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SUVANNABHUMI means “The Land of Gold” in Pali, which location implies Southeast Asia.
Cover Photo: Entrance of Phra Mondop at Pra Kaew, Bangkok, Thailand, founded in 1784
under the order of Rama I.

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The Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Indonesia's Economy and Alternative Prospects for Untact Society*



Kyungchan Lee**

[*Abstract*]

This research is an attempt to understand the economic and social consequences that are occurring in Indonesia due to the spread of COVID-19. Indonesia, which has maintained solid economic growth since the inauguration of President Jokowi's government, is also experiencing difficulties to deal with unexpected COVID-19 pandemic as the global economic turmoil has had a very significant impact on its economy. The economic impact of COVID-19 can be felt, starting from the phenomenon of panic buying, the free fall of the stock price index, the depreciation of the *Rupiah* against the Dollar, sluggish activities in the processing industry, and ultimately it has an impact on slowing economic growth. Various policies and measures have been taken by the Indonesian government to minimize the negative impact caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. One such area is electronic commerce business or e-commerce that witnessed a vast increase of online and non-cash transaction amid rising voices that the country needs to prepare for the advent of a new economic system, the so-called New Normal era. The Covid-19 pandemic will

* This work was supported by Youngsan University Research Fund of 2021.

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temporarily slow economic growth and delay some development projects and policy initiatives as the Indonesian government diverts capital from infrastructure development to help respond to the crisis. However, the Jokowi administration's efforts for continuous reform are expected to accelerate the transition to the digital economy.

Keywords: Indonesia, COVID-19, Economic impact, Untact society, New normal

I . Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic which broke out in China and spread rapidly all over the world, is changing the life of the global village. Despite the effects of COVID-19 appearing in many ways, it is the economy and industrial sectors that are hit most directly and seriously. The evolution and economic effect of the disease is highly unpredictable, making it difficult for policymakers to devise an effective response to macroeconomic policies. Warwick and Roshen discussed seven different scenarios of how COVID-19 could develop in the coming years, and they concluded that even a controlled outbreak could have a major short-term effect on the global economy (Warwick and Roshen 2020). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its June 2020 World Economic Forecast also noted that, as the pandemic continues to sow chaos and companies across the world struggle to operate in the midst of the epidemic, the global economy will face an even greater decline than previously expected (IMF 2020). The forecast highlights the severity of the challenge that policymakers face as they try to dig out of what the institution has described as the most extreme economic recession since the Great Depression. While countries are beginning to reopen their economies, it is becoming increasingly clear that the recovery will be uneven and prolonged as cases continue to grow and consumers remain skeptical about resuming normal activity.

Indeed, almost every country and its people around the world, whether developed, underdeveloped or emerging economies, are affected by the epidemic. As trade flows and tourism have

evaporated due to the COVID-19 crisis, economic structures around the world have ground to a virtual halt. Indonesia, which has maintained solid economic growth since the inauguration of President Jokowi's government in 2014, is also experiencing difficulties to deal with unexpected COVID-19 pandemic as the global economic turmoil has had a very significant effect on its economy. The economic impact caused by the increased spread of COVID-19 can be felt, starting from the phenomenon of panic buying, the free fall of the stock price index, the depreciation of the Rupiah against the Dollar, sluggish activities in the processing industry, and ultimately it has an impact on slowing economic growth.

This research which is based on qualitative descriptive approach is an attempt to understand the economic and social consequences that are occurring in Indonesia due to the spread of COVID-19. More precisely, this paper's structure is as follows. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the goal, substance and significance of the study which shall be followed by Chapter 2 examining the negative impact of the pandemic on Indonesia's economy and industry. Chapter 3 looks at the responses and policies of the Indonesian government to minimize the negative impact caused by the COVID-19 crisis on the economy. Chapter 4 analyzes the expansion of the untact or non-contact service in Indonesia amid rising voices that the country needs to prepare for the advent of a new economic system, the so-called New Normal era.¹ And finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the main contents discussed in this paper and concludes with the outlook on the various effects of COVID-19 on Indonesian economy and its future impact on Indonesian society.

¹ New Normal is a new economic term after the global financial crisis in 2008, when Fimco's CEO Mohamed El Erien pointed out low growth, low interest rates, low prices, and high unemployment rates as 'New Normal' after the crisis in his book, *When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change*. McGraw-Hill Education. (June 13, 2008).

II . The Impact of COVID-19 on Indonesian Economy and Industry

2.1 Impact on Indonesian economy

The impact of COVID-19 is quite significant on the Indonesian economy. Like other countries that were hit hard by COVID-19, major international organizations and global economic analysis institutions are looking at Indonesia's economic outlook darkly. In April 2020, the Asian Development Bank(ADB) lowered the forecast for Indonesia's 2020 GDP growth to 2.5% and the IMF 0.5% (ADB 2020). The World Bank projected a growth rate of 0% in its global economic outlook report released on June 8, 2020 which was significantly lowered from its original forecast for Indonesia (World Bank 2020). This is a result of analysis taking into account of the possible decline in prices of raw materials, a sharp decline in household consumption expenditure, and the possibility of prolonged quarantine measures due to the pandemic. Fitch Solution, a US credit rating agency, also lowered Indonesia's 2020 economic growth forecast to 4.7%(March 30), 2.8%(April 20), and -1.3%(May 6) (Fitch Solutions 2020). It even suggested negative growth, which is the darkest figure among the forecasts so far.

<Table 2-1> GDP Growth Rate by Country in Southeast Asia (%)

	2018	2019	2020 Forecast		2021 Forecast	
			IMA	ADB	IMF	ADB
ASEAN	5.1	4.4	Δ0.7	1.0	7.4	4.7
Brunei	0.1	3.9	1.3	2.0	3.5	3.0
Cambodia	7.5	7.1	Δ1.6	2.3	6.1	5.7
Indonesia	5.2	5.0	0.5	2.5	8.2	5.0
Laos	6.2	5.0	0.7	3.5	5.6	6.0
Malaysia	4.7	4.3	Δ1.7	0.5	9.0	5.5
Myanmar	6.4	6.8	1.8	4.2	7.5	6.8
Philippines	6.2	5.9	0.6	2.0	7.36	6.5
Singapore	3.4	0.7	Δ3.5	0.2	3.0	2.0
Thailand	4.2	2.4	Δ6.7	Δ4.8	6.1	2.5
Vietnam	7.1	7.0	2.7	4.8	7.0	6.8

Source: IMF, ADB (Requoted in KOTRA's Overseas Market News, [Southeast Asia] Post Corona, Promising Fields of Southeast Asian Market).

From the supply side, it is very likely that labor productivity, investment and financing activities decrease and the global supply chain would be disrupted. Meanwhile, since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, it has been noted that people do not travel or carry out tourism activities, while anticipating restrictions on movement, increasing consumption of basic necessities considered important. As such, from the demand side, the condition of the COVID-19 pandemic clearly reduce the consumption sector, travel and transportation activities, and increase transportation and trade costs. Overall, the level of consumption would tend to fall due to distorted prices, high cost of transportation and logistics of goods. Since March 2020, when the impact of COVID-19 began in earnest, the Indonesian economy has been experiencing all-round stagnation, outflow of capital and a drop in stock prices. This is because household expenditure and investment decreased significantly compared to the same period of the previous year, and government expenditure also retracted (ASEAN-Korea Centre 2020).

Likewise, analysts at CSIS Indonesia tried to project the impact of COVID-19 on Indonesia's economic growth in their report applying both internal and external factors as we can see at Table 2-2 (Yose and Fajar 2020). According to the report, if there continues the effects of the ongoing global economic slowdown and inadequate handling of the spread of COVID-19 in the country, the most likely scenario in 2020 is a pessimistic outlook with economic growth ranges from 0~1.99%. However, if what happens is stagnation or the status quo of global and domestic conditions, the possibility of Indonesia's economic growth in 2020 was estimated in the range of 2.0~3.99%. Finally, if there is a positive trend from the global and domestic situation, Indonesia's 2020 economic growth was predicted in the range of 4.0~4.99% (Ibid.).

<Table 2-2> Indonesian Economic Growth Projection Scenario, 2020

	Pessimistic	Status Quo	Optimistic
Global	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Decreased economic growth in 5 countries / regions (US, China, Japan, India, EU) - Decreasing trend of the commodity price index and trading volume - Strong protectionism and trade wars - Increasing spread of COVID-19 - Unstable political and security situation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stagnation of economic growth in 5 countries / regions (US, China, Japan, India, EU) - Stagnation of the commodity price index and trading volume - Continued protectionism and trade wars - Stagnant spread of COVID-19 - Uncertain political and security situation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increased economic growth in 5 countries / regions (US, China, Japan, India, EU) - Increasing trend of the commodity price index and trading volume - Less protectionism and trade wars - Decreased spread of COVID-19 - Stable political and security situation
Domestic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ¹⁾ Structural reforms are not working - ²⁾ Bureaucratic reform does not work - Poor performance of ³⁾ fiscal and ⁴⁾ monetary regime - Declining growth in household consumption, poor investment climate, contraction in the manufacturing industry - Poor handling of COVID-19 and lack of transparency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Structural reforms are running less than optimal - Bureaucratic reform is not running optimally - Less optimal performance of fiscal policy - Stagnation of growth in household consumption, bad investment climate, contraction in the manufacturing industry - The handling of COVID-19 is not good and lacks transparency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Structural reforms are running optimally - Bureaucratic reform is running optimally - Optimal performance of fiscal and monetary regime - Increased growth in household consumption, poor investment climate, contraction in the manufacturing industry - Handling of COVID-19 is good and transparent
	Economic growth 0~1.99%	Economic growth 2.0~3.99%	Economic growth 4.0~4.99%

Source: CSIS Commentaries DMRU-015 (26 March 2020).

1) Structural reforms: competitiveness and productivity, industrialization, digital economy, access to finance

2) Bureaucratic reforms: bribery, corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, synergy and weak coordination

3) Fiscal policy: budget deficit, tax ratio to GDP

4) Monetary regime: inflation, exchange rates, interest rates

The economic slump is expected to increase unemployment and widen the gap between rich and poor. In reality, as of mid-April 2020, more than 2.8 million people lost their employment as a result of plant closures and sluggish sales, which caused companies to

substantially cut their purchasing and production operations. The Ministry of Manpower and the Workers Social Security Agency estimates that COVID-19 could result in an additional 2.9 million to 5.2 million unemployed people.² Indeed, the unemployment rate in Indonesia surged to 7.07% in the third quarter 2020 from 5.28% in the same quarter a year earlier, amid the economic downturn caused by the Covid-19 crisis.

Given the fact that external variables are virtually uncontrollable, Jokowi government needs to try to improve the domestic sector to overcome the economic crisis. The question remains on how serious the Indonesian government is in carrying out structural reforms, particularly in relation to increasing competitiveness, productivity, reindustrialization, increasing access to finance, and most importantly increasing the capacity of the digital economy. In addition, bureaucratic reform also needs to be a priority for improving domestic economic performance. The implementation of fiscal and monetary policies to support economic growth is also very crucial in maintaining the consumption, investment and government spending.

2.2. Impact on Indonesia's trade performance

The decline in Indonesia's economic performance as well as the global economy certainly affects Indonesia's trade performance negatively. While most sectors in Indonesia is unexceptionally affected by the spread of COVID-19, one of the most badly affected is the manufacturing industry. The contribution of this sector is quite significant to the Indonesian economy (19~20%) and products originating from the manufacturing industry also contribute significantly to Indonesia's total exports, which is above 70%. The performance of the manufacturing industry in Indonesia slowed down in line with the increase in COVID-19 cases. The sluggish performance of the manufacturing industry, accompanied by the global economic slowdown which has an impact on lower demand,

² Adrian Wakil Akhlis. Millions to lose jobs, fall into poverty as Indonesia braces for recession. The Jakarta Post. (April 15, 2020). <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/04/14/millions-to-lose-jobs-fall-into-poverty-as-indonesia-braces-for-recession.html> (Accessed August 6, 2020).

will automatically reduce Indonesia's export performance.

Given the fact that the Indonesian economy is highly dependent on the Chinese economy, as illustrated in Table 2-2, it is clear that the downturn in China's economy will surely have a negative impact on Indonesia's economic development and trade performance.³ Above all, in a situation where there is concern about disrupted world supply chain due to the distorted Chinese economy which has been the factory of the world, Indonesia will have to find sources of raw materials or capital goods from other countries, although it is not easy and the price is more expensive.

<Table 2-3> Percentage of Indonesian imports from China, 2018

Types of Goods	Percentage
Capital goods	39.33
Semi-finished goods	23.14
Engine parts and components - Parts and components of electrical equipment / devices - Parts and components of office equipment and communication devices - Motor vehicle parts and components	36.27

Source: CSIS Commentaries DMRU-015 (March 26, 2020).

As a result of the decline in economic growth in many of its export destination countries, Indonesia's total exports are expected to decline by 3~14% due to the economic downturn in major exporting countries. On the other hand, imports are likely to increase between 1.1~6.2% due to decreased local production while demand may increase.⁴ According to the above-mentioned CSIS analysis, it was forecasted that the largest decline would occur in the main export destination countries in the Asia and Pacific region including Japan, the United States and China while exports to ASEAN and European countries would also experience a decline,

³ In their recent paper, Dito and others predicted that 1% slowdown in Chinese economy would have an impact of 0.09% on Indonesia's economic growth. Dito Aditia Darma Nasution, Erlina dan Iskandar Muda, Dampak COVID-19 Terhadap Sektor Ekonomi Indonesia, *Jurnal Benefita*, 5(2): 219-220. Juli 2020.

⁴ Using McKibbin and Fernando's model, Yose and Fajar(2020, 5-8) estimates the size of Indonesia's exports and imports in 2020. Requoted from Warwick and Roshen, *ibid*.

although not as deep as the decline in the major markets. In terms of the decline by export items the biggest decline is likely to occur in the manufacturing sector, including textiles and textile products.

2.3. Impact on major industries

(1) Industrial sector

According to the Indonesian Ministry of Finance statement released in April 2020, hotels and restaurants, mining, manufacturing, and transportation were the sectors most affected by COVID-19 in the first quarter of 2020. Manufacturing, which accounts for 19% of Indonesia's GDP as of 2019, faces unprecedented challenges due to temporary suspensions in production and extreme consumption contractions. Car sales, a vital economic sector that accounts for 1.8% of Indonesia's GDP, plunged drastically as a result of the unexpected decline in demand and factory closures by major automakers such as Toyota and Honda. The Indonesian Automobile Industry Association (GAIKINDO) predicted that car sales in Indonesia would only reach 600,000 units, a half from 1.1 million units in the previous year, and exports would only reach 175,000 units from 350,000–400,000 units. Meanwhile, though retail sales of new cars dropped by 15% in March, wholesale sales of new cars, a leading indicator of market trends, fell by a whopping 90.6% in April, with just 7,871 units sold. As such, the decline in domestic sales and consumer sentiment is evident.

Like the automobile industry, the situation in the garment industry is also worrisome. More than 70% of the clothing factories in Indonesia will be forced to permanently close as cash-flow problems emerge, according to the Indonesian Filament and Fiber Producers Association. For similar purposes, textile firms have also suspended operations. When orders were cancelled due to lockdowns in major importing countries and the closure of retail outlets, about 2.1 million workers in the garment industry, most of them women, were affected (Clean 2020).

(2) Service sector

The growth rate of the service sector is also showing a marked decline. The impact is particularly noticeable in the tourism

industry, which accounts for about 10% of Indonesia's GDP. According to tourism statistics from the Indonesian National Statistical Office (BPS), the number of foreign tourists visiting Indonesia in the first quarter of 2020 was 2.6 million, a 31% decrease from 3.8 million in the same period last year. In particular, the number of foreign tourists in March fell by 64% compared to the previous year, mainly due to a sharp decline in Chinese tourists, which accounted for about 13% of foreign visitors to Indonesia previous year (Yose and Fajar 2020: 214). Tourism revenue in 2020, according to an announcement by the Ministry of Tourism, is expected to fall by about 10 billion USD, accounting for only about half of the previous year's tourism revenue, which reached about 20 billion USD.

The hospitality and food service industries, such as hotels and restaurants, are no exception, which are directly affected by the decline of incoming tourists. The Indonesian Hotel & Restaurant Association (PHRI: Perhimpunan Hotel dan Restoran Indonesia) reports that since January 2020, hotel occupancy rates have been around 30~40%, much lower than the average of 50~60% during this period before the pandemic, and since the infection cases were reported in March, the occupancy rate has further dropped to the level of 20% which affected the worsening hotel profits by up to 40%. Weak tourism growth also has a negative impact on the retail industry and micro, small and medium business sector (Iswahyudi 2016; Saidi et al. 2017).

(3) Primary industry

Indonesia's exports of primary products such as palm oil and coal declined significantly as the pandemic brought global economy to a halt. Consumption of palm oil has declined globally as demand in the food and hospitality industry has decreased in some of the key Asian markets and logistical interruptions and delays have reduced import demand during lockdown periods. In particular, the domestic lockdowns in China and India, Indonesia's largest palm oil import markets, caused significant drops in demand. The decline of palm oil demand in India would hit Indonesia even harder as an agreement was reached to reduce the rules for importing Indian sugar in return for its access to palm oil exports (Dekker 2020).

Indonesia is the world's largest coal producer and dry fuel contributes to 14% of the country's exports. It is also home to the world's largest copper and gold mine, employing thousands of workers in the province of Papua. The coal industry have been hit hard due to the global decline in industry activity, especially in India. Likewise, drop in tin demand has been caused by the decline of activity in electronic goods, with state-owned tin producer PT Tima decreasing its output by 30%. This has largely been caused by a drop in demand from China, a key market for Indonesian tin.

III. Policy Responses by the Indonesian Government

3.1 The spread of COVID-19 and health policy response

The spread of COVID-19 that has been controlled in several countries, including China and South Korea, is different from what happened in Indonesia. At a time when the curve starts to slope, indicating a slowdown in the growth of COVID-19 patients, conditions in Indonesia show a significant increase in the growth of active cases. In terms of the mortality rate, the data available as of July 7, 2021 shows a fairly high percentage when calculated from the ratio of the number of COVID-19 patients who died (61,140 people) to the number of positive cases (2,313,829 people) in Indonesia, which is 2.76%. According to the latest Worldometers data on COVID-19, this figure is higher when compared to the ratio of the number of COVID-19 patients who died (4,001,736 people) to the number of positive cases of COVID-19 (184,969,547 people) in the world, which is 2.16%.⁵

Meanwhile, the ASEAN region has more than 124,000 people infected with the virus, with all its 10 member states having recorded outbreaks of COVID-19 since the first confirmed case on January 13, 2020. The CFR (Case Fatality Ratio) in the region ranges from as low as 0.06(Singapore) to as high as 2.76(Indonesia) for the affected countries. Although the most recent epidemiological curve

⁵ Worldometers is a reference website that provides counters and real-time statistics for diverse topics including COVID-19. <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/> (Accessed July 7, 2021).

in the ASEAN region shows that there are some countries with a slowing rate of transmission, there is still a serious risk of infection and reinfection.

<Table 3-1> COVID-19 Outbreak in ASEAN Countries

2021.02.05.

Country	Cases	Deaths	Cases per Million	Case Fatality Ratio(%)
World	104,502,416	2,271,277	13,398	2.17
Indonesia	1,123,105	31,001	4,191	2.76
Philippines	531,699	10,997	5,069	2.07
Vietnam	1,957	35	20	1.79
Thailand	22,058	79	318	0.36
Myanmar	141,104	3,146	2,644	2.23
Malaysia	231,486	826	7,419	0.36
Cambodia	467	0	29	-
Laos	45	0	7	-
Singapore	59,624	29	10,624	0.05
Timor Leste	80	0	61	-
Brunei	180	3	420	1.67

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), "Southeast Asia Covid-19 Tracker".

The Indonesian Government has introduced various containment measures, including temporary bans on domestic and international air and sea travel, screening at ports of entry, school closures and other restrictions on public events. First, from April 2, the government implemented measures to ban all foreigners from entering and transiting Indonesia. However, long-term residence permit(KITAS/KITAP) holders, diplomatic and official visa holders, visitors for humanitarian aid purposes such as medical and food assistance, land/port/air transport workers, foreign national workers participating in national strategic projects, etc. were allowed as an exception to the country, but took thorough quarantine measures.⁶

Accordingly, all foreigners entering Indonesia must have a health certificate proving the negative PCR result issued within 7

⁶ German-Indonesian Chamber of Industry and Commerce, COVID-19 developments in Indonesia, EKONID Insight. (04/02/2021).

days prior to the departure date. And those entering the country who do not have a health certificate and those with a negative PCR result after 7 days should conduct a rapid diagnostic test at the arrival hall, and if the result is positive, transfer them to a designated hospital. On the contrary, if the result is negative, they are quarantined in a special facility for 14 days and then conduct the PCR test again. In addition, as a cautionary measure, self-isolation is mandatory for all entering people for 14 days after entry into the country and the local health authorities monitor them closely, but the effectiveness of such measures was considered insufficient. The government also banned Indonesia's traditional annual exodus for Muslim holidays during Eid al-Fitr celebrations in May in an effort to curb the spread of the virus from Jakarta and other high-risk regions.

In June 2020, Indonesia started to ease some containment measures. On June 5, the city of Jakarta began a transition process from large-scale social constraints and further relaxed restrictions on malls, parks and recreation areas. However, in the absence of a persistent decrease in daily new cases of viruses, the city of Jakarta extended the transition process from large-scale social constraints to September 10, 2020. On September 9, the governor of Jakarta Anies Baswedan announced that the large-scale social controls would be further tightened to curb the transmission of the virus⁷.

3.2. Economic policy responses

(1) The nature and characteristics of the COVID-19 economic crisis At an invitational seminar entitled "Re-imagining the Future of Indonesia's Economy" held by the Jakarta Post, Indonesia's largest English daily newspaper on August 19, 2020 Finance Minister Sri Mulyani said Indonesia has successfully overcome the past two financial crises⁸. She stressed that Indonesia was responding

⁷ <https://www.csis.org/programs/southeast-asia-program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker-0> (Accessed 05 February 2021).

⁸ Adrian Wail Akhla and Esther Samboh, Pandemic an opportunity for reforms in Indonesia: Sri Mulyani, The Jakarta Post. August 21, 2020. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/21/pandemic-an-opportunity-for-reforms-in-indonesia-sri-mulyani.html> (Accessed March 8, 2021).

relatively well to the COVID-19 crisis compared to other countries with the know-how accumulated in the past crises where Indonesia successfully overcome the two financial crises in 1997 and 2008. But the current crisis is in many ways different from the previous ones and requires a more complex response, she added. The financial crisis of the past was a simple crisis that only required returning national finances to pre-crisis levels through necessary financial support. On the other hand, the current COVID-19 crisis is a complex crisis that requires resolving the expanded national debt along with strengthening health and quarantine, restoring shrinking investment and consumer sentiment, and consolidating people's guidance and persuasion.

The biggest cause of Indonesia's economic slowdown is sluggish consumption, accounting for more than 50% of Indonesia's GDP. As Jakarta and East Java, the two regional pillars of Indonesia's economy, became epicenters of the virus outbreak, the Indonesian economy recorded negative economic growth from the second quarter. The second quarter was a particularly difficult time for the Indonesian economy for the large-scale social restraint (PSBB) measures implemented, restrictions on movement between regions, and reduced consumer sentiment led to a rapid contraction of the economy. Also, it wasn't until June 2020 that the government's budget execution to respond to the pandemic took place.

On the other hand, due to COVID-19, the Indonesian government faced with the double difficulty of solving short-term problems as well as bringing about structural changes at the same time. As a short-term task, the Indonesian government is working to implement comprehensive health and quarantine policies to prevent the spread of COVID-19, boost the economy, and expand and strengthen the social safety net. In the longer term, the second-term Jokowi government has a difficult task to make Indonesia as a high-income country by 2045, realize the 4th industrial revolution through the 'Making Indonesia 4.0' program, foster competitiveness in the manufacturing industry, eradicate corruption, and develop human resources.⁹

⁹ President Jokowi said in his inauguration speech in October 2019 that by 2045

(2) Key Policy Responses¹⁰

1) Fiscal packages

As part of a national economic recovery program (PEN), the government spent a total of IDR 579.8 trillion (approximately 3.8% of GDP) in 2020. The PEN includes (i) assistance to the health-care sector to increase testing and treatment capacity for COVID-19 cases; (ii) increased benefits and broader coverage of existing social assistance schemes for low-income households, such as food aid, conditional cash transfers, and electricity subsidies; (iii) expanded unemployment benefits, including those workers in the informal sector; and (iv) tax reliefs, particularly for the tourist industry and people with income ceiling; and (v) permanent reductions in the corporate income tax rate from 25% to 22% in 2020-21 and 20% beginning in 2022.

Capital infusions into state-owned companies are also included in the PEN, as are interest subsidies, credit guarantees, and debt restructuring programs for micro, small, and medium-sized businesses. To encourage credit creation, the government has invested state money in chosen commercial banks, allowing banks to expand leverage and provide guaranteed working capital loans to labor-intensive companies. The government has allocated IDR 699.4 trillion for the PEN in 2021.

2) Monetary and financial measures

Bank Indonesia (BI) lowered the policy rate to 3.5 percent by 125 basis points in, March, June, July, and November 2020, and by 25 basis points in February 2021. BI has also adapted macroprudential regulations to facilitate liquidity and to promote the stability of the bond market. The minimum criteria for down payments on car

when Indonesia celebrates its 100th anniversary of independence, the country would emerge as the world's fifth-largest economy by achieving a gross domestic product of US\$ 7 trillion, per capita GDP of US\$ 18,130, and a poverty rate of 0%. Karina M. Tehusijarana and Ghina Ghaliya, Jokowi highlights economic, bureaucratic reforms in inauguration speech, *The Jakarta Post*. October 20, 2019. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/20/jokowi-highlights-economic-bureaucratic-reforms-in-inauguration-speech.html> (Accessed February 14, 2021).

¹⁰ IMF, Policy responses to COVID-19, (Last updated on July 2, 2021). <https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#1>. (Accessed July 6, 2021).

loans and the residential property loan-to-value ratio have also been reduced, effective from 1 March to 31 December 2021.

In the face of the COVID-19 shock, a Presidential decree has expanded BI's authority to maintain financial system stability, including facilitating BI liquidity assistance to banks, allowing BI to purchase government bonds in the primary market, and financing the deposit insurance agency (LPS) for bank solvency problems. On July 6, 2020, the government and BI launched a burden-sharing program to help finance economic response to the pandemic. BI has also adopted measures to further enhance financial deepening, access and monetary operations, notably through facilitating collaboration between the banking industry and Fintech, promoting numerical payments in different industries and introducing Sharia-compliant products. To reduce stock market volatility, the regulator OJK has implemented a new share buyback policy which allows listed firms to repurchase their shares without first holding a shareholders meeting, and introduced limits on stock price declines. To encourage debt restructuring, the OJK has also loosened loan categorization and loan restructuring processes for banks, and delayed the deadline for publicly traded firms to file their annual financial reports and host annual shareholders meetings by two months.

3) Stabilization of exchange rate

In March 2020, the Rupiah was hit hard after the outbreak of COVID-19 in Indonesia, falling more than 14% against the dollar, as many foreign investors withdrew capital from the country. In order to stabilize the financial market, BI withdrawn 9.4 USD billion from its foreign reserves, which prompted some worries about a repeat of the financial crisis of the 1990s. By issuing US dollar-denominated government bonds, the government alleviated such fears and replenished its forex reserves to 130.5 billion USD by May. BI stressed that the current level of foreign exchange reserves is not only adequate to withstand external shocks, but also to sustain the domestic market and financial system's stability. As such, in order to preserve orderly market conditions, BI has intervened in the spot and domestic non-deliverable foreign exchange markets and in the domestic government bond market. BI has also reaffirmed that it is

possible for foreign investors to use global and domestic custodian banks in Indonesia to conduct investment transactions.

IV. Prospect for the Post-COVID Indonesia

4.1. The 'New Normal', a turn toward untact society

Now that the world is suffering from Covid-19 pandemic, 'New Normal' is becoming a global hot topic. New Normal means a standard that newly emerges as the time changes. More specifically speaking, it refers collectively to the characteristics of the global economy that have emerged after the financial crisis in 2008. With the collapse of the existing economic system due to the pandemic, voices are rising that it is necessary to prepare for the advent of a new economic system, the so-called New Normal era. In relation to the advent of the new normal era of COVID-19, global consulting firm Alix Partners recently published 'Disruption Insight' report as five new normal trends to pay attention to in the post COVID-19 era: acceleration of deglobalization, increasing importance of resilience, the importance of increased trust, and the promotion of digital transformation along with changes in consumption behavior according to income level and health interest.¹¹

Of these five new trends, digital transformation is the fastest and most widespread of tangible changes. This is because various digital experiences such as digital commerce, entertainment streaming service, and online games are becoming commonplace as people spend more time at home. As expectations for digital transformation of products and services rise and online channels expand, digital transformation in various fields, including the grocery industry, which has been relatively slow to transition, is expected to accelerate rapidly. As such, the COVID-19 pandemic is not only accelerating key future industries such as digital transformation of artificial intelligence and big data, but also rapidly creating new flows in our lives, such as telecommuting and online transformation.

¹¹ COVID-19 through the lens of disruption: Seven years of change in seven months, Alix Partners Disruption Insights 2020. <https://www.alixpartners.com/disruption-insights/covid-19-lens-of-disruption/>. (Accessed March 27, 2021).

In an uncertain situation where the future cannot be predicted, governments and companies around the world must keep an eye on the New Normal trend and respond quickly to new changes (Lee & Lee 2020).

Under the renewed environment, people are encouraged to avoid direct human-to-human interaction, and as a result, digital infrastructure and operational improvements have taken on new significance. The digital trend using individualism and IT technology, i.e., 'untact way of life' is expected to become a new normal. Untact refers to a situation in which goods and services are distributed even if consumers do not face each other in the same space as the producer of the product or the provider of the service. The non-face-to-face untact culture is rapidly spreading as industries that can enjoy services without face-to-face due to the fear of virus infection are in the spotlight. In the early days, untact referred to a payment system that minimized contact points with clerks such as kiosks and food ticket vending machines, but since then, it has embraced new trends that allow people to experience various activities and consumption beyond the concept and limitations of places. Untact has rapidly emerged as the dominant consumption pattern in society as drive-through system or online education has become a representative culture of untact consumption that has emerged due to COVID-19.

4.2. The new normal Indonesia after COVID-19

While various attempts have been made to characterize the new normal following the COVID-19 disaster, its eventual shape will be determined by a variety of elements that are now unknown. Despite these uncertainties, now is the time for Indonesia to analyze the many trends that will define the future normal. With regard to the new trends facing Indonesia, McKinsey & Company pointed out the following changes in its report "Efforts can help Indonesia emerge stronger from the COVID-19 crisis": the country's health care system; government and regulation; technology and innovation; energy and environment; supply chain; work habits; society and consumers; and social contracts (Vivek et. al 2020).

Indeed, since the first outbreak of COVID-19 case in Indonesia, there have been tremendous changes in various fields within such a short period of time. One such area is electronic commerce business or e-commerce that witnessed a vast increase of online and non-cash transaction. In Southeast Asia, cash transactions have taken up a large portion of commerce due to traditional commercial practices and high fees. In Vietnam, the amount of non-cash transactions increased by 124% from the Lunar New Year holiday to mid-March, and an official from OVO, an Indonesian electronic payment service application, said that OVO transactions surged as telecommuting was implemented due to COVID-19. According to BI, non-face-to-face online transactions increased explosively during the period from January to April 2020, with online transactions increasing by 102.5% in the same period of the previous year.

