities in the region. This was done beginning in 2015, a year after the first university in the country (UP) complied with this requirement for ASEAN Integration.

The De La Salle University also possessed the potential and expertise to venture into Southeast Asian studies. One of its senior faculty, Wilfrido V. Villacorta, was appointed Assistant Secretary General of the ASEAN from 2003 to 2006. Later, Villacorta became the Ambassador of the Philippine Permanent Mission to the ASEAN from 2011 to 2012. Some of its senior and middle level faculty have expertise on Southeast Asian studies, notably in the fields of security and international relations. Like the two aforementioned universities, a good number of region-related courses are currently offered by various departments within the College of Liberal Arts. Research, conferences, and publications on Southeast Asia were bolstered by its Yuchengo Center which specializes on human security and foreign affairs. The university also offers undergraduate and graduate degrees in International Studies, major in either China or Japan.

In 2013, the College of Liberal Arts undertook the creation of a bachelor's degree in Southeast Asian Studies, housed under the International Studies Department. Aside from the General Education courses, the degree requires 60 units of credit subdivided into four

areas: History and Economy, International Relations, Politics and Governance, Literature and Cultural Studies and Philosophy, Religion and Contemporary Society. Like the Ateneo, the university's curriculum reflected the support and collaboration of disciplinal departments, necessary in birthing an area studies program. In addition, a student had to enroll in 15 units of credit in any Southeast Asian university as part of specialization.

Academic Year 2016-2017 should have been the launch of this new program. However, this was postponed temporarily in view of the implementation of the new K-12 curriculum. Designed to adhere to international educational standards and make Philippine universities in sync with its regional peers, the K-12 added two more years of secondary education in 2016. This implies that for the next two years, or until 2018, graduating secondary students will not proceed to the tertiary level as they are rerouted to senior high school for additional preparation before entering university. The very small number of secondary school graduates from so called K-12-compliant schools entering the tertiary level forced university officials to defer the implementation of the Southeast Asian Studies Program until such time when the first graduates of the K-12 curriculum are to move up for tertiary education.

La Salle has been an active participant in regional exchanges. It is one of 60 participating universities in the ASEAN Inter Mobility for Students (AIMS) Program. Started in 2009, AIMS intended to hasten the process of regional integration by supporting student exchanges for at least one Term (or Semester) in a university of their choice – 7 in Malaysia, 4 in Indonesia, 4 in Thailand, 8 in Vietnam, 2 in Brunei and 3 in Japan. So far, students from Business, Economics, Engineering and Liberal Arts were made eligible to avail of this opportunity.

At the University of Santo Tomas, the Faculty of Arts and Letters offers a bachelor's degree in Asian Studies. This area studies program, set up in the mid-1970's, is the oldest in the Philippines. The program had withstood the vicissitudes that characterized the conduct or state of area studies in the past-small number of enrollees, lack of qualified faculty, little resources for library

acquisitions, to name a few. Despite these hurdles, the student population of Asian Studies grew steadily over the years. From only a few dozen students when it was first introduced, it now accommodates at least two sections (or blocks consisting of around 40 students) per year level. It boasts of a population of approximately 300 students.

Of the 201 units (or credits) required to complete the course, 67 units were devoted mainly to the study of Asia. Of these, 8 courses (24 units) focused solely on Asia and its sub regions *per* se while the rest were interdisciplinary courses on politics, economics, society, arts as well as language, seminar and reading courses. However, Nippongo and Mandarin were offered mostly in language courses. The curriculum has not changed much over the years. The university also has not been as active as the other three Philippine universities in terms of exchanges with its ASEAN counterparts.

Ⅳ. Transitions and prospects

The decline of Southeast Asian area studies in Europe and North America came at a time when the region was undergoing rapid development and growing in importance in world affairs in economic, social and security terms. As McVey (1995) observed, the Southeast Asian region has experienced rapid development more than Southeast Asian studies. Ironically however, as one scholar noted, the institutional crisis that gripped Southeast Asian studies in the US and Europe is not a major cause of concern for most Southeast Asians, it was of little interest to Southeast Asians, except perhaps for Singapore (Heryanto 2007: 76). But instead of going the way of area studies in the US and Europe, the fates of Southeast Asian Studies were reversed, marked by the increasing linkages and connectivity of nations and its institutions within the region. Marked by the massive movement of peoples, goods and information, this cross-cultural interaction defined Southeast Asian Studies which soon bore cross-country themes such migration, mobility, urban studies, environment, gender and religion and many more.

If Southeast Asian area studies started out from a colonial perspective (i.e., Southeast Asia was seen from "without" by traders, monks, scholars and travelers entering the region), the immense interaction among peoples of Southeast Asia precipitated a view that was from "within" and "cosmopolitan" (Bonura and Sears 2007: 16). As Beng Lan (2011: 14) pointed out, the future of Southeast Asian studies lies in regionally-located scholarships as alternative sites. Sears (2007: 3) further argued that rethinking area studies does not mean a better, a more precise and scientific inquiry but is a coming to terms with the politics, tensions, and gaps in the production of knowledge. For many practitioners within the region, an ideal Southeast Asian Studies program should be able to answer questions of people within the region as well as develop multiple perspectives (Baviera 2003).

The tension between area studies and the disciplines, as well as the general direction of Southeast Asian Studies in recent years were articulated and discussed several times over (Szanton 2004; Chou and Houben 2006; Goh 2011; Houtari et.al. 2014). In addition, the systemic or built-in disadvantages of Southeast Asian scholars and universities in this undertaking were discerningly noted by expert practitioners (Heryanto 2007; Reid 2003). On the one hand, this may look like a classic case of supply and demand. The lack of funding opportunities and priority led to a dearth of qualified teachers, scant opportunities for research and very limited library resources. Which translated to less interest and fewer students, making the program unsustainable in the long term and making it harder to advertise and attract its intended clientele. Taken together, this pattern perpetuates a vicious cycle. Furthermore, the growth and development of area studies on Southeast Asia has been uneven, as some countries had more resources to devote, and the research focus or emphasis equally varied depending on the country's history and cultural trajectory.

The development of Southeast Asian Studies from its inception in the 50's until the early 90s was primarily due to government prodding and patronage (Rafael 2004). Academic institutions were necessary partners of the state in the formulation of foreign policy as well as the training of its personnel. On the one hand, the

creation and development of area studies at the UP was sanctioned and supported by the state. At the same time, when the government's priorities and thrusts were altered, the Asian Center took the brunt, being deprived of funds and other support mechanisms. While private universities were not prone to this scheme, they were nonetheless reluctant in pursuing area studies due largely to its long-term viability. Impediments were overcome with the advent of rapid economic growth and the emerging importance of Southeast Asia in world affairs. ASEAN Integration is a promising opportunity that gave Philippine universities another chance to come up with a viable and sustained Southeast Asian Area Studies programs.

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Nation-Building in Independent Myanmar:
A Comparative Study of a History Textbook and a Civic Textbook

Myo Oo*

[*Abstract*]

This article examines the image of the nation of the Union of Myanmar (Burma) by comparing the history textbook and the civic textbook prescribed in state schools during the period of independence from 1948 to 1958. After the Second World War, the political conditions gave the way for the formation of the Union of Myanmar composed of ethnic nationals in Myanmar. To shape the national identity, the newly-founded independent nation in 1948, introduced textbooks in history and civics for the purpose of nation building. The paper concludes that the history textbook illustrated the golden ages of the Myanmar kingdom by way of national consolidation and portrayed ethnic nationals as homogenous; on the other hand, the civic textbook defined a citizen as one who is born and raised in Myanmar; it also included migrant Asians such as Chinese and South Asians in the fold. The history textbook aspired for the national consolidation of ethnic nationals for the strength and prosperity of the country while the civic textbook required cooperation from both ethnic nationals and migrant Asians for peace and development of the country and the world.

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Ⅰ. Introduction

This article examines the image of the nation of the Union of Myanmar (Burma),[1] composed of various ethnicities when it was newly-founded in 1948. For this purpose, a school history textbook and a civics textbook prescribed in state schools were compared.