<Table 4-1> Increase of E-commerce Transactions in Indonesia, Jan.~Feb. 2020

(%)

Area	Growth Rate	Regional Share
Jakarta	353	49.1
Greater Jakarta (excluding Jakarta)	397	26.1
Banten	391	14.6
East Java	322	3.9
Central Java	339	3.1
Yogyakarta	259	1.0
North Sumatra	443	0.7
Bali	475	0.6
Lampung	433	0.5
South Sumatra	360	0.4
Total	347	

Source: PwC Indonesia.

Changes in food consumption trends are also evident. In terms of eating habits, Indonesia has traditionally developed a dining out culture, but with the increase in telecommuting and online lectures due to COVID-19, the dining out culture is decreasing, orders for delivery food increase, and the number of online grocery purchases

is increasing. After COVID-19, more restaurants and grocery stores subscribe to food delivery online platforms such as GrabFood and GoFood, and the use of delivery application services has exploded. Noodle dishes have traditionally been popular in Indonesia, and in particular, with the recent increase in ramen sales and movement restrictions spreading, the demand for easy-to-cook food is also increasing. In addition, as interest in boosting immunity and physical strength is increasing due to COVID-19, the demand for health functional foods is expanding. Also the demand for vitamin C and natural health supplements has increased by 10-20% compared to usual.

It is noteworthy that changes are accelerating in the fields of medicine, quarantine, and sanitation as well. In a situation where there was little interest in hygiene and the medical system was weak, awareness of hygiene has been strengthened due to the recent incident. In Indonesia, where medical infrastructure is lacking while boasting high internet and mobile penetration rates, telemedicine has emerged as a new normal. As such, the development of services by digital healthcare startups like Gomed, a prescription drug delivery service through an on-demand program, ALODOKTER, a remote doctor consultation system, and Tanyadok, a reservation system for hospitals and health promotion centers is expected to accelerate. In particular, considering that emerging markets like Indonesia are more willing to accept digital solutions than advanced markets, the possibility of telemedicine expansion is expected to be very high.

The demand for e-learning and digital content is also expanding as the length of stay at home has increased due to the expansion of school closures and restrictions on telecommuting and outside activities.¹² According to the president director of Telkomsel, the firm has witnessed gains in a variety of areas, including e-learning, online meeting apps, and online gaming in which the usage of all three apps increased by more than 5,400%. He added that the spike in broadband traffic was driven by e-learning program

¹² Indonesia's largest state-owned telecommunication company, Telkomsel, announced a 16% increase in its broadband traffic as people continue to follow physical distancing measures amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The Jakarta Post (April 7, 2020).

usage, such as Ruangguru, universities' e-learning centers, and Google Classroom. As the COVID-19 outbreak increases, the Indonesian Ministry of Education has decided to suspend all school activities and change the education system to in-home online/distance learning where a free online learning portal Rumah Belajar for students and Program Guru Berbagi for teachers were provided. In addition, the education authorities provided learning materials to students in areas with poor internet connectivity through the Belajar di Rumah program in cooperation with TVRI, the national television broadcasting station. For this the government increased budget for school operation support (BOS) in accordance with the expansion of distance education by 96% from IDR 36 trillion to IDR 70.7 trillion. At the local government level, the DKI Jakarta Department of Education also offers the integrated school information system SiPintar by Simak and WeKiddo SMK Bisa, a distance learning platform for vocational students, as an effort to maintain the quality of education amid the spread of COVID-19.

4.3. Prospect for digital era and Indonesia's preparedness

In order to discuss Indonesia's response and prospects in the new normal era, it is necessary to first accurately analyze the current level of the digital economy, and then examine how the Indonesian government, society, and companies are preparing for the transition to the digital era. It is widely accepted that Indonesia possesses significant digital economy potential. The number of internet users and mobile users in Indonesia is rapidly increasing thanks to the improvement of the internet infrastructure and the spread of low-cost mobile phones. With the increasing use of internet and mobile devices, Indonesia has the largest number of internet users in Southeast Asian region. According to the Indonesian Internet Service Provider Association, APJII's 2019 estimate, there are at least 171.17 million internet users in Indonesia, accounting for around 64.8% of the total population.¹³

With the high economic growth of more than 6% in recent

¹³ APJII. Laporan Survei: Penetrasi & Profil Perilaku Pengguna Internet Indonesia. Jakarta (Indonesia). 2018.

years, expansion of the middle class, and changes in lifestyle, consumers prefer modern distribution channels such as online shopping that offer convenience and a variety of services over conventional marketplaces. Furthermore, driven by the increase in internet access and usage, Indonesia's e-commerce market size reached 13 billion USD in 2018 or has grown 50% each year for the last 2 years (Bisara 2019). According to the "We are Social January 2019" study, at least 107 million individuals or 40% of the total population buy consumer products through e-commerce platforms.¹⁴ The yearly income from consumer products sales on e-commerce is 9.5 billion USD, or 41 USD per capita, and this figure is expected to rise steadily as mobile device penetration accelerates. The Ministry of Communication and Informatics (MCI) predicted that digital economy in Indonesia may expand by 130 billion USD in 2020 (Vience and Ashwin 2020). A study report released by Google and Temasek/Bain in 2019, indicated that Indonesia's internet economy was growing at a rapid pace, with revenues anticipated at 40 billion USD in 2019 and on track to reach 130 billion USD by 2025, accounting for about 20% of Indonesia's overall GDP.¹⁵ According to the same data, as of 2018, Indonesia's digital economy accounted for about 40% of the total ASEAN digital economy.

In Indonesia, where digital-based services and technologies are rapidly developing amid the advent of the 4th industrial revolution, the digital economy is expected to become a very important future growth engine. The Jokowi government is strengthening policy support for Indonesia's digital economy and industrial development by realizing the 'Making Indonesia Industry 4.0 Roadmap', a plan to build an infrastructure to develop the digital economy. For this

¹⁴ Medical, electronic products, home appliances and cosmetics are selling well on the internet. We Are Social. Digital 2019: Indonesia [Internet]. 2019. Available from: <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-indonesia> (Accessed July 1, 2021).

¹⁵ Google and Temasek/Bain. e-Conomy SEA 2019: Swipe Up and to the Right: Southeast Asia's \$100 Billion Internet Economy [Internet]. 2019. Available from: https://www.blog.google/documents/47/SEA_Internet_Economy_Report_2019.pdf (Accessed June 28, 2021). The Frost & Sullivan 2018 White Paper also predicted that Indonesia's internet economy is expected to grow at a pace of 40% per year, outpacing Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

purpose the Indonesian government expends effort to accelerate the construction of infrastructure related to the 4th industrial revolution through active investment attraction, and aims to achieve an additional 1~2% GDP growth rate by promoting Industry 4.0 project. Such effort includes the completion of Palapa Ring Project, the creation of an investment ecosystem to foster the digital economy, and the development of digital manpower.¹⁶ Furthermore, President Jokowi said during the project's launch that "the Palapa Ring will hopefully be able to bring justice to all Indonesian citizens – from Sabang to Merauke, from Miangas to Rote – and allow them to have an equal opportunity to access advanced technology and high-speed connectivity."¹⁷ The Indonesian government announced plan to invest Rp 30.5 trillion (2.1 billion USD) for ICT development in the 2021 state budget to drive digital transformation for governance and strive for connectivity inclusion.¹⁸ MCI's public service agency, the Telecommunication and Information Accessibility Agency (BAKTI), also announced 'Merdeka Sinyal 2020', a program to provide telecommunication connection to 5000 frontier, outermost, and undeveloped areas, or 3T areas, by 2020. All of these actions are part of Indonesia's commitment to satisfy its WSIS (World Summit on Information Society) membership agreement.¹⁹

Meanwhile, in relation to fostering the digital economy, deregulation of start-ups based on ICT technology is also being

¹⁶ The Palapa Ring project is a telecommunication network development project in Indonesia that includes the building of marine cable and fiber optic communication systems. It connects 514 districts/cities. In October 2019, the Palapa Ring project was officially launched and began operations.

¹⁷ "Disconnected: Digital divide may jeopardize human rights," <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/05/18/disconnected-digital-divide-may-jeopardize-human-rights.html>. (Accessed July 13, 2021).

¹⁸ "Govt to roll out \$2b for ICT development in 2021, boost inclusion," <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/14/govt-to-roll-out-rp-30t-for-ict-development-in-2021-boost-inclusion.html>. (Accessed July 2, 2021).

¹⁹ WSIS was a United Nations summit that began with the purpose of achieving a shared commitment to building a people-centered, inclusive, and development-oriented Knowledge Society in which anybody can generate and share information. As a member of WSIS, Indonesia should develop ICT infrastructure to delineate the digital gap within the regions. <https://publicadministration.un.org/en/Themes/ICT-for-Development/World-Summit-on-Information-Society> (Accessed June 28, 2021).

promoted. Unlike traditional industries, the digital economy is a field in which small and medium-sized enterprises are relatively easy to start in the form of IT-based startups. To this end, President Jokowi mentioned that he would ease start-up regulations to foster 1,000 start-ups following Gojek and Traveloka as part of the digital economy nurturing policy when he pledged for the 2019 presidential election. Today, several of Indonesia's digital start-ups are expanding globally. Gojek is classed as a 'Decacorn', with a worth of 10 billion USD. Gojek was the first local start-up to receive this designation, joining 21 other firms worldwide. Tokopedia, the largest Indonesian e-commerce start-up, is valued at 7 billion USD, after Gojek (Vience and Ashwin, *ibid*).

All of these figures demonstrate how profitable the Indonesian e-commerce business is. Some factors influence the growth of e-commerce sector in Indonesia, including: rising per capita income; the expansion of various e-commerce companies; the development of telecommunications infrastructure and internet connectivity, especially in remote regions; and the shift in consumer behavior from offline to online stores. However, it needs extensive resources to create e-commerce systems. It requires high-performance infrastructure, enormous money and investments and even highly qualified human resources. In developing nations such as Indonesia, the availability of these resources is rather scarce and hence the country remains dependent on industrialized countries. Furthermore, the growth of the digital economy may result in employment replacement that necessitates more technology than human resources. Existing policies and regulations should not only assure the continued expansion of the digital economy business, but also address these essential concerns.²⁰ Therefore, government policies should guarantee that technology should not create these negative effects, but to serve people.

²⁰ Tapscott warns the dark side of the digital economy that includes (1) dislocations (many old jobs will have perished); (2) privacy threat (the personal data breaches); (3) polarization of wealth (20% of household worth 80% of country's wealth); (4) digital gap among society; and also (5) digital slave (technology invades every part of human time and space). Tapscott(2015: 41).

V. Conclusion

Mankind can never go back to life before COVID-19. We will live in a completely different world, as Professor Yuval Noah Harari mentioned. Uncertainties are growing in all fields, and new solutions are required. The COVID-19 pandemic is changing the peoples' way of life around the world. Video conferencing programs have replaced offices and classrooms. Places like department stores, hypermarkets and restaurants have moved into mobile apps. The era of the New Normal has already begun, with untact as the new standard in all aspects of life encompassing work, rest, consumption and entertainment. Governments and businesses around the world are taking the breathtaking challenge of turning crises into opportunities and change for survival in the new post COVID-19 environment.

The era of new standard, the New Normal, has already begun, and Indonesia is no exception. This paper dealt with Indonesia's economy and industrial change in the new normal era, and accelerating digital transformation. Since the first case of infection was reported on 2 March 2020, COVID-19 has spread rapidly, with more than 32,000 confirmed cases reported across all of the 34 Indonesian provinces as of June 8. In addition to the rapid spread of the virus, Indonesia's national health emergency declaration and a large scale social restrictions following the enactment of Ministerial Decree No. 9 of 2020 makes the outlook even darker.

Indonesia had reduced its 2020 GDP growth forecast from 5.3% to 2.3%. Since then, the toll of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia has rapidly increased, with 2,313,829 COVID-19 cases and over 61,140 deaths reported as of 6 July 2021. It is certainly the country's first responsibility to mitigate and contain the effects of the pandemic on several fronts, such as promoting safe behaviors, quickly mitigating health capacity limitations and making the COVID-19 testing a major effort. With the possibility of a second wave of infections, such efforts in the public and private sectors must continue.

Even in the face of such adversity, public- and private-sector leaders may prepare for the post-pandemic environment by

identifying the adjustments required for the country to emerge stronger to safeguard both lives and livelihoods after the pandemic. From a future perspective, government and cooperate leaders may start to create longer-term policies to assist Indonesia move forward rapidly to build a modern economy. In that context, it is essential to comprehend how the country and the world have changed, and to craft strategies and plans that recognize those changes. The Covid-19 pandemic will temporarily slow economic growth and delay some development projects and policy initiatives as the Indonesian government diverts capital from infrastructure development to help respond to the crisis.²¹ However, the Jokowi administration's efforts for continuous reform are expected to accelerate the transition to the digital economy.

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²¹ For example, Indonesian government has placed its ambitious 33 billion USD plan to move the capital city to the island of Borneo on hold. Suharso Monoarfa, the Minister for National Development Planning mentioned that the construction of government buildings for the new city has been postponed until Indonesia sees "the light at the end of the tunnel" on the epidemic. "Indonesia puts \$33bn capital relocation on hold", August 19, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Indonesia-puts-33bn-capital-relocation-on-hold> (Accessed July 13, 2021).

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Mazu – The Chinese Sea Goddess Transforming into Mother Goddess in Vietnam Urban Areas – A Case Study at Mazu Temple in Pho Hien, Vietnam*



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[*Abstract*]

Mazu is considered the famous Chinese Sea Goddess, venerated by seafarers. Mazu belief was conducted in Meizhou County, Fujian Province. Soon worship of Mazu spread quickly to other parts of over the world, especially in Southeast Asia. In China, the Mazu belief was strongly influenced by marine culture, but its marine factors faded when Chinese immigrants had lived together with the Kinh people in Pho Hien (in the north of Vietnam) for more than four centuries. Applying the Acculturation theory, this paper aims to analyze the migration background of the Chinese and their integration into Kinh culture in Pho Hien. It can be said that historical, economic and social context, as well as native government policies have highly affected the manner and the rate of this belief's acculturation. Furthermore, the article explains the reasons for the fading of marine cultural traits and their replacement by the Kinh people's cultural factors in this belief.

Keywords: Acculturation, cultural assimilation, cultural integration, heritage culture, receiving culture

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I . Introduction

Although Mazu received an official title in 1398 (Ptak and Cai Jiehua 2017) the Mazu worship emerged in Fujian, under the early Song (960 - 1279). Nowadays, it has spread to Guangdong, Hainan, Taiwan, Macau, Hong Kong and among the overseas peoples in Southeast Asia. This belief is not set in stone, it has evolved to accommodate local people's cultures. A large number of historical, religious, cultural academic studies have been conducted extensively on Mazu in the past two decades, particularly in the last 10 years.

Stewart and Strathern emphasized the contemporary importance of Mazu in cross-strait relations and the competitiveness of Mazu temple inside Taiwan and the Mainland of China, particularly considering China's rapidly changing economic and global strength today (Stewart and Strathern 2009). In Hong Kong, Macau, and Guangdong, Tianhou became the patron god of the village (Liu 2003). In Putian (China) the local elites played a role in the growth of the Mazu worship. It is said that the locally promoted form of goddess worship functioned at the crossroads of governmental objectives, Confucian ideology, the agency of local elites, and popular religiosity dynamics (Zhang 2020). Other research of Yanchao Zhang focuses on the role of international tourism in the creation, folklorization, and commercialization of the Mazu cult. The support of the federal and municipal governments, as well as the influence of economic globalization, have converted a traditional pilgrimage destination with a local and then national scope into a worldwide tourism magnet (Zhang 2021). Zhang stated belief in the efficacy of the sea goddess is the main driving force behind the ongoing interaction of devotees across the Strait, and a continuing commitment to unraveling personal encounters between Chinese and Taiwanese devotees will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between pilgrimage and tourism across conflicting borders (Zhang 2017).

In Vietnam, the Tianhou worship has only been interested in research for about 30 years and now most of the studies on this belief are limited to the South under the following topics: description of Tianhou temples and its rituals (Nguyen Thi Anh

Tram 2013; Phan An 2002), the transformation and acculturation of this belief (Nguyen Ngoc Tho 2012; Nguyen Thi Thanh Xuyen 2008; Pham Van Tu 2011; Phan Thi Hoa Ly 2018; Tran Hong Lien 2005; Trinh Xuan Tuyet 2015), on the function of Tianhou beliefs (Trinh Xuan Tuyet 2015). The northern Chinese community is very different from the southern one in terms of migration context, historical economic and social background, and policies on management of culture, religion, and the studies of Tianhou worship are still limited so this study is meaningful for both scholar and reality.

Approaching from history and cultural anthropology perspectives, doing field work including participant observation and in-depth interview and focus group discussion, consulting previous studies, this study aims to identify and analyze the process of transformation from the Chinese Sea Goddess to Vietnamese Mother Goddess in the North of Vietnam.

II. Mazu - The Chinese Sea Goddess

Mazu is the Chinese Sea Goddess (also known by several other names and titles Maternal Ancestor, Mother, Granny or Grandmother and Tianhou) was worshipped by very devout merchants, mariners, and fishermen.

Many Chinese history sources such as *Qing dynasty's convention* (大清會典), *Bodhisattva Legend*, *Fujian monography* and other local monographies all wrote legends about her with the basic details: Mazu was once a real woman by the name of Lin Mo, born on the 23rd March 960, and died on 9th September 1119 (Lunar calendar). She lived in a small fishing village on Meizhou Island, a part of Fujian province. It was written in another legend, that she was born on 23rd March 1110.

According to legends, while she was being born, a red light suddenly swooped down, dazed, and fragrant. It was said that she did not cry during birth and the whole first month afterwards; she remained a quiet and pensive child as late as four so people called her Lin Mo. Her parents also called her Moniang Princess that

meant a Silent girl. When her father and brothers were caught offshore during a typhoon her spiritual power began to save the father from drowning, but her mother roused her, causing her to drop her brother into the sea. The father returned and told the other villagers of the miracle.

A few days later, her father returned and told the other villagers of the miracle; this version of the story was preserved in murals at Fengtin in Fujian. She was not sick but died when she was 28 years old. Later, the seafarers told that they often saw her in red dress flying over the sea to save people in distress. As a result, people who lived in Meizhou Island and most sailors began to worship Mazu to pray for a favorable and peaceful sailing.

Recently, many Chinese researchers have tended to argue that Beidai district of Fujian province was the origin of Mazu legend, which is why it has the most earliest Tianhou temples with the largest number of China. Mostly, they said that Mazu was an unreal character it must be the result of the process of concretizing the Goddess identity. The fact that the water is considered a negative element, so the Sea God is also feminized. However, other legends said that Tianhou had a real prototype, specifically it was Shaman in the Beidai district (Bui Thi Thien Thai 2020: 80-81).

Initially, the Mazu was only worshipped in Beidai district of Fujian province. In 1122, on a sailing boat to South Korea as a duty of an emissary of the dynasty, Lu Yin Di was in a dangerous situation due to strong winds and big waves but was blessed peacefully by Mazu. By the way, one of the dynasty's emissaries named Li Gen who was from Beidai presented to the King the merit and miraculousness of Mazu and requested the court to grant Mazu. The cult of Mazu was approved by Emperor Huizong of Song, granted the Shun Ji Miao signboard to Mazu temple.

Since then, Mazu officially became the Chinese Sea Goddess. In the mid-thirteenth century, Fujian's trade and sea transportation was strongly developed and greatly contributed to the royal treasury. For a convenient and peaceful sailing, before and after each journey, sailors always prayed to Mazu. As a result, in order to encourage the development of sea trade, the Chinese kings crowned Mazu. From

the Song Dynasty (1156) to the Qing Dynasty (1648), the court granted a total of 36 ordinations for Mazu, her title from two words to 64 words, the status from a Lady to the highest rank of Goddess. In 1282 (Yuan Dynasty), Kublai Khan (*was a Mongolian general and statesman who was the grandson and greatest successor of Genghis Khan*) ordained Mazu to be the Goddess. In 1648, she was conferred Tianhou. Since she was ordained the Goddess, her temple quickly spread to the entire southern coast and most of China. In 1719, Tianhou was classified by the Qing dynasty as “The Three Great Sects of China”, equal to the sacrifice of Emperor and Confucius. The court also prescribed that the local officials must personally preside over the spring and the autumn ceremony, the three-kneeling and nine prostration ceremony (Bui Thi Thien Thai 2020).

During the Ming-Qing period, Chinese people migrated a lot, mainly to countries in Asia and particularly to the Southeast Asia. In their new locations they set up the congregations to worship Mazu as a place for trade activities, as well as other community activities. Mazu now had new functions such as maintenance for health, for commerce and as the home of immigrants' thoughts. Mazu is also a symbol of peace and cohesion. Countries with the largest number of Mazu temples are Singapore, Malaysia, and Taiwan with more than 1000 temples. Currently, in the world there are more than 6000 temples worshipping Mazu. Meizhou Island has become the mecca of more than 300 million followers from 45 countries and regions in the world (Bui Thi Thien Thai 2020). Meizhou Island and Taiwan were only separated by a narrow strait, but due to historical circumstances, the two sides had no relationship for half a century. In October 1987, tens of thousands of Mazu followers from both straits held a solemn ceremony “1000 years of Mazu ceremony” at the Meizhou temple. Many followers in Taiwan crossed the sea to make pilgrimages to Meizhou Island, despite all the bans.

In 1997, the Mazu statue of the Meizhou temple was taken to almost every temple in Taiwan from the 24th January to the 5th May, a cultural exchange activity mentioned in Taiwan history textbooks. The above events, along with the cultural exchange activities contributed significantly to the elimination of the situation of nearly

50 years of non-commercial relation between the two coasts in 2008. Because of that, Mazu was recognized the Goddess of Peace by the United Nations. On 30th September 2009, the Mazu belief was officially recognized as the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (Bui Thi Thien Thai 2020).

Recently, Mazu belief has been flourishing for many different purposes such as developing tourism, enhancing international cultural exchanges, promoting Chinese culture, protecting national unity, and producing cultural products related to Mazu belief (Bui Thi Thien Thai 2020). The strong development of this belief is also evident through the constant increase in new functions for Mazu. The sixteen legends of her life show that she was not only the Sea Goddess, but also the God of irrigation, healing and eradicating evil (Taiwanese Journal 2004a).

The system of legend about her has added the function of supporting the imperial army to suppress internal turmoils, foreign invasions or conquer new lands (Taiwanese Journal 2004b). Some other documents also show that Mazu has function of the God of birth and the Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva (China Central Television 2006). According to study of Li Lu Lu, in the southern coast of China, the people worshiped her in four places: at the community temple, on boats, in the household and at the clan hall. In the past, the rituals at Mazu temple were solemnly performed by the Qing dynasty bureaucrats, while the people offered incense, prayed, and put money in the donation box. The sacrifices included chicken, duck, pig, goat and fish. In Port North, Taiwan people also hold a Mazu palanquin (add footnote) procession with two followed deities: One whose eyesight thousands of miles away and other has heard sounds in the wind. People on both sides of the streets opened the door, donated offerings, set off firecrackers, and welcomed the Goddess into the house for good things. During the procession, the palanquin usually rotated; when it arrived the temple people “went through the palanquin”.

Besides sacred rituals, the temple management board also held many different cultural activities such as the lion dance, drumming, live theater, gongs, reading the eulogy, circus, jade palanquin,

walking on stilts, offering incense, wrestling and pole climbing. Other than that, the Mazu sacrifice ceremony was organized at the end of Spring and the beginning of Autumn in which the priest was invited to worship Mazu, like at Wen Chang temple, with sacrifices offered by bureaucrats. Some places people worshipped Mazu on boats and organized dragon boat races.

In order to get on the boat to participate in the ceremony, people had to be vegetarian, washed and wear cleaned new clothes. When performing the ritual of inviting the Goddess, the head of the boat had to be in a long dress, a pink scarf, and burning incense while the boys beat the drums and gongs to invite the Goddess to the boat. In some places, people worshipped Mazu by the dragon's head (a part of the dragon boat).

During the ritual performance, people also re-enacted the event that Mazu cloned to come her mother's home in Meizhou island. In places very far from Meizhou island, people solemnly carried Mazu statues to the local congregations of Fujian or Guangdong, or to the oldest Mazu temple which was considered the "ancestral temple" to worship and the Mazu statue was left there for three days before being carried back to the local temples.

In the past, Taiwan once chose the oldest Mazu temple as the "Ancestral one" to worship. However, more recently, with an improved relationship between Taiwan and China the Taiwanese can come to worship Mazu in Meizhou Island (Liu Xi Cheng ed. 1994: 135-146).

In summary, Mazu is the Chinese Sea Goddess originated from Meizhou island, Fujian province. This belief was borne by seafarers, its rituals were related to the sea and strongly reflected the Chinese marine culture. Due to the historical, economic and political background of China, her position has been increasingly strengthened and enhanced, eventually becoming the most famous Sea Goddess in this country.

III. Chinese in Pho Hien

Initially, Chinese traders came to live in the border areas between Vietnam and China in the third century BC. Then, sporadic migrations, or organized ones relocated in the territory of northern Vietnam. In 13th century, they mainly lived in urban areas, near ports and roads to facilitate business, in areas such as Thang Long, Pho Hien, Hai Phong, Nam Dinh.

The Chinese migrated to Pho Hien in the thirteenth century, but mostly in the seventeenth century, when Pho Hien became a busy international trading port because traders from many countries around the world such as the Netherlands, Portugal, England, France, Japan and China came here for trade. For security reasons, in 1650, the Le dynasty banned foreigners from living with the Viet people¹ (Kinh) (Fujiwara 2006: 98-99). Among foreigners, the Chinese accounted for a large number, so the Vietnamese court's policies were mainly aimed at the Chinese. In 1666, the court ordered that the Chinese who wanted permanent residence had to register in the Vietnamese family, and at the same time the houses, the costumes, and the hairstyle had to follow the Vietnamese style, while overseas Chinese who wanted to temporarily stay had to live in a designated residence, away from the Vietnamese (Fujiwara 2006: 98-99).

In Pho Hien, these policies enabled the Chinese to live in isolation forming a village called Bac Hoa Minh Huong. They built many congregations to employ as their own God worship, meeting places, community activities to preserve their traditional culture.

In the late seventeenth century, Pho Hien began to fade. The commercial centers gradually closed, foreign traders also left one by one but most of Chinese decided to stay here. They produced and sold some handicrafts or Chinese traditional medicine. According to the two epitaphs at Hien and Chuong Pagodas, in the early eighteenth century, several hundred Chinese families lived in Pho

¹ The Viet people, also known as the Kinh is the largest population in Vietnam. In 2019, the Kinh ethnic group had 82,085,826 people, accounting for 85.32% of the national population (Ethnicity Committee - General Statistics Office 2020: 54).

Hien (Truong Huu Quynh 2006: 40-41). In the nineteenth century, Pho Hien declined more and more, merchants moved to live in big cities such as Hanoi, Hai Phong, and Nam Dinh, so the Chinese population in Pho Hien decreased significantly. During the French resistance (1946-1954), Pho Hien was heavily destroyed by bombs, which was why merchants left Pho Hien. The number of people remaining was about 200-300. Mr. X², a Chinese Vietnamese intellectual, formerly a member of the Temple management Board for six years, said "In 1950 - 1960, there were about 200-300 Chinese in Pho Hien. After 1954, Hung Yen was destroyed, the Chinese went to other cities such as Hanoi, Hai Phong, and Nam Dinh"³. After 1954. Later, as a result of the 1979 Vietnam-China border war, almost all of the Chinese people left.

The Chinese who lived in Pho Hien had inter-married with the Vietnamese for many generations, and had almost no relatives left in China anymore. In 1992, in the old Pho Hien area, there were 18 households with 70 people of Chinese Vietnamese, No one considered Chinese (the whole area had 35,000 people) (Nguyen Dinh Nha 2006: 111). At that time, they had identified themselves as Vietnamese on their personal papers.

In 2009, when Hung Yen city was established, the old Pho Hien area was still a part of the city. In 2020, there were only 50 of Chinese Vietnamese because many of their descendants had moved to live in other places⁴. Because of many generations of marriage and living with the Vietnamese community, they have become Vietnamese in many aspects such as bloodline, dress, language, home affairs and customs. They have mainly worked in trade and Chinese traditional medicine, electronic repairs. Most of them cannot speak Chinese and no longer have kinship relationships in China. Their personal identity papers claimed to be the Kinh ethnicity, with some inscribing Chinese origin, or Minh Huong origin, some not.

² In this paper, the names of the interviewees are anonymous to keep their privacy.

³ Interviewed Mr. X in Pho Hien on 7 August 2019.

⁴ According to the survey result of Phan Thi Hoa Ly in Pho Hien. 2020.


IV. Pho Hien Tianhou temple and its religious activities

4.1. The structure and layout of Mazu Temple in Pho Hien

The Tianhou temple was established in 1640 by the Chinese of Guangdong, Hainan and Fujian with some building materials and statues brought from China. In general, the temple’s architecture is in the Fujian style, but was influenced by many Vietnamese architectural elements such as Bat Trang bricks to pave the yard and wooden frames for roofing, especially the inner gate.

In the past, the language used at the temple was Chinese but Vietnamese gradually has replaced it. Since the Reform of 1986 for instance the signboard inscribed with the name of the God worshipped is in Vietnamese. The history of the temple in Vietnamese was carved on the wall in 1999. Nowadays, Tianhou’s oration and language of communication are also Vietnamese.

<Figure 1> The layout of Tianhou temple



- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Tianhou statues | 10. The West Alter |
| 2. Tianhou assistant statues | 11. The Pantheon of Four Palaces |
| 3. Guarding God statues | 12. <i>Tir phu Van linh</i> |
| 4. Statues of God with eyesight thousands of miles away and heard sounds in the wind. | 13. Community altar |
| 5. Community altar | 14. Worship those who have passed away |
| 6. Parent's Tianhou statue | 15. The Earth God |
| 7. King Shui Qi | 16. Contributor Altar |
| 8. Statues on the West | 17. Hoang Bua altar |
| 9. High bureaucrat statue | |

The temple's original architecture has retained the above layout, but worshipped statues have changed over time. The Earth God is Chinese Blessing God. Forms of worshipping those who have passed away, Ông Hoàng Búa also appeared after 1986. Initially, the Pantheon of Four Halls and *Tứ phủ Vạn linh*⁵ were two separate Halls and they have changed since 1945. According to Mr. Q, a Chinese Vietnamese, over 80 years old, was born in rich and high prestigious family and he also used to be a member of the Temple Management Board, initially the temple had two main halls but there was only one main altar. Before the 1945 Revolution, people worshipped the *Tứ phủ* of heavenly region, Mountainous, River water and Geographical Areas and the *Tứ Phủ* of ToCo"⁶.

Two the West and the East altars set up after building two main halls: The Four Deities of the ancestors" of Chinese in the East together with "the Four Deities of Vietnamese in the West. In 1992, the temple management board worshipped the Uncle Ho statue next to Tianhou. Then, in 2018, Uncle Ho statue was moved to the other Hall to end serious controversies about worshipping Uncle Ho with God. Now, the deities of *Tứ phủ* belief such as Ancestral Deity and



<Photo 1> Sacred Four Halls (Tứ phủ Vạn linh)

Taken by Phan Thị Hoa Lý on 19 February 2019

⁵ A Vietnamese belief - the four kingdoms of Ten Thousand Spirit.

⁶ Interviewed Mr. Q on 2 February 2019.

Dragon King are worshipped in the main hall of the temple. The “Sacred Four Halls” (see: photo 1) worships eight female statues and the three plaques of the Third Blessed One, the Fifth Venerable God and the Venerable Heavenly God of the Three Areas. On the altar there are also two paper hats with a Rahu's face and votive items.

The Four Deity Hall [see photo 2] has worshipped four women statues in four different colors of dress (blue, red, yellow, white). The Temple Guard and some Chinese-Vietnameses confirmed these were the four Ancestral Ladies of four Chinese clans including: Lam clan (dressed in white), Ly (in blue shirt), Quach (in light yellow shirt, Hoang (red shirt).

In this hall, it can see votive offerings and decorations with *worshipped hat (nón công đồng)* (*Tứ phủ* belief), pale white snake double on the ceiling and couplets presenting the Four Duchess:

Four Duchess of the Goddess

*Always with her no matter the Spring, the Summer,
the Autumn or the Winter*



<Photo 2> Four Duchess of the Goddess

Taken by Phan Thị Hoa Lý on 25 May 2008



<Photo 3> Contributor Altar

Taken by Phan Thị Hoa Lý on 18 February 2019



<Photo 4> Tianhou Altar

Taken by Phan Thị Hoa Lý on 18 February 2019

4.2. Temple Ritual

Before 1945, this temple was completely managed by Chinese, so they carried out rituals twice a year on the birthday of Tianhou (23rd March of lunar calendar) and the date of death (9th September of lunar calendar). The ritual is described as "seven big and rich clans

prepared vegetable and meat offerings, at the beginning of the ceremony local officials and members of seven clans prayed to Mazu for happiness, health, and prosperity. The management board assigned ten or twelve girls in Chinese traditional costumes to line up one to make an offering and the others to receive the offering to the altar. Then Ritual Board prayed the Mazu⁷.

Normally, one ceremony has 10-12 offering trays, and the head of the temple is responsible for making the opening ceremony's speech in Chinese. After making the speech he releases a bunch of balloons tied with a silk ribbon that has chanted a spell. It is said that since then, in the ceremony, the Chinese dress in robes like the Vietnamese⁸.

"In the past, offerings were roasted pigs, boiled chickens, sewn meat. Especially, the Ritual on 9th September, offerings were frozen meat, white sticky rice, different seasonal fruits. People also offered Suzhou cakes, jelly seaweed, rice, sesame salt because of the magic carpentry like a sesame tree!"⁹. Most of these dishes were Chinese cuisine and Suzhou cake was a specialty of the Fujian people so they made sacrifice her"¹⁰. Nowadays, besides Chinese dishes, offerings are also Vietnamese dishes such as boiled chicken and sticky rice.

On the occasion of the ritual on March 23 of year, the Chinese held a procession on the afternoon. The procession is a tour around Bac Hoa village. On the way, the procession stops at each village's temple to celebrate. Every 5 years, the village held a huge festival with a solemn procession (Le Hong Ly 1999).

To organize and maintain religious activities at the temple, the Chinese elected a Management Board who were responsible for raising funds and calling for material contributions from their own community. Mr. Q mentioned "The temple fund was contributed by the Chinese that was only spent on the worship while management board were not paid, they worked with charity. The temple's fund was not much. The temple management board was elected by the

⁷ Interviewed Mr. Q at his home in Pho Hien on 19 February 2019.

⁸ Interviewed Mr. P, a Chinese Vietnamese, a member of Temple management Board since 1986, at the temple on 25 May 2008.

⁹ Interviewed Mr. Q at his home in Pho Hien on 19 February 2019.

¹⁰ Interviewed Mr. Q at his home in Pho Hien on 19 February 2019.

Chinese including a head, a deputy of Congregation, a secretary, a treasurer. The management board were responsible for taking care of the temple and organized rituals". On the occasion of the old festival, "the elders used to play the traditional games (*tổ tôm, đánh chắn*), chess, and chicken fights. They also invited people from other provinces volunteering to perform the Chinese traditional theatre because Hung Yen had no artist"¹¹.

After the August 1945 revolution, the Chinese temples were directly managed by Vietnamese Ward level government. However, the government only managed in legal terms, while the Chinese still directly organized religious activities at the temple. Before organizing the festival or renovating the temple, the Temple Management Board has to apply for permission to send to the ward People's Committee and they also manage the funding for the activities of the temple

During the French and American resistances (1945-1954 ; 1954 - 1975) religious activities were not allowed to organize and Tianhou Temple was no exception. "During this period, a Kinh man stayed in the temple. He earned by drawing patterns, or portraits decorated on plates on enamel plates brought to Hai Duong for baking"¹². It was said by Mr. X "Around the year 1945 – 1954, three Vietnamese families lived in two side halls of the temple, and they were required to leave (by the local government) in 1992 when the temple was recognized as a Historical - Cultural Heritage¹³. During this period, the relationship between Vietnam - China was very close, so the Chinese and Vietnamese people in Pho Hien were quite friendly with each other. There was no distinction, which is why a Vietnamese could live in the Chinese temple and voluntarily take care of the daily worship and cleaning the temple. However, the Vietnam-China relationship began to fall into dispute when US President Nixon officially visited and signed the Shanghai Joint Declaration in 1972. Finally, the Vietnam – China border war broke the two countries' relationship in 1979, causing almost all Chinese to leave Pho Hien. The remaining people lived quite self-consciously. They hardly went to the temples or pagodas.

¹¹ Interviewed Mr. Q at his home in Pho Hien on 19 February 2019.

¹² Interviewed Mr. Q at his home in Pho Hien on 19 February 2019.

¹³ Interviewed Mr. X in Pho Hien on 14 April 2019.

Thanks to Renovation (Doi Moi, 1986), along with the promulgation of many policies on socio-economic development, the Vietnam Government also launched many regulations on freedom of religion and religious festivals. The Vietnam-China relationship also gradually reduced tensions and was normalized in 1991. Some Chinese people thought about restoration their temples. During this period, Chinese were also allowed to directly manage and organize religious and religious activities at their temples.

They then elected a management board consisting of a Head of the Committee, two Deputy Chiefs, a Treasurer and a Lady of the incense. These four people belong to four Chinese clans: On, Ly, Quach and Hoang. They were clans of high socio-economic status in the community. Mr. Q (one of the four people above) talked about the way they restored Tianhou ritual "The management board issued a notice that said Tianhou temple was recognized by the government, it had a Management Board which is responsible for inviting guests to attend the ritual. Then the Management Board communicates to the children and Chinese households who used to live in Pho Hien or relatives and acquaintances everywhere such as Hai Phong, Thai Binh, Nam Dinh, Hai Duong, Hanoi ... "14.

In 1987, the Tianhou ritual was restored for the first time. This restoration has been particularly strong since the temple was recognized as a National Historical Cultural heritage by the Ministry of Information Culture (Vietnam) according to Decision No. 3959 signed by the Minister Tran Hoan, dated 2nd December 1992 and shortly thereafter by Pho Hien International, held on 10-12th December 1992. The conference attracted researchers from around the world. Since then, the temple has been managed by the City Department of Culture and Information and the Ward Vice Chairman took the role of the Head of the Ritual Board. The local government has managed the activities of the temple, and also provided funding for restoration. The Vietnamese started to join the Temple Management Board.

Since its restoration, at the beginning of the ceremony, a Government Representative makes a speech in Vietnamese, and

¹⁴ Interviewed Mr. Q at private house in Pho Hien on 19 February 2019.

then sets off fireworks. The ritual is also increasingly performed according to the Vietnamese style that includes six steps of worship offerings incense, flower, candle, tea, fruit, rice. Studies on this ritual in the late 1990s showed that Vietnamese dishes are popular, with offerings such as sticky rice, green bean sweet soup, rice nuggets, persimmons, lychees, Gac cake, pigs, chickens, carp, goats, and geese, then boiled pork, chicken, and ducks (Le Hong Ly 1999: 72; Nguyen Phuc Lai 1998: 58).

The Chinese traditional offerings also are getting lost. Nowadays, the Tianhou ritual's offerings no longer include foods such as roasted pork, Caramelized pork, tortoise shaped cake and Suzhou cake. On the occasion of September 9, 2019 lunar festival, it recognized offerings such as fruit, betel nut, cakes, *bánh dày* and a vegetarian tray at Tianhou altar; Community worship (*Ban Công đồng*) altar had boiled chicken, pork bologna and carnism diet tray; At *Thổ Công*, *ông Hoàng Búa* and *Tứ phủ vãn linh* altars all have meatarian diet trays; *Ban Tứ vị tổ cô* had a vegetarian tray (see photos 5, 6, 7, 8, 9).



<Photo 5> Offerings at Ban Tứ phủ vãn linh altar on the ritual on September 9, Lunar Calendar

Taken by Phan Thị Hoa Lý on 7 October 2019



<Photo 6> Offerings at *Ban Tít phũ Tổ cồ* altar on the ritual on September 9 Lunar Calendar
Taken by Phan Thị Hoa Lý on 7 October 2019



<Photo 7> *Ban Mưa hậu* altar on the ritual on 9th September Lunar Calendar
Taken by Phan Thị Hoa Lý on 7 October 2019



<Photo 8> Ban Hoàng Búa altar on the ritual on 9th September Lunar Calendar
Taken by Phan Thị Hoa Lý on 7 October 2019



<Photo 9> Ban Thổ thần altar on the ritual on September 9 Lunar Calendar
Taken by Phan Thị Hoa Lý on 7 October 2019

The Tianhou temple's ritual has been transformed dramatically since 2000. In 2002 when the movie "My Fair Princess", a very popular Chinese film was shown in Vietnam, Mr. P had the idea that "A Chinese temple must be different from a Vietnamese one, ritual costumes, and processions have to be in the Chinese style". He discussed it with the Temple Management Board, who then presented it to the authorities. With the approval of the government, Mr. P went to Hanoi to order ten dresses, hats and shoes like the costumes of the female characters in the above-mentioned movie. That year's ritual, the new outfits were widely praised, so after that, the management board bought more female and male outfits for the ritual¹⁵. Some of the people who carried the Tianhou palanquin wore this costume, while most of them still wore the Vietnamese costume. This costume has been not only worn on Tianhou ritual but has also been lent to other temples since 2012.

Tứ phủ Vạn linh has often carried out votive dance which is the most prominent ritual of Đạo Mẫu influenced on Tianhou ritual since 2000. The congregations have also held light, flag, bow and sword dances as offerings to Mazu.

In 2014, the temple was recognized as "Special National Monument" according to Decision No. 2408 / QĐ-TTg, signed by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung on 31 December 2014. This title is given to a complex of sixteen monuments (both Chinese and Vietnamese) of special historical, architectural and artistic value (Minh Ngan, Phuong Thu 2018). The Hung Yen Provincial People's Committee issued Decision No. 2156/QĐ-UBND on the establishment of a National Monuments Management Board, which has been run by the People's Committee of Hung Yen city since November 2017. All members of the Board are employees of the People's Committee and receive salaries from the State. Every year, the Board plans activity budget including money to buy offerings, organizing ritual, expenses of electricity, water, internet, security guards, incense etc. It is approved by the Provincial People's Committee.

The Temple management Board organizes all temple activities.

¹⁵ Interviewed Mr. P. at the temple on 24 May 2008.

They decide how the ritual will be held and who will be invited to attend the ritual. They also invite employees of agencies, companies and local social organizations to take part in the ritual to strengthen community cohesion. The management board prepare all the offerings, assign the person to write and make the opening speech and invited Ritual Master. The day before the ritual, the board takes care of space for guests, setting up tables and chairs and assign a person who is responsible for recording the name of people contributing fund to temple activity budget. The board also appoints some staff to welcome pilgrims and even prepare gifts (usually sweets) to give back to those who come to the ceremony and make merit for the temple. This gift is considered as a reward from Tianhou that brings good luck to the recipient. In general, all work of rituals are undertaken by the Management Board; therefore, it is considered the agent and owner of the temple. Chinese people who could voluntarily participate in the temple's affairs as owners now become guests. A Chinese woman said: "In the past, the city government did not manage the temple activities, so I considered those my housework, so I had to invite people to attend the ceremony. Now it is put under of the City government control, having the Management Board to take care of everything, they only invite state organizations and companies. For local people, they just announce about the ritual on the loudspeaker"¹⁶.

On the full moon and the first day of every month, a member of the Board makes offerings to Tianhou.

In the period when the Chinese people completely owned the temple (before 1945), annually, besides two occasions of birth day and transformation of Tianhou, the temple also had the following festivals: Full Moon January (January 15 in lunar calendar). Doan Ngo (May 5 lunar calendar), the full moon of July (July 15 of the lunar calendar), Mid-Autumn Festival (August 15 of the lunar calendar) and the Year end, New Year's Eve. During the Mid-Autumn Festival, they held a full moon ceremony, party and released flower lanterns. "When the Chinese managed the temple,

¹⁶ Interviewed Ms. V, a Vietnamese Chinese woman, at her home in Pho Hien on 19 February 2019.

on the Mid-Autumn Festival, they set up a temporary lake on both sides of the middle hall to release the flower lanterns”¹⁷.

At the end of the year, they held the year-end and New Year's Eve ceremonies “The Chinese hung lanterns and decorative cord and held New-Year's Eve ceremony”¹⁸. During this period, the Chinese people gave up organizing the Cold Food Festival (3rd March of the lunar calendar) which was an important traditional ceremony and integrated *Doan Ngo Tết* (May 5 of lunar calendar) of the Vietnamese “No longer the Cold Food Ceremony, Adding *Tết Doan Ngo* on May 5 with offerings such as glutinous rice wine, fruits, traditional cakes”¹⁹.

Since 2000, Tianhou Temple strongly has integrated deeply the Vietnamese Mother Worship and its two typical “*attendant service*” rituals are annually hold “in and out the summer”. Mr.X, a Chinese - Vietnamese member of Board for 16 years stated “In the past, the people didn't hold ritual “in and out the summer”; they just simply worshiped. Since 2005, many groups have come to hold these two rituals and then hold *attendant service ceremony*”²⁰.

When the National Heritage Management Board was set up, they wrote the Ritual Timeline of the temple (see photo 10), including Temple door opening ceremonies on January 8, March 22; March 23 and September 9 traditional festivals; March 24 Thanksgiving ceremony; April 8 ceremony in summer; July 18 the out summer ceremony; December 23 of the year-end ceremony. According to this timeline, the temple no longer has the ritual of worshipping the full moon of January, *Doan ngo*, the full moon of July, the mid-autumn festival and the New Year's Eve. These rituals are not set in stone, but they evolve to accommodate changing needs. Some Vietnamese rituals have been conducted “in the summer” (*vào hè*), “out the summer” (*ra hè*). Thus, two of the eight Tianhou rituals of the Chinese people have been conducting, four others are replaced by four Vietnamese rituals among *Vào hè* and

¹⁷ Interviewed Mr. K, a Vietnamese temple keeper, at the temple on 18 February 2019.

¹⁸ Interviewed Mr. Q at his home in Pho Hien on 19 February 2019.

¹⁹ Interviewed Mr. X, in Pho Hien on 1 April 2019.

²⁰ Interviewed Mr. X, in Pho Hien on 1 April 2019.

Ra hè are typical rituals of the Kinh people's *Tứ phủ* belief. It is said that the National Monument Management Board has conducted the Kinh people's rituals that created a major turning point in the process of Vietnamizing the belief of Tianhou worship in Pho Hien.



TT	NGÀY	NỘI DUNG
1	Ngày mùng 8 tháng 1	Lễ mở cửa đền
2	Ngày 22 tháng 3	Lễ mở cửa đền
3	Ngày 23 tháng 3	Lễ hội truyền thống (Kỷ niệm ngày sinh của Mẫu)
4	Ngày 24 tháng 3	Lễ tạ
5	Ngày 8 tháng 4	Lễ vào hè
6	Ngày 18 tháng 7	Lễ ra hè
7	Ngày 9 tháng 9	Lễ hội truyền thống (Kỷ niệm ngày hòa của Mẫu)
8	Ngày 23 tháng 12	Lễ tất niên

Ban Quản lý khu di tích quốc gia đặc biệt Mẹ Hiền

<Photo 10> Ritual timeline has been set up since the early of 2018
Taken by Phan Thị Hoa Lý on 18 October 2019

V. Tianhou - The Mother goddess in urban Vietnam

In China, this Sea Goddess was often called Mazu (the Mother) but the Goddess was named Tianhou in Pho Hien that's why two temples' name boards written "Tianhou Temple". In the past, people used to call Tianhou temple, but over time, this belief has integrated with Vietnamese local beliefs in particular the Mother worship. Therefore, in the beginning of the twenty-first century, it appeared the name "*Đền Mẫu*" (Mother Temple) and it has become more and more popular. The Tianhou worshipping altar is also called Mother's Altar.

Goddess belief appeared in the Vietnamese prehistoric period and was historicized and royalized through the deification of Feudal dynasties that made a large number of typical goddesses become Mother Goddess. This belief absorbed Chinese Taoism to form the *Tam phủ, Tứ phủ* belief in the fifteenth century. The Vietnamese historical context made this belief strongly developed and become the unique and typical belief of the country that identify the musical characteristics, costumes, dances of many ethnic groups in Vietnam. Thus, it was also recognized as a UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in December 2016.

Tam phủ, Tứ phủ belief has a consistent temple system with its primitive worldview and a large number of legends, myths and rituals. Its temple basically consists of the gods from high to low as follows: *Phật Bà Quan Âm* (the Bodhisattva) - Jade Emperor - Mother *Tam phủ, Tứ phủ* - Five great priests (from the Fifth to the Tenth) – *Tứ vị chầu bà* (four assistants) – *Ngũ vị Hoàng tử* (the Five Princes (call from the order of the First to the Fifth but there are from Fifth to Tenth Mr. Hoang) – *Thập Nhị vương cô* (Ten Princess, call the order from the the First to the Tenth) – *Thập nhị vương cậu* (the Ten Princes, call from the First to the Tenth) – *Ngũ hổ* (Five Tigers) – *Ông Lót* (snake) (Ngo Duc Thinh 2010: 61-62).

Tam phủ includes *Thiên phủ* (Heavenly domain) symbolized by *Mẫu Thượng Thiên* (the Heavenly Mother) in a red dress; *Địa phủ* (the Land) symbolized by *Mẫu Địa* in a yellow costume; *Thoải phủ* (Water domain) symbolized by *Mẫu Thoải* in white dress. *Tam phủ* emerged first, then developed into *Tứ phủ*, adding more *Nhạc phủ* (Forest area) symbolized by *Mẫu Thượng Ngàn* in blue dress. *Tam phủ, Tứ phủ* belief has strongly developed since early 21st century leading to the explosion of the *Hầu đồng* ritual which has been performed in temples, pagodas, communal houses and shrines of the Kinh people and religious temples of other ethnic groups such as Hoa, Khmer, Tay, Nung and some ethnic groups in the Central Highlands. This assimilation transformed Tianhou's worship and ritual into the Kinh people's *Tam phủ, Tứ phủ* rituals.

The Tianhou temple was built in the middle of the seventeenth century (1640) and absorbed strongly *Tứ phủ*

Vietnamese belief in the middle of the twentieth century (around 1945). The two former worshipping halls were replaced by two palaces (*Tứ phủ Vạn linh* and *Tứ phủ Châu Bà*),. *Tứ phủ vạn linh* meant that “the innumerable (one thousand) goddesses in the four regions”, worshipping *Đệ Tam*, *Đức Ông*, *Đệ Ngũ* *Đức Ông* and *Thượng Thiên Đức Ông*, the eight female statues (the Deities of the Twelve Goddesses), a Tiger on the floor and a pair of snakes on the rafters are all gods in *Tứ phủ* Vietnamese belief. A Chinese - Vietnamese who used to be a member of the temple management board insisted that “*Tứ phủ châu bà* were Ancestors of four Chinese clans who built the temple”²¹. *Tứ phủ châu bà* statues worshipped in the Tianhou Temple showed that the Chinese either accidentally or intentionally legitimized the worship of their four ancestors as *Tứ phủ*. Mr.X said: “When I was about 5-6 years old (he was born around 1940 - P.T.H.L), the temple worshipped four ancestors and held *lên đồng* (homophobic) ritual. *Tứ phủ vạn linh* organised many homophobic rituals to invite *Liễu Hạnh*, *cô Bơ*, *hoàng Mười*”²². And Mr. Q explained “Chinese worshipped *Tứ phủ vạn linh* in Tianhou temple because of their changed worldview”²³. It was easy to recognize the Chinese immigrants actively adopted the Vietnamese culture in a favorable context that positively impacted on them, and this case was true of acculturation (Berry 2005; Richmond 1993).

Integrating the Kinh's *Tứ phủ* belief into Tianhou temple, the Chinese also created another corresponding temple to worship their goddesses. The fact that Tianhou was a virgin girl, the Chinese community selected four unmarried girls from four prestigious clans such as Lam, Ly, Quach, Hoang to worship as Tianhou's followers. Because of that, over the centuries, the temple custodians are members of these four clans.

In the temple, worshipping the four young Lady statues dressed in blue, red, white and yellow costumes, tiger worship and decorated with worshipped hats and a pair of yellow and green snakes wrapped on two beams of the building represent the Kinh's *Tứ phủ* temple. The people called *Tứ phủ Tổ cô* or *Tứ phủ châu bà*.

²¹ Interviewed Mr. X on 12 April 2019.

²² Interviewed Mr. X in Pho Hien on 12 April 2019.

²³ Interviewed Mr. Q on 19 February 2019.

However, some Chinese-Vietnamese people who used to be members of the temple management board affirmed that "*Tứ phủ châu bà* are ancestors of the four Chinese clans who have contributed to establish the temple"²⁴. This ambiguity shows that the Chinese have unintentionally or intentionally legalized their ancestors in the form of *Tứ phủ* belief that marked a very strong influence of the Kinh *Tứ phủ* worship on the Tianhou worship in Pho Hien since the mid-twentieth century.

Tổ cô, *Cô tổ* or *Bà cô tổ*, *Bà cô*, also known as a virgin girl and died at a very young age at sacred hours, so she was very sacred and fierce. She could harm people if they did not make offerings to her, but she also loved children, helped them stay healthy, eat well, and grow up quickly. Similarly, to *Cô tổ*, Mr. Manh is an unmarried male teenager who was sacred too and was willing to help people. *Bà cô* and uncle Manh are often worshiped separately at a small altar, placed below the Ancestor altar. Worshiping *Bà cô* and Mr. Manh is a typical Vietnamese belief. The fact that the Chinese legalize *Bốn Bà cô* worship and called *Tứ phủ Tổ cô* shows that they were strongly influenced by the Kinh's *Tứ phủ* belief.

Since the mid-twentieth century, the Tianhou temple has absorbed more and more Vietnamese local beliefs that related to historical context. Firstly, during the time of Vietnamese domination, the French colonial government gave the Chinese many political and economic priorities, they became rich and powerful, and they actively absorbed the Vietnamese *Tứ phủ* belief to integrate well with the Vietnamese and fulfill their spiritual needs. Secondly, for 17 years of unification within 7 years of renovation, Vietnam gained economic achievements, then it had conditions to pay attention to cultural heritage, so Tianhou Temple was recognized as a National Historical Cultural Heritage (by the Vietnamese Ministry of Culture). However, after the 1979 Vietnam-China border war, most of the Chinese left Pho Hien; the rest had to self- identify as Vietnamese and had a lower social status than the Kinh people so that the Kinh were able to participate directly in the management and administration of temple affairs²⁵.

²⁴ Interviewed Mr. X at Pho Hien on 12 April 2019.

²⁵ Interviewed Mr. Q on 23 March 2019.

At that time, the temple management board worshipped the Uncle Ho statue in the main hall “Uncle Ho statue was worshipped in Temple in 1992 by its popularity” (the Management Board’s explanation)²⁶. They also worshipped *Hoàng Búa*, *Mua hậu*, *Ban Các cụ quy*. Regarding the origin of the *Hoàng Búa* belief, Mr. X, a Chinese - Vietnamese, used to be a member of the Temple Management Board in 1996 assumed “*Hoang Búa* was worshipped in 1996. It couldn’t identify who he was but it could propose he was definitely Assistant god of Tianhou”²⁷. Furthermore, Mr. Q assumed that “*Hoàng Búa* was a Vietnamese superstition, *chúa Thượng Ngàn* with *Ông Hoàng* may be worshiped by Mr. P when he was a temple manager”²⁸. The fact that *Hoàng Búa* worshipping space (photo 8) was decorated *nón công đồng* (a worshipped hat of *Tứ phủ* belief), offerings including votive papers, vegetarian and meatatarian meal trays cooked in Vietnamese style identify Hoang Bua as a deity of the *Tứ phủ* belief. *Ban Các cụ quy* worships people who took care of the temple passed away from 1987 to now. *Mua hậu* worships people who had no sons or were unmarried and they had contributed a sum of money or land according to the village's regulations so that, after their death, they would be worshiped at the temple.

More and more Vietnamese have become members of the Tianhou temple management board while Chinese members have been involved less and less, and the last two Chinese members were advised to give up due to their old age and weakness in 2012. Since then, the rituals and offerings have become more and more Vietnamese. Since the special National Monument Management Board has managed and organized the Tianhou ritual in a new way, the Chinese have rarely come to see the temple; only their descendants who live far away visit the temple when they come home. For the Vietnamese “they usually come to Tianhou temple”²⁹.

Tianhou’s Sea Goddess function has also transformed into a Mother Goddess and absorbed functions of the Avalokiteshvara

²⁶ interviewed Mr. X on 12 April 2019.

²⁷ Interviewed Mr. X on 8 May 2019.

²⁸ Interviewed with Mr. Q on 23 March 2019.

²⁹ Interviewed Mr. X at Pho Hien on 12 April 2019

Bodhisattva and Goddess in Urban Vietnam. People come to Tianhou temple to pray for health, peace, good business, promotion, passing exams, even exorcism. Tianhou 's offerings has been vegetarian since 2018.

Tianhou's death anniversary, a Vietnamese priest was invited to carry out the ritual and women have been responsible for organizing the ritual as Vietnamese Goddess one since 2000.

VI. Conclusion

The Chinese from the southern coast of China and the Vietnamese are so similar in race, history, and culture that it was not difficult for them to integrate into Vietnamese society as the Second homeland in the 17th century.

The fact that for nearly four centuries living with the Vietnamese, socio-historical events, especially Vietnam-China diplomatic relations, the Chinese community in Pho Hien, depending on each context, have been integrating into Vietnam society actively or passively. They also have mixed blood with Vietnamese people for many generations that makes acculturation between the Chinese quickly and smoothly. The border war of 1979 made most Chinese leave Vietnam and they were far lower in status. The number of Chinese who stayed in Pho Hien identified themselves as Vietnamese and no longer related to relatives in China. Nowadays it can be said that this community has been Vietnamized in terms of language, clothes, housing, customs, habits and culture.

Tianhou worship is a Chinese popular belief representing their cultural identity. However, the continuous process of acculturation with Vietnamese folk beliefs, socio- historical events have transformed Tianhou worship into the Pho Hien Goddess belief which are totally different from Tianhou belief in China. It can be said that the transformation a Chinese famous sea goddess into a Vietnamese Mother Goddess has been completed.

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Tributary Activity in Diplomacy Relations between Vietnam and Mainland Southeast Asian Countries from 938 to 1885*



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[Abstract]

Based on research of documents left by Vietnamese feudal dynasties, the current article reports how it initially reconstructed the process of Vietnamese tribute activity of Southeast Asia from the 10th to 19th century and demonstrates the significance of these activities to how Vietnam is considered central rather than peripheral as a nation. Tribute activity took place during a period when Vietnam was an independent country; feudal dynasties of Vietnam were independent and autonomous dynasties. Vietnam had just escaped from the 1,000-year invasion of China and more recently gotten out from the control of the French colonialists. From the demonstration of the tribute activity, otherwise called requesting investiture, the current article places it in relation to the contemporary Chinese “tributary system” to draw out the characteristics and its essence. At the time the current article explores the underlying causes that contributed to shaping the core characteristics of this “tributary system” and its significance to power relationships.

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Keywords: Paying tribute, Mainland Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Nineteenth century, China

I . Introduction

For a long time, when referring to requesting investiture or paying tribute, researchers around the world have often considered such things as special activities only found in diplomatic relations between China and neighboring countries. This is true in the case of Vietnam, which is regarded as a good example the use of special activities with its complicated and multifaceted nature (Phan Huy Chu 2017). Fairbank J.K (1941, 1942, 1953, 1968), S.Y.Teng (1941), John E. Wills (1988), Joseph F. Fletcher (1968), Morris Rossabi (1983), Nicola Di Cosmo (2003), Michael H. Hunt (1984), James A. Millward (1998) and Zhang Feng (2009) all emphasized China's "tributary system" and regarded it as a unique form of international relations only found in ancient and medieval times in East Asia. However, in reality, there was an existence of another "tributary system" in the mainland Southeast Asia at that time (also known as the Indochinese Peninsula) whose center was a vassal state of China, which is Vietnam. In the "tributary system" placing Vietnam as the center, tributary activity of some mainland Southeast Asian countries such as Chen La (Cambodia), Van Tuong (Vientiane), Nam Chuong (Luang Prabang), Thuy Xa (Water Heaven, in western Phu Yen province of Vietnam today), Hoa Xa (Fire Heaven, a tribe in the west of Thuy Xa, also in the west of Phu Yen province of Vietnam today), was also included in the tributary system. However, due to the different geopolitical, geo-cultural characteristics between these two "tributary systems", mainland Southeast Asia's "tributary system" would have its own unique characteristics, besides the general features brought about by the nature of the tributary activity. From the reconstruction of the tributary activity between Vietnam and the mainland Southeast Asian nations from 938 to 1885 (around the time the feudal dynasties of Vietnam were independent), the research presented here initially points out the core characteristics of this special "tributary system" - which not only governed diplomatic relations between Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries

at that time but also had a significant impact on such relations at the present time and in the future.

II . Causes of tributary activity between Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asian countries from 938 to 1885

Relations between Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asian countries were limited from the 10th century (namely after 983 when Vietnam gained its independence after more than 1000 years of Chinese rule) to 1885 (when France and China signed the Tianjin Treaty, permanently ending the tributary relationship between Vietnam and China. This is when Vietnam ceased to formally be a vassal state of the suzerain state-China) (Documents diplomatiques 1885: 259-60). During this period, Vietnam was a nation, a sovereign nation, and Vietnam existed with two statuses. One was as the tribute-paying country under the tributary system in which China was the center and the second was as the country receiving tributes from several Southeast Asian countries and therefore a center in its own right.

It can be said that the relations between big countries and small ones, between the center and the periphery, have always been one of the most crucial issues in international relations for many years. Here, the words “small” and “big” in the term “small country, big country” only have a relative meaning. The country is smaller when placing it in a comparable position to a country with more territory, a larger population, or having greater military, economic, political, and cultural potential, and more influence and governance over other countries. A country may be bigger than one country, but it also may be smaller than other countries. Similarly, the words “central” and “peripheral” have a relative meaning. A country may be considered a center compared to these peripheral countries, but it may be a peripheral or semi-peripheral country when compared to other centers. In those relations, the center often has many options, plans and a trump card to bind the peripheral countries to be dependent and follow the center’s lead.