Modern politics of Myanmar may be easily traced by looking back at its administration by the British. The British colonial administration began in the western coastal part of Rakhine, and the southern coastal area of Taninthayi, after the First Anglo-Myanmar War (1824-1826) (Stewart 1972: 35-56; Woodman 1962: 68-69). After the Second Anglo-Myanmar War (1852), the British took over Lower Myanmar (Nisbet 1901: 8; Vibart 1914: 221). Finally the British completed the annexation of Upper Myanmar in 1885 (Furnivall 1953: 21-16). After which, the British divided Myanmar into two administrative areas: Proper Myanmar, inhabited by major ethnic Burmese and some ethnic minorities, and Frontier Area, composed of Shan, Kachin, and Chin Hills. Since the 1900s, nationalist movements emerged in Proper Myanmar and reached a peak by the 1930's (Mya Han 1991: 58). The Young Men Buddhist Association (YMBA), which asked for the development of Buddhist Burmese, (Myo Oo 2011: 124) led the movement between 1906 and 1920. The General Council of Burmese Association (GCBA), which attempted to practice "Home Rule" (Taylor 1988: iv), led from 1920's to the 1930's. The Myanmar Association, which aimed for independence (Khin Yi 1988: 3), led the movement from 1930 to 1945. The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, which decided to form the Union of Myanmar, led the movement from 1945 to 1948. On the eve of the independence of Myanmar, the nationalists led by AFPFL made an agreement with ethnic national leaders to form the Union of Myanmar composed of Proper Myanmar and Frontier Areas

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1 The term "Myanmar" has been used to refer the country, "Burmese" is for the ethnicity.

(Maung Maung 1959: 186-187).

This article is an attempt to figure out the national identity in the Union of Myanmar during the independent time. It was an important moment to inculcate civic knowledge to the citizens of the Union of Myanmar. This study carried out a comparative study of a school history textbook and a civics textbook prescribed during this period.

Ⅱ. Nation-Building and Education in Myanmar Context

Education is a powerful tool of modern governments to shape national identity. As Chai noted, existing researches proved that some authorities utilized textbooks to shape national identity (Vural and Ozuyanik 2008; Cayire 2009; Lee 2010; Williams 2014; Zaho 2014; Chai 2015: 3). Crawford also noted the crucial role of school textbooks in transmitting ideologies and reflecting knowledge considered important by a powerful group (Crawford 2003: 5; Myo Oo 2012B: 123).

In an article, Chai reviewed literatures on history, civics, and social studies textbooks that fostered nationalism or shaped national identity in some countries such as North Korea, Jordan, Turkey, China, India, Nepal, Ukraine, Singapore, and the United States. Chai annotated researches by Apple (1992), Sleeter (2002), Nassar (2004), vom Hau (2009), and Carney and Madsen (2009) (Chai 2015: 4). To build national identity, political leaders often used state education systems and school curricula to make citizens' national identity consistent with long-term political goals (Chai 2015: 3). Regarding how shaping national identity is carried out through textbooks, Williams on the other hand proved the role of social institutions in developing national identity. One may read his "Nation, State, School, Textbook" in *(Re) Constructing Memories: School Textbooks and the Imagination of the Nation* (2014).

Three articles discuss Myanmar history textbooks and Burmese nationalism: "Historiography and National Identity of Colonial Burma: An Analysis of a Vernacular School History Textbook" (Myo

Oo 2012a); "A Textbook Case of Nation-Building: The Evolution of History Curricula in Myanmar" (Nicolas Salem-Gervais and Rosalie Metro 2012); and "History Textbooks and the Construction of National Identity in Burma" (Ada Chai 2014). In his article, Myo Oo has explained how modern Burmese national identity was portrayed in a national school history textbook during the colonial period. His paper showed how U Ba Than's history textbook has reconstructed the golden ages such as the First Burmese Kingdom, the Second Burmese Kingdom, and the Third Burmese Kingdom, as well as how he divided the Burmese historical periods in chronicles and conceptualization that discourse Burmese national identity since the colonial period (2012a: 19-20).

Meanwhile, Salem-Gervais and Rosalie Metro's paper (2012) unravel how and why the contents in state school history textbooks evolved. It also dealt with how respective Myanmar governments used classic nationalist strategies, such as emphasizing the contributions of national heroes, looking back and the golden past, as well as reinventing and projecting national unity (Chai 2015: 7).

Chai's research (2014) has noted the use of history by the Myanmar State to promote the following ideas:

> (1) the rule of skilled military leaders who are able to defend and unite the nation and improve national development, (2) the unity of different national races as one homogenous group for national peace and prosperity, (3) the unity of different national races as one homogenous group for national peace and prosperity, (3) cautious interactions with "others," such as foreigners or dissenting ethnic minorities, and (4) Buddhism as the State religion (Chai 2015: 2, 4).

Regarding modern civics textbooks imported into Myanmar during the colonial time and transmitted civic knowledge, there is but one research, "Colonial Knowledge Transmitted in British Burma: An analysis of Civic Textbook Prescribed in National School" (Myo Oo 2012b). In this textual analysis, the author highlighted the reasons the General Council of Burmese Association, the leading nationalist association of the period, in transmitting colonial administrative knowledge in the form of modern civic knowledge, to students and the populace. The council wanted to inform people

about freedom, equality, and civic duties such as protecting the country or obeying the law paying taxes, and participating in social activities.

Researches on the history and civics textbooks prescribed during the colonial and the current times abound, but not as the country was about to gain independence, which, this paper assumes as pivotal in forming citizenship in the Union of Myanmar in 1947. This article appraises the efforts and discourses of nation-building in the history and civics textbooks prescribed during the post-independent period, especially between 1948 and 1958.

Ⅲ. Myanmar History School Textbook

The history textbook for consideration is *Pyidaungzu Myanmar Nainggan Thamine* (History of the Union of Myanmar) (Yangon: Thudamawadi Ponnaitaik, 1956 (Six Edition)) by Ba Shin, a lecturer of the Department of the Myanmar and Far Eastern History, and an ex-major of the Myanmar Army.

The textbook is composed of four parts. Part A, "The Prehistory and Ancient History of Myanmar," dealt with the migration of ethnic groups into present day Myanmar and their coexistence. Part B, "Feudal Era," chronicled the accounts from AD 1000 to the First Anglo-Myanmar War (1824-1826). Part C, "Colonization Process in Myanmar," featured historical accounts during the colonial period, 1826 to 1945. Part D, "The Federal Era," record the accounts from 1945 to 1948 (Ba Shin 1956: Contents).

Of these, Part B and C are further divided into several chapters. Part B has five chapters: the First National Consolidation Era (1044-1300); the Disunity Era (1300-1539); the Second National Consolidation Era (1539-1600); the Third National Consolidation Era (1600-1752); and the Fourth National Consolidation Era (1752-1824). Part C has four chapters: The Era of the Present of Capitalism (1824-1885); No Resistance Era (1886-1920); The Nationalist Movements Era (1920-1942); and the Japanese Fascism Era (1942- 1945). Please see below:

<Table 1> Contents of School Myanmar History Textbook

Part	Chapter	Title	Subject
A		The Prehistory and Ancient History of Myanmar	The geographical formation of Myanmar
	Chapter 1	The Stone Age (BC 2500- AD 600)	The migration of ethnic groups into present day Myanmar
	Chapter 2	People in Myanmar	The population of the ethnic nationals based on 1930 Census
B		Feudal Era	The history of Myanmar kingdoms
	Chapter 1	First National Consolidation Era	The glory of Bagan Kingdom by the national consolidation
	Chapter 2	Disunity Era	The disunity and emergence of city-states
	Chapter 3	Second National Consolidation Era	The glory of Taungoo Kingdom by the national consolidation
	Chapter 4	Third National Consolidation Era	The glory of Nyaungyan kingdom by the national consolidation
	Chapter 5	Fourth National Consolidation Era	The glory of Konbaung Kingdom by the national consolidation
C		The Capitalist Era (1826-1945)	Accounts of the Colonial Period
	Chapter 1	The Present of Capitalism Era (1824-1885)	The British colonization process
	Chapter 2	No Resistance Era (1886 -1920)	Accounts before the nationalist movement occurs
	Chapter 3	The Nationalist Movements Era (1920-1942)	Accounts of the nationalist movement throughout colonial period
	Chapter 4	The Japanese Fascism Era (1942- 1945)	The state in Myanmar during the Second World War
D		The Union of Myanmar Formation Era	The formation of the Union of Myanmar by the AFPFL led by General Aung San

3.1. *Taiyintha*: Homogenous People of Myanmar

In Part A, the author described the migration of ethnic nationals during the ancient times (Stone Age, Slash-and-Burn-Life Age, and Rice Cultivation Age) in this manner: The migration of Mon-Khmer

and Tibeto-Burman into the area of British Myanmar in the Stone Age; the Salon-Malay in Slash-and-Burn Life Period; and the Mon, Palaung, and Wa in Mon-Khmer group and Pyu and Karen (Ba Shin 1956: 30) in Tibeto-Burman groups in the Rice Cultivation Age. Most of the above-mentioned ethnic groups migrated to Myanmar during the Slash-and-Burn and Rice Cultivation Ages. The cultivation of culture made possible the founding of a city-state. Through trading, they evolved literacy, religion, and arts. Ethnic nationals were perceived to have developed culture and coexistence in the said periods (Ba Shin 1956: 20-36).