Meanwhile, small countries and peripheral countries are often vulnerable. The vulnerabilities of small nations have been

demonstrated countless times throughout history. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Thucydides in *The Peloponnesian War* once said: “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Goodby 2014: 32). Although this statement is not true in all cases, it reminds us of the predominance in many aspects of the center and the disadvantageous position and greater vulnerability of small countries considered to be peripheral.

Here, from the 10th to 19th centuries, not all mainland Southeast Asian countries paid tribute to Vietnam. In fact, only some countries such as Ai Lao, Chiem Thanh, Chen La, Van Tuong, Nam Chuong, Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa performed this obligation. The common point in these countries is that they are smaller than Vietnam in terms of territory, population, and military, economic, political, and cultural potential. This is an undeniable fact even though Vietnam at that time was also a smaller country than many other countries in the region, such as China and Japan. Obviously, a country may be small compared to one country, but larger than that country.

Once these Southeast Asian countries decided to pay tribute and requesting investiture, the act means that they accepted their inferior position in their relations with Vietnam. There must be a logical reason for this, otherwise, at the same time, why did Siam not accept paying tribute to Vietnam like many other countries? Unlike Siam - a country equivalent to Vietnam in terms of political, military, and economic potential - the countries of Chen La, Ai Lao, Van Tuong, Nam Chuong, Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa were smaller countries at that time in terms of potential in all aspects. They always fell into civil war, suffered instability and were under pressure of aggression and annexation from the outside. Therefore, they were in the middle of two options. One was being to submit itself to the rule of and pay tribute to the bigger country like Vietnam, for finding support in the life of survival and development. The other being to self-resist oppositions from domestic opposing factions and endure a permanent threat from many of the more prominent surrounding countries. They chose the first option - submit themselves to the rule of Vietnam. It was the inevitable choice of survival like Vietnam when Vietnam was facing the risk of

permanent security threats from China.

On the Vietnamese side, Vietnam was also willing to accept the tributary activities of smaller Southeast Asian countries. It considered it as a way to maintain the uninterrupted “suzerain - vassal” relationship. This is because the existence of this “tributary system” of taking Vietnam as the center not only brought political and economic benefits to Vietnam, but also created an adjacent stable external environment to maintain stability within Vietnam. Moreover, the maintenance of a “tributary system” with a central position for Vietnam also contributed to creating a balanced correlation in terms of potential, at least in terms of form, for Vietnam in relations with its giant neighbor in the North. Therefore, the “tributary system” of mainland Southeast Asia at that time was not merely unilateral, as described by Yu Insun (2009) when he described the Chinese world order, which was operated based on demand from both sides (Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries).

However, while China is the biggest country in East Asia, Vietnam, despite being the center of the mainland Southeast Asia’s “tributary system”, is still not the largest country in the region. It was often under the pressure of aggression from the bigger side of China and from competition with Siam--the country with the same potential. Therefore, Vietnam’s authority in the eyes of vassal states is not as supreme and absolute as China’s supremacy over its vassal states. At that time, besides Vietnam, these mainland Southeast Asian countries could and must have relied on other big countries to ensure maximum security for their country. Moreover, both China and the countries in its “tributary system” were in the same Chinese Cultural Sphere. Both shared the same ideological basis of Confucian ideology; both were deeply imbued with a sense of upholding up-down order between big countries and small ones according to the theory of Righteousness; both honored the “Emperor”; both obeyed “the will of Heaven”, and both considered requesting investiture and paying tribute as the duty of vassals to their Emperor, and “the will of Heaven” to have the righteousness and agreement with God. In contrast, between countries in the mainland Southeast Asian “tributary system”, there was no such coherent adherence in terms of ideology (Nguyễn Thị Mỹ Hạnh

2019: 71-72). Although Confucian culture still affected many countries in the region, the weak or strong influence level in countries was different. Besides Confucianism, many other religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism, among others still played an essential role in the ideological life of both the rulers and the people in feudal society in many countries in this region. Therefore, the power of Heaven (Tian-天) and Divine Son of Heaven (the Emperor) - the invisible force with the theocratic power of Confucianism creating the mutual binds between countries of the "tributary system" taking China as the center was unable to bring into full performance of its functions in the "tributary system" of mainland Southeast Asia. Therefore, the concept of "center" and "suzerain" was defined by Shils as something supreme and extremely sacred in the field of symbolism, values and beliefs (Shils 1961: 117-30; Shils 1975: 3). It was also the convergence of "traditional" values, especially the "rituals" and sacred beliefs, thereby spreading and diffusing culture to the periphery (Winthrop Robert 1991: 83-84)¹ and gaining "credibility" and "respect" from the peripheral countries, which seemed inapplicable when it comes to the "center" of Vietnam in the "tributary system" of mainland Southeast Asia at that time. The characteristics of this geopolitical, geo-cultural context would shape the very unique characteristics of tributary activity between Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asian countries during the 19th century.

III. The process of tributary activities between Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asian countries in the 19th century

Through surveys of the Internal Affairs of Nguyen Dynasty, especially the *Annals of Đại Nam* - the annual fully records the diplomatic activities of the Nguyen Dynasty with Southeast Asian countries at that time, a detailed table describing the tributary

¹ Winthrop Robert wrote: "Versions of diffusionist thought included the conviction that all cultures originated from one culture center (heliocentric diffusion); the more reasonable view that cultures originated from a limited number of culture centers (culture circles); and finally the notion that each society is influenced by others but that the process of diffusion is both contingent and arbitrary".

activities to Vietnam conducted by Southeast Asian countries under the Nguyen Dynasty is possible and provided as follows.

<Table 1> Tributary activity between Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asian countries

<i>Year</i>	<i>Tribute-paying countries</i>	<i>Content</i>	<i>Vietnam's response to envoys bringing tributes</i>
994	Champa	King Champa sent Che Dong to offer materials. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 228)	
1011	Champa	Champa offered lions. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 242)	
1014	Chen La	Chen La paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 244)	
1025	Chen La	Chen La paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 247)	
1026	Chen La	Chen La paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 247)	
1033	Chen La	Chen La paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 255)	
1039	Chen La	Chen La paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 261)	
1055	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 271)	
1056	Chen La	Chen La paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 271)	
1067	Nguu Hồng ²	The two countries Nguu Hong and Ai Lao offered gold, silver, aloeswood, rhino's horn, ivory and other local products. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 274)	
1068	Champa	Champa offered white elephants, but then harassed the border. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 274)	
1069	Champa	King Che Cu (Rudravarman III) would like to offer three districts including Dia Ly, Ma Linh and Bo Chinh to atone for the sin. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 275)	
1071	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 275)	
1110	Champa	Champa offered white elephants. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 286)	
1112	Champa	Champa offered white elephants. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 286)	
1117	Champa	Champa offered three golden flowers. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 288)	
1118	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên <i>et al.</i> 1993a: 289)	

1120	Chen La	Champa's envoy paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 290)	
1120	Champa	Champa's envoy paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 290)	
1123	Chen La	Chen La's envoy paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 292)	
1126	Champa	Champa's envoy paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 294)	
1130	Champa	Champa's envoy paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 304)	
1132	Chen La	Chen La went to Vietnam and paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 152)	
1132	Champa	Champa went to Vietnam and paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 152)	
1135	Chen La	Chen La's envoy paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 307)	
1135	Champa	Champa's envoy paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 307)	
1149	Trao Oa ³ , Ai Lao, Lo Lac ⁴ , Siam ⁵	Trading boats from the three countries of Trao Oa, Lo Lac, Siam to Hai Don, applied for residence, trading and offering local products. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 317)	
1154	Champa	The King of Champa, Che Bi La But (Jaya Harivarman I) offered his daughter. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 321)	
1154	Champa	Champa's envoy paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 321)	
1159	Nguu Hong	Nguu Hong offered flowers and elephant. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 322)	
1164	Champa	Champa's envoy paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 323)	
1167	Champa	Champa sent envoys to offer pearls and local products to ask for peace. Since then Champa kept its role as a vassal state and fully paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 324)	
1182	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 328)	
1184	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 328)	
1191	Chen La	Chen La paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 330)	
1198	Champa	Champa's envoy paid tributes and besought investiture. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 331)	
1228	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Le Quy Don 1978: 11)	

1242	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 19)	
1262	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 33)	
1266	Champa	Chen La's envoys, namely Bo Tinh, Bo Hoang and Bo Su paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 35)	
1267	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 36)	
1269	Champa	Champa offered white elephants. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 38)	
1270	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 38)	
1279	Champa	Champa sent Che Nang and Tra Diep to pay tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 45)	
1282	Champa	Champa sent Bo Ba Ma Cac including 100 people to offer white elephants. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 47)	
1293	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 70)	
1301	Champa	Champa paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 86)	
1305	Champa	- Champa sent Che Bo Dai and his subordinates, including over one hundred people to offer gold, silver, Burma padauk, and curiosities to make a marriage proposal. - King of Champa Che Man (Jaya Simhavarman III) brought the land of two districts including O and Chau Ly to make wedding offerings.	The Tran dynasty married Princess Huyen Tran to the King of Champa Che Man. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 89-90)
1307	Champa	Prince of Champa Che Da Da (Jaya Simhavarman IV) sent the envoy Bao Loc Ke to offer white elephants. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 91)	
1346	Champa	Champa sent envoys to pay tribute; offerings were very simple and inconsiderate. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 130)	
1352	Champa	Che Mo, a person of Champa, ran to Đại Việt, offered one white elephant, a white horse, a large ant (1 meter and nine decimeters long) and tributes and asked for beating Tra Hoa Bo De (Maha Sawa) to confer the title on him as King. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 133)	
1376	Champa	Che Bong Nga (Po Binasuor) sent subordinates to pay tribute to the Tran Dynasty with 15 gold trays. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 216)	
2/1427	Champa	Champa's envoy paid tributes. Le Dynasty	

		gave him bird's nests, horses and silk and told the envoy to return. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 265)	
7/1427	Champa	Champa people offered local products. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 272)	
7/1427	Ai Lao	Ai Lao offered local products. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 273)	
1434	Ai Lao	Ai Lao's Muong Bon sent people to pay tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 317)	The Le Dynasty bestowed on the envoy two gold lamé knitwear and five silks.
1434	Ai Lao	Con Co of Ai Lao, sent his subordinates, Quan Long, to offer elephants and gold and silver to ask for reinforcements. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 321)	
1434	Champa	Champa's envoy brought letters and gifts for paying tribute to pray for reunification. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 321)	
1434	Ai Lao	Ai Lao people surrendered, offered 3 elephants. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 323)	
1435	Ai Lao	King of Ai Lao, Du Quan, sent his subordinates to bring gold and silver-made cups for drinking alcohol and two elephants to pay tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 324)	
1435	Muong Qua of Ai Lao	Muong Qua of Ai Lao paid tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 329)	
1435	Muong Bon ⁶	Muong Bon paid tributes including ivory, rhino's horn and silver, and fabric. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 333)	
1437	Siam	Siamese trading boats went to pay tributes.	
1437	Siam	Siam sent envoys, Trai Cuong Lat's group, to pay for tribute. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 346)	The Emperor gave the imperial edict and told him to take it home, and deducted trade taxes, i.e. decreasing by half the trade taxes of the previous year.
1448	Bon Man	Bon Man sent people to pay tributes including rhino's horn, gold, silver and a three-ivory elephant (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 359)	Rewarding the Bon Man envoy
1448	Champa	Champa's envoys brought with them national letters and offerings along with Huu Quang's group to Dai Viet. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 360)	Le Dynasty rewarded the envoys handsomely.
1449	Champa	Champa people paid tributes including local products. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 360))	Le Dynasty issued a royal proclamation, refusing to accept the tributes.
1467	Champa	Chapa's envoy went to pay tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 408)	

1467	Siam	Siamese sailing boats offered local products. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 427)	The Emperor refused to accept them.
1468	Champa	The chieftain in Sa Boi, Cam Tich, and the chieftain in Thuan Binh, Dao Nhi, came to attend Court and offer local products. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 1471)	
1468	Ai Lao	Ai Lao's envoy, defenders of Quan Binh, Lang Le's group brought local products to pay tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 1471)	
1471	Ai Lao	Ai Lao sent envoys to pay tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993b: 451)	
1510	Ai Lao	Cuc Mong of Ai Lao sent an envoy to Nghe An to ask the Court and pay tributes. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993c: 54)	The Emperor issued a royal proclamation refusing to accept the tributes because he had just taken the country and was afraid that they would like to occupy Vietnam.
1564	Ai Lao	At that time, Sa Dau of Ai Lao ordered his subordinates to pay tributes including local products and four male elephants.	The Emperor ordered the Grand Chancellor to bring his daughter to marry Sa Dau to establish the relationship with the neighboring country. (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993c: 136; Le Quy Don 1978: 11; Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 649)
1583	Ai Lao	Ai Lao sent envoys to offer local products. Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 665)	
1699	Chen La	Losing the Nguyen army, Chen La asked to follow the previous tribute rules. The Dai Viet army withdrew. (Lê Quý Đôn 2018: 137)	
1700	Man Lac Hon people (Ai Lao)	Man Lac Hon people ⁷ asked for paying tributes. Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 763)	The Trinh court did not accept the request because it did not want to "take sides with this person, not do it with another". Moreover, Ai Lao was being divided into many factions.
1706	Ai Lao	Ai Lao paid tributes Trinh Lord.	Trinh Cuong (one of Trinh Lords) brought his daughter to Trieu Phuc, chieftain of Ai Lao. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 767)
1714	Bon Man (Ai Lao)	Bon Man went to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 774)	
1728	Ai Lao	Ai Lao sent envoys to pay tributes. In addition to the usual rules, the number of	When the envoys came to the tribute and returned to

		elephants and native products were paid twice as much as before.	the country, welcome and food were given in a favorable manner. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 807)
1747	Man Lac Hon (Ai Lao)	Lac Hon came to pay tributes, and asked for paying tributes every three years with strong elephants in accordance with the rules of Tran Ninh and Cao Chau. They offered white elephants.	The Court did not accept white elephants. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 872)
1753	Tran Ninh (previously called Bon Man)	Tran Ninh ⁸ came to pay local products. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 887)	
1755	Tran Ninh	Tran Ninh came to pay tributes. Tran Ninh's letter about paying tribute is an anonymous one. His letter requested paying tributes every six years and forbidding the Ai Lao's envoy from travelling through Tran Ninh's territory.	Courtiers discussed, said that the customs of the Man like that, should not reproach too much and placed regulations for Tran Ninh: every three years to pay tribute (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 890)
1756	Ai Lao	In January, Ai Lao came to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 892)	
1756	Ai Lao	In December of bissextile year, Ai Lao offered a paper for paying tribute with two white elephants. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 892)	Trinh Doanh issued a royal proclamation: "The annual ceremony of the tribute is customary; as for precious things, allow them to be kept as treasures in the country; white elephants are free to choose to give, without having to send people to do anything".
1771	Nam Chuong ⁹	Nam Chuong came to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 923)	
1772	Ai Lao	Ai Lao came to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 926)	
1776	Lac Hon	Lac Hon came to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 939)	The Imperial Court approved.
1801	Van Tuong	Van Tuong sent envoys to pay tributes including ten bronze gongs and one white rhino's horn.	The Nguyen Dynasty also gave the King four pieces of agarwood, two handguns, lead and tin with a weight of 100 kg for each. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 432)
1802	Van Tuong	Van Tuong sent an envoy to pay tributes.	Nguyen Dynasty granted 100 Guan (貲) and allowed him

			to return. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 530)
1802	Nam Chuong	Van Tuong sent people to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 505-506)	
1803	Nam Chuong	Nam Chuong sent people to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 559)	
1803	Nam Chuong	Nam Chuong sent Nai Khai's group to send a letter to ask for following Chau Bien's way to enter the Court for paying tributes.	Emperor Gia Long issued a royal proclamation, ordering Bac Thanh court to treat the envoy carefully, and wrote a letter in reply. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 559)
1803	Chen La	Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 571)	Emperor of Nguyen dynasty ordered towns from Quang Tri to the North, to welcome the envoy, and to take him to the temporary residence.
1805	Van Tuong	King of Van Tuong, Chieu A No, sent his envoy to pay tributes (two male elephants, two rhino's horns, 800 kg of Cortex Cinnamomi Cassiae).	When the envoy came, the Court allowed him to access, asked about the customs of their country, and then carefully welcomed them. At the same time, they ordered the Ministry of Rites to discuss a rule of making tributes every three years, the types of tributes and a road. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 649)
1806	Chen La	Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes.	The Nguyen dynasty ruled tributes to be made every three years, the types of tributes, and objects of envoys applied for Chen La. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 707)
1807	Siam	Siam sent an envoy to pay local products.	When the envoy came, the Nguyen dynasty granted much and told him to return. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 690)
1807	Luong Mang (Muong Luong ¹⁰)	Luong Mang (Muong Luong) sent an envoy to pay tributes.	The Emperor asked the subordinates to send back the tributes, grant much and told the envoy to return" (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 687).

1809	Van Tuong	Paid tributes to the Nguyen Dynasty in 1809. (Yoshiharu 1992: 135)	
1811	Van Tuong, Cam Lo	- On February 29, Van Tuong sent an envoy to pay tributes. - Man in Cam Lo came to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 810; Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 810)	
1811	Van Tuong	Van Tuong sent an envoy to pay tributes Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 810, 829)	Emperor Gia Long issued the ordinance for praising.
1814	Van Tuong	Van Tuong sent an envoy to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 893; Ngô Sĩ Liên et al. 1993a: 839)	
1816	Chen La	Sentan envoy to pay tributes (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 901, 935)	Emperor Gia Long saw that the country had just been peaceful, ordered to collect some tributes and the rest was returned, and then kindly treated him and told him to return.
1817	Van Tuong	Van Tuong came to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 962)	
1818	Chen La	Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes and pleaded forever for claiming to be a vassal and travelling and trading like they used to. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 973)	Emperor Gia Long approved.
1820	Chen La	King of Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes and went to the Court to call on Emperor Minh Menh. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2009: 1744-1745)	Minh Menh rewarded the brocade items so that the King enjoyed grace.
1821	Chen La	Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 1747-1748)	Minh Menh received the tributes without bowing.
1821	Van Tuong	Van Tuong sent an envoy to pay tributes.	Emperor Minh Menh rewarded handsomely. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 122; Cabinet of the Nguyen dynasty 1993: 468)
1821	Thuy Xa (12)	Thuy Xa asked for its envoys to pay tribute. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 138)	Emperor Minh Menh commended that he came with great intentions and agreed. Then the country had troubles; the tributes did not arrive.
1822	Van Tuong	Van Tuong sent an envoy to pay tributes. (Cabinet of the Nguyen dynasty 1993: 486-487)	
1822	Chen La	King Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes.	The Nguyen dynasty praised their sincerity and gave

			priority to treat them kindly. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2009: 1749)
1823	Chen La	King Chen La sent an envoy to Vietnam to pay tributes as rules.	Emperor Minh Menh issued an order to allow Chen La's delegation to bring tribute items back and the envoys were also exempted from coming to the capital city. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2009: 1752)
1823	Nam Chuong (the first name is Lao Lung) ¹¹	King of Nam Chuong sent an envoy to submit a letter to ask for a vassal status. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 273)	Emperor Minh Menh ordered Ministry of Rite to rule that paying tributes every three years and selected the expected tributes, rewarded the King, the deputy envoy. However, then the country was busy and could not come to pay tributes.
1824	Chen La	Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 360)	Emperor Minh Menh issued a royal proclamation, stating that the envoy is exempted from coming to the capital city, gave the King of the vassal state an imperial edict and silk and gave the envoy silver and told him to return.
1824	Van Tuong	Van Tuong sent an envoy to pay tributes.	Because Van Tuong was at war, Emperor Minh Menh decided to exempt the tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 333; Cabinet of the Nguyen dynasty 1993: 487)
1826	Van Tuong	King of Van Tuong, A No, sent his son, Hat Xa Bong, to offer local products to show its gratitude.	Emperor Minh Menh ordered to send back the offerings, took only ten male elephants, rewarded the envoy with much and told him to return home. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 664)
1826	Van Tuong	King of Van Tuong presented treasures of his ancestors including a pair of gold boxes, twenty-three jewels to congratulate the Queen Mother on her longevity.	Emperor Minh Menh also appreciated and gave his gifts back. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2009: 1760)
1826	Chen La	Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes.	As soon as Chen La's envoy arrived in Gia Dinh province, Emperor Minh Menh ordered not to come to the capital city and to grant the

			King of Vassal state and the envoy some money and silk to bring home. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2009: 1756)
1826	Chen La	King of Chen La offered tributes including various kinds of wood to serve the building of Emperor Minh Menh's boat.	Emperor Minh Menh has "praised. He bestowed rewards, treatment, and gave three boats." (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2009: 1756)
1827	Van Tuong	King of Van Tuong, A No, sent his son, Hat Xa Bong, to offer local products to show its gratitude.	Emperor Minh Menh agreed to present the envoy before him, ordered to send back the offerings, took only ten male elephants, rewarded the envoy a lot and told him to return. (Ngo Si Lien et al. 1993b: 664; Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 621)
1827	Chen La	Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes.	The Nguyen Dynasty rewarded the Chief envoy and Deputy envoy with hats, clothes, clothes, blankets and cushions. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 684; Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2009: 1760)
1828	Nam Chuong	Nam Chuong came to pay tributes.	Emperor Minh Menh sent a citadel's guardian to lead the envoy to the citadel, ordered Ministry of Rites to rule that paying tributes every three years and rule types of tribute and pathway (from Tran Ninh to Nghe An to go to the capital city). The Emperor rewarded handsomely and told him to return. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 772-774)
1829	Chen La	Chen La continued to send an envoy to Vietnam to pay tributes.	Minh Menh issued a royal proclamation, exempting the Chen La's envoy from going to the capital city to visit. At the same time, the Emperor also sent an imperial edict and brocade to King of Chen La and rewarded the envoy's delegation. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2009: 1765)

1831	Hoa Xa (13)	Hoa Xa sent an envoy to pay tributes (a pair of ivory, one rhino's horn).	Emperor Minh Menh gave him gold, silk and clothes and allowed the envoy to come back. Ministry of Rites discussed for preparing some tributes (a pair of ivory, two rhino's horns), paying tributes every three years and the Emperor approved. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 197-98)
1831	Chen La	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes. The envoy came to Gia Dinh. - Nine administrative divisions in Cam Lo district also came to pay tributes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Emperor Minh Menh exempted the envoy's delegation to the capital city and bestowed on the King of vassal state a royal edict, colorful silk, and gave the silver to the envoy's delegation based on the different ranks. - Nine administrative divisions in Cam Lo district came and paid tributes. Emperor Minh Menh rewarded the Head of each division, a set of robes for each one, rewarded handsomely and then told them to return. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 169)
1832	Chen La	Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes.	When the envoy arrived in Gia Dinh province, Emperor Minh Menh issued a royal proclamation stating that the envoy is exempt from going to the capital city, gave the King of the vassal state a royal edict and a flowered piece of silk, and gave the envoy silver, and then told him to return. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 169)
1832	Muc Da Han in Lac Bien	Man Muc Da Han people in Lac Bien district sent an envoy to pay tributes	Emperor Minh Menh ordered officials of Nghe An province to treat and then told him to return. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 169)
1833	Chen La	Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes.	Emperor Minh Menh gave Mandarins' grade attire and drinks. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 545)

1833	Nam Chuong	Nam Chuong sent an envoy to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 581; Ngô Sĩ Liên at al.581)	
1833	Nam Chuong	Nam Chuong came to pay tributes.	Emperor Minh Menh rewarded them. ((Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 609-10))
1834	Chen La	King of Chen La, Nac Chan, would like to offer three male elephants.	Emperor Minh Menh thought that all the people who paid such tributes are heartfelt, so the Emperor approved and rewarded them, then calculated the price and paid for them (paid 200 Guan for each elephant). (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007b: 276)
1834	Hoa Xa	Hoa Xa sent an envoy to pay tributes.	Emperor Minh Menh ordered Phu Yen province to escort the envoy by waterway to the capital city and was rewarded. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007b: 306-307)
1835	Chen La		Chen La was exempt from paying tributes because of suffering from the Siamese enemies (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 1776)
1836	Chen La	King's daughter of Chen La, Ngoc Van, sent people to offer local products to the Nguyen Dynasty because she wanted to thank the Nguyen Dynasty for helping Chen La fight against the Siamese enemies.	Emperor Minh Menh greatly praised and rewarded them, but he allowed them to bring the offerings back to the country. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2009: 1782)
1838	Nam Chuong	Nam Chuong sent a family member named Tao Kham Phan to send a letter to Nghe An to admit its guilt and to replace the tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007c: 261-62)	
1840	Hoa Xa	Hoa Xa sent people to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007c: 687)	
1841	Hoa Xa, Thuy Xa	The two countries, Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa, jointly paid tributes (the tributes of Thuy Xa were two ivories and two rhino's horns. Hoa Xa's tributes were one ivory and one rhino's horn).	Emperor Minh Menh agreed to let Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa pay tribute every three years jointly. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 92-93)

1841	Thuy Xa, Hoa Xa	The two countries of Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa came to pay tributes.	Emperor Minh Menh treated them well to show his love for the far away countries. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 172)
1843	Thuy Xa, Hoa Xa	Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa came to pay tributes. Deputy envoy Kieu Moc was ill and had to stay at the front of the border. Chief envoy Son Thi also became ill when going to the embassy in Phu Yen province.	Emperor Thieu Tri allowed the envoy' delegation to wait in Phu Yen province, there no need to go to the capital city, then gave more rewards. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 515)
1846	Chen La	Nac Ong Don submitted a letter acknowledging guilt to the Emperor and sent an envoy to bring products to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 427-428; Lê Quý Đôn 2018, 193)	
1847	Cao Mien	Cao Mien's envoy came to pay tributes.	The Nguyen Dynasty rewarded the mission of Cao Mien. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 968-73)
1847	Cao Mien	The King of Cao Mien accepted the title bestowal and tributary rules.	The Ministry of Rites discussed and reported to the Emperor paying tributes every three years and then rewarding products. The Emperor approved. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 1007)
1848	Cao Mien	The King of Cao Mien, Xa Ong Giun, sent an envoy to offer products in the incense-offering ceremony, congratulation ceremony, and tributary ceremony every year.	Emperor Tu Duc agreed to accept offerings of incense-offering ceremony and tributary ceremony, and the offerings for the great rejoicings were waived. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007e: 54)
1851	Cao Mien	King of Cao Mien, Xa Ong Giun, sent his servant to submit a tributary petition. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007e: 191)	
1851	Cao Mien	King of Cao Mien, Xa Ong Giun sent an envoy to pay tributes.	Emperor Tu Duc, who was dwelling in Can Chinh palace, allowed the envoy of Cao Mien to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007e: 198)
1852	Thuy Xa, Hoa Xa	Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa sent envoys, the Kieu Moc's group, to come for paying tributes (ivory and rhino's horn).	Emperor Tu Duc allowed them to perform a ceremony in the palace of Phu Yen province and then gave gifts and told them to return.

			(Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007e: 298)
1854	Cao Mien	Cao Mien sent an envoy to pay tributes.	King Tu Duc issued a royal proclamation, rewarding the King, Xa Ong Giun, treated the envoy well and allowed him to return. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007e: 306)
1855	Thuy Xa, Hoa Xa	Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa came to pay local products. Thuy Xa paid one pair of ivory, two rhino's horns; Hoa Xa paid one ivory and one rhino horn.	Emperor Tu Duc rewarded items to the subjects and interpreters of a vassal state and then agreed to let them return to the country. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007e: 382)
1865	Thuy Xa, Hoa Xa	Thuy Xa, Hoa Xa sent the envoy, Sơn Ly to pay tributes. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 20073: 923)	
1857	Cao Mien	Cao Mien sent envoys to pay tributes (two elephants, rhino's horns, ivory, nutmegs, and other presents).	The Nguyen Dynasty rewarded Cao Mien's envoys. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007e: 493)
1868	Thuy Xa, Hoa Xa	Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa presented offerings of tribute and celebration. Tributes of Thuy Xa include two ivories, two rhino's horns and one ivory for celebration; tributes of Hoa Xa include one ivory, one rhino's horn and one ivory for celebration).	Emperor Tu Duc approved the army in Phu Yen not to return to the capital city. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007e: 1111)

² Thai clan in Son La, maybe they are *Thái đen people (Tai Dam)*

³ I.e. Giava island (Indonesia). *Yuan History* wrote Qua Oa, which was also Java, according to the phonetic method used in *Yuan History* and *Ming history*

⁴ Lo Lac: unknown country yet. Under the Tran dynasty, there was a trade boat of Lo Hac to Van Don. Perhaps Lo Lac is Lo Hac. Based on the phonetic reading, it can be assumed that Lo Hac is La Hoc mentioned in the Nguyen - Ming Chinese bibliography (see also the comment on Siam below). La Hoc is the Lavo nation of Lopburi, Thailand. Lo Hac is likely to be La Hac mentioned in Macro Polo's travel book

⁵ Siam: the country of the Thai people in the upper middle of the Mekong River in the middle ages.

⁶ I.e. Bon Man

⁷ Lac Hon: I.e. Lac Bien now. Location in the southwest of Nghe An province (Vietnam). In the previous Le Dynasty, Lac Hon always remained tribute according to position. When the Le Dynasty disintegrated, Lac Hon depended on Tiem. In Gia Long (1802-1819), Lac Hon was paid tribute several times; the year of Minh Menh was considered to be the Lac Bien district of Nghe An; then betrayed and returned to Siam.

⁸ Lord-Tran Ninh's words: Formerly called Bon Man

⁹ Nam Chuong: According to Thông giám tập lãm, the Nam Chuong is known as former Man Lao Qua, the southeastern border bordered our country. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 923)

From the aforementioned records of historians in the Vietnamese feudal dynasties, we initially have a general picture of the tributary activities to Vietnam conducted by mainland Southeast Asian countries from the 10th century to the 19th century.

Before the 19th century, there were generally a number of Southeast Asian countries/states that paid tribute to Vietnam, specifically Champa paid tributes to Vietnam 30 times (in 1055, 1071, 1118, 1120, 1126, 1130, 1132, 1135, 1154, 1164, 1182, 1184, 1198, 1228, 1242, 1262, 1266, 1267, 1270, 1279, 1293, 1301, 1346, 1352, 1376, 1427, 1434, 1448, 1449 and 1467), 14 times of offering products that history did not record as "paying tribute" (in 994, 1011, 1068, 1069, 1112, 1117, 1154, 1167, 1269, 1282, 1305, 1307, July 1427 and 1468); Ai Lao paid tributes 17 times (in 1434, 1435 paid tributes two times, 1436, 1448, 1468, 1471, 1510, 1564, 1583, 1700, 1706, 1714, 1728, 1747, 1753, 1755, twice in 1756, 1772 and 1776), including the tributes of Man Lac Hon and Bon Man (later named Tran Ninh) in Ai Lao, five times offering products in 1427, 1434 (twice), 1583, 1735. Van Tuong paid tributes in 1801; Nam Chuong paid tributes in 1771; Chen La paid tributes ten times in 1024, 1025, 1026, 1033, 1039, 1056, 1120, 1123, 1132 and 1191, respectively. Also, Siam paid tributes twice in 1437, two times of offering products in 1149 and 1467. Trao Oa, Lo Lac also offered local products in 1149. Thus, before the 19th century, the country with the most tributary presentations to Vietnam was Champa, followed by Ai Lao and Chen La. Except for the only tributary time in 1149 of Trao Oa, Lo Lac, the rest of the tribute-paying countries came from mainland Southeast Asia.

Remarkably, in the 17th century, there was no Southeast Asian tributary activity to the Le - Trinh dynasty except for the tributary time of Chen La in 1699. Le Kings and Trinh Lords in Dang Ngoai (the North-Vietnam) and Nguyen Lords in Dang Trong (the South-Vietnam) were in a similar situation. During this time, Nguyen Lords in Dang Trong miserably used compulsory measures or sent people to other countries to compel these for giving up

¹⁰ Muong Luong: I.e. Luang Phabang

¹¹ True records of Đại Nam, Vol.II, p.273.

paying tributes many times (as in 1658, Nguyen Lord forced Chen La to pay tributes after helping to resolve internal conflicts (Lê Quý Đôn 2018: 137): but in 1699, Chen La asked to follow the old rules of paying tributes (Lê Quý Đôn 2018: 137). Furthermore, in 1688, Chen La refused to be a vassal, so Nguyen Lord sent troops to defeat, forced to follow the tributary rules (Lê Quý Đôn 2018: 137). Similarly, in 1693, Champa gave up paying tributes, Nguyen Lord had to send soldiers to compel Champa to observe its obligations (Phạm Văn Sơn 1960: 360-61). No event reflected the tributary activities to Nguyen Lords of Chen La and Champa in this 17th century. Obviously, when compared with the Dai Viet-China relationship in this period, the tributary activities to Dai Viet by Southeast Asian countries did not obey regulations, mainly they were often interrupted, and even stopped for a very long time. In some countries like Nam Chuong, it was not until 1771 that it began to establish friendly diplomatic relations with Dai Viet (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 923).

Such a break and even absence of the tribute activity for a long time throughout the century in Vietnam - Southeast Asia relations was due to the complicated political and social context of the Southeast Asian countries at that time. War with foreign countries and civil wars often occurred. This can be seen in internal disputes within the royal Chen La Court (e.g. an uncle and his nephew fought for power) after the King died in 1658 (Lê Quý Đôn 2018: 137); or constant war between Lac Hon and Trieu Phuc - two tribes of Ai Lao (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office, 1998: 763). Another example is Ai Lao's envoy often harassed Tran Ninh (formerly known as Bon Man) (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office, 1998: 891). In particular, during this period, Dai Viet's relationship with some Southeast Asian countries was not merely "peaceful" like the Dai Viet-China relationship. The two sides clashed, causing tensions many times and even the territories of some countries were annexed to Dai Viet during this period. For example, in 1699, when Chen La was chaotic all the time, the King, Nac Ong Thu, brought his army against the Nguyen Lord army in Dang Trong; then the Lord ordered the General Nguyen Huu Kinh to come and fight. Nguyen Lords came to Nam Vang citadel, Nac

Ong Thu fled, Nac Ong Non and Nac Ong Yem subsequently opened the citadel door and surrendered. After that, Nac Ong Thu also surrendered and asked to follow the same rules of tribute (Lê Quý Đôn 2018: 137). Or in 1688, other people in My Tho rebelled, and Nguyen Lords sent Hoang Tien to kill Duong Ngan Dich, then brought them to garrison at Nan Khe, making a ship to cast guns to fight against Chen La. The King of Chen La, Nac Ong Thu, dug up ditches to build a fortification to stand firm and refused to be a vassal of Nguyen Lords (Lê Quý Đôn 2018: 137). After a few years, in 1693, Chiem Lord, Ba Tranh, gave up paying tributes. Minh Vương (Lord Nguyen Phuc Chu) sent General Nguyen Phuc Kinh (son of Nguyen Huu Dat) to bring troops to question the captured courtiers, Ke Ba Tu and Ta Tra Vien and his relatives Ba An to Phu Xuan. The remaining land of Champa was changed to Thuan Thanh by Nguyen Lords.¹² Ta Tra Vien and Ke Ba Tu were appointed chief officers and three children of Ba An were appointed governors in charge of Thuan Thanh. Nguyen Lords forced Chiem's people to change clothes, from which they subsequently dressed like the Vietnamese (Phạm Văn Sơn 1960: 360-61).

In the context of frequent internal conflicts of power between factions as well as the constant pressure of war with larger countries (such as Dai Viet, Siam), these countries were forced to apply for paying tributes to Dai Viet to find “support” in the fight against the opposing forces or considered it as a way of peace with Dai Viet after military defeats. Therefore, the period of peace for Southeast Asian countries to conduct diplomatic activities such as paying tributes and celebrations to Dai Viet was not much. Moreover, as in the case of Chen La, Champa at this stage, they only asked for paying tributes after enduring military defeats and considered it as a means of peace with the Nguyen Lords in Dang Trong (Dai Viet). The state of interwoven peace - war in Vietnam's relations with many Southeast Asian countries at that time made diplomatic

¹² Champa after this event was no longer a country so tributary activities no longer existed. In 1697, Nguyen Lords moved to Binh Thuan, changed Phan Ri and Phan Rang into Yen Phuc and Hoa Da districts. From there, the position of Champa disappeared on the map, which is after the princes and relatives of Champa became civil servants of Vietnam and the Champa royal family was no longer prestigious. (Phạm Văn Sơn 1960: 360-61)

activities that were “peaceful” like this tributary system often to be characterized by breaks and interruption, and otherwise not following a set rule.

As of the 19th century, eight countries in the region paid tributes to the Nguyen dynasty during this period. Of these, Chen La paid tributes most frequently for a total of 11 times (in 1803, 1806, 1816, 1818, 1821, 1824, 1827, 1831, 1832, 1833 and 1834), followed by Van Tuong with eight tribute times (in 1802, 1805, twice in 1811, 1814, 1821, 1824 and 1827), Thuy Xa paid eight tribute times (in 1821, 1831 (16), 1841, 1843, 1852, 1855, 1865 and 1868), Hoa Xa paid eight tribute times (in 1834, 1840, 1841, 1843, 1852, 1855, 1865 and 1868), Nam Chuong paid six tribute times (in 1803, 1823, 1828, twice in 1833 and 1838), Cao Mien paid five tribute times (in 1847, 1848, 1851, 1854 and 1857), Muc Da Han in Lac Bien paid tributes once in 1832, Muong Luong (Luong Mang), i.e. Luong Phabang paid tributes once in 1807. In the tribute times of the two countries Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa, in the last six times (in 1841, 1843, 1852, 1855, 1865 and 1868) the two countries jointly paid tributes under the Nguyen Lord’s approval. If based on the number of tributes mentioned above, Chen La, Van Tuong, Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa were the countries that maintained the most regular tributary activities. Nam Chuong and Cao Mien followed it; the rest of the countries such as Muc Da Han and Muong Luong only had one time to pay tributes during the nineteenth century. All were mainland Southeast Asian countries; thereby also partly revealing that the strong – weak degree of the “suzerain-vassal” relationship between Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asian countries was a predominant at this time.

Like the tributary activities to China conducted by many East Asian countries at the same time, the tributary activities to Vietnam conducted by mainland Southeast Asian countries took place according to specific rules promulgated by the Vietnamese feudal courts. Of course, those rules must get the consent of the tribute-paying countries. Based on the records of the National Historian Office and historians of the dynasties, we know the specific provisions on the tribute schedule, the number of objects in each tribute, the number of envoys during each tribute time, the tributary route and time of tribute which the Vietnamese feudal

courts set for the “vassal states”. For example.:

In May 1706, Ai Lao came to Vietnam to offer tributes to the Restored Le dynasty and ask for paying tributes every three years, exempting the annual tributary ceremony. Le Kings - Trinh Lords agreed (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 767). In May 1755, Tran Ninh¹³ paid tributes and asked for paying tributes every six years. Courtiers of the Restored Le dynasty discussed and decided that it is required for Tran Ninh to pay tributes every three years. (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 1998: 890)

Or in 1805, the Nguyen dynasty decided a tribute rule to Van Tuong, which was once every three years. In December, it was required for Van Tuong to come to the Capital city to attend the Lunar New Year in time. Tributes included two male elephants, two rhino's horns, two ivories, and 5 kg of cinnamon bark. In terms of the envoy's delegation, it included one chief envoy, three chieftains, two interpreters and 30 escorts. Nghe An's station guided roads, and it was forbidden to follow Cam Lo and Ai Lao roads (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 649).

In 1807, after Nac Chan was crowned King of Chen La by the Nguyen dynasty, the Nguyen dynasty ruled paying tribute once every three years for this country, starting this year. The Nguyen Dynasty also stipulated tributes including two male elephants, two rhino's horns, two ivories, two buckets of black paint, nutmeg, Amomum vilosum lour, beeswax of 50 kg of each. Also, an envoy delegation was appointed, including one chief envoy and one deputy envoy who arrived in Gia Dinh every April. Gia Dinh sent people to take them to the capital city. Also, ten escorts by road and 20 by sea were allowed (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 707)

In 1828, the Nguyen Dynasty set out tributary rules for Nam Chuong as follows: paying tributes every three years, the tributes (four pairs of ivory, eight slabs of rhino's meat, two bronze drums) and roads (from Tran Ninh to Nghe An and then to the capital city) (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 772-74)

¹³ Now Hua Phan province of Laos

In 1833, Emperor Minh Menh amended and supplemented the regulations on tributary activities applied to Nam Chuong. Specifically the Emperor ordered the Ministry of Rites to change rules for the envoy's delegation to the capital city (previous rules were that the delegation included 26 people, but only ten people were allowed to the capital city including one chief envoy, one deputy envoy, three headmen, one interpreter, four escorts; meanwhile, for the current rules: the delegation included eight people including one chief envoy, one deputy chief, two headmen, one interpreter, and three escorts. The remaining members were required to stay at the border and would be rewarded (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 581)

In 1831, the Nguyen dynasty also set out rules for Hoa Xa about tributes, including one pair of ivory and two rhino's horns. The tribute time was to be every three years, starting from the 15th Minh Menh year [1834] (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 197-98)

Or in 1847, the Nguyen dynasty set out tributary rules for Cao Mien that it required to pay tributes every three years (including tribute and thanksgiving gifts offered at the same time). Tributes were also prescribed, including two male elephants with two ivories, two rhino's horns, *Amomum vilosum* lour, nutmeg, beeswax, all of 5kg of each and 20 buckets of black paint. The number of assigned envoys was one chief envoy, one deputy envoy, two interpreters, two physicians, nine escorts, and then An Giang's provincial officials review tributes. In the middle of February, it is required to come to An Giang, the provincial officials are responsible for reviewing the tributes then dividing the ivory, rhino and nutmeg into three categories which were brought with the delegation by road, and other categories could get arbitrary transport: elephants assigned to Gia Dinh province to be raised. Ordering two deputy envoys, one interpreter, one physician, three military followers along with provincial officials such as one officer and one interpreter as leader departed by the road. In the middle of April, it is required to come to the capital city to pay tributes in the last ten days of the month, and then stay waiting for Double Fifth Festival and Lunar New Year for worship. When the ceremony is completed, it is required to ask

for permission to go home. Thus, even the tributary route and steps applied to Cao Mien were stipulated quite explicitly by the Nguyen Dynasty (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 1007).

In particular, in 1841, the Nguyen Dynasty also issued an ordinance to the two countries of Hoa Xa and Thuy Xa jointly paying tribute every three years "facilitating for the far-off people to be satisfied". When the ordinance came, both Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa were pleased and asked for sending envoys to the capital city in June (an envoy came to perform an incense-offering ceremony, an envoy went to celebrate the throne). Emperor Minh Menh approved. The tributes were regulated as follows: Thuy Xa's tributes include two ivories and two rhino's horns; Xa Hoa's tributes included one ivory and one rhino's horn. Every year in the Year of the Rat, Horse, Rabbit, and Rooster, Thuy Xa was required to send envoys to bring both countries' tributes to Phu Yen province (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 92-93).

Thus, we can see that, although countries are different, regulations on the route, quantity and items of tribute are also different. However, in general, the tributary products are not much, and they are easy to find in these countries. Moreover, the tributary time for every country is every three years. In particular, through the records of the Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office, we also know that the Nguyen Dynasty bestowed gifts on tributary delegations. For example, in 1841, Emperor Minh Menh issued the ordinance: "According to the rules, rewarding the King of Thuy Xa an eight meter-long colored scarf, one pair of blue and white robes; one blue velvet robe with silk lining and narrow sleeves; one thick blue robe; one thick white robe with narrow sleeves; five silk robes with narrow sleeves of all colors, one blue pant, one pink pant, two light brown silk pants, one set of alcoholic drinks with one small bottle of wine, three cups and one tray. The King of Hoa Xa was given an eight meter-long colored scarf, one thick blue robe, one thick white robe, one blue velvet robe in silk lining and narrow sleeves, three silk robes with narrow sleeves of all colors, one blue pant, one pink pant, one set of alcoholic drinks. He also gave the king of both countries two clothing of martial arts; rewarded Nguyen Van Quyen as the captain in that province, Dang Van Hoat as the

nine-grade mandarin, each officer and interpreter a pair of Western fabric and ten taels of silver” (Nguyen Dynasty’s National Historian Office 2007d: 93).

Rewarding the tribute delegations of the countries was promulgated as a rule by the Nguyen Dynasty at the time. This shows the respectful attitude, extraordinary flexibility in the diplomatic conduct of the Nguyen Dynasty to the “vassal” states despite being in the role of a “suzerain” of the Nguyen Dynasty. With the motto of “flexible with far-off land” foreign policy (Nguyen Dynasty’s National Historian Office 2009: 1742), the feudal dynasties of Vietnam, Nguyen dynasty, devoted much favor in the exchange and reception of envoys when they came to Vietnam to pay tributes.

In 1437, when Siam sent a person to pay tribute, Le King sent an ordinance to the envoy and told him to return home and deducted half of the trade tax rate compared to the previous year. He collected 1 from each 20 and rewarded very well. In addition, in regard to the Lord of that country paying tribute, Le King gave 20 colored silk plates, 30 sets of porcelain bowls, and each wife of the Lord was given five colored silk plates, three sets of porcelain bowls, each containing 35 pieces (Ngô Sĩ Liên et al.1993b: 346). Or in 1718, when the Ai Lao’s envoys came to pay tributes, the restored Le Dynasty grasped the spirit “When the envoys came to pay tributes and returned to the country, the welcoming and provision of foods and clothing must all carried out very well so that they feel satisfied” (Nguyen Dynasty’s National Historian Office 1998: 807).

By giving the tribute-paying countries respect, the surplus tributes as per the regulations were returned, the envoys of the countries were well treated before returning to their countries by the Nguyen Dynasty. For example, in 1816, when Chen La sent an envoy to pay tributes, Emperor Gia Long found that that country had just been peaceful, so he ordered his servants to collect a few things and return the remaining, and then well treated the delegation (Nguyen Dynasty’s National Historian Office 2002: 901-35).

Following the tributary activity to Vietnam at that time, it is easy to see the extremely generous policy of treating the envoys of tribute-paying countries as they were implemented by the Nguyen

Dynasty. Typically, in 1821, when Van Tuong's envoy, Phi Chu Pho, came to pay tributes, Emperor Minh Menh encouraged and rewarded very well. In addition to rewarding, as usual, the Emperor further rewarded the King with five segments of brocade, different colors of silk, fine silk, chiffon, ten pieces of each, one set of gold-plated teacups, one gold-plated bowl, one silver-plated bowl, ten silver-plated plates, one big drum. He rewarded the chief envoy with one red Song brocade-made combat shirt. He rewarded the deputy envoy with one blue velvet combat shirt; a brocade dress, a wooden stretcher, a parasol, one set of gold-plated teacups and 20 taels of silver. The chief envoy was rewarded two metal pistols and one silver-plated sword; the deputy envoy received one metal pistol and one silver-plated sword. The King rewarded the chieftain eight taels of silver, the interpreter five taels of silver, a blue fine-silk combat shirt, one man skirt for each one; and rewarded each man three taels of silver (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 122). By 1828, when Nam Chuong came to pay tributes that included two male elephants, one pair of ivories, two of rhino's horns, two round cloud-shaped gongs, two bronze drums, 20 sheets of men's fabric and men's fine silk, Emperor Minh Menh treated them well and allowed the delegation to return. Specifically, King Chiem Mang was given four brocade plates, eight raw silk plates, ten silk plates, 40 pieces of chiffon, 30 pieces of fabric; the chief envoy and his followers were rewarded crepe dresses and taels of silver depending on their position (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 772-74). Or in 1833, Chen La sent envoys to pay tributes to the Nguyen dynasty. Emperor Minh Menh ordered the civilian to prepare court clothes for the chief envoy, Nha Nha Chiet Tuc, deputy envoys including Nha Bong Sa and Oc Lich Nham. When they returned home, the Emperor rewarded the chief envoy one set of gold teacups and one set of gold-plated crystal cups for alcoholic drinks. He rewarded each deputy envoy a set of silver teacups and a set of crystal cups for alcoholic drinks (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 545). Or in 1834, when Hoa Xa came to pay tributes, in addition to rewarding as usual, the Nguyen Dynasty also rewarded many silk plates depending on different positions (two envoys: two pieces of chiffon, raw silk; one interpreter: two pieces of domestic plain chiffon; three passengers: each one one tussore

piece) (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007b: 306-307). In 1857, when Cao Mien sent envoys (the chief envoy, Oc Nha Bo Ni Doc named Ngoi, the deputy envoy, Oc Kha De Ni Doc called Khet) to bring tributes (two elephants and rhino's horn and ivory, nutmeg and all kinds of gifts), the Nguyen Dynasty gave each of them a four-grade and a martial six-grade cap and robe. When coming back, the Nguyen dynasty also rewarded the chief and deputy envoys and lower positions with gold, silk, chiffon, raw silk depending on their positions. The king of the tribute giving country was given ten brocade of all colors, two plates of raw silk, fine silk, thin silk, fabric, silk, eight-fibre weaved silk, fine bleached silk, white crepe, watered chiffon with dark blue, with a total of 94 plates, and 36 plates including fine & pure silk và thin chiffon, thick chiffon, and bleached silk (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007e: 493).

In particular, in many cases, the number of gifts that the Nguyen Dynasty gave to the King and the envoy-mission of tribute-paying countries was many times higher than the number of tributes received. For example, in 1805, the King of Van Tuong, Chieu A No, sent envoys to pay tributes (two male elephants, two rhino's horns, 800 kg of Cortex Cinnamomi Cassiae). Emperor Gia Long told Dang Duc Sieu that: "Good treatment to the far-away people is our flexible policy. Van Tuong did not give up the worship and respect to the big country, which is praiseworthy, so they were worth being treated well before coming back." He gave the King five plates of raw pink silk, 20 plates of fine white silk, 50 plates of colored thin silk, white silk, small white fabric, and small dark fabric; 43 envoys were given money depending on different ranks (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 649). Or in 1847, when King Cao Mien came to pay tributes, the Nguyen Dynasty rewarded the King and the envoys handsomely, particularly with a large number of products. Not only the King, Chief, and Deputy envoys were rewarded, but even the military officers accompanying them and the interpreters were also very well treated and rewarded (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 968-73).

Obviously, the number of Nguyen's gifts in these times to the tribute-paying countries was many times greater than the tributes

the Nguyen dynasty received.

In some cases, seeing the sincerity of the envoys' delegation coming to pay tributes, the Nguyen Dynasty also converted the tributes into money. It gave the corresponding amount back the mission. For example, in 1834, when the King of Chen La, Nac Chan paid tributes, including three male elephants, a servant, Chu Dich Danh Tuan, also offered one elephant. Emperor Minh Menh thought that those were very sincere, so he approved for receiving and rewarding, then converted them into money and paid for them (every tributary elephant paid 200 Guan) (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007b: 276).

Sometimes, when realizing the vassal states were in a lot of difficulty, the Nguyen dynasty did not accept the tributes but gave them back and gave more rewards. For example, in 1827, the King of Van Tuong, A No, sent his son, Hat Xa Bong, to bring animals for paying tributes. Emperor Minh Menh ordered to send back the offerings, and took only ten male elephants. The Emperor rewarded handsomely and allowed him to come back (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 664).

Moreover, the Nguyen Dynasty also understood that toil and cold weather were threatening the health of the envoys when coming to pay tributes in the winter. Therefore, it was only in 1827 that the Nguyen Dynasty gave winter clothes and blankets to Chen La's mission (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 684).

Moreover, in order to help the envoys reduce strain after their distant journey, the Nguyen Dynasty had many times exempted the envoys not to come to the capital city. For example, in 1824, Emperor Minh Menh issued a royal proclamation in which Chen La's mission was exempt from coming to the capital city (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 360). In 1831, Emperor Minh Menh continued to issue the ordinance in which Chen La's envoy was exempt from coming to the capital city (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 169). Or in 1843, when the two countries Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa came to pay tributes, the Deputy envoy Kieu Moc became ill and had to stay at the border. The Chief envoy, Son Thi when coming to the embassy in Phu Yen

province, also got sick, Emperor Thieu Tri gave them sympathy, showing special care by issuing an ordinance in which the envoys were exempt from coming to the capital city, stating: “The two countries are in the far-off place, admired the imperial Court and were listed as long-time vassals. The unchanged heart of being afraid of heaven, worshipping the great country was very worth rewarding. Those envoys had previously been admonished and were given ordinances and products as usual when returning. Now that such envoys came despite far-away land was more and more respectful, so the Emperor approved that they could stay at Phu Yen province instead of coming to the capital city to be relieved of trouble” (Nguyen Dynasty’s National Historian Office 2007d: 515). As of 1852, Emperor Tu Duc also agreed that because these two countries were far –off and faced with crop failure, they only worshipped at the palace of Phu Yen province, then gave them gifts and allowed them to return without going to the Capital city (Nguyen Dynasty’s National Historian Office 2007e: 248-49).

In particular, when the vassal states encountered difficulties due to natural disasters, epidemics, internal reactions, or foreign invasions, the Nguyen Dynasty was willing to exempt the required tribute. Typically, in 1835, due to the death of the King of Chen La, Emperor Minh Menh issued an ordinance to stop the tributary activity “to show the will of the court to share and comfort the old vassal state, not considering it as an outside country” (Nguyen Dynasty’s National Historian Office 2007d: 516).

Despite the flexible treatment with such vassal states, Vietnam was also very careful in this activity. Therefore, in 1449, when the younger brother of the Champa’s King, Quy Do, put his Lord (Quy Lai), and established himself as the King, and sent his subordinates including Giao Nhi Mo and Ban Thao, to Vietnam to pay tributes, Le Trung Hung dynasty refused (Le Quy Don 1993b: 369). In 1700, Man Lac Hon people asked for paying tributes, but the Le Trung Hung dynasty refused because it did not want to “defend one person for another”. Moreover, Ai Lao was being divided into many factions (Nguyen Dynasty’s National Historian Office 1998: 763). Or in 1807, Luong Mang [Muong Luong] sent envoys to pay tributes. As soon as receiving the news, Gia Long

thought that Luong Mang was far-off but came to declare its vassal state, which was not exact, so he asked the subordinates to send back the tributes, rewarded them handsomely and told them to return (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 687). Or in 1838, when Nam Chuong sent a family member named Tao Kham Phan to send a letter to Nghe An to expiate its guilt and to replace the tributes, Emperor Minh Menh severely criticized the associated activities with the Siamese invaders, giving up the country's previous tribute payment and pointing out the true motive of Nam Chuong's tribute as "the position of King was not decided, they made use of a position of our country to fight with each other". Accordingly, the Nguyen dynasty decided to "not tolerate" and "agreed to dismiss immediately. Later, when the country was peaceful, the position of King was identified, if they genuinely wanted to apply for merit, it was required to report, then it will be recognized" (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007c: 261-62).

Despite being strict and cautious, when vassal states repented of their sins and surrendered to the Court, the Nguyen dynasty "welcomed them, let the people and soldiers rest, the worries at the border could partly reduce". For example, the Nguyen dynasty accepted the 1847 tribute ceremony of Cao Mien after a long time that the country tolerated the bandits disturbing the border, negatively affecting the Nguyen Dynasty, thereby showing the Nguyen dynasty's generosity and humanity (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007d: 968-73).

In addition to the aforementioned tributary activities, in fact, Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asian countries often maintained a harmonious relationship through irregular visitation. However, only the countries that accepted the "suzerain" proceeded to pay tribute. Therefore, at this time, not every country submitting itself to the rule of Vietnam paid tribute to the Nguyen Dynasty. Thus, although the feudal Vietnamese historian recorded an event in 1437, particularly Siam had performed two tributary times (Lê Quý Đôn 1993b: 345-46); Siam sent envoys to pay local products and reported the funeral" (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 690). As a country with a balanced position of potential with Vietnam, to Siam, it was just a conventional ceremony to maintain a

harmonious relationship between the two countries at this time like other times. Moreover, during the nineteenth century Siam regularly sent envoys to Vietnam (in 1803 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 576), twice in 1806 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 675, 682), 1809 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 770-71), 1810 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 792), 1811 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 810-11), 1813 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 858), 1816 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 934), 1820 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 83-84), 1822 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 231), 1830 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007a: 78-80), 1880 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2007f: 415)). In addition, the Nguyen dynasty regularly sent envoys to Siam to visit and offer products (specifically in 1803 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 550), 1804 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 590), 1808 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 741), 1817 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2002: 956-57), 1828 (Nguyen Dynasty's National Historian Office 2004: 782)). Meanwhile, to other Southeast Asian countries at the same time, the Nguyen Dynasty did not send direct envoys to visit and offer products. Clearly, unlike the countries of Chen La, Van Tuong, Nam Chuong, Thuy Xa and Hoa Xa, Siam was not part of a system of countries that paid tribute to and submit itself to the rule of Vietnam, especially in the Nguyen Dynasty in the 19th century.

IV. Conclusion

From the evolution of the tributary activities to Vietnam of the Southeast Asian countries mentioned above, a new reality which is entirely different from the previously proved judgments of many domestic and foreign researchers can be noted. Particularly, apart from the "tributary system" considering China as the center in East Asia during East Asia in the feudal times, a second "tributary system" also existed whose center is the peripheral, vassal country of the first "tributary system". If Fairbank and Teng had considered

the tributary system to be only “a means for diplomatic and international relations” in which China was the center and “a framework for the whole structure in which the non-Chinese barbaric areas positioned in the structure embraced all Chinese politics and morals” (Fairbank and Teng 1964: 137, 139; Cranmer-Byng 1973: 68), more thorough research provide in this article shows Vietnam not just a vassal state (albeit a form) in this “tributary system” considering China as a center. Vietnam was also the center of the mainland Southeast Asia’s “tributary system”. The parallel existence of two orders (one considered China as the center and the other considered Vietnam as the center) contributed to helping Vietnam achieve a relative balance of position in a comparative relation with neighboring China for a long time.

The problem was that Vietnam’s “flexible with far-off land” diplomacy and its soft, lenient, and good conduct in relations with other tribute-paying countries has shown us the gap between Vietnam (as a center, suzerain) and Southeast Asian countries (as vassals and peripheries) was much closer in comparison with the gap between China and its vassal states at that time. This soft approach to power is shown in in many forms, such as the willingness to give gifts to the mission many times more than products received by the Court; or approval of joint tribute payment between Hoa Xa and Thuy Xa; willingness to exempt to pay tributes for the vassal states when they encountered difficulties; tolerance of Cao Mien- a vassal state colluding with Siam at the border, neglecting to pay tributes for a long time.)

The number of tributes to Nguyen dynasties paid by the mainland Southeast Asian countries was accordingly more erratic, not following the set rules. Therefore, it can be said that compared to China’s tributary system, Vietnam’s “tributary system” is more loose. This is entirely in line with what Womack identified in *Asymmetry and China’s tributary system*. In his work, he had to admit that China is a “solid center” in comparative relation to other centers in the world: “In contrast to the traditional West that had a ‘liquid center - the Mediterranean—around and through which regimes swirled, China’s has been Asia’s ‘solid center’ of greatest productivity and population” (Womack 2012: 39). The looseness in

the “tributary system” taking Vietnam as the center stemmed from the very looseness in geopolitical and economic ties, especially in terms of culture and ideology between countries in the “system” - which the author mentioned in the first part of this article. It was this looseness that characterizes the relativity of Vietnam’s power in relations with smaller countries in Southeast Asia at that time. The smaller countries themselves in the same region such as Chen La (Cao Mien), Van Tuong, Nam Chuong, Hoa Xa, Thuy Xa, among others, always have a “vulnerable” characteristic - a common characteristic of small countries in general in relation to big countries – which was asserted by Womack in *Asymmetry theory and China’s concept of multipolarity* (Womack 2004: 13). Therefore, if “If larger states are prudent, consultative, and cooperative, smaller states are less likely to be anxious about their vulnerability...tend to accept the international order led by the larger state because it is inclusive of their interests” (Womack 2004: 15).

Conversely, when bigger countries like Vietnam did not cooperate, this threatened the interests of these smaller countries and hurt them, small countries would not be “vassal” states anymore and, accordingly, “the tributary system” taking Vietnam as the center was also broken, Vietnam would lose its “center” position in the region - a position contributing to helping Vietnam strengthen security and safety of the West and Southwest borders, as well as reach a relative balance in relations with many bigger or similar countries in the region. Obviously, as Womack stated: “The key to a peaceful frontier did not lie in dominating neighbors, but rather in managing a mutually acceptable relationship” (Womack 2012: 42). As a bigger country, in a position to keep its “center” position in mainland Southeast Asia, efforts to “manage the mutually acceptable relationships” with small countries was clearly a wise choice of the Nguyen Dynasty at that time. And such ingenious diplomatic behavior of the Nguyen Dynasty will also be valuable suggestions for Vietnam in its relations with Southeast Asian countries today as well as in the future when the cohesion between nations in the region are facing countless unpredictable challenges.

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Deforestation and Islamic Ethics: A Search for the Eco-Religious Links between Islam and Sustainable Development in Indonesia*



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[Abstract]

Indonesia has undergone the rapid deforestation largely as a result of practical consequences of human overexploitation of the forest. Between 1950 and 2015, around 43% of the forest area in Indonesia had been lost (68.0 million hectares). The process of deforestation has partly been a response to the rapidly intensifying 'global' and 'domestic' economic demands.

Deforestation in Indonesia is also indirectly due to 'materialism-driven' value system and the corresponding weakening of Indonesian ethics. Therefore, given that socio-cultural expressions of modern Indonesian value systems have mostly taken place within a framework of Islam, the aim of the paper is to attempt to find Islamic ethics in general, which can provide the basis of ecological ethics to prevent rapid deforestation in Indonesia.

The paper is composed of the followings. First, following the 'Introduction', it outlines the historical process of deforestation in Indonesia and also its corresponding socio-economic contexts. Then it moves on to talk about

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ecological ethics in general, thereby emphasizing that the phenomenological problem of deforestation needs to be conceived at a philosophical level beyond ecological phenomena. After discussing the ecological ethics, the paper proceeds to examine Islamic ethics as a canonical framework of ecological ethics in Indonesia. In doing so, it attempts to apply the Islamic ethics to the diverse Indonesian society and then considers 'Pancasila' as a potential framework for a pragmatic link between Islam ethics and Indonesian society. Having said that, in conclusion, the paper argues that there is a need for 'concrete' translation of 'Pancasila' into implementation in an Indonesian context, thereby various agents (government, policy-practitioners, concessionaires and also all the Indonesian) may agree in saying 'no' to overexploitation of the forest, to rapid depletion of the forest and to 'unsustainable' development practices.

Keywords: Deforestation, Sustainable Development, Islam, Ecological Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Pancasila, Indonesia

I . Introduction

Indonesia has about 92 million hectares of forest within forestry department boundaries, about 52% of its surface area (FAO 2020). Indonesia has the highest deforestation rates in the world, exceeding even Brazil that has 4 times bigger forest area than Indonesia (Green Facts 2021). For that reason, forests and sustainable development in Indonesia are inevitably intertwined, and the sound management of the forest is a prerequisite of socio-economic development. Indonesia has, however, undergone the rapid depletion of the forest largely as a result of practical consequences of human overexploitation of the forest.