The author also listed the ethnicities of the *taiyintha* (ethnic nationals) based on the 1930 Census conducted by the British Colonial Government. The list pegged the total population to over 1,450 million; two-thirds of these were Burmese (the term Myanmar used to refer to ethnic Burmese in the textbook), one-third consisted of other ethnic nationals (135,000), and what remains are foreigners (Ba Shin 1956: 21) such as Europeans, Chinese, and Indians (100,000). Ethnicity was also identified based on language, as ethnic population was determined as it was identified in the 1930 Census (Ba Shin 1956: 21-22). The ethnic groups in British Myanmar in 1930 are as follows:

<Table 2> Ethnic Groups

No.	Ethnic Group	Population
1	Salon-Malay Group	64,000
2	Mon-Palaung Group	84,000
3	Karen Group	1,350,000
4	Burmese Group	9,900,000
5	Thet Group	50,000
6	Kachin Group	150,000
7	Chin Group	350,000
8	Naga Group	40,000
9	Shan Group	1,000,000

3.2. The First National Consolidation

In Part B, the author wrote about the history of Feudal Era, which encompasses the Burmese dynastic history. Unlike previous historians, the author divided history based on the economic system

prevalent in the eras: the First National Consolidation Era (1044-1300); the Disunity Era (1300-1539); the Second National Consolidation Era (1539- 1600); the Third National Consolidation Era (1600-1752); and the Forth National Consolidation Era (1752- 1824). "The Feudalism Era (AD 1000 -1826)" is an account of Burmese dynastic history from Bagan to the Colonial periods. In this, the author claimed that the golden age of the Burmese dynastic history and the construction of the Burmese kingdoms were made possible by way of national consolidation structured on the military conquests of Burmese kings.

The author also separately explained the establishment of the First Myanmar Kingdom in two small sections. The first one is national consolidation in King Anawrahta's time, the second in King Kyansitha's, where the Burmese and Mon, the largest ethnic groups in Central Myanmar, consolidated. The author himself preferred the national consolidation by King Kyansittha than that of King Anawrahta. The author also pointed out that King Kyansittha was more interested in national consolidation (Ba Shin 1956: 69) referring the King Kyansitha's actions, namely, the holding of his wedding to Mon Princess Khin Oo in traditional Mon rituals, alongside the performance of traditional Mon dances and songs; his enthronement which was recorded in stone inscription in Mon language, and where he is recognized as a great king by both Mon and Burmese (Ba Shin 1956: 69); his attempt to solidify Mon-Burmese friendship when he married off his daughter to Nagathaman, a son of a former Mon king. Consequently, he named his grandson Alaungsithu and had him enthroned. The child's mixed ethnicities satisfied both groups and further enhanced national consolidation (Ba Shin 1956: 71).

Equality between the ethnic groups was observed in the First Myanmar Kingdom. Describing national consolidation of Pagan Period, the author underlined the importance of political strategies and the application of necessary standards in daily life and religious practices of the citizens. For instance, reports stated that King Alaungsithu introduced the standard units of weights, measurement, and currency that enhanced domestic trade and business. During this period, the king equally treated all citizens and emphasized

national consolidation. King Alaungsithu integrated the First Myanmar Kingdom by the policies mentioned above (Ba Shin 1956: 79).

Unlike the First Myanmar Kingdom, wartime was aptly described in Part B's title as the "Disunity Era (1300 - 1539)." As in history textbooks in the colonial period, the Disunity Era meant the period of strife among the city states Sagaing, Pinya, and Inwa (Ba Shin 1956: 103). The author still puts premium on national consolidation, as he emphasized that the wars did not involve ethnic conflict. He also underlined the co-mingling of the Mon and Burmese in lower Myanmar after the later migration in the region.

3.3. The Second National Consolidation (1539-1600)

The Second National Consolidation consists of accounts covering the Taungoo dynastic history, often referred to as the Second Myanmar Kingdom in modern history textbooks. The textbook for consideration wrote that the formation of the Second Myanmar Kingdom began in the time of King Dabinshwehti. As in the national consolidation in the First Myanmar Kingdom, the author described the rise of the Second Myanmar Kingdom into two ways: military power and national consolidation. The author however paid more attention to the national consolidation of King Dabinshwehti than his military success. He also noted that the king never engaged in oppression nor the destruction of Mon culture and traditions after his conquest of Pegu, the old Mon capital near Yangon. The king allowed Mon officials to govern, and the landlords to tend to the lands (Ba Shin 1956: 151). Even his cabinet maintained an equal composition of Mon and Burmese noblemen. This suggests the author's tendency to emphasize the importance of national integration which is also true for the reign of King Shwehti. For the author, the kings provided the Mon a space to integrate, since they were the largest ethnic group in Lower Myanmar. This may be seen in how King Shwehit earned the support from both the Mon and Burmese after his conquest of Pegu (Ba Shin 1956: 151).

Another king who engaged in national consolidation is King Bayinnaung, a brother-in-law of King Dabinshwehti. His governance,

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economy, trade, and religion were accounted for, but not his military affairs. The author described King Bayinnaung as a unifier who provided security to his people (Ba Shin 1956: 167). Later on, equality among ethnic groups was discussed. Taking from the ethnic egalitarianism (Ba Shin 1956: 151) of King Dabinshwehti, King Bayinnaung adopted a ranking and appointment system through meritocracy that avoided discrimination among the Mon, Shan, and Burmese.

3.4. The Third National Consolidation (1600-1752)

The Third Myanmar Kingdom (1600-1752) mentioned in this textbook is widely recognized as the second half of the Second Myanmar Kingdom in modern Myanmar historical writing. The Third Myanmar Kingdom emerged when King Nyaungyan, (1600-1605), a son of King Bayinnaung, built a new capital in Inwa, an old capital, after the destruction of the Second Myanmar Kingdom in Pegu. The author evaluated two key factors that shaped this period. First was King Anaukpelon's positions that prevented of colonization in Myanmar. After Bayinnaung's death, King Nanda, his eldest son, succeeded the throne. In King Nanda's time, Pegu was attacked by the Rakhine king, who gave Thanlyin the seaport of Pegu, as well as to Phillip de Britto, who led the Portuguese soldiers. King Tharlon of Inwa attacked Rhanlyin, which De Britto ruled, consequently driving away the west from Myanmar (Ba Shin 1956: 185).

The second one has to do the reforms the king adopted to help Myanmar's economy recover. The author mentioned King Tharlon as the one who led the economic reforms, which especially benefitted the lower class (Ba Shin 1956: 204). The Third Myanmar Kingdom was strong in its national consolidation policy because of three factors: 1. The military efforts of King Nyaungyan and King Anaukphelon that followed King Bayinnayung's national consolidation policy; 2. The effective economic reforms enforced by King Tharlon (1628-1648); 3. Continued foreign relations despite the weakening and collapse of the nation in the time of the successors of King Tharlon (Ba Shin 1956: 213-214). The author considered the

economic gains of the Third Myanmar Kingdom as pivotal in national consolidation.

3.5. The Fourth National Consolidation (1752-1824)

The Forth National Consolidation period in the history textbook for consideration is usually the first part of the Third Myanmar Kingdom in modern Myanmar history books. This period covers the first half of the Konbaung Period, the last dynasty in Myanmar. The author accounted for the reigns of six of 11 kings. Unlike the other kingdoms, the Fourth Myanmar Kingdom was characterized by way of its military might.