In 1950, nearly 159.0 million hectares (87.0%) of the total land area (182.7 million hectares) was covered in forests. Between 1950 and 2015, around 43% of the forest area in Indonesia had been lost (68.0 million hectares) (Tsujino et al. 2016: 335-347). Particularly, in

2012, the annual rate of deforestation (840,000 hectares) surpassed that of deforestation in Brazil (Vidal 2014). The process of deforestation has partly been a response to the rapidly intensifying ‘global’ and ‘domestic’ economic demand for arable land for agricultural activities, exports crops, teak, timber, and forest-based manufactured exports (Global Forest Watch 2021).

The human overexploitation of the forest is also indirectly due to ‘materialism-driven’ value system and the corresponding weakening of Indonesian ethics, since human behavior is often strongly influenced by religious ethics and value systems as well as economic and political motives. A more holistic approach to deforestation, therefore, is required in terms of religious ethics and value systems which may be the fundamental basis of human behaviors and activities. Therefore, given the fact that Islam has been the major socio-cultural marker of Indonesia in modern history and socio-cultural expressions of modern Indonesian value systems have mostly taken place within a framework of Islam, the aim of the paper is to attempt to find Islamic ethics in general, which can provide the basis of ecological ethics to prevent rapid depletion of the forest in Indonesia. It consequently attempts to apply the Islamic ethics to Indonesian society, keeping in mind the potential role of Pancasila¹ in it.

The paper is composed of the followings. First, following the ‘Introduction’, it outlines the historical process of deforestation in Indonesia and also its corresponding socio-cultural and politico-economic contexts. Then it moves on to talk about ecological ethics in general, thereby emphasizing that the phenomenological problem of deforestation needs to be conceived at a philosophical level beyond ecological phenomena. After discussing the ecological ethics, the paper proceeds to examine

¹ Pancasila has been the official and philosophical ideology of Indonesia since it was first articulated on 1 June 1945. It consists of five foundational principles: ① The Principle of Belief in the One and Only God; ② The Principle of Just and Civilized Humanitarianism; ③ The principle of Indonesian Unity; ④ The Principle of Democracy Guided by Wisdom through Deliberation/Representation; and ⑤ The Principle of Social Justice for the Whole of the Indonesian People (CSIS 1978: 11-14).

Islamic ethics as a canonical framework of ecological ethics in Indonesia. In doing so, it attempts to apply the Islamic ethics to the diverse Indonesian society and then considers Pancasila as a potential pragmatic link between Islam ethics and Indonesian society. Having said that, in conclusion, the paper argues that there is a need for 'concrete' translation of 'Pancasila' into implementation in an Indonesian context, thereby the stakeholders (government, concessionaires and also all the Indonesian) may agree in saying 'no' to overexploitation of the forest, to rapid depletion of the forest and to 'unsustainable' development practices.

II . Deforestation in Indonesia


2.1 The State of Deforestation in Indonesia

Before the Agrarian Law of 1870² was introduced by the Dutch, much of Indonesia was still covered in forests, but by the time of the Independence in 1945, large swathes of low-lying forest, especially in Java, had already been cleared. The deforestation was partly a response to the rapidly intensifying colonial demand (Rossabi 1999: 32-33). Deforestation accelerated even faster after the 1960s when the Indonesian government adopted the Foreign Investment Law of 1967³ and the first Five Year Plan (REPELITA I) and the 25-Year Development Plan in 1969.

² The Agrarian Law of 1870 stipulated that all land in Indonesia was considered to be public property and could be leased to non-Indonesians for a period of 75 years. The law opened the door to foreign investment from other countries and possibility the development of free enterprise in tropical products (Kerstiens 1966: 49).

³ The Foreign Investment Law of 1967 was favorable to foreign investment that operated mainly in the natural resources sectors such as petroleum, timber and resource-based manufacturing.

<Figure 1> Forest Area in Indonesia (1950-2020)



Source: Reconstructed from 'Matthews 2002' and 'World Bank 2021b'

As shown in <Figure 1>, prior to 1950, Indonesia had around 148 million hectares of forests, with around 84% of its surface area (Matthews 2002: 8). As a result of rapid deforestation, Indonesia now has around 92 million hectares of forest, about 52% of its surface area (FAO 2020).

It appears that the process of deforestation has slowed down due to Indonesia's legal and regulatory efforts since 2000 (see Austin et al. 2019: 7-8). For example, in 2002, the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry implemented new legislation that re-centralized authority over forests and attempted to ban district-level local governments from issuing permits for logging and forest conversion on publicly-owned land. Moreover, in 2011, the Indonesian government called for a two-year moratorium on new licenses for logging, oil palm farming, mining etc in its forests (Jang and Bae 2013; Scholte 2019: 19-25). However, Indonesian government still has a number of major task ahead to manage and preserve its forests within forestry department boundaries.

2.2 Causes of Deforestation in Indonesia

Eldeeb et al. (2015) and Baker (2020) consider politico-economic milieu as a major driver of deforestation in Indonesia and argue that deforestation in Indonesia is mainly caused by politico-economic corruption and its unsustainable practices. On the other hand, Adrianto et al. (2019) point out that fire and forest loss in Indonesia are closely related both spatially and temporally. A number of scholars emphasize other agents of deforestation in Indonesia: shifting cultivation (Sunderlin 1997), rapid population growth (Nasendi 2000), forest-based manufacturing industry such as plywood (Makkarennu and Nakayasu 2013), migration/transmigration (Rustiadi and Junaidi 2011: 25-26; Darmawan et al. 2016; Kim 2019: 87-88), and Poverty (Miyamoto 2020).

However, it seems that the potential causes of deforestation in Indonesia are much more complicated than each of the above-mentioned explanations intends to suggest. As a matter of fact, determination of the cause of deforestation poses large conceptual and methodological challenges. The potential agents of deforestation are so various that it is not easy work to put them all in sequence. Moreover, ascertaining causes of deforestation is methodologically difficult because it involves demonstrating linked patterns of cause and effect through time, and there are often few data to prove these linkages. Therefore, there is yet no consensus in the research community on the causes of deforestation in Indonesia. According to some other findings, nevertheless, we can categorize the potential agents of deforestation in Indonesia, more or less, within several encompassing factors (see Austin 2019: 4-5; IBRD 1990: 3; Rossabi 1999: 38-47).

The first major source of deforestation is commodity-driven overexploitation of the forest, especially since the Suharto regime. The rapid depletion of the forest in Indonesia today has been due largely to the 'log export boom' of the 1970s and the persuasion of forest-based manufactured products such as plywood, furniture and paper since the 1980s, both of which have been largely financed by foreign investors.

Since the Suharto regime introduced and implemented a

completely open-door policy, the first Five Year Plan (REPELITA I) and the 25-Year Development Plan in 1969, the last half-century has been a period of extraordinarily rapid change in Indonesia. Its economy dramatically expanded, and real GDP per capita has considerably increased from USD 75 in 1969 to USD 4,136 in 2019 (World Bank 2021a). Despite this process, however, Indonesia has undergone rapid environmental change, especially the rapid depletion of forests since the 1970s, with a parallel steep growth in log export and forest-related manufactured products (for domestic industries and exports) such as plywood, paper and furniture. In particular, Indonesia has, with the support of foreign inputs, succeeded in capturing the world's forest-related manufactured products market (Jepma 1995: 285; Makkarennu and Nakayasu 2013: 190-191; FAO 2021). As shown in <Table 1>, the biggest forest-related production is logs and the major contributor for forest-related exports is plywood. The high domestic consumption of logs is due to the use by domestic industries, in particular the pulp and paper industry and tertiary industries such as furniture production (Timber Trade Portal 2021).

<Table 1> Forest Production, Trade and Consumption in Indonesia (2018)

	Production (1,000 m ³)	Imports (1,000 m ³)	Exports (1,000 m ³)	Domestic Consumption (1,000 m ³)
Logs	73,797	674	28	74,443
Sawn Wood	4,169	19	539	3,649
Veneer	749	2	96	655
Plywood	3,200	1	2,348	852

Source: ITTO (2019)

Although not all forms of log export and forest-related manufacturing industries are negative, deforestation in relation to the two agents seems to be connected with the comparative devaluation of forests which encourages their massive use. As mentioned earlier, Indonesia has achieved steep growth in forest-related manufactured exports and succeeded in capturing the world's forest-related manufactured products market. Consequently, after the oil boom in the 1970s and the log export ban in 1985,

enforced export substitution proved successful. On the other hand, the forest has been felled by concessionaires under the pretext of economic growth. Prior to 1970, no trend of severe forest loss was apparent. Since the 1970s, export-oriented log production and global demand for forest products has been one of the primary pressures underlying deforestation (Tsujino et al. 2016: 335).

Commercialism-driven massive logging by concessionaires is also another major source of deforestation. As shown in <Table 2>, in 2015, most of Indonesia’s forest (91.15%) was publicly owned by the government and only 1.08% was privately owned (FAO 2020). The privately-owned forest is ‘titled’ forest. A titled forest is a forest located on land on which the land title is registered by private organizations or individuals. The majority of the public forests are owned principally by the government, but normally directly managed by private concessioners (corporations and institutions) based on forest concessions. It means that the management of forest resources in Indonesia is largely in the hands of private concessionaires (Timber Trade Portal 2021).

<Table 2> Forest Ownership in Indonesia (1990-2015)

Categories	Forest Area (1,000 ha)			
	1990	2000	2010	2015
Private Ownership	na	488.20	1,776.00	1,033.40
Public Ownership	103,058.00	86,422.00	82,095.18	86,625.60
Unknown / Other	na	14,369.80	15,788.02	7,368.90
Total	118,545.00	101,280.00	99,659.20	95,027.90

Source: FAO 2020

Forest-related concession per se is not a problem. However, the alarming challenge is the fact that overexploitation of the forest in Indonesia is often caused by politico-economic corruption and its unsustainable practices. It is estimated that corruption in the forestry sector reached over Rp. 273 trillion in 2011 in Indonesia. In corruption-related cases, there are very few incentives for concessionaires to manage their holdings sustainably. Since logged-over areas have

greatly reduced value, many concessionaires do little to protect their holdings from encroachment and fire once they are logged (Eldeeb et al. 2015; Baker 2020).

As mentioned earlier, on 20 May 2011, the Indonesian government called for a two-year moratorium on new licenses for logging, oil palm farming, mining etc in its forests. The moratorium covers 66 millions of primary forests and peatland (a third of the Indonesian land): conservation forest, protection forest, production forest and ever areas allocated for other uses. It was extended every two years until 2019 (Jang and Bae 2013; Scholte 2019: 19-25). On August 2019, the Indonesian government signed the permanent extension of the temporary moratorium on forest-clearing permits for plantation and logging (Jong 2019). As indicated in <Figure 1>, the moratorium and its follow-up amendment seems to curtail rapid deforestation in Indonesia (Scholte 2019). Nevertheless, critics claim that the moratorium itself has not been effective in slowing down the loss of primary forests⁴ and the deforestation rate has actually increased within areas under the moratorium (Jong 2019). Global Forest Watch (2021) estimates that from 2002 to 2019, Indonesia lost 9.48 million hectares of humid primary forest, making up 36% of its total tree loss in the same period. Total area of humid primary forest in Indonesia decreased by 10% in this time period. Therefore, Indonesian government still has a major task to implement an alternative measure to tackle the commercialism-driven massive logging by concessionaires.


The other significant source is small holder agricultural conversion such as 'shifting cultivation', both by local people and immigrants. Global Forest Watch (2021) claims that "the drivers of permanent deforestation are mainly urbanization and commodity-driven deforestation. Shifting agriculture may or may not lead to deforestation, depending upon the impact and permanence of agricultural activities". However, a number of scholars clearly points out that various forms of 'unsustainable' small holder agricultural conversion is a major source of deforestation in Indonesia (Austin

⁴ Primary forest is defined as mature natural humid tropical forest that has not been completely cleared and regrown in recent history (Global Forest Watch 2021).

2019: 5; Rossabi 1999: 46-47; Sunderlin 1997). Moreover, given the transmigrants’ agricultural conversion, as ‘new’ small holders, outside of formal programs, environmental impacts on forests from informal conversion should also be paid attention (Darmawan et al. 2016; Kim 2019: 87-88; Rustiadi and Junaidi 2011: 25-26)

As can be seen in <Figure 2>, ‘unsustainable’ agricultural conversion by small holders and transmigrants is practiced in a range of types, especially in connection to or outside concession areas. The depletion of forests may also be driven by the networks of small palm oil plantations operated by small holders and transmigrants who produce nearly 40 percent of Indonesia’s palm oil stock. Research findings about these conversion by small holders and transmigrants suggests that they operate outside of established concessions in many cases (Jepma 1995: 288; Wijaya 2017).

<Figure 2> Types of Conversion by Small Holders and Migrants



Source: own compilation

Local small holders and transmigrants in reality may have few incentives to preserve the forest. In general, they may face serious constraints in obtaining legal land titles because of the land tenure regulation and shortage of cash. Therefore they may be attracted to forest lands outside of formal programs or outside concession areas

nearby. Moreover, the Forestry Law of 1999 recognizes the right of local people to harvest forest products, except timber. For that reason, the main way local farmers can realize profits is by clearing forest lands (Wijaya et al. 2017).

III. Ecological Ethics and Islam

In previous part, I mentioned several major encompassing factors of deforestation in Indonesia: commodity-driven overexploitation of the forest, commercialism-driven massive logging by concessioners, and 'unsustainable' agricultural conversion by small holders. It is true that not all forms of deforestation are negative and some degree of deforestation is inevitable to satisfy demand for necessary production and other activities related to socio-economic development. In this regard, the Indonesian government has designated production forests as areas appropriate for deforestation and also legal policies to manage and preserve the forests. However, serious socio-economic and environmental degradation is still associated with destructive overexploitation of the forest, commercialism-driven practices by concessioners, and 'unsustainable' agricultural conversion by small holders. Bearing in mind the major encompassing factors of deforestation, I will move on to explore ecological ethics as an alternative framework to address the notable ecological problems.

In a sense, deforestation is primarily a phenomenological problem in the sphere of ecology which is 'the science of the complex interplay of natural organisms and natural systems' However, Schrader-Frechette made a slightly different point when he said that:

If environmental degradation were purely, or even primarily, a problem demanding scientific or technological solutions, then its resolution would probably have been accomplished by now (Quoted in 'International Conference 1994': 7).

Here lies a need to refer to ethics as an alternative framework at a philosophical level beyond ecological phenomena. Especially, at this point, it would be quite useful for understanding deforestation

today in Indonesia to refer to western ecological ethics, since it could provide a functional frame in sketching out ecological issues at a philosophical level.

Ecological problems have been defined as problems arising 'as a practical consequence of man's dealings with nature, where nature is used as the non-human environment of man' (Attfield 1983: 1). Ecological ethics, therefore in general, is premised in general on the conviction that there is something wrong with such attitudes (speciesism and human chauvinism): only humans are bearers of intrinsic value, only humans are worthy of moral consideration, the rest of nature is merely of instrumental value and means in the service of human aids. With regard to such ecological attitudes towards nature, there have been three kinds of cognitive tendency in the Western tradition: 'egocentrism', 'anthropocentrism' and 'despotism'. Firstly, 'egocentrism' may have a stunting effect on the self through failing to see how the self is actually constituted and fulfilled in association with others in the nature. Secondly, 'anthropocentrism' can have a retarding effect on humanity in as much as it denies or loses sight of how humanity is a part of, constituted by, nature (Hayward 1995: 58). Thirdly, 'despotism' is based on a one-sided interpretation of the Biblical belief in man's dominion according to which everything is made for man, nothing else is of any intrinsic value or moral importance, and people may treat nature in any way that they like without inhibition (Attfield 1983: 4).

The matter that confronts us here is how we could indeed tackle deforestation in Indonesia, an Islamic country, by avoiding such attitudes as 'egocentrism', 'anthropocentrism', and 'despotism'. The question leads us to Islamic ethics which could provide obligatory and binding power which could set spontaneous limit to commodity-driven overexploitation of the forest, commercialism-driven massive logging, and 'unsustainable' agricultural conversion, and stimulate the moral behavior of human beings.

Unlike Buddhism as a religion of meditation, Islam is a religion of 'revelation' (Ali 1983: 1092, xxxii 2; Kurdi 1984: 4-5). Islamic philosophy, activities, and ethics are therefore based on the

revelation of Allah, the Qur'an and the other scriptures such as Sunna. In the Muslim view, the Qur'an contains everything (Ahmed 2020: 322-325; Christopher 1972: 28; Von Grunebaum 1961: 81). By entering into every intellectual and emotional aspiration, on whatever level, the Qur'an has provided Muslims with a large area of shared understandings. It also offers a large measure of conceptual and imaginative homogeneity and a universally accepted framework for value judgments (Ebrahimi 2017: 332-333; Von Grunebaum 1961: 90-91). For that reason, in order to obtain insight into Islamic ethics where they are concerned with ecological ethics, it is necessary to focus intimately on the Qur'an, centering ethical framework within itself. Islam thinkers point out that the theological effort to limit the doctrine of determinism so as to provide for moral responsibility belongs to 'the ethics of Islam', and call ethics "Practical Philosophy" (Ahmed 2020: 331-339; Donaldson 1953: ix). The "Practical Philosophy" in relation to ecological ethics, as the Qur'an reveals, can be taken into account in terms of three major ethics (stewardship, balance, and moderation) as alternatives to undesirable attitudes (speciesism and human chauvinism) towards nature mentioned above that regards humans as bearers of intrinsic value and the nature merely as instrument and means for the service of human aids.

Firstly, 'stewardship' is based on the initial assumption that Allah created both men and women (Ali 1983: 24, ii 30) and that He sees and hears and knows everything that they do (Ali 1983: 903-4, xxiv 28). According to the Qur'an, man was made vicegerent on the face of the earth (Ali 1983: 24, ii 30; Shariati 1979: 3). Such is man's natural place in creation, and on this premise, insofar as Islam makes his duties and privileges explicit, it may be regarded as a religion of nature as well as of revelation. Allah did not leave the human race as his vicegerents with guidance and without provision for the regulation of their conduct known as 'Balance', and 'Moderation' (Donaldson 1953: 253). It is revealed throughout the Qur'an that the believer should "fear Allah and know that Allah is with those who fear Him" (Donaldson 1953: 15).

Secondly, the notion of 'balance' in the Qur'an may be regarded as a feature of the Islamic ethos with regard to ecological

ethics. The Qur'an says:

The sun and the moon follow courses computed; And the herbs and trees both bow in adoration. And Firmament has He raised high, and He has set up the balance in order that ye may not transgress balance. So establish weigh with justice and fall not short in the balance (Ali 1983: 1472-3, lv 3-9).

It is in figurative language that the Holy Book of Islam points out that each object of creation is made subject to the laws intrinsic in its nature in order that it might fulfill its function, and that man is to conduct himself in accordance with the laws of his being, and in 'balance' with the laws governing the rest of creation (Donaldson 1953: 254).

Thirdly, the notion of 'moderation' is advised in the command "...do not transgress limits; for God loveth not transgressors" in the Qur'an (Ali 1983: 75, ii 190). According to the Qur'an, "all creatures of Allah are His family and he is the most beloved of Allah who loveth best His creatures" (Donaldson 1953: 255). 'Moderation' has, therefore, to be exercised towards all creatures and interpreted in terms of the good that man can offer not only to his fellow man but to every living object on earth (Donaldson 1953: 265).

A number of scholars show scholarly interest in what is called 'Islamic ecology' or 'Islamic environmental ethics' that is based mainly on the theological principles (stewardship, balance, and moderation) manifested in the Qur'an. Those scholars believe that Islam signals detailed ethical principles on the environment, although the majority of Muslim countries show an apparent indifference to environmental issues and Islamic principles are represented in various forms (Gada 2014; Khalid 2010; Saniotis 2012; Schatzschneider 2013)

IV. Application of Islamic Ecological Ethics in Indonesian Society

The rapid deforestation in Indonesia has been brought about notably through commodity-driven overexploitation of the forest, commercialism-driven massive logging by concessioners, and 'unsustainable' agricultural conversion both by indigenous people and transmigrants. Policy-practitioners, concessionaires, and indigenous people/transmigrants who operate in the fields of the forests, as mentioned in the part II, may have few incentives to manage and preserve the forest which may be the sustainable foundation for the long-term stability of Indonesia. Instead, they give undue value to short-term profits.

Given the facts that Indonesia is the top ten countries with the largest forest area in the world and has the potential to become the largest forest-related manufactured products exporter in the world, there would be no one who doubts that forestry itself is a indispensable net contributor to the economic growth of Indonesia. At the same time, however, taking into account the major sources of deforestation in Indonesia mentioned in the part II, it can be noticed that the intrinsic value of forest has been transformed into commercial exchange values and devalued on the pretext of development. Indeed, the forest has a variety of potential uses. Properly carried out, the conversion of such land may yield not only higher economic returns than standing timber, but gainful employment for rural people who have few alternative sources of income.

Speaking in a philosophical sense, it can be said that the above mentioned profit-oriented attitudes towards the forest seems to be based on 'anthropocentrism', 'egocentrism', and 'despotism' as well as 'materialism'. Furthermore, given the instructions in Islamic ethics, the unsustainable practices and activities of concessionaires, policy-practitioners, and indigenous people/transmigrants seem to be contradictory to the Islamic ethics, which provide the proper limitation to their overexploitation of the forest. Firstly, they appears to be oblivious to the fact that they were made not as a master but as a steward on behalf of Allah who knows everything they do in

this world and that Allah committed nature to the human race with regulations for their conduct such as ‘balance’ and ‘moderation’. Rather, they prioritize extra gain and profit-making from environmentally-destructive practices. Secondly, they apparently lose sight of the fact that Allah commanded that the balance He has set should not be transgressed and that nature therefore has its own intrinsic value to fulfill its function in the creation. Thirdly, they seems to be negligent in the ‘moderation’ which says that they should not exceed the limits Allah set towards all the creatures. As a result, ‘commodity-driven overexploitation of the forest’, ‘commercialism-driven massive logging’, and ‘unsustainable agricultural conversion’ on a practical level can be said to be consequences of ‘revocation of the stewardship’, ‘disruption of the balance’ and ‘secession out of moderation’ at the level of Islamic ethics.

In fact, Islamic approach to environmental concerns among Muslims has been visible since 1999 when the earliest attempt was made by the Institute of Ecology in Bandung. Since 2002, the Islamic Foundation for Ecology and Environmental Sciences have been involved in a series of eco-religious training exercises, based on the Qur’an, for scholars, teachers, NGO activists and community members (McKay et al. 2013: 23). The ecological problems have also raised eco-religious concerns for the environments among major Islamic groups in Indonesia. In particular, the major Islamic organizations such as MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah, have engaged in emergent environmental issues in contemporary Indonesia. In this regard, they have released fatwa (Islamic official opinion) since 2006 when MUI issued the first fatwa on illegal logging and mining activities in Kalimantan, proclaiming them to be haram (Dewayanti and Saat 2020; McKay et al. 2013: 23-24). Indonesian Islamic groups have also attempted to voice Islamic eco-religious concern about the alarming challenges of the environments in various forms: organization of eco-religious institutions (Dewayanti and Saat 2020), establishment of environmental education programs at the local level (Efendi et al. 2017), and combination of Islamic principles with traditional methods of conservation (Mangunjaya and McKay 2012).

There are, however, some practical difficulties involved in applying Islamic ethics directly to Indonesian society. They are concerned with 'contextualization of applicability', which stems mainly from the two features of Indonesia. I will attempt to examine the two features of Indonesia in terms of Hildread Geertz and Clifford Geertz's analysis of Indonesian society (mainly in the island of Java). They may be criticized for the 'out-of-date' and 'rigid' conceptualization of peoples in Indonesia. Nevertheless, it seems that their analytical insight is still valid, at least in understanding 'broad' socio-cultural landscape of Indonesia.

The first problem is derived from 'heterogeneous human landscape', which is reflected by geographical distinctions. In this aspect Hildred Geertz categorized Indonesian societies into three groups: 1) the strong Hindunized inland wet-rice areas; 2) the trade-oriented deeply Islamic coastal peoples whose significant characteristics are ethnic heterogeneity and Islam as the most important unifying element; and 3) the mainly pagan tribal groups of the mountainous interior regions, generally left untouched by either Hinduism or Islam and relatively isolated from the outside world (Darmaputera 1988: 27-28; Geertz 1963: 6-7). The problematic categories here, in terms of 'applicability of Islamic ethics', are the first and last one since they are largely unconcerned with Islamic dogma and doctrine which may be the basis of ethical activities.

Secondly, the next problem is rooted to 'mixed religio-cultural types'. It could be said, as Clifford Geertz proposes, that the types can be categorized into three systems: 1) the 'abangan', 2) the 'santri', and 3) the 'priyayi' (Darmaputera 1988: 76-78; Geertz 1960: 5-7). The 'abangan' represents 'a basic Indonesian syncretism' and commonly consists of the peasant element of the population, 'a balanced integration of animistic, Hinduistic, and Islamic elements' (Geertz 1960: 5). The 'santri' represents the purer Islamic elements as known Islamic orthodox practice and various Islamic organizations (Geertz 1960: 6). The 'priyayi' originally referred to Hindu-Buddhistic cultural elements in the hereditary aristocracy. Today, however, it implies the world view, ethics, social behavior and westernized elements of the elite group (Geertz 1960: 6). The arguable systems here, as regards 'applicability of Islamic ethics', are

the two non-Islamic systems, the 'abangan' and the 'priyayi' since each system has not only different aspects of religious orthodoxy but also a different ethical perspective. In other words, among 'abangan' and 'priyayi', in a sense, we could find universal agreement of Islamic ethics. However, given the dichotomy of religious practices between in 'name' and in 'nature', what is clear here is that Islamic ethics cannot play a full part as an orthodox binding power among them, even among Muslim.

To compensate for the irrelevances of Islamic ethics, there should be a link which allows the Islamic ethics to be put into practice all over Indonesian societies. The link has to be acceptable, if possible, to all Indonesians, and inclusive of all value systems and all beliefs in Indonesia. Here, Pancasila can be considered as a potential framework for the link in view of the fact that Pancasila has important meanings in Indonesia with reference to its three main features: normative integration of socio-cultural diversity, creation of a national identity, and provision of a national ideology. Such implications are symbolized in the five principles of Pancasila as follows: 1) The Principle of Belief in the One and Only God; 2) The Principle of Just and Civilized Humanitarianism; 3) The principle of Indonesian Unity; 4) The Principle of Democracy Guided by Wisdom through Deliberation/Representation; and 5) The Principle of Social Justice for the Whole of the Indonesian People (CSIS 1978: 11-14). Given the fact that it has always been in the Preambles to Indonesian constitutions despite several constitutional changes since 1945, it can be said that the in-born role of Pancasila is to provide meanings of integration, a national identity and a national ideology (Departmen Penegaraan Indonesia 1987: 6). Moreover, although Pancasila in principle remains ambiguous towards Islam on account of this all-inclusive nature, Islamic ethics have some shared analogies with Pancasila with regard to ecological ethics, as Mohammed Nasir said that

[...] none of five principles will be put aside or dropped if we accept Islam as the foundation of the state... All those principles can be found in Islam-not as sterile 'pure concepts,' but as living values with real and clear substance (Quoted in 'Darmaputera 1988': 186).

Firstly, Pancasila, like Islamic ethics, implies the notion of 'balance' which is based on 'stewardship'. Pancasila is geared to the principle of harmony and balance, which are the core concepts of the Indonesian value system. Pancasila therefore provides a philosophical foundation for the maintenance of harmony and balance, between the creation of the One Lord.

That integrated unity, which is Pancasila, provides the Indonesian Nation and its People with a certainty that happiness in life will be achieved when it is based on harmony and balance; whether in the life of an individual, in his relation with society or with nature, in the relations among nations, in the relationship of man with his God, or in the pursuit of material progress or spiritual happiness (CSIS 1978: 11).

Secondly, Pancasila also, as can be found in Qur'an, implies the ethical concept of 'moderation'. It is rooted to the Indonesian cognitive methodology of the 'neither-nor' approach to reality. The original spirit of Pancasila was precisely in the middle, it neither went too far to the right (Liberal Democracy) nor too far to the left (Guided Democracy). In fact, the Suharto regime, a modern interpreter of Pancasila, was committed to correct all the mistakes of the past, that is, both of the so-called 'liberal-democracy' period and of the 'guided-democracy' period (Darmaputera 1988: 160).

Thirdly, Pancasila emphasizes on 'Gotong-royong' as an all-encompassing normative frame, namely mutual cooperation and mutual interest (CSIS 1978: 11). It appears to be based on the notion of 'balance', 'harmony' and 'moderation'. In Pancasila as a whole, there seems to be a point beyond which the individual cannot go without disturbing the 'tata-tentrem' (the others and the tranquility) of the other (Darmaputera 1988: 189). The matter becomes clearer in Sukarno's comment on Pancasila. He said that:

If I compress what was five into three, and what was three into one, then I have a genuine Indonesian term, gotong-royong, mutual cooperation (Quoted in 'Darmaputera 1988: 189').

V. Conclusion: *Need for 'Concrete' Translation of Pancasila*

It has emerged that Pancasila could be a potential framework for the link between Islamic ethics and all Indonesian societies. In this regard, it has also emerged that Pancasila, including the notion of 'balance', 'moderation' and 'gotong-royong', could set normative limitation to commodity-driven overexploitation of the forest, commercialism-driven massive logging by concessioners, and 'unsustainable' agricultural conversion both by indigenous people and transmigrants, by providing an ethical basis over such attitudes as 'egocentrism', 'anthropocentrism' and 'despotism'. It is therefore quite possible that Pancasila at a normative and ethical level could play an important role in an Indonesian context in terms of 'sustainable' development.

However, even though Pancasila can indeed be considered to be a potential framework for the ideal link between Islamic ethics and all Indonesian societies, as Indonesians say, "*Tak ada gading yang tak retak*", which means that there is no ivory which is not cracked, Pancasila also has some limitations and weaknesses. That is to say, one can imagine the phenomenon that government, policy-practitioners, concessionaires and ordinary people would possibly give up the ecological concern with ethical consideration and concentrate instead on an account of what benefits themselves. Moreover, there seems to be a tendency in the process of deforestation that the politico-economic settings, such as 'patron-client' relationships, development policies and foreign capital, have also conditioned forest over-exploitation and environment changes. Thus, unsustainable development practices in Indonesia may be attributed not only to the simple nexus of the environment and exploitation, but also to the complex interplay of politico-economic milieu and policies. However, it seems that the ethical properties of Pancasila has been limited and weak at the practical level in the process of the rapid deforestation in Indonesia. Therefore, Pancasila needs to clearly establish practical guidelines for environmental sustainability. This will require substantial reform of the politico-economic process leading ultimately to proper resource exploitation practices, the sound management of resources

and politico-economic advocacy, and thus sustainable development.