Historically, the country during this period faced grave situations. The southern coastal areas of Taninthayi, Myeik, and Dawe were being claimed by Thailand, and in the west, India is being controlled by the British. The author noted that the challenges compelled King Alaungmintaya to further strengthen the kingdom (Ba Shin 1956: 221-222), by way of military enhancement. The author also noted the reign of King Bodawphaya (King Grand Father), third son of King Alaungmintay, who was able to unify the Rakhine Kingdom up to the Forth Myanmar Kingdom. Meanwhile, a conquest led by the crown prince, King Bodawphaya's eldest son, attacked Rakhine (Ba Shin 1956: 250).

The Capitalist Period (1826-1945) corresponds to the Colonial Period covering British colonization to the Second World War. This section was divided into four parts: the Capitalist Period (1826-1945), the Passive Period (1886-1920), the Independent Movement Period (1920-1942), and the Fascist Period (1942-1945).

The Capitalist Period started in what is considered the second half of Konbaung Period (1826-1886) in the modern Myanmar history books. The second half of the Konbaung Period covered the reigns of King Bagyidaw, King Thayawaddy, King Pagan, King Mindon (1853-1878), and King Thibaw (1878-1885) until the British invasion hit the country hard.

3.6. The Union of Myanmar Formation Period (1945-1948)

The Union Period covered national consolidation in British Myanmar after the Second World War. This section narrated General Aung San's contributions to the formation of the Union of Myanmar, the split of the AFPFL, his assassination in July 19, 1947, and the emergence of independent Myanmar. In the narrative, the government led by the Aung San insisted that Myanmar be given independence within one year. The government also convened Burmese and other ethnic minorities such as Kachin, Kaya, Karen, Chin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan to form the 5th Union of Myanmar as a means of the national consolidation. Aung San worked hard to carry out the project. The author maintained that the ethnic nationals understood the Burmese ambition to unite (Ba Shin 1956: 351). In other words, the author believed that it was possible to form the 5th Union of Myanmar because the ethnic nationals consented with national consolidation.

Also, the author briefly described the main factors that made possible the rise of the Myanmar Communist Party and the split of AFPFL. Foremost of which is the assassination of Aung San, which also aborted the government (Ba Shin 1956: 352-353). U Nu, who succeeded Aung San, and his other cabinet members, signed a treaty on defense and independence with the British government August 29, 1947 (Ba Shin 1956: 353).

The section on independence was the last item in the history textbook. The author discussed the Nu-Attlee Agreement of October 17, 1947 signed by the Myanmar Provisional government's Prime Minister U Nu with United Kingdom Prime Minister Clement Attlee, which certified. Myanmar independence, and set the day of Myanmar independence of January 4, 1948 as also the foundation of the 5th Union of Myanmar (Ba Shin 1956: 354).

3.7. Discussion

Myanmar modern historiography has changed during the colonial period. A. P. Phayre, administrator-scholar, published *History of Burma*, which successfully acknowledged Myanmar (the British

Burma) as a multi-ethnic society. Another milestone in Myanmar historiography is U Ba Than's school history textbook *Kyaung Thone Myanmar Yazawin*, which coined the golden ages of Myanmar and introduced the First, Second, and Third Myanmar Kingdoms in Myanmar history. Historiography emerged on the eve of the 1947 independence seeking national consolidation of all ethnic groups in Myanmar across time. This ethos is not lost on school history textbooks.

From the start, the ethnic diversity of Myanmar was pointed out by the history school textbook prescribed during the period of independence. Multi-ethnicities were said to have existed in Myanmar since the prehistoric times, as Myanmar kingdoms were founded in multi-ethnic contexts. This multi-ethnicity stretched to colonial times. The textbook assessed the formation of the Myanmar kingdoms, locating their golden ages of cultural and economic development as well as the gains of national consolidation which eventually led to the formation of the Union of Myanmar after the Second World War.   The history textbook prescribed at the independent time assumed a basic ideology: that Myanmar was a nation composed of many ethnicities that participated in national consolidation and the creation of a homogeneous population.

Ⅳ. Civics School Textbook

Civic education was imported to Myanmar during the colonial period as part of modern education. The initial purpose of Civics was to impart British Imperial ideology to the colonial populace. In those days, Myanmar educators prescribed Civics in national schools to impart civic awareness. It became more necessary in shaping the citizens of the independent Myanmar. This section analyzes how a prescribed post-independence Civics textbook was produced to educate citizens of the Union of Myanmar.

4.1 Civic Education during the Period of Independence

The civics textbook for consideration is *Pyithu Niti* (Direction of

Citizen) by U Ba Pe, a former administrator and educator. It has two parts: one for Grade 9 students; the other for Grade 10 students.

The first part has 12 chapters, including an introduction; Chapters 1 and 2 discussed the necessity of civic education. Chapters 3 to 6 defined citizenship while Chapters 7 to 12 described the state and its institutions. Meanwhile, the second part described how government works: Chapters 13, 14, and 15 outlined the functions of the administrative bodies; meanwhile, Chapters 16, 17, and 18 discussed the functions of the ministries for the national development; Chapter 19 talked about what the country is all about and the role of a volunteer. Chapters 21 to 24 featured lessons on the importance of the democracy movement in Myanmar and the world after the Second World War.

<Table 3> Contents of Civics School Textbook

Chapter	Title	Subject
1	Meaning of civic education and basic characteristics	Social character of human being
2	Society and Unity	The formation of a society
3	Citizenship, its Characteristics	Definition and characteristics of a citizen
4	Characteristics which cancel a Citizenship	Characteristics of a citizen who are ineligible
5	Citizen's Responsibility	The responsibility of a citizen
6	Citizen's right	The rights of a citizen
7	The Government	The formation of a government
8	The State	The definition and obligation of a state
9	The State's Policy	The duties of the government
10	The Formation of the State	The formation of a state
11	The President and the Parliament	The role of a president and the parliament
12	The Federal government	The formation of the Union of Myanmar government
13	The State and Government	The description of administrative bodies

Chapter	Title	Subject
14	Laws and Administration	The description of legislative system
15	The State and Defense	The department of Defense and Security
16	The State and Social Welfare (1)	National development: Education
17	The State and Social Welfare (2)	National Development: Health
18	The State and Social Welfare (3)	National Development: Transportation
19	Volunteering	The needs of volunteer work in Myanmar
20	Local Governments	The formation of local governments
21	World's Development and Myanmar	The relation of the world's development and Myanmar
22	Peace	The need of peace for the world's development
23	Human Rights	The importance of human right
24	Democracy	The description of democratic values

4.2. The Social Character of a Human Being

In the first chapter, man is described by the author as fundamentally a social being. Civic then is important as it outlines man's duties and responsibilities to society (Ba Pe 1953: 2). Furthermore, society is multifarious, which makes civics essential (Ba Pe 1953: 5).

The second chapter emphasis man's being a social animal, pacing Aristotle (Ba Pe 1953: 17), and related how it helped evolve the formation of a nation. Societies have been founded on the family as the basic unit, clans were forged by kinship and the need for collective protection. As population increased, the clan grew into a tribe, which later on developed culture and formed ethnicity or a nation (Ba Pe 1953: 17-19). This is something observable in the formation of the Union of Myanmar, which integrated ethnic minorities into the fold immediately after independence.

The author theorized that Myanmar emerged out of this same human process of nation formation, which consequently grew larger

communities like the League of Nations in the 20ᵗʰ century. Cooperation among member-countries was forged and the league grew into the United Nations (UN) after the Second World War (Ba Pe 1953: 20-21). The textbook featured the charter signed by world leaders establishing the UN in July 26, 1945, as well as Myanmar's application for membership communicated on February 27, 1948. The country was accepted in the UN in April 19, 1948 (Ba Pe 1953: 21). This sojourn into modern history emphasized once more the importance of Civics as the world finds itself growing into a larger community. International relations were deemed important (Ba Pe 1953: 22).

4.3. The Definition of Citizen

Lessons from Chapters 3 to 6 accounts for citizenship: Chapter 3 defined what a citizen is; Chapter 4 discusses the characteristics of a citizen who is in-eligible; Chapter 5 talked about citizen responsibility; and Chapter 6, citizen's rights.

The author defined a citizen as "a person who has to fulfill the duty of the state and who has rights," again pacing Aristotle. He adds that because of this "one cannot be eligible to become a citizen if he is not dutiful, even though he is a citizen by law" (Ba Pe 1953: 27).

For the author, people living in the country may be classified into two categories. The first one is a citizen or *taiyintha,* composed of the Burmese majority and the ethnic minorities (Ba Pe 1953: 28). Taiyintha is one who is born and raised in the country. A foreigner may also acquire nationality in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Ba Pe 1953: 28).