Therefore, what is required here is a ‘concrete’ translation of the principles in Pancasila into implementation in an Indonesian context. Given the fact that the primary interpreter has been the Indonesian government and its policy-practitioners, the role of the Indonesian Government is indispensable in interpreting and implementing the principles in Pancasila in an Indonesian context. Similarly, given the reality that the agents of deforestation and Indonesian government are intertwined with one another, the ‘appropriate’ translation of Pancasila is also required. For that reason, just as Pancasila has points of comparison with Islamic ethics in diverse Indonesian societies, so Indonesian government should pursue a point of ‘gotong-royong’ where government, policy-practitioners, concessionaires and all the Indonesian may agree in saying ‘no’ to overexploitation of the forest, to rapid depletion of the forest and to ‘unsustainable’ development practices. Agreement on points such as these could provide a normative value for the next steps ahead, to see how government should translate Pancasila into its society.

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Making *Anyatha* (Upper Lander) and *Auktha* (Lower Lander): Crossing the Introduction of the Colonial Boundary System to British Burma (Myanmar)

Myo Oo*



[Abstract]

In Myanmar studies, despite research on the categorization of ethnic nationalities are fairly much, research on the categorization of Myanmar people (ethnic Myanmar) is rarely exposed. People settled down in Central Myanmar had been categorized by regionalism into two groups as *Anyatha* (Upper Lander) and *Auktha* (Lower lander). It can be determined that the regionalism of Myanmar people existed and still exists. Previous scholarship in the colonial history of Myanmar has primarily referred to the documents recorded by the colonial officers and historical texts composed by the British authorities and scholars. The Catalogue of the Hluttaw Records is one of the rarest documents recorded in the Myanmar language on the affairs in the borderline drawn by the British after the Second Anglo-Myanmar War (1852-1853). Scrutinizing the Catalogue of the Hluttaw Records, it has been found that the text sheds light on the division of Central Myanmar into two regions in colonial Burma, later known as Lower Myanmar and Myanmar kingdom. These areas were known as Upper Myanmar between 1853 and 1885, and the categorization of

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the Myanmar king's subject, known as *Anyatha* (Upper Lander) and British colony citizen later known as *Auktha* (Lower Lander). This article traces back the relation of introducing the colonial boundary system and the division of Central Myanmar into two regions that allowed the emergence of regionalism among Myanmar people.

Keywords: Colonial boundary system, Lower Myanmar, Upper Myanmar, *Anyatha*, *Auktha*

I . Introduction

In the Myanmar language, two words categorize Myanmar people into two sections: they are *Anyatha* (Upper lander); and *Aauktha* (Lower lander). The former means the upper lander, born in Upper Myanmar, starts from Magway Division northwards, while the latter means the lower lander, born in Lower Myanmar, starts from the Pegu (Bago) Division southwards. According to the Myanmar-English Dictionary published by the Myanmar Language Department, *Anya* means the upriver region adjoining the upper reaches of the Ayeyarwaddy River (2019: 620) and *Auk* means the downriver area (2019: 690). These words are generally used in present-day Myanmar to refer to the upper and lower parts of Myanmar. *Anyatha* (Upper lander) and *Auktha* (Lower lander) are defined based on their birthplace. Since they descend from the same ethnicity, it is challenging to define via appearance. However, it is possible to determine whether a Myanmar person is an *Anyatha* or an *Auktha* listening to their vocabulary and pronunciation and when they speak out. *Anytha* pronounces the word *tawinpu*, the 16th number of the Myanmar alphabet, which has the pronunciation of *ta*, as *tha*, as well as the word *tha*, the 30th number of Myanmar alphabet, which is pronounced *ta*. On the other hand, while the *Anyatha* differentiate the usage of paternal uncle (lower) as *bagyi* and (younger) as *badwe*, that of maternal uncle (lower) as *ugi* and younger as *ulay*, *Auktha* never addresses every parent's siblings as *ulay* (uncle). Similar to the paternal uncles, different words signify maternal aunty. Upper landers address their aunty (lower) as *ayilay*

and aunty (upper) as *ayigyi*, while the Lower landers do not do that. Together with the fame of Mandalay, the last capital of Myanmar, as a cultural center of Myanmar, the term *Anytha* can be interpreted by the extended meaning as a people who are intimate with Myanmar language and culture. For example, *Ahet Myanma Pyi Saye-say-mya* literarily means here are Upper Lander writers publishing novels on traditional Myanmar culture and society in upper Myanmar. On the other hand, the term *Anyatha* has generally been used to address the children working in teashops in Yangon. Some upper landers regard that term as discriminatory against the people who migrated from upper to lower Myanmar for their living.

The modern administrative areas started to divide Central Myanmar during the colonial period. Dividing upper and lower Myanmar only happened to Central Myanmar and excluded Rakhine State located not in the central area, and Shan and Kayin State situated in the frontier areas. Myanmar kingdom has been divided into two countries immediately after the Second Anglo-Myanmar War (1852-1853) due to losing the war of the Myanmar kingdom. Upper Myanmar remained as the Myanmar Kingdom while the lower part became British colonial Burma (Myanmar). In this way, various administrations practiced in Upper and Lower Myanmar. Strikingly this period only last long 32 years, precisely from 1853 to 1885 when the British Army occupied Upper Myanmar after the Third Anglo-Myanmar War in 1885. Though these 32 years were not important enough to be mentioned in Myanmar's historical period, this period took an important role in categorizing modern Myanmar people into two categories.

Research on *Anyatha* and *Auktha* conducted from the linguistic approach has done to some extent, uncover the different usage and pronunciation of speakers from Upper that of speakers from Lower Myanmar (Patricia & Milner 1989; Kartz 1999). Analysis from a historical perspective: there is an article entitled "A Study on the Factors of Domestic Migration of the Ethnic Burman in the Burmese King's Age" (Myo Oo 2012). This article throws light on the push-pull factors of the ethnic Burman (Myanmar) migration in Central Myanmar during the Myanmar king's age. Though this article traces the organizational and economic characteristics of

ethnic Burma's migration from Myanmar kingdom (Upper Myanmar) to the British colony Burma (Lower Myanmar) in the Yadanabon period, the scope of this article does not reach the making of British colonial citizens in Lower Myanmar.

The article under study historically traces how the colonial boundary system demarcated Central Myanmar into two countries as the Myanmar Kingdom, later Upper Myanmar, and British Burma, later Lower Myanmar, and categorized the people in Central Myanmar into two groups such as Myanmar king subject, later *Anyatha*, and the British colonial citizen, later *Auktha*. To trace the categorization of two groups in Central Myanmar, this study will focus on how the colonial boundary system demarcated the Myanmar kingdom into two countries and categorized Myanmar king subjects in upper Myanmar and colonial citizens in lower Myanmar. To understand how both authorities, understand and took action to subjugate the Myanmar king's subjects and colonial citizens, this research scrutinizes the document entitled *The Catalogue of the Hluttaw Records* (2011).

Previous scholarships in the colonial history of Myanmar have mainly referred to the documents recorded by the colonial officers and historical texts composed by the British administrator-scholars. Scrutinizing the Catalogue of the Hluttaw Records, it has been found that the text sheds light on the historical accounts on the categorization of the British colonial citizens, which have been documented in a record recorded by the Myanmar king's officers. This document has revealed the account on the categorization of the British colonial citizen differentiating from its citizens from that of Upper Myanmar since the British authority had drawn a borderline between the Upper and Lower Myanmar immediately after the Second Anglo-Myanmar War (1852-1853). This document has also referenced the account on the categorization of the Asians in Upper Myanmar, such as Indians and Chinese and British colonial citizens. In sum, this document could help provide historical knowledge that introducing the new boundary, defined by the Western perspective, had categorized the British colonial citizen and the Myanmar King's subject.

The record which has been noted accounts mentioned above is *The Catalogue of the Hluttaw Records*, Vol. I and II (Yangon: Yapyi Printing Press, 2011) recorded the official letters during the Yadanabon Period (1853-1885). The first publication, *The Catalogue of the Hluttaw Records (CHR)* Pat I and II, had been published in two volumes in 1909 by the Government Printing Press. However, due to having the first publication published in 1909, it is challenging to reach these books, the second publication of the *CHR*, of which two volumes were published in a book in this publication, has been scrutinized. The records in the book are primary documents that are full of historical data recorded in the official letters dispatched by the Hluttaw of the Myanmar king's court during the Yadanabon Period (1853-1878). In this book, Dr. Kyaw Win, the Secretary of the Myanmar Historical Commission and a part-time professor of Yangon University has given a review in the "Preface" of the *CHR* as follows.

... The account on foreign relations, that of Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, that of the state scholars of Myanmar, and that of Bombay-Burma Timber Company, has been recorded in the *CHR*. This book has recorded precious historical documents. It is a primary source for Myanmar history. In addition, since the events recorded in the book have been noted in official writing, the record is entirely accurate. I firmly believed that the *CHR* is a helpful handbook for scholars in the fields of Myanmar literary and Myanmar history, and they can rely on this book for their studies... (Kyaw Win 2011: 9).

The *CHR* is full of historical values. The letters, dispatched by the Myanmar king's court and the British authorities since 1826, copied from the *parabikes* (a writing material of coarse paper made from mulberry pulp and applied before the colonial period in Myanmar from no. 1 to 25, has been printed in the first part, and other documents on the account from 1874 to 1885, noted from the *parabike* no. 159 to 419, in the second part. The record, the *CHR*, has opened with the account of the 3rd waning day of *Dabaung* 1187 (23 February 1826) and recorded the affairs of King Mindon and his son King Thibaw.

One of the purposes of this research is to investigate a historical document recorded by the Myanmar king's officials, which would also help conduct further examinations on the colonial history of Myanmar. This research could reveal new historical facts on the categorization of the Myanmar king's subject and British colonial citizen to more foreign researchers who want to use documents recorded from the Myanmar side. This study would also help to understand the colonial formation of the British colonial, which continued to 1885 when the Upper Myanmar was annexed by the British Annexation Army after the Third Anglo-Myanmar War (1885).

In this research, a socio-linguistic approach will be adopted to decipher the newly categorized people and locations defined by the new territorial outlook noted in the record. This article has been divided into five sections. The following section briefly introduces the historical context of pre-modern Southeast Asia when Western imperialism entered there. The discussion on the relationship between the establishment of the colonial boundary system and the categorization of the British colonial citizen in Lower Myanmar will be in the third section. The final section is a summary of the discussions in the article.

II. When Western Imperialism and Pre-Modern Southeast Asia Meet

The adventure of Western powers to Southeast Asia made the emergence of modern Southeast Asian nations, and these nations owe their present boundary alignments to colonial action. Southeast Asian areas, both mainland and archipelago, were incorporated into the Western colonies from the late 18th century. The Western powers were mapping their processions and defining colonial jurisdictions during the 19th century (Owen 2005: 79). While mapping and representing jurisdictions in the colonies, the authorities were confronted with political instability. To respond to the instability, the powers tried to provide sovereignty to the residents in the totality of the colonial territory. For this purpose,

Western powers incorporated Western territorial outlooks into their colonies, defined in territorial terms, and maps and treaties set the borders (Solomon 1969: v). With the incorporation of the Western territorial perspective by the Western powers to Southeast Asia during the colonial period, modern boundaries came into existence in the region. The colonial boundary system, which was incorporated into Southeast Asia, gave way for categorizing the colonial citizens in the respective countries.

It is common in Southeast Asia that the past kingdoms were defined by natural boundaries such as streams, rivers, and mountain ranges. These boundaries could not develop an effective administrative apparatus in the remote areas. The nature of borders in traditional Southeast Asia can be seen in Solomon's research memorandum entitled *Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia* (California: The Rand Corporation, 1969). In his work, he has illustrated the relation of the sovereignty and boundary in Southeast Asia as follows:

In Southeast Asia, order and surveillance were not easily maintained in remote areas. Sovereignty was not defined in a strict territorial sense. Marginal territorial concessions were a legitimate instrument of national policy and were not viewed as fatal to the kingdom. A shifting frontier based on transitory power relationships was a means of gauging and aligning the international equilibrium. Sovereignty was as crucial to Southeast Asian principalities as it was the oldest nations of Europe, but the content was different: in Southeast Asia, the preservation of sovereignty was less dependent upon the maintenance of absolute territorial integrity (Solomon 1969: vi).

Subsequently, the borders of the conventional main lands of Southeast Asian nations were distinguished by independent administrations, which could be interpreted without treaties or articles from another country, multiple barriers that an edge, unconnected, but which were adaptable, and autonomy and borders were not coincident. For provincial civilizations, they were accustomed to calling upon their families on both sides of the border, and some emigrated from one side to the other at various times (Thongchai 1994: 76-78). Accordingly, only the civilized

regions or the borders respected the limits, were conserved by regional sentries. Thus, a guardhouse was also an indication of the extremity of autonomous authority over a specific realm. Incredibly since Bangkok discerned no perimeter, the stance of a guardhouse and the extent the patrol post distinguished the breadth of the domain under the hegemony of Bangkok. On the other hand, in contemporary periods, the extent of sovereign territory marked by a boundary line delimits the space of a border guard's sovereignty. Each quantity of this barrier was stipulated unassisted by the regional council. It may or may not reach another piece of a perimeter. Hence, the perimeter of a commonwealth was sporadic, and, consequently, the kingdom was not officially bound (Thongchai 1994: 76).

2.1. The Western Notion on the Boundary

By referring to the term as suggested by Solomon, the Western notion of the boundary will be reported in this small section. The Western state is defined in territorial terms and focused on the sovereignty in its national territory. In Western territorial outlooks, borderlines are well-defined by maps and treaties. During the colonization in Southeast Asia, Europeans were confronted with political instability. Thus, they responded by defining borders within colonizers agreeing on boundaries that became more urgent for the more intense competition in colonization. According to Solomon, the colonial boundary system was designed to stabilize spheres of influence and provided border security assurance against invasion or large-scale territorial encroachment (Solomon 1969: v).

The Western boundary concept, incorporated into Southeast Asia, is a common assumption of a modern state. Referring to previous scholarship on the characteristic of boundary, Solomon has summarized the modern western boundary concept as follows. A modern nation-state necessitates and is desirable to achieve the establishment of boundaries, which can be represent by lines on maps. In addition, they should consider the issues of authority and organization (Solomon 1969: 1). Moreover, a state should have territory, and there can exist one entire sovereign state only. In other words, a state is defined as a territory, and state sovereignty

resides within the totality of the national territory (Solomon 1969: 2). The colonial boundary system was designed to stabilize spheres of influence without significant commitments of resources (Solomon 1969: v).

In the past, streams, rivers, and mountain ranges were selected as natural boundaries, often in disregard of the cultural unity of the river valley and upland civilizations (Solomon 1969: v-vi). In traditional Southeast Asia, order and surveillance were not easily maintained in remote areas. Sovereignty was not defined in a strict territorial sense. Marginal territorial concessions were a legitimate instrument of national policy and were not viewed as fatal to the kingdom. A shifting frontier was a means of gauging and aligning the international equilibrium based on transitory power relationships (Solomon 1969: vi).

Sovereignty was as crucial to Southeast Asian principalities as it was the oldest nations of Europe, but the content was different: in Southeast Asia, the preservation of sovereignty was less dependent upon the maintenance of absolute territorial integrity (Solomon 1969: vi). A new border defined by the western perception appeared in central Myanmar after the Second Anglo-Myanmar War (1852-1853). Immediately after the war, administrative interactions between Upper and Lower Myanmar had initiated, and legal offices such as custom houses, immigration offices and mixed-courts were established. From the Western territorial outlook, the British authority defined the sovereignty of Lower Myanmar. The attempt led to the categorization of two different citizens in Upper and Lower Myanmar.

As mentioned in the previous small section, the rationalistic European view of modern international relations was different from the indigenous tributary relationship. Studying the case of Thailand, Thongchai said that the exclusive sovereignty of the supreme king over the lesser kings meant to expand the realm of the modern nation-state Siam under the regime of the new geographical concept over the indigenous ambiguous space. The confrontation occurred among these Siam and European powers and between different realms of geographical knowledge (Thongchai 1994: 104, 107).

2.2. Colonial Boundary System

The colonial boundary system is a system practiced by Western colonial powers in Mainland Southeast Asia. Solomon has pointed out the system in his book (1969), studying the case of Vietnam. When the European powers ventured into Southeast Asia, the authorities were confronted with highly dynamic political instability, delimited or demarcated boundaries. At that time, there were no legal and cartographic instruments of border definition. When they were embroiled in disputes in Southeast Asia, they realized the absence of the boundary system there.

Solomon has explained the aims of the European powers in Southeast Asia that the original purpose was to develop trade, and the acquisition was of only secondary interest. They changed their ambition because it was more challenging to control than to conquer new territory (Solomon 1969: 5).

According to Solomon, the interest in power became a steadily growing one stimulated by economic and security reasons (Solomon 1969: 5). The financial incentive for expansion in the quest for stable and profitable resources was matched by a territorial drive spurred by competition among the colonizers. The competing colonizers rushed toward each other's frontiers in their efforts to secure their possessions and deny other prizes to their traditional rivals, and the competition tended to be self-limiting (Solomon 1969: 6).

The imperial powers wished to avoid disastrous armed conflict with each other and had enough experience with misunderstandings and minor skirmishes to appreciate the real danger of imperial confrontation. Restraint was an essential element of the colonial boundary system (Solomon 1969: 7). Solomon concludes the colonial boundary system that political-economic factors led the colonial powers to enlarge their dominions and then strive for a definition and codification of the limits of their sovereignty. Many of the colonial boundaries bore a superficial resemblance to the broad outlines of earlier indigenous states (Solomon 1969: 8).

While Westerners were interested in borderlines, not Southeast Asian authorities; it is possible to see an example in Thongchai's

seminal work entitled *Siam Mapped*. The territorial delimitation of Siam was much more complicated because a clear boundary did not exist, but a frontier town was regarded as standard to more than one kingdom (Thongchai 1994: 81). According to Thongchai, to designate a boundary was not an exciting job for the king of Chiang Mai; if the British wanted to do it, they could have done it themselves with the help of local people who earned their living by collecting honey or hunting elephants (Thongchai 1994: 75).

The *khetdaen* (เขตแดน) of each town was determined primarily by the extent of the surrounding area it could protect. A town may or may not have a common border connecting it to another town, let alone a line dividing the realms of two towns or countries. As a conglomeration of towns, a kingdom was composed of political-territorial patches with much blank space in between (Thongchai 1994: 75). The *khetdaen* of an empire expanded to the edge/end of these outlying villages and the regions over which their sovereignty could be practiced. Farther than these thresholds, many woodlands and mountains comprise a path between the two realms (Thongchai 1994: 75). It was a boundary without a borderline. Or one could say that it was a wide section with a considerably straight breadth. It was not the entire perimeter, which was considered the region under one's autonomy and supervision (Thongchai 1994: 75).

In *Siam Mapped*, Thongchai analyzes the line as the barrier by trees or poles or stone markings between Burma and Siam as noted in many ancient records. Two well-known selections are the Three Pagoda Pass and the *Singkhon* Pass, which are also the *khetdaen* of this kind. The three pagodas were not, in fact, pagodas but enormous heaps of rocks purposely established. They were marking the limit (Thongchai 1994: 76). A bull track ritually depicted a boundary between Chiang Mai and a Kayah state at the crest of a ridge (Thongchai 1994: 76).

Accordingly, only the inhabited areas or the corridors, regarded as limits, were maintained by local wardens. Therefore, a guardhouse was also a reminder of the extremity of supreme authority over a specific sphere. Any part of this threshold was designated independently by the regional leadership. It might or

might not contact another area or perimeter. Thus the “boundaries” of dominion were unsteady and, therefore, the territory was non-bound (Thongchai 1994: 76).

The colonial boundary system, which represented the boundary, replaced the border area of the traditional mainland Southeast Asia boundary. Thongchai has pointed out that the British incorporated a concept of boundary; into Thai, whose qualification was different from that of *khetdaen*. In this way, the conception of *khetdaen* held by Siam had been replaced by the concept of boundary imposed itself as an alternative of signification (Thongchai 1994: 79).

III. Incorporation of Western Boundary into Myanmar

The boundary drawn in Central Myanmar was not the first boundary defined by the Western perception for Myanmar. With the defeat of the Myanmar king's army in the First Anglo-Myanmar War (1824-1826), Assam, Manipur, Cachar and Jaintia were put under total British control, and Arakan (Rakhine) and Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) were occupied (Htin Aung 1967: 214-215).

The Second Anglo-Myanmar War started on 5 April and ended on 20 December 1852. In December 1851, the Myanmar king's governor of Rangoon fined the captains and two crews 1,000 rupees for reported customs violations. Dissatisfied of the judgment, the Indian Governor-General Lord Dalhousie dispatched two vessels of the Royal Navy with an ultimatum that the Myanmar government rescind the fine and the governor should be immediately removed. Due to King Pagan and his minister being fully aware of the consequences of a new war, the Myanmar government accepted the terms. The British naval commander, Commodore Lambert, went ahead and blocked the coastline on 6 January 1852 (Cobden 1853: 21-22). On 18 February 1852, Dalhousie sent a new ultimatum, demanding four items, including one million rupees, to cover the costs of preparing for war (Banerjee 1947: 13). Without waiting for a reply from Myanmar, joint British naval and ground forces seized Yangon on 5 April, Patheingyi on 14 April and Mottama on 19 May

(Banerjee 1947: 14). Bago was taken in November despite spirited resistance (Thein 1967: 151). In December, Rangoon (Yangon), Pegu (Bago) and Prome (Pyi) were declared as newly occupied territory, and it became a new province of British Burma, a.k.a Lower Myanmar. On 18 February 1853, there was a rebellion in the Myanmar king's palace, and the war came to an end. Because a half-brother of King Bagan, King Mindon, led a peace party, enthroned, the Myanmar forces retreated to Upper Myanmar (Thant Myint-U 2004: 23).

Though the new king, King Mindon (1853-1878), did not ratify or acknowledge any treaty with the British regarding the annexation of Lower Myanmar after 1852, the boundary between the Lower and Upper Myanmar had been demarcated. The borderline was marked by stone pillars throughout the border drawn by the British one-sidedly. The initiation of the modern administrative apparatus in Myanmar also helped categorize different citizenship within the same ethnicity.

Along with introducing the new boundary, responding to the British administrative apparatus, new administrative offices had been established throughout the Irrawaddy River in Upper Myanmar. The official ports such as Dagonmaw Port, Minhla Port and Shwemyodaw Port also came into existence (*CHE* 2001: 517). Other new offices that emerged in Upper Myanmar were the custom-house. The names of the custom-houses were Minde-Dewun Custom House, Bamaw Custom House, Yadanabon Custom House, Minhla Kindaw Custom House and Myingyan Custom House (*CHE* 2001: 109, 131, 200, 206, 207, 234, 240, 245).

In traditional Myanmar, a frontier was expected, and it was regarded as a zone of less contact and hence of less definition. After the Second Anglo-Myanmar War, a boundary that divided Upper and Lower Myanmar had been drawn, and Lower Myanmar included all of the territory of British colonial Myanmar, composed of Bago, Pyi, Rakhine and Taninthayi. Drawing a boundary was an attempt to define the British colonial Myanmar territory and state sovereignty residents within the territory. This attempt differentiated indigenous people into two categories: the citizen of the British

colonial Myanmar who lived in Lower Myanmar; and Myanmar's king's subject who lived in Upper Myanmar. In other words, the inhabitants in Lower Myanmar were categorized as British colonial citizens, excluding the Myanmar who share the same ethnicity with them and who lived in Upper Myanmar. As Leach has explained that a boundary violently divides ethnic peoples into different nations, new citizens appear in both countries (1960: 49-51).

The emergence of the new administrative institutions paid the way for introducing new terms of the new institutions as follows. This section will attempt to determine the initiation of new administrative apparatus on the categorization of the British colonial citizens, referring to new terms used after the boundary had been drawn.

3.1. New Boundary and New Territorial Concept in Myanmar

The terms for a new territorial administration encountered in the records happen to be new terms created and modified. Immediately after the occupation of the areas in Lower Myanmar where the British authority had one-sidedly drawn a boundary that defined British colonial Myanmar. The British administration had erected stone pillars throughout the border without codifying the treaties with the Myanmar king.

After the boundary had been drawn between Upper and Lower Myanmar, new administrative terms became official languages; the term *kyauktaing* and related terms. It is possible to trace two names of some stone pillars established in the borderline in the CHR as follows. They were *Thanbaya-gaing Kyauntaing* (*Thanbaya-gaing* stone pillar) and *Lu-kyauk Kyauktaing* (*Luu-kyauk* stone pillar) (CHE 2001: 562). Initially, the term *kyauktaing* was a stone pillar. The term was revived and applied to a stone pillar, and it was used by the Myanmar officials and retained its use in the CHR. In many cases, *kyauktaing* had been used throughout the CHR. *Kyauktaing*, it means stone pillar in literature. Thus, the word for setting up stone pillars to mark boundary had been represented as *kyauktaing sitehmat* in the record (CHE 2001: 64).

It did not mean that marking a stone in the border area by the

British authority was not the first one. There were two places that limited and marked the passages between Thailand and Myanmar. The two well-known passages were the Three Pagoda Pass and the *Singkhon* Pass. Explaining the meaning of a boundary in Thai, Thongchai informed us of the marks between Thailand (Siam) and Myanmar (Burma). According to him, the three pagodas were not, in fact, pagodas but massive stone pillars that had intentionally been constructed to mark the passage in the border area between Myanmar and Thailand. In addition, these pillars maintained the limit of the two kingdoms. The *Singkhon* Pass was a boundary between Chiang Mai and a Kayah state, ritually marked by a bull track at the top of a hill (Thongchai 1994: 76).

As mentioned above, the *kyauktaing* is a limit for Myanmar in the indigenous territorial conception, but it marked the boundary between Upper and Lower Myanmar for the British. The colonial boundary concept was unfamiliar to the Myanmar king's officials, and to stipulate such conditions might have seemed to them to be interpreted as what they had seen. In another ward, the notion on the boundary associated with the laws and customs associated had paid the invention of new terms combining the term *kyauktaing*. Another term that had often come up in the record is *Kyauktaing-myau-bak*. The term *Kyauktaing-myau-bak* had also been used to express the areas located in the northern region of the boundary (CHE 2001: 56, 57, 58, 65, 69, 71, 81, 99, 106, 133, 134, 140, 141, 146, 161, 167, 168, 176, 184).

Regarding the border area, the officials used the term *kyauktinag*, *necha* and *nesat* interchangeably (CHE 2001: 66, 93). Generally, the terms *necha* and *nesat* are frontier areas. In this sense, they had been used as a boundary. The term *Hnit-nainggan-ne-asat* or *Hnit-nainggan-asat* (frontier area between two countries) (CHE 2001: 184), meaning a border between two countries, has also been used with an alternative. Myanmar officials seem to be muddled in understanding the newly introduced territorial concept, and they synonymously used the terms mentioned in this paragraph, with a boundary in the record.

In short, the British fixed a boundary in central Myanmar after

the Second Anglo-Myanmar War. The term *kyauktaing* is denoted in traditional Myanmar as a mark that limited the area which confronted two countries: Upper Myanmar Kingdom and British colonial Myanmar (Lower Myanmar). In this way, the realms of geographical knowledge seem to have changed at this time.

3.2. *Nainggan* or State in Colonial Boundary System

Myanmar officials revived the terms such as *nainggan* or *nainggandaw* to mean the Myanmar kingdom in Upper Myanmar. Initially, the term *nainggan*, which has been used since the Bagan period, had denoted the kingdom of Myanmar. *Nainggan* is a compound word of *naing* and *gan*. According to Than Tun, the most famous historian in pre-modern Myanmar history, the term *naing* had referred to an area occupied by the military power; and *gan* was an area of a tiny state which became a tributary taking protection (2005: 7). *Nainggandaw*, in modern Myanmar literary, means the state in the contemporary political definition; the term *Myanma nainggan* is today a popular political term in Myanmar. In the CHR, the term *nainggan* has often been recorded (CHE 2001: 49, 58, 94, 102, 120, 156, 157, 158, 159, 187, 308). The term *nainggandaw* was first found in the *Dhamayazaka* Stone Inscription of the Bagan Period (Nyein Maung 1972: 65-69).

Continuously, the terms prefixed to *naingan* can be seen in the same record. In this context, the term *naingandaw* may refer to the space of Upper Myanmar (CHR 2001: 299). Because the term *naingandaw-ne-ludo* here relates to the people who lived in the state (CHR 2001: 70, 81), and the term *nainggandaw-bet-ne* means the areas in the state (CHR 2001: 81). It, thus, can be said that the term *nainggan*, which has been used to refer to the kingdom since the Pagan period, has been used with the meaning which denotes not only the territory but human and territory, too. Though the term's meaning is ambiguous on the spatial concept, it might be included in a modern sense to some extent.

In the text, the other term, the territory of Myanmar is *Myanma-ne* (CHR 2001: 56, 144, 115, 117, 120, 158, 170, 179) and *Myanmar Nainggandaw-atwin* (CHR 2001: 158). While the term

Myanma-ne means the territory of the Myanmar kingdom in Upper Myanmar, the term Myanmar *nainggandaw-atwin* means a particular place in the territory of the Myanmar kingdom. In this context, the meaning of the terms might have been gradually modified by a modern territorial outlook, defined by the western perception.

The Myanmar officials had adopted *Myanmar-min-paing-ne* and *ingalte-min-paing-ne* to refer to areas on both sides. These two terms have contained the territorial concept of the sovereignty of the rulers. The term *Myanmar-min-paing-ne* is the way it has been spelled in the Myanmar realm (CHR 2001: 150). As expressed in the word itself, the term's meaning has been associated with the territorial concept of the sovereignty of the Myanmar king. As will be discussed later, the territorial concept of sovereignty took a crucial role in categorizing the Myanmar king's subject. With its intrinsic meaning, *ingalte-min-paing-ne* is equivalent of a British territory. The term referred to Lower Myanmar, which had been established as British colonial Myanmar at the time. It, however, is clear that the word was added to an exceptional concept of sovereignty in this context.

The other term used in the sense of sovereignty with the Lower Myanmar was *ingalate-paing* (CHR 2001: 176). The term indicates the territory which the British colonial government had ruled. Continuously, the terms *ingalate-pine-myitsin* (CHR 2001: 169) and *ingalate-ne-nay* (CHR 2001: 171) have also been used to refer to the territory under the sovereignty of the British government. The former means the river valley ruled by the British government, and the latter indicate a particular man or woman directly, and the British colonial citizen indirectly. The term above mentioned was referring to the territory of the British, but there is also a term called *ingalate-nesat* (CHR 2001: 65). The term reflects the meaning of the areas on the border, which are located in the side of Lower Myanmar that had been ruled by the British.

The term *ingalate-ne* has also been used synonymously with Lower Myanmar (CHR 2001: 95, 97, 117, 150, 166, 170). In contrast to the term *ingalte-min-paing-ne*, the term *ingalate-ne* here simply

indicates the British territory (*CHR* 2001: 116, 150, 153, 154). On the other hand, there is a term that refers Lower Myanmar. It is *auk-myo-kyeywa*, which is located in the towns and cities in Lower Myanmar (*CHR* 2001: 55, 63, 307). This term has still been used in the local dialect of the uplands.

To sum up, the terms used to refer to the territories of the Myanmar kingdom and British colonial Myanmar had been revived and modified. They might have seemed to be influenced by the new territorial outlook, which had been added eventually. The introduction of new administrative terms would help to understand the categorizing of the British colonial citizen and the Myanmar king's subject in the following small section.

IV. Making Myanmar King's Subject and the British Colonial Citizen

Since the introduction of new administrative terms, which are based on the colonial boundary system, the expression of Myanmar ethnic had been divided into two categories: the British colonial citizen and Myanmar king's subject. The differentiation of the British citizens and Myanmar king's subject can be seen in cases recorded in the *CHR*, such as the robberies in border areas, reported illegal smuggling of cows, buffaloes and horses, and in cases that had been judged in joint-courts. Studying these cases recorded in the *CHR*, it is possible to see the categorization of two citizens.