The second one is any individual who meets the citizenship requirements of the Union of Myanmar as stipulated in the 1947 Constitution. One may acquire Myanmar citizenship if: one was born to native parents; one has grandparents born in Myanmar; one was born to parents who are citizens; one whose parents were born British; one has stayed in Myanmar 8 to 10 years from January 1, 1942; one wants to live in Myanmar forever.

Chapter 4 describes the possible disqualifications of citizenship, which delved on unpatriotic actions such as lack of knowledge, selfishness, and disobedience of laws (Ba Pe 1953: 37). One may also be disqualified by way of economic difficulties, strong attachment to a political party, and preference of individual over collective interests (Ba Pe 1953: 42-44).

Chapter 5 outlines the duties and responsibilities of citizens. The author maintained that the more society develops, the heavier the responsibilities for the citizen. For the author, obligations of citizenship are part of everyday life. When one cannot fulfill obligations harmony in the state is disturbed (Ba Pe 1953: 44-45). As life changed for the past 100 years, and developments in science, education, economy, transportation, and politics has made it increasingly complex, people are required to understand it and be responsible for their immediate and larger communities (Ba Pe 1953: 46-48).

Chapter 6 laid out the rights of the citizens. Rights are part of his participation in society, and must be protected at all times (Ba Pe 1953: 62).

4.4. Freedom and Equality in the Union of Myanmar

Lessons from Chapters 7 to 12 describe the structure of the administrative agencies, including the functions of the state. While Chapters 7 and 8 explained the rationale and obligations of the state, Chapters 9 to 12 outlined the policies and configuration of the Union of Myanmar government.

Chapter 7 bears the title State and Government. Pacing European scholars, the author explains what a state is and the factors that forms it.

Chapter 8 is titled the Duty of a Government. In here, the author explains what nations are all about. According to the author, a state is an organization composed of citizens, and in order to further include all in its fold, it must organize systematically operate the government which was established by way of national sovereignty emanating from the citizens. The author also stated that

while a state is an organization composed of all citizens, the government is a small administrative body composed of selected representatives (Ba Pe 1953: 80f).

As representatives of the state, the government is obligated to rule as the citizens wish (Ba Pe 1953: 80f).

Meanwhile, Chapter 9 is titled the Basic Policy of the State. This chapter explains freedom and equality as enacted by the 1947 Constitution. Chapter 10 is the Formation of the Nation. The author narrated how the Union of Myanmar was formed through national consolidation after the Second World War. It also traces the history of Myanmar from the time of Myanmar kings and the colonial period, to the ethnic and geographic integration that led to the striving for independence. The book sported a clearly anti-colonial perspective that valued, among others, the contribution of General Aung San in the movement for national consolidation that led to the formation of the "union" that imbued rights to its citizenry and formed the government.

Chapter 11 on the other hand outlined the functions of the President and Parliament. It detailed how a president is elected as well as his duties and responsibilities. A president is elected from members of Upper and Lower Parliaments by the secret balloting, and serves only twice. A full term is composed of five years (Ba Pe 1953: 127).

Chapter 12 is titled the Federal Government, and contains what had been articulated in Chapters 10 and 11. The legitimacy of the independent government was also elaborated in this chapter. The author reiterated that the Chin, Karen, Kachin, Mon, and Shan already existed and co-mingled freely in Myanmar, a rich country of national resources, throughout history, from the time of Dagaung to Mandalay to the founding of the Union of Myanmar, when all consolidated. He argued that the Myanmar suffered when the United Kingdom occupied it in 1886 (Ba Pe 1953: 139). The author reiterated the importance of nationalists like General Aung San in the campaign for independence. Differences in ethnicity, language, thought, and religions were bridged as the Union of Myanmar strived for national solidarity, inspired by the national spirit of

taiyintha (Ba Pe 1953: 139-148).

Chapters 13 to 15 account for the governing agencies of the Union of Myanmar. Chapter 13 explained administration from the village level to the state level administration of the Cabinet. Chapter 14 discussed the judicial and legislative systems. Chapter 15 elaborated on defense and security, and the institutions of the military, police, and prisons. These chapters explained the three main pillars of the Union: legislation, administration and judiciary.

4.5. The Development of the State

Lessons from Chapter 16 to 20 discuss the functions of administrative agencies. Chapters 16, 17, and 18 dealt with education, health, and agriculture while 19 stressed the importance of volunteerism. Chapter 20 talked about local administration.

Chapter 16 particularly discusses education in general, criticized its dispensation during the colonial period, and explained how it changed in the independent period. Chapter 17 accounted for the government's health services. Chapter 17 discussed agriculture and forestry, as 65 % of Myanmar citizens are farmers (Ba Pe 1953: 141-146).

Chapter 18 delves into transportation and infrastructure (Ba Pe 1953: 151) while Chapter 19 discussed social welfare. Local administration was discussed in Chapter 20 (Ba Pe 1953: 182-184).

4.6. The World and Myanmar

Chapter 21 elaborates on Myanmar's relation with the world. Given that the world has become borderless by way of progress in science, technology, and economy in the last 100 years, Myanmar has found itself connecting with the world (Ba Pe 1953: 206). The author emphasized that this necessitated a forging of international relations.

Chapter 22 talks about the emergence and importance of the League of Nations (1930-1946) that later became the United Nations (UN). The league was described as pivotal in ending the First World War, and much later on, campaigning for lasting peace (Ba Pe 1953:

215-216). The author also explained the structure and functions of the UN, as well as its purposes: to be a forum where countries deemed equals may lobby for peace; to be a platform where a set number of members with particular tenures dialogue (Ba Pe 1953: 227-228); and to provide access to a World Court of Justice where disputes may be raised. 68 countries became members of the UM in 1951. In 1947, every member country agreed to teach about the UN in schools. The success or failure of the UN depended on the participation of member countries (Ba Pe 1953: 236-237). As a member, Myanmar is expected to cooperate with the international community to maintain world peace and stability.

4.7. Discussion

Administrators and educators in Myanmar imparted civic knowledge during the colonial period and the independent period. During the colonial period, the British administrators taught civic education to teach British Imperial ideology; Myanmar intellectuals prescribed civics in national schools to educate people about modern administrative knowledge. In the independent period, the state conveyed civic awareness to the citizens of the inclusive Union of Myanmar.

The civics textbook prescribed in during independent period situated the country in a multi-cultural context. For the textbook, national politics was formative in the consolidation process. The textbook emphasized man's being a social animal who could not avoid relating with other people and the world. This is a fundamental principle that hold citizens of the Union of Myanmar responsible for forging solidarity among themselves, and with the larger world. The textbook educates as well as it imparts understanding about democracy and the multiculturalism that built its national consolidation. In short, this textbook imparted civic knowledge and conveys a sense of spiritual and social unity to produce members of the union and the world.

Ⅴ. Conclusion

In this article, a comparative study of a Myanmar history school textbook and a civics school textbook prescribed in state schools during the independent period (1948 to 1958) was carried out. The history textbook portrays the golden ages of the Myanmar kingdoms and narrated the process of national consolidation that homogenized all ethnic nationals. On the other hand, the Civics textbook defines citizenship for all dwelling in Myanmar, including migrant Asians, Chinese, and Indians, who acquired nationality. It may be inferred that a dichotomy exists in the history textbook and the Civics textbook. The history textbook posit national consolidation of all ethnic nationals as a requirement for national strength and prosperity; the Civics textbook meanwhile require the cooperation of all citizens to achieve peace and development in the region and the world.

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Social Capital Revitalization of the Sasaq Community in Lombok, Indonesia through Learning Organization

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[*Abstract*]

The Sasaq community in Lombok, Indonesia has been recognized as a peasant community with its unique and strong social capital. Sources of social capital recognition can be derived from common terms or expressions and institutions practiced in community daily life. However, there is a trend of neglecting and ignoring those values by the community, especially the youth. Through action research, we would like to revitalize social capital of the community in supporting social and economic development in the rural level. In this paper, we introduce a Strategic Leadership and Learning Organization (SLLO) approach to build community participation in solving social and economic problems. Through regular dialogue, communities come with common agreements and collective action that are perceived as emergence property. Several common agreements are intended to solve community problems actually in line with the objectives of government designated development.

Keywords: language terms, institutions, community dialogue, collective action, recognitive learning.

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Ⅰ. Background

Social capital is a result of social interaction, development of norms of behavior, and institutionalization of rules and norms (Rudd 2000: 131). Social capital is now often referred to as the complex of social relationships, norms, and institutions (Coleman 1987; Ostrom 1999). Furthermore, the theory of social capital clarifies relationships between social interactions and outcomes that contribute to the production of environmental quality, public peace, and economic prosperity, as well as necessary factors for long-term social and ecological sustainability (Rudd 2000: 132).

The theory of social capital focuses on the thesis of "relationship matter" (Field 2003). Meanwhile, the central idea of social capital is that social network is a valuable asset. Through interaction, people can build communities; commit themselves to each other; and create a tightly-knit social fabric. Hanifan (1920) believes that the cultivation of good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social interaction can make up a social unit. In interactions, relationships built on trust and tolerance install social networks. An established social network potentially brings great benefits to people (Field 2003).

World Bank has elected the notion of social capital as a useful organizing principle (Knack 1999). Evidence suggests that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital allows people to resolve collective problems easily. Through collaboration, communities maybe become better and share to support community action (Putnam 2000).

Social capital accelerates the development process of a community. Trust that enables repeated interactions reduces costs of everyday business and cultivates social transaction among community members (Putnam 2000). Fukuyama (2002: 23) emphasizes that social capital is a necessary precondition for development, but a strong rule of law and basic political institutions are necessary to build social capital. However, he admits that there are still much to be done to build strong social capital.

The development of social capital is a long-term process chronicled through language and literature. The social cohesiveness of traditional communities utilized currently as social capital is expressed in language. Category and linguistic expressions are considered to be lingual category forms and verbal expressions in the social capital domain. Lingual category and verbal expressions considered as surface structure can be transformed into deep structure as articulated by behavior (Mahyuni 2007: 84; Saharudin 2014: 140).

Meanwhile, although literature is a result of writer's imagination and creativity, it reflects the empirical situation of community a writer has experienced (Abdullah 1985). Literature is also perceived as a system or symbol since literature has a strong link to the social system form which it emerged (Kuntowijaya 1985). Therefore, social capital can be traced from practical language and existing literature through the usage of language terms, expression, and institutions.

The most popular literature portraying the Sasaq community is the Babad Lombok. It is a collection of literary works, as well as writings on values, norms, faith and beliefs, historical background, the origin of Sasaq Community, kings and nobles, and teaching of behavior and manners. Babad Lombok is written in Ancient Javanese–*Jejawen*–and it comprises 1221 *pupuh* (traditional poetry) (Djuwita 2015: 72). Saharudin (2014: 147) considers that there are at least three types of social capital in the Sasaq community which construct social cohesiveness values. Social capital here refers to the forms of interaction (brotherhood and collaboration), institutions, and norms.

As a peasant traditional community, Sasaq has several language terms relating to the activities of cooperation or solidarity in managing rice fields, which may be classified as social capital. Some of these are *najen, nginjam, bêsiru, bêkelompok, bêdêrêp,* and *bêgae (*Saharudin 2014: 142*).* The most common term used by Sasaq community is besiru, which literally means "mutual help." Besiru is an expression of solidarity and cohesiveness of the community in helping, as well as supporting each other without expecting any wage. It appears in social events such as farm cultivation, wedding

parties, building houses, and death and funeral ceremonies.

Besiru is reflected in expressions such as "*bareng susah atau bareng senang,"* which means togetherness in either difficulty or happiness. Another is "*bareng anyong jari sejukung,"* or to sink together in one boat. This indicates how people realize that to live in harmony requires the willingness to share the burden of others. Another is "*beriuk tinjal,"* or to push together using the feet. This idiom is similar to *gotong royong* in Bahasa Indonesia meaning freely working together.

The Sasaq community has a concept of collectivity expressed in the term of "*semeton*" or brotherhood. The social mechanism to build the concept can be found in several linguistic categories such as *ngayo*, *bejango*, *siarah, sempait salam*, and *belangar* (Saharudin 2014: 143). These terms have different meanings according to are to be visited, the distance one takes, the directness or indirectness of the meeting, and the reason for visiting. However, these find common ground in the context of visiting others. These indicate how people are concerned with the importance of a harmonious human relationship. This may be considered a foundation to build social cohesiveness and social capital as well. For instance, there is an expression that describes the social cohesiveness among the Sasaq community: "*bareng anyong saling sedok.*" This expression exemplifies how happiness and sorrow are similarly felt in life as well as in death.

Ngayo, for example, is a special term for describing the habit of visiting neighbors who are not family. The term *ngayo* literally means "visiting" someone close area or within the neighborhood. It is used to express the activity of visiting whoever is perceived to be able to share ideas or feelings with. *Ngayo* is an expression of sincerity, since there is no demands or obligations to do it. People do it to simply see each other. *Ngayo* is both an important and an effective way to build and to tighten solidarity among people in the community as well as to solve community problems.

The Sasaq community is known as a community that preserves much of norms and traditions as a social capital that nurtures social cohesiveness and togetherness. The term used to represent social

norm is *tendeh,* a basic ideal cultivated in the traditional Sasaq community. Its usage as a term of positive values may be seen in its relation to its meanings such as appropriateness, wellness, commendability, worth, fitness, rightness, diligence, seriousness, persistence, and endurance (Saharudin 2014: 145). Nowadays, the existence of *tendeh* can be measured by way of religious pity and educational attainment (Mahyuni 2007).

In addition to language categories or terms, traditional institutions perceived to be foundations of social capital are *krame dese, krame gubuk*, and *krame banjar. Krame* is a community association in several administrative levels that form a village, hamlet, or a small group of people. These institutions encourage the participation of the community in certain events or occasions such as weddings, deaths, and cultural ceremonies.

Another expression of social cohesiveness in the Sasaq community is the "*berugaq.*" A *berugaq* is similar to gazebo, and is an open building constructed with 4 or 6 poles. It is usually built beside, or sometimes, in front of a house. As a cultural icon, *berugaq* is a place where family members, friends, and guests share stories and experiences together. The Sasaq community puts premium on togetherness and solidarity in the hierarchy of tradition.

Moreover, the Sasaq community holds important tradition, cultural values, and the role of local institutions. Customary and community-based regulations (or *awiq-awiq*) remain an important aspect of social life, and while largely an oral tradition continues to bind local community structures and traditions (Bai et al. 2015: 6).

Local leaders also retain strong influence within Sasaq communities. However, changing social and cultural values over the past few decades brought new influences, particularly in economic development (Sukardi 2009; Fachry 2011). Unfortunately, there is now an apparent neglect and total ignoring of those values by the community.

Through action research, we would like to reintroduce the importance of a community's social capital in supporting social and economic development in rural level. In this paper, we will use a

Strategic Leadership and Learning Organization (SLLO) approach to build community participation in solving social and economic problems. This approach intends to establish synergy among stakeholders, from the government as provider of public services, the community (the village-level institution), to the household. More specifically, this paper seeks to identify suitable institutions for revitalizing social capital existing in the Sasaq community. We also would like to analyze social changes within the community as seen in common agreements and collective actions.

Ⅱ. Lombok and Sasaq Community

Lombok is one of two main islands in the province of West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) Indonesia, sandwiched between Bali and the Lombok Strait in the west, and Sumbawa and the Alas Strait in the east. The topography of Lombok is dominated by the Mount Rinjani volcanic complex. It is located in the north-central part of the island. Mount Rinjani is considered the second highest volcano in Indonesia and the nation's third highest mountain at 3,726 meters high. Central Lombok is hilly, sloping to the relatively flat relief in the southern part of the island. The island is about 70 km across, with a total area of 4,738 km^2 (BPS 2012).

The 2010 Census pegged the population of the NTB province at 4.5 million, with 1.25 million households and an average of 3.59 family members per household (see Table 2.1). Seventy percent of NTB's population resides in the island of Lombok, although the island is only about a quarter of the province's total land area. Northern and Western Lombok show generally lower population densities and higher forested areas than other parts of the island. Lombok's annual population growth rate decreased from 2.31 percent between 1971 and 1980 to 1.12 percent between 2000 and 2010. This is generally attributed to successful family planning and improved health service programs. However, the population of Lombok has continued to increase significantly during the last three decades, doubling from 1.6 million in 1971 to 3.2 million in 2010. Population growth rates are comparatively higher in West Lombok

and Mataram City (see Table 1). Urban areas, in particular, have expanded dramatically during this time, increasing five-fold in NTB province (Fachry 2011).