Regarding the categorization of the British colonial citizens, there are six terms: *kyauktaing-taung-bak-ne-lumya*, *ingalate-min-kyun*, *ingalate-min-kyun* (repetitive), *kuauk-taing-taung-bak-ka-lu*, *ingalate-kyun-myo* and *Myanma-ne-kula-thu*. The Myanmar king's officials use *kyauktaing-taung-bak-ne-lumya* to mean the British colonial citizens. The term directly refers to the people who lived in the boundary's southern territory, indirectly referring to the people in Lower Myanmar or British colonial Burma (Myanmar) (*CHR* 2001: 106). Another term that denotes the British colonial citizens is *inglate-min-kyun*. The term *kyun* generally means a slave; however, in this context, it means a subject. The term directly expresses the

British colonial citizen in the Myanmar context (*CHR* 2001: 80, 98, 141, 153). The other word that refers to the British colonial citizens is *ingalate- kyundaw-myo* (*CHR* 2001: 157, 173, 182, 193, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 213, 216, 218, 220, 225, 226, 234, 235, 237, 259, 260, 261, 269, 304, 305, 315, 336, 337, 338, 343).

And another term is *ingalate-kyun* (*CHR* 2001: 199, 427, 437, 486). The term, *ingalate-kyun*, which referred to the British colonial citizen, can be seen as violating a criminal law that prohibited the export of animals used in farms. The export of animals such as cows, buffalos and horses, was a crime in the Myanmar kingdom (*CHR* 2001: 292). In the *CHR*, the letters dispatched between the British and Myanmar officers on exporting animals have also been printed on some pages. In his letter to the British officer who resided in Mandalay dated 11 April 1874, the Kinwun Mingyi, the chief minister of the Myanmar king's court, had explained the Myanmar law, which prohibited the export of the animals above mentioned (*CHR* 2001: 257). The term *ingalate-kyun* has been used in robbery (*CHE* 2001: 193), criminal cases (*CHR* 2001: 215, 266, 533), and civil lawsuit cases to refer the British colonial citizens (*CHR* 2001: 227, 269, 335, 337, 338, 505).

Ingalate-Kyun-myo, meaning the British's repetitive, can be seen in a criminal case charged for the Myanmar government's timber abuse (*CHR* 2001: 327). Continuously, the term *ingalate-Kyun-daw-ma* (the British subject) has also been recorded in civil lawsuit cases (*CHR* 2001: 227, 260). In exporting animals, the term *ingalate-kyun* (*CHR* 2001: 256-257) and the terms such as *inglate-kyun-daw-myo* (*CHE* 2001: 292, 450, 451, 549, 584, 598) and *kyauk-taing-taung-bak-ne nwa-we-thu*, which means the man who came to buy a cow from south of the boundary, have been referred to (*CHR* 2001: 364). The Myanmar king's officials, in addition, contained the term *kuauk-taing-taung-bak-ka-lu* to mean a British colonial. *Kuauk-taing-Taung-bak-ka-lu* can be interpreted as a man who came from the southern part of the boundary (*CHR* 2001: 56). Similarly, the term *Myanma-ne-kula- thu* was also used to refer to British colonial citizens (*CHR* 2001: 56).

To refer to the Myanmar king's subject, the Myanmar king's

officials have used expressions such as *Myanmar-min-Kyun*, *Myanmar-kyundaw-myo*, *Myanmar-Kyun*, *Myanmar-min-Kyun*, *Nainggan-bak-ka-lu*, *Myanma-ne-ga-lu*, and *Myanmar-Kyun-daw-myo*.

The term *Myanmar-min-kyun* (CHR 2001: 153) has been used with the intrinsic meaning of the term *ingalate-min-kyun*. In the same context, Myanmar officials recorded the terms *Myanmar-kyundaw-myo* (CHR 2001: 261, 392, 400, 444) and *Myanmar-Kyun* (CHR 2001: 198) to refer to the Myanmar king's subject. These terms should be appropriately interpreted as the Myanmar king's subject. However, the term *Myanmar-min-Kyun* has added a sense of citizenship, which indicates the preposition of the Myanmar King's subject. On the other hand, *Myanmar-Kyun-daw-myo*, meaning Myanmar king's subject, has been used in civil lawsuit cases (CHR 2001: 331, 338, 341, 343, 347, 505) and criminal cases (CHR 2001: 519, 548). Though *Myanmar-Kyun* and *Myanmar-Kyun-daw-myo* directly mean a slave of Myanmar, there is not much distinction in using the terms mentioned above.

The other term which refers to the Myanmar king's subject is *nainggan-bak-ka-lu* (CHR 2001: 81). It expresses the meaning of a man from Myanmar territory. In addition to these terms, there is one more term, which is *Myanma-ne-ga-lu* (CHR 2001: 90), which means a man who came from the Myanmar territory. This term has been used synonymously with *nainggan-bak-ka-lu*. All of these terms were mainly used to refer to the Myanmar king's subject.

Along with the bureaucratic reformation in Lower Myanmar, there had been a case that Myanmar had also been given a chance to choose its citizenship repeatedly. In the case of Myanmar, it is vividly informed as follows. A Myanmar had generally been born in Myanmar and had been regarded as a Myanmar king's subject, based on their birthplace (CHR 2001: 423, 533, 549, 562). One, however, could change his citizenship, moving out of the motherland. Again, he had gotten a chance to apply for his citizenship where he wanted to be. If a Myanmar king's subject who had moved out to Pyay, Lower Myanmar, in 1867; he would have obtained his citizenship in Upper Myanmar by requesting it to the authorities (CHR 2001: 339).

Thongchai has explained the indigenous Southeast Asian tradition on an individual subject and his king in his book.

In indigenous Southeast Asian tradition, a subject was bound first and foremost to his lord rather than a state. People who lived in one area might not necessarily belong to the ruler of that area, although they might still have to pay tax or rent to the lord of that land. As the surveyor James McCarthy noted with puzzlement, it was a peculiar custom in which the power over individuals and land was separated. As a modern western man, he did not realize that this custom was quite common in the region and throughout Asia (Thongchai 1994: 164).

In Myanmar, this kind of relationship changed immediately after incorporating Lower Myanmar into the British Empire. The British authority attempted to define the territory of Lower Myanmar and the sovereignty residents within British colonial Burma (Myanmar). This attempt paid the way for cancelling the binary relationship between an individual and his king in British colonial Myanmar. In this way, the British colonial authority categorized the British colonial citizens, excluding the Myanmar king's subjects in Upper Myanmar.

4.1. Including, Excluding and Making British Colonial Citizens

In British colonial Myanmar, people were categorized into two citizenships as the Myanmar king's subject and the British colonial citizen. Regarding the method of categorization, the term, *sayin-cha* was applied (CHR 2001: 269). By *sayin-cha* means a man listed as a British colonial citizen or a Myanmar king's subject. As reflected on its meaning, the term proves that both citizens had already been listed on both sides.

In this section, the relation of the categorization of the Myanmar king's subject and the registration of Asians as British colonial citizens will be explored. The British authority in Lower Myanmar tried an attempt to get the registration of the Asians, who migrated to Myanmar as British colonial citizens. This attempt included the Asians in the category of British colonial citizens. In addition, the British authority in Lower Myanmar showed their concern for the Europeans who visited Upper Myanmar. Their

endeavor had let them take the role as representatives of the European. In doing so, the Europeans had been placed on the other sides of the Myanmar category. In this way, the others became the Myanmar king's subject. The term *ingalate-kyun-daw-myo sayin-cha-lu* here means the man who had been listed as a British colonial citizen (CHR 2001: 270).

4.2. Including Asians into the Category of the British Colonial Citizen

In Yadanabon Period, it is well known that some Asians, Indians and Chinese migrated and settled down in both Myanmar territories: Upper and Lower Myanmar. Some of the Asians performed as complainants or defendants in the cases of criminal and civil lawsuits. To judge the circumstances that occurred between two citizens, the mixed court had been initiated. The Mixed Court Law had been enacted in 1869, and it had been recorded in the *parabike* no. 116 by the agreement of the officials in both countries, in a letter dated 21 July 1869 (CHR 2001: 129). The British Deputy Commissioner asked for one head and six assistants to be appointed in the mixed court for the British officer in his letter to Upper Myanmar dated 28 July 1869 (CHR 2001: 130). According to the letter from the Pakhan Mingyi to the British Deputy Commissioner dated 10 August 1869, the cases in the mixed court had been judged by a British officer and the Kala Wun Myintinsa Maha Thiriguna Kyawthu (CHR 2001: 130). According to the letter dated 11 August 1870, the first judge assigned in the mixed court from the Myanmar side was Ala Zeyathein, in a city near present-day Nay Pyi Taw. When he moved out, the Kala Wun was appointed in his place (CHR 2001: 139); then he was replaced by Phan Chet Wun. Finally, a new judge, who had not been mentioned his name in his record, was assigned (CHR 2001: 137).

The different categorizations had been made between indigenous Myanmar and the Asians who migrated to Myanmar. To clarify the various categories of Asians, such as the British colonial citizens and Myanmar king's subject, the term refers to the categories discussed in the latter part of this section.

According to the record of the CHR, on 5 Aril 1869, the British

representative had issued an announcement in a board in Zegyo Market, locates in the center of Mandalay, stating that one, regardless of ethnicity, who wanted to claim British colonial citizenship, should come and register in the mixed court (*CHE* 2001: 109).

Firstly, the category of the British colonial citizen of Indian decent will be introduced. The term *sayin-cha*---meaning one who had been listed as a British colonial citizen or as a Myanmar king's subject---was often found in the case of Asians in the record (*CHR* 2001: 304, 350). The term *sayin-cha* can be found in Sul Man, an Indian who served in the Myanmar king's royal artillery and claimed that he was a British colonial citizen himself. The case of Sul Man was that he refused it, saying that he was a British citizen when he had been assigned to military service, though he was working as a soldier getting 80 rupees from his officer, U Yang Naing, was under contract (*CHR* 2001: 373). The term *ingalate-Kyun* referred to the Indians can be seen in civil lawsuit cases and criminal cases (*CHR* 2001: 182); the term *ingalate-kyun-daw-myo* (*CHR* 2001: 199) was in civil lawsuit cases (*CHR* 2001: 199, 208, 216, 218, 260, 261, 261, 266, 336, 337, 391, 505) and criminal cases (*CHR* 2001: 204, 205, 208, 213, 234, 243, 350, 351, 378, 519).

The same term has also been referred to with the Chinese. The cases in which the same term for the ethnic Chinese were disagreements of tax collection (*CHE* 2001: 205, 304, 305), reported cases of violation of the tax law (*CHE* 2001: 220, 237), and civil lawsuit cases (*CHE* 2001: 497). In addition to the Asians, some Europeans were also addressed as *ingalate-kyun* in a civil lawsuit case (*CHE* 2001: 182, 523, 534). On the other hand, the opposite of the term *ingalate-kyun-daw-myo*, *Myanmar-kyun-daw-myo* can be found in the civil lawsuit case of Caliba, an Indian (*CHE* 2001: 189, 199).

4.3. Excluding Europeans

To know the preposition of the European, the terms referred to respective ethnicities will be discussed in this small section. The ethnicity of the Europeans had been clearly defined in the CHR, and

the essence of the term *Ingalate-kyun* was different from the terms *Ingalate* and *acha-lumyo* (other European) (CHE 2001: 80). In the record, the British have been named *Ingalate-lu-myo* (CHE 2001: 80,89,90, 230, 236,324, 354, 357) while the British officers were addressed as *Ingalate-ayashi* (CHE 2001: 91, 93, 101, 102, 320, 326, 355, 365). On the one hand, the term *Ingalate-than*, which refers to the British diplomat going on a trip to China in 1874 (CHE 2001: 276-283), has been found.

On the other hand, the Europeans were titled *thosaung* (European) (CHE 2001: 440). As a limitation for foreigners, the Myanmar authority enacted a law for the Europeans and foreign citizenships and a regulation for the British officer who would travel around Upper Myanmar (CHE 2001: 80).

M. Yegar in his book, *Muslim of Burma, A Study of a Minority Group*, Wiesbaden, 1972, states *Kala* roughly means overseas person-somebody from South Asia, West Asia and Europe and Beyond. The root of this name is believed to be *ku la* meaning either “to cross over (the Bay of Bengal)” (1972: 29, 30, 32, 36-37, 111). In this record, *kala* (Than Tun 1990: 23) has special meaning for people who migrated from the Indian continent, and *kala-phyu* is for the Europeans. The term *kala-phyu* was found on page no. 129. *Kala-lumyo* is on page no. 213, 288 and 472 of the CHR. The other terms which referred to Indians are *Hindu-lumyo* (CHE 2001: 186) and *India-tai-tha Pathi* (CHE 2001: 294).

Regarding Westerners in Upper Myanmar, the British authorities performed different actions. The British administration showed their concern on the affairs of Westerners who had been in Upper Myanmar. In doing so, they tried to place the European position on the other side of the Myanmar king's subject. The authority showed their concern in the affairs of Westerners, asking permission of the traveler in Upper Myanmar. The first record that the British authority asked for from the Myanmar authority was administrative, which allowed two American mission members to travel in the Shan State in December 1876 (CHE 2001: 102). In 1868, the British officer in Mandalay had asked for a permit granted to the American Mission led by Rev. Cushion, which would go to the Shan

State accompanied by ten youths and bring five guns and five swords (*CHE* 2001: 117, 131, 138). In 1871, the British authority asked for permission for the American Mission to the Shan State again (*CHE* 2001: 162).

As has been seen in this section, the attempts of the British authority to let the Asians be British colonial citizens placed the Europeans on the other side of the Myanmar king's subject. In this way, the remained people formed the Myanmar king's subject in Upper Myanmar.

4.4. The Alternative Way: Migration

Another way that increased the scope of the British colonial citizen was the migration of the Myanmar king's subjects to the south in the late Konbaung Period. Through King Thibaw (1878-1885), Myanmar officials charged steep taxes, especially *Sassamedha-kun*, to the subjects because of increasing tax on canals, land and products. Apart from heavy taxes by the Myanmar king, there might have been other factors such as drought and famine (Adas 1974: 45-46). These facts became essential push factors for the domestic migration in Upper Myanmar, as reflected in a survey. For example, the farmers from Kyaukse, a main agricultural area of Upper Myanmar, migrated to Lower Myanmar (Maung Maung Tin 1965: 128-129).

After the Second Anglo-Myanmar War, some Myanmar kings' subjects moved in hordes to Lower Burma. Most of the immigrants were farmers, merchants and slaves (Kyan 1969: 3), and it can be regarded that the migration was ascribed to the differences in the socio-economic conditions between Lower and Upper Myanmar.

The stability and the economic development of Lower Myanmar triggered the migration of the Myanmar king's subjects looking for a better life. After the Second Anglo-Myanmar War, agriculture was developed in British colonial Burma (Myanmar), especially in the plain areas, owing to the economic policy of the British colonial government and the growing need for workers on farms in this part. The tenants from Upper Myanmar and India were permitted to come to Lower Myanmar in the harvesting season for

labor requirements (Kyan 1978: 131). While some of them went back to their native lands, others settled down in Lower Myanmar. According to historical records, the number of immigrants from Upper Myanmar amounted from 311,000 in 1881 to 411,000 in 1885 (Adas 1974: 44).

The British authority tried to persuade the immigrants on the pretext of economic development of Lower Myanmar. The colonial government probably aimed then to generate the landowner class rather than the farm-hands class. For this purpose, the British government legitimized the 1876 Land Owning Act, and according to this act, if a farmer worked on the same farm for 12 years continuously, he would be entitled to own the farm (Ohno Toru 1975: 325; *The Burma Code* 1910).

In addition to the economic condition, the social state of Lower Myanmar caused the migration of the Myanmar king's subject to the south. Compared to the other feudal societies, though it was not severe and absolute feudalism was the administrative system in the Myanmar kingdom. While the farm slave system was practiced in Upper Myanmar, the British government enacted the Slavery Abolition Act in 1833 (Hayward 1985: v), and the British government legitimized the abolition of the farm slave system in all its colonies in 1843, including Lower Myanmar (*Achepya* 1977: 372).

The dramatic demographic changes in Upper Myanmar were happening in the time of King Thibaw. A British diplomatic who visited Mandalay recorded the demography of Upper Myanmar in his records. In 1855, three years after the Second Anglo-Myanmar War, Henry Yule arrived at Amarapura, an old capital near Mandalay, and recorded the population of Upper Myanmar. According to Yule's record, the population was no more than 3,600,000, among whom about 1,200,000 people were in the capital (Yule 1968: 289). Demographic changes can be seen in some documents as well. Although King Badon (1782-1819), the most flourishing era of the Konbaung Period, 40,000 families lived in Amarapura, 20,000 families were listed when the royal capital moved from Amarapura to Mandalay in 1855 (Maung Maung Tin 1965:

127). Given the population of Upper Myanmar during the King Mindon reign after the Second Anglo-Myanmar War, it came to be known that 400,000 families lived in Upper Myanmar except for the Shan plateau, but only 200,000 remained at the time of King Thibaw (Maung Maung Tin 1965: 127).

To sum up, the administrative and socio-economic condition in Lower Myanmar, set up by the British authority, persuaded the migrants from Upper Myanmar who had been seeking a better life. In this way, giving an alternative way to the migrants from Upper Myanmar led to citizenship in British colonial Myanmar.

V. Conclusion

The purpose of this article is to deepen the discourse of the colonial boundary system categorizing Myanmar people into two sections as *Anytha* and *Auktha*. This article deals with the study of the Catalogue of the Hluttaw Records, the primary document that recorded the Supreme Court's official letters during the Yadanabon Period (1853-1885), paying attention to the influence of Western notions of boundary on the creation of the Myanmar king's subject. In studying the creation of the Myanmar king's subject, the socio-linguistic approach was adopted. Before the Second Anglo-Myanmar War, no boundary defined by the western perception was traceable in the Myanmar realm.

The boundary that had been viewed from the western perception had been incorporated into Myanmar after the Second Anglo-Myanmar War. Regarding the western boundary concept, Solomon has noted that the concepts were essentially legalistic, and the colonial boundary system was designed to stabilize spheres of influence without a significant commitment of resources, as mentioned above. After the Second Anglo-Myanmar War, the British authority had drawn a borderline between Upper and Lower Myanmar. Defining the sovereignty residents in Lower Myanmar, the British authority categorized Myanmar in Lower Myanmar as the British colonial citizen, differentiating them from Myanmar in Upper Myanmar. In Upper Myanmar, giving a chance to the Asians, such

as Chinese and Indians who migrated to Myanmar, to apply for their citizenship as British citizens, the British authority made them British colonial citizens. In addition, the British authority had taken the role of representation of the Europeans who visited Upper Myanmar, showing their concern on the respective cases with visitors. Moreover, the British administration had persuaded the tenants who had migrated at harvest time from Upper to Lower Myanmar, offering wild land for settlement in Lower Myanmar.

In the discussion so far, it has been found that the colonial boundary system created the Myanmar King's subject in Upper Myanmar, excluding them from the category of British colonial citizenship. Thirty-two years later, the Third Anglo-Myanmar War (1885) broke out, and Upper Myanmar was incorporated into British Myanmar. However, since Lower and Upper Myanmar are divided by land and the categorization of the people in Central Myanmar came into existence, the extended meaning of the terms distinguished the people in modern time.

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Research Report



Rajakudakan Wat Chotikaram: From Ruins to The Reconstruction of The Grand Stupa, Wat Chedi Luang, Chiang Mai*

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[*Abstract*]

The Grand Stupa is mentioned in historical text as 'Rajakudakan', which means a royal building with a multitiered superstructure. This Grand Stupa is the principal construction of Wat Chedi Luang, and marks the center of the Chiang Mai City Plan.

This study argues that the Grand Stupa was built in 1391 during Phaya Saen Mueang Ma's reign, possibly inspired by the construction of Ku Phaya in Bagan. Thereafter, in 1545, the Grand Stupa's superstructure collapsed after the great earthquake, resulted in the irreparable damage since then. Therefore, a survey using a 3D laser scanner is conducted to collect the most precise data on the current condition of the Grand Stupa, yielding an assumption of its reconstruction.

* This research article is a part of the research project "Rajakudakan Wat Chotikaram: From Ruins to The Reconstruction of The Grand Stupa, Wat Chedi Luang, Chiang Mai," conducted by Excellence Center for World Heritage, Creative City and Historic Urban Landscape Management in Southeast Asia.

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Other simultaneous stupas or those that show a close architectural relationship (e.g. stupas in Wat Chiang Man and Wat Lok Moli and the stupa of King Tilokaraj in Wat Chet Yot in Chiang Mai) are also employed as research frameworks for the reconstruction. As a result, the architectural research on the Grands Stupa, compared with simultaneous stupas, yields a fruitful argument that the pre-collapse superstructure form of the Grand Stupa marks the most architectural similarity to the stupa of Wat Chiang Man.

Keywords: Wat Chedi Luang, Lanna, point cloud images, heritage building information modelling, reconstruction supposition

I . Research purpose

This study has three main purposes:

- (1) to carefully survey the current condition of the Grand Stupa with a 3D laser scanner;
- (2) to conduct a comparative study from the aspects of architectural relationship and measurement of other simultaneous stupas in complete condition in Chiang Mai City for yielding the reconstruction of the pre-collapse superstructure form of the Grand Stupa;
- (3) to analyze and reconstruct the complete architectural form of the Grand Stupa and to generate its 2D computer model and the 3D model for the purpose of interpretation.

II . Brief historical information of the Grand Stupa

Chiang Mai is a province in northern Thailand. Its geography features basin plains in valleys. Historically, Chiang Mai was the capital of the Lanna Kingdom, which was an important ancient civilization and was contemporary with other outstanding kingdoms, such as Sukhothai, Ayutthaya, Ava and Rakhine. Notably, at that

time, these kingdoms were rapidly prosperous after the fall of Southeast Asian great empires (e.g. Bagan, Angkor and Dai Viet) and the emergence of traditional states, including Chiang Mai <Fig. 1>.

Chiang Mai City was established by King Mangrai in 1296 on the hugely abundant lowland flanked by Mae Ping River and Suthep Mountain, featuring a perfect location of an urban settlement <Fig. 2>. The city was given a convenient canal journey through Mae Ping River and the lowlands of the east, suited for the traditional irrigation of dikes and irrigation systems (Mueang Fai), which were typically invented by Tai-speaking people to divert river for farming. Considerably, this traditional irrigation contributed to the security of food and administration that Chiang Mai was able to centralize a huge group of traditional states of 'Lanna'.

Meanwhile, the mountainous areas in the north and the west (Thanon Thong Chai Range) provided a natural defensive feature to prevent the city from enemies and a significant headstream as a lifeline of the city.

Moreover, Suthep Mountain, as part of Thanon Thong Chai Range, significantly embodies the special status of the sacred mountain of Chiang Mai, given that the relics of Lord Buddha are enshrined in Doi Suthep Temple at the top of this mountain, as recorded in the White Elephant legend. Therefore, King Mangrai selected this location for Chiang Mai in 1296 instead of living in previous cities of Hariphunchai and Wiang Kum Kam (Ongsakul 2009: 120).

Remarkably, the physical characteristics of Chiang Mai City Plan can be separated into two sections; the square plan and the earthen rampart in the east and the south of the city <Fig. 3>. Firstly, the square plan is almost exactly square, which measures 1.6 kilometers long in each side, and entirely involves the surrounding brick walls and moats. Secondly, four main fortresses are located in

the four corners of the city walls, including the five city gates, serving as a single gate at each direction; only the south wall features two gates. Remarkably, the Chedi Luang (the Grand Stupa) marks the center of the Chiang Mai City Plan and was established in the late 13th century as the spiritual and physical center of Chiang Mai.

The Grand Stupa was historically named after an old name of Wat Chedi Luang, 'Chotikaram Vihara,' which means 'the temple with illuminated light' where the hair of the Lord Buddha was enshrined.

The inner area of the temple is the place where the Grand Stupa is located. It has been known as 'Rajakudakan,' which means 'a royal building with a multitiered superstructure.' With its elegance and height, the complete Chedi Luang is so tall that it can be seen from a four-kilometre distance.


Historically, the Grand Stupa was built in 1391 during the reign of Phaya Saen Mueang Ma (Ratanapanya Thera 2011: 185) The background of the construction of the Grand Stupa was conveyed through a myth that a merchant traded with Chiang Mai and the Irrawaddy river basin. On his trade route, he once dreamt about the late Phaya Kue Na that his soul was not at peace. Rather, his soul still resided in a huge Banyan tree on this trade route; the soul also extremely wishes his son, Phaya Saen Mueang Ma, to establish the Grand Stupa as a dedication to the soul of Phaya Kue Na. Thus, Phaya Saen Mueang Ma patronised the establishment of the Grand Stupa (The Committee for the Revision of Chiang Mai Chronicle 1995: 53).

Notably, as conveyed in the legend, assuming that the architectural form of the Grand Stupa during the reign of Phaya Saen Mueang Ma was a stupa with a multitiered superstructure and was somehow inspired and derived from the Bagan art was


reasonable.

The further construction and reform of the Grand Stupa were executed; coincidentally, the Emerald Buddha image was enshrined at the east chamber of this Grand Stupa during the reign of King Tilokaraj in the 15th century, resulting in the adjusted proportions and forms as seen at present (Ratanapanya Thera 2011: 201).


Thereafter, in 1545, the superstructure of the Grand Stupa collapsed after an earthquake during the reign of Queen Jiraprap <Fig. 4>. Remarkably, it resulted in the irreparable damage of the Grand Stupa's superstructure since then (Ongsakul 2009: 177).



<Fig. 1> A map showing the location of Chiang Mai City and ancient cities in Southeast Asia



<Fig. 2> Geography of Chiang Mai City flanked by Mae Ping River in the east and the Suthep Mountain in the west



<Fig. 3> A map showing the position of Wat Chedi Luang (Wat Chotikaram), centrally located in the square city plan of Chiang Mai



<Fig. 4> Current architectural condition of the Grand Stupa with its damaged superstructure, Wat Chedi Luang

III. Research Methodology


This study employs an architectural survey of the Grand Stupa with a 3D laser scanner, which effectively yields the most precise and correct data of the ruin with a rapid and convenient operation. The obtained data can be merged with architectural tools and knowledge to further reconstruct the original architectural form of the Grand Stupa. Finally, the heritage building information modelling (H-BIM) is used to provide a virtual information model of the Grand Stupa's reconstruction and its interpretation.

The research methodology can be divided into six steps: (1) a survey with the 3D laser scanner; (2) the data processing and connecting of the scanned data; (3) the creation of point cloud images; (4) the creation of the current architectural condition; (5)

the historical analysis and comparative study; (6) the reconstruction of the architectural form and the summary.

The 98 spots of scanning positions are set by the surrounding exterior to cover the entire three main parts of the Grand Stupa; bases, chambers and superstructures, including the interior space at the walkway tunnels underneath its bases <Fig. 5, 6>.


From the abovementioned data collection plan, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is used to record the details of the superstructure of the stupa; then, such data are generated into a format of photogrammetry. However, given that UAV is not permitted to be operated within nine kilometers from the Chang Mai International Airport, the survey with the 3D laser scanner is used instead.



<Fig. 5> Position of the 98 spots of the 3D laser scanner, placed around the Grand Stupa and its interior, Wat Chedi Luang

Apart from the architectural survey of the exterior form of the Grand Stupa, this research also conducts a survey of the walkway

tunnels inside the stupa, which can be accessed only at the side of the Naga ramp in the north direction. Yet, the entrances of the walkway tunnels are presumed to be under the ramp at all directions.



<Fig. 6> Operation of scanning points, linking the 98 spots of scanning positions to generate the point cloud images of the Grand Stupa, Wat Chedi Luang

IV. Measurement Result and Data Collection

From the survey of the walkway tunnel in a particular part under the exterior ramp, the design was clearly rendered in a form of a steep slope; and its sloping sides join at the ridge, which is exactly

related to the stair slope and designated by the exterior ramp form. In addition, the formation of the bricks of this tunnel was systematically arranged, and each riser of the stairs relatively changed its height according to the levels of the ceiling (No.1). The next part is a straight line of tunnel (No.2), intersections-ending at T (No.3). The junction to the right is a short distance thoroughly closed by compacted rubble and clay (No.4). Heading to the left (No.5) approximately 2 meters can meet another higher tunnel on the left (No.6). This left subordinate walkway (No.5) features a sharp turn (No.6), and its floor is so compacted that people cannot stand this area, as ceiling are low (1.5 meters). The end of this subordinate walkway (No.7) is fully compacted with rubble and clay <Fig. 7>.

Turning back to the mouth of the tunnel (No.6), this walkway connects to another higher tunnel, featuring identical stairs (No.7) to the stairs at the entrance (No.1), and slightly leads to a sharp turn and a dead end. Moreover, a further dug tunnel, which deviates from the circumambulatory terrace of the upper exterior stupa, is found. This additional tunnel is later dug; it also features marks of breaking bricks and laterites, possibly left after the archaeological excavation and the conservation by the Fine Arts Department to create a connecting tunnel to the circumambulatory terrace above the outside of the stupa (Phetpradap 1986: 18).

Notably, based on the survey, the formation of the bricks of the first-level tunnels is more systematically arranged than the second-level tunnels. A fruitful outcome is also evaluated from the results of the 3D laser scanner, and the tunnel survey reveals a significant engineering problem that the tunnels bear massive-dead loads, resulting in their great collapse during the earthquake due to unstable bases with interior tunnels.

Furthermore, the Grand Stupa shows a similar construction technique to Ku Phaya in Bagan, which reflects that the chief engineer got inspiration and might have learned the engineering knowledge from Bagan. Historically, this proposition is congruent


with the cultural and religious relationships between Lanna and Bagan during that time, even the powerful political center of the Irrawaddy basin, Bagan, thoroughly collapsed due to the invasion of the Mongol.

However, by studying the architectural structure of Ku Phaya in Bagan, the tunnel planning of Ku Phaya is parallel with the line of wall. Looking through its cross section, the walls are double-layered. The outside walls cover tunnels and prevent them from the weight of the superstructure of the stupa; thus, the outside walls of the tunnels are free from the dead load of the superstructure.

Moreover, the design of the lotus petal-shaped arched walkway tunnel (the pointed arch) enables its own structure to support the interior structure of the entire stupa whose cross section demonstrates the similarity to the buttress of the Gothic architecture.

Meanwhile, the tunnel planning of the Grand Stupa features a horizontal alignment toward its core, bearing massive-dead loads, rather than being parallel with the line of walls similar to the Bagan structure. Significantly, the chief engineer, who designed the Grand Stupa, got inspiration from and was impressed with ‘the phenomenology of space and construction’ and the construction technique of the pointed arch of Bagan but lacked the full engineering knowledge of its structural accuracy in the tunnel planning. Thus, the construction of walkway tunnels inside the Grand Stupa failed and was unfunctional as planned.

Therefore, the architectural form of the Grand Stupa features the typically self-developed architectural style of the Lanna Kingdom. Intriguingly, its inspiration was influenced from the Bagan stupa as proved by an effort to construct the interior walkway tunnels like the tunnel planning of Ku Phaya in Bagan.



<Fig. 7> Walkway tunnels inside the Grand Stupa, Wat Chedi Luang


V. Reconstruction of the Grand Stupa of Chiang Mai

The reconstruction of the Grand Stupa