<Table 1> Population change on Lombok Island

District	1971	1980	1990	2000	2010
West Lombok	510.068	654.878	583.907*	665.749	599.986*
Central Lombok	477.262	576.910	678.746	745.578	860.209
East Lombok	594.725	725.340	865.283	973.296	1.105.582
North Lombok	-	-	-	-	200.072*
Mataram City	-	-	275.089	315.738	402.843
Lombok Island	**1.582.055**	**1.957.128**	**2.403.025**	**2.700.361**	**3.168.692**

Sources: BPS 2012; Population Censuses 1971, 1990, 2000 and 2010 (Fachry et al. 2011)

* Mataram City and North Lombok district were separated from West Lombok in 1986 and 2008, respectively.

<Table 2> Annual population growth rate (%) of Lombok Island

District	1971-1980	1980-1990	1990-2000	2000-2010
West Lombok	2.80	2.75	1.40	1.50
Central Lombok	2.11	1.64	0.98	0.94
East Lombok	2.19	1.78	1.18	0.78
North Lombok			1.09	0.94
Mataram City			1.44	1.97
Lombok Island	**2.31**	**2.01**	**1.17**	**1.12**
NTB	**2.36**	**2.15**	**1.34**	**1.17**

Source: BPS (NTB Statistics 2011).

Based on census figures for Lombok in 2010, more than 1.6 million people (51.8%) lived in rural areas (BPS 2012). The World Wildlife Fund (2006) reported that 600,000 people live in the upland areas surrounding Mount Rinjani and are dependent on forest resources for their livelihoods. With population growth rates at 1.7

percent, it is estimated that the pressure on these limited forest resources will continue to increase.

There are three major ethnic groups in NTB province, the Sasak, Samawa, and Mbojo people, with additional populations of Balinese, Javanese, and other migrants. Sasak is the indigenous and majority ethnic group on the island of Lombok, comprising more than 90 percent of residents, while Samawa and Mbojo people originate from neighboring Sumbawa Island. More than 96 percent of Lombok's residents are Muslim (BPS 2012).

NTB province is administratively divided into eight districts (*kabupaten*), two cities, 116 sub-districts (*kecamatan*), and 1,117 villages (*desa*), while Lombok consists of four districts and one metropolitan area, Mataram City. Prior to 1986, Lombok was divided into three districts: West Lombok (Lombok Barat), Central Lombok (Lombok Tengah), and East Lombok (Lombok Timur). Mataram City was separated from West Lombok in 1986, and in 2008 West Lombok district was further divided to establish the district of North Lombok. The current number of sub-districts and villages in Lombok is at 53 and 592 respectively (NTB Statistics 2012).

NTB province ranked the second lowest among 33 provinces in Indonesia in the Human Development Index (HDI). The lowest HDI in Lombok was in North Lombok district: 57.79 in 2008, rising slightly to 61.37 in 2012. This figure reflects a life expectancy of 60.94 years, a literacy rate of 76.97 percent, an average 5.60 years of schooling, and per capita annual expenditure of Rp. 615,900 (or approximately US$ 47.37 at current exchange rate). The latest figures (BPS 2015) indicate that Mataram City also ranked highest in HDI (life expectancy, 67.13 years; 91.85 percent literacy rate, 9.22 years schooling, per capita annual expenditure, Rp. 648,010, or US$ 49.84). Although the average income per capita of Lombok is lower than that of the NTB province as a whole, Mataram City had the highest per capita expenditure in NTB in 2010 (BPS NTB 2012).

Ⅲ. Social Capital as Non-Material Resources

In recognitive learning perspective, social capital is considered a part of non-material resources. Non-material resources consist of knowledge, skills, reputation, social networks, and spiritual resources. Spiritual resources include eagerness to engage in science, the vision of opportunities, work ethics, sensitivity to discipline, solidarity, brotherhood, norms, values, and virtue (Muadz 2013: 38).

The question then is how to build or grow non-material resources. Non-material resources grow through learning processes. There are two stages of learning, namely, first-order learning, learning in the communication domain to acquire generic competences; and second order learning, which is a cognitive learning process. Learning in the first level is considered a recognitive learning, an inevitable process since everyone communicates everyday (Muadz 2013: 261).

Recognitive learning takes place in an institution where communication or dialogue takes place. Dialogue is an occasion where we can be honest and sincere. Communication or dialogue is inevitable since it is very much part of our lives (Senge 1994: 239). The purpose of communication is to seek higher truths than subjective truths. Communication in this sense is the truly goal. If communication is a merely a means to an end, participants also turn up to be a means to a particular goal. Considering that communication is a fundamental goal, the true consequence of communication is social action (collective action) (Muadz 2013).

As a result of the communication, agreements are binding and bonding. To create communication that results in agreement and social action, each participant must comply with the rules of communication or dialogue. There are two main rules or principles that should be followed by participants: *First*, everyone has to learn not to say or to do what is believed to be wrong. *Second*, everyone has to do what has been agreed upon. Breaking the agreement, violate the principles (Muadz 2013).

Communication that aims to inter-subjective truth brings about egalitarian values of openness, patience, bravery, freedom,

respect, democracy, and mutual trust. Communication exists in the level of individual relationships. If communication is the primary institution where one can seek the higher truth, the circularity of the communication will be ensured. Communication is recursive, meaning it must be repetitive and continuous. Truth is attracts dialogue. Establishing a link between individuals comes with the communication process, repeatedly and constantly carried out (Habermas 1984).

Communication is a domain to build connectedness or mutually acceptable relationships with others. Mutually acceptable relationship occurs solely when participants communicate comfortably. When emotions are relaxed, the intelligence potential can work optimally. The truth will be easier to see. People learn to see others with humanity. Strained emotions such as fear, anger, envy, and resentment limit intelligence relationship options. They create asymmetrical relationships, which prevent the truth to be seen. Tension impedes common or shared understanding, as well as inter-subjective or shared truth. In every act of communication, the identity of the social system is established and maintained. The process of communication becomes a learning process that everyone learns from, and where all may be teachers for others (Senge 1994; Zuber-Skerritt 2002).

Ⅳ. Research Method

The design of the qualitative approach used in this research is aimed at identifying an institution model to revitalize social capital existing in certain target groups. In addition, the qualitative approach is also used to analyze the social changes occurring in the community after the intervention.

This research was conducted in three sub-districts including Tanjung, Kediri, and Narmada in West Lombok district. Each sub-district has established a core group consisting of sub-district government officials, village officials (heads of villages and hamlets), and health workers at sub-district level (doctors in community

health centers, midwives, and nurses). Meanwhile, informants of the research were composed using a purposive sampling approach consisting of village officials, health workers, and locals. The number of informants was determined by way of "snowball sampling." If acquired information is inadequate, additional information is solicited from other sources.

The technical data collection applied in the research includes observation, participatory observation, and in-depth interviews. Participatory observations are conducted during the administering of community dialogue of the core group. In addition, researchers were also involved in various activities in the initial stage of action research, the training of the core group, mentoring, and evaluation.

Data analysis was carried out continuously from the initial action research until the end of the study. The stages of qualitative data analysis consist of data reduction, data presentation, data interpretation, and conclusion. Through these stages, the institutional model developed to revitalize social capital existing in the community was described. In addition, the results of community dialogue, as well as consequent forms of collective action considered were identified carefully.

Ⅴ. Results and Discussion

The results and discussion of the study will be divided into three sub-sections, namely, strategy and approach in learning organization process; implementation of recognitive learning; and results and implication policy.

5.1. Strategies and Approaches in Learning Organization

The strategy used to achieve the objectives of the research is adopted from the conceptual framework introduced by Figueroa (2002: 7) with some modifications. This model has been chosen since the model basically puts a great emphasis on the community ownership of the process and the content of communication, the

role of society in changing themselves, and community dialogue on various actual issues existing in society. The focus of this model is not only on outcomes relating to behavioral changes, but also on various aspects relating to norms, values, culture, environmental support, policy, and other issues associated with the complexity dynamic of social system.

As a catalyst, the early stage of intervention for various stakeholders such as government, community institution, and household is a 2-day training. The subject of the training comprises of basic levels of recognitive learning including the introduction of recognitive learning, theory of constraints, analysis of problem root, mental models, system thinking, shared vision, personal mastery, and team learning. The last five topics are well known as the "fifth discipline" introduced by Peter Senge (1994). In addition, the training provided subjects relating to cultural issues including social cohesiveness, value, norms, institution, idioms and expressions. By introducing the cultural issues we reminded the community that social capital plays a significance role in community daily life.

The approach used in the program assumed that the biggest problem faced by many institutions lies in people's worldview. In many cases, the problems dealt with do not actually exist externally but the mind, in the way people think. The issue was explored through the discipline of personal mastery, mental models, and system thinking. These three disciplines may be learned individually. However, there are also disciplines that not only involve the individual alone, but the individual as a member of a group or institution. This is called shared vision and team learning. The fifth discipline is needed as an effort to establish a learning organization (Senge 1994).

It is important to note that the training provided at the initial stage is merely an invitation to start learning. This is where the trainees or participants were introduced to the basic concepts of the five disciplines and recognitive learning, the philosophical basis of learning organizations and strategic leadership. After the training, participants were expected to translate training materials individually or in groups by applying the core concepts of the materials in daily

work. The translation process is undertaken through persistent recognitive dialogue and by complying as well with the rules of dialogue.

Any agreement forged by the dialogue is formulated into an action plan and then realized as collective action. If a problem occurs, it was discussed and overcome through recognitive dialogue. The circularity of the process of dialogue is maintained, as the stakeholders developed plans of action and realized collective action. This activity was carried out continuously, which made communication among individual learners no longer a means to achieve a certain goal but a goal in itself. This process instilled in the community that dialogue overcomes problems. Changes were noted during the process of recognitive dialogue and collective action among individuals, communities, and institutions.

<Figure 1> Activities Approach Framework

5.2. Implementation of Recognitive Learning

A variety of policies and programs implemented by both government and private organizations improving the quality of life or people's welfare in NTB did not yield satisfactory results. The

impact of these programs and policies is still very limited. In addition, the programs could not be sustained as they focus on the technical aspect of things rather than social engineering. In fact, if we want to build a solid foundation for the sustainability of the program, social development programs should pay more attention to the perspective of stakeholders, from the households and communities to the government. This means that before the implementation of any program, it is important to deal first with social preparation that provides a space for interaction among these three stakeholders. The continuous interaction among those stakeholders is a prerequisite for the success of development programs. Through a continuous interaction process, shared understanding could be solidly built. In turn, it raises shared agreement that becomes the basis of common programs. Through this, the implementation of common programs becomes easier as all stakeholders are in agreement. Besides, controlling the process of the common program would be easier to realize.

Currently, interactions among the three stakeholders are by far occasioned by the demands of the program as it is implemented, and does not emanate from a collective awareness problem or issues. This does not guarantee the sustainability of any program. Genuine interaction among stakeholders is built on the setting of collective goals and common understanding of things. This ensures continuous interaction encouraging a sense of belonging and of responsibility. These are secrets to assuring the sustainability of programs. A serious effort to engage continuously is necessary.

The Institute of Education Development at the University of Mataram has developed an institutional model to address various social issues. The model allows the cultivation of common awareness that produces collective agreement and collective action. The model has been tested in three different sectors as a pilot project, namely the economic sector (farmers' groups around the forest); the education sector (junior high school, Islamic boarding school, and vocational school); and the health sector (community health center in two sub-districts). The early stage of learning program was the execution of a recognitive learning training for target groups at village level. After completing the training, the target

groups formed a community learning groups at the village, as well as at hamlet levels. The community learning groups conducted a regular community dialogue in each group at village and hamlet levels. Members of the community dialogue include heads of villages or hamlets, village cadres, religious leaders, and other local community leaders. Each month during the year, researchers took part in the community dialogue to mentor and provide inputs, as well as ensure the participant's compliance to the rules of community dialogue. Through continuous community dialogue, various agreements have been realized in the form of collective action.

5.3. Emergence Properties

The results achieved in the series of trials were noted in the changes in the individual, community, and institutional levels. This section focuses on the changes at the community level by reason of their concreteness and ease in identification. Some of these include the establishment of community dialogue forums in the village and hamlet levels as well (LPP 2006). The establishment of community dialogue forums at various levels indicates the communities' confidence in dialogue as one that enables them to overcome common problems. Regular community dialogues help many ideas and common agreements surface, sustained concretely by collective action such as the establishment of institutions that engage in charity called BAZIS (*Badan Amil Zakat, Infaq, dan Sedekah*), *banjar sehat* (health union), *banjar sekolah* (school union), and school for religious teaching (*TAPAS = Taman Pendidikan Anak Sholeh*).

In Teniga, a village in the Tanjung sub-district, for example, people contributed to build a two-floor village office. In addition, people also built public MCK (mandi, cuci, dan kakus), a common place for bathing and washing, as well as a common lavatory. Lastly, local people agreed to guard the village forest to prevent it from illegal logging and encroachment. The locals came to an agreement that forest villages should be properly sustained as it supports the community.

In Sigar Penjalin, another village in the Tanjung sub-district,

people work together to rehabilitate the village road by turning it as a cemented walkway for pregnant women visiting or needing access to health facilities in case of emergencies. The local community also built a-7012 meter water pipe and a 3×2×1.5 meter water reservoir; it has also rented out an office for village health service, as well as regularly contributed to community health fundraising. People have also agreed to provide for medicines for emergencies.

The local community has also built a "*berugaq*'' (traditional gazebo) placed in the village office of Sokong, a village in the Tanjung sub-district. The *berugaq* is intended to be the venue for community dialogue. In addition, the local community has also agreed to clean up the surroundings twice a week, as well as facilitate village health services. They also established groups such as health and school union (*banjar*) and TAPAS to support community education and health services in several hamlets.

One of significant results of recognitive learning activities undertaken in Kediri village, a village in the Kediri sub-district, is the diversification and reallocation of BAZIS funds. The BAZIS funds are usually allocated for poor people at certain times. After taking part in recognitive learning, the local community has reformed the use and allocation of BAZIS fund. As a result, BAZIS fund are spent in various forms in accordance with the needs of the community. BAZIS funds are now allocated for building village health services, scholarships for students from poor families, and donations to orphans and elderly people. In addition, BAZIS funds are allocated to support the supplementary feeding program (PMT) for children; provide capital assistance to small business; improve public facilities such as hamlet mosques; build cemetery fences; and rehabilitate the houses of the poor.

A case in point is the one introduced in Lembah Sempage, a village close to forest areas in the Narmada sub-district. Through intensive community dialogue, the local community was able to establish shari'a financial institutions (*Baitul Mal wat Tamwil*/BMT) to help people fund business. BMT's uniqueness lies in its cancellation of management costs and its practice of honesty, mutual help, trust, virtue, good deeds, among others. The BMT

board runs and manages the institution voluntarily. BMT assets grow very fast due to the increase of public trust. Some of the community's needs have been supplied by BMT, making loan sharks unnecessary.

The emergence of various institutions at the local level as initiated by the community shows that dialogue fosters public awareness on the importance of collaboration, trust, and support. Through intensive community dialogue, various agreements have been finally explored. These agreements created collective action that helped communities confront social, economic, and environmental problems. A forum for community dialogue and the emergence of collective action clearly play a major role in accelerating development in the village. Without financial support from government, local communities have consciously and independently initiated various activities in line with the government's development program. Community dialogues may be considered a catalyst in carrying out development program, especially in rural areas.

Ⅵ. Conclusion and Recommendations

From the above data, we may conclude that dialogue enables people, compels community participation, and therefore revitalizes the social capital of any given society. Participation grows if mutual understanding and unconditional mutual acceptance among stakeholders exist in a community. As an effort to establish shared values among community, mutual understanding and unconditional acceptance establish continuous dialogues conducted with honesty and sincerity. Also, mutual understanding and community dialogue inspire collective agreements that manifest collective action. Various collective agreements are actually intended to satisfy collective needs. Satisfying the needs of the public is naturally the main goal of development implemented by government and society.

In recent years, one of the failures of various development programs is the lack of mutual understanding and mutual

agreement, as well the lack of a sense of ownership. Therefore, in order to nurture common understanding and mutual agreement, as well as unconditional mutual acceptance, recognitive learning should be introduced prior to the provision of technical project assistance. By providing recognitive learning that complements projects, public participation can be nurtured to ensure effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.

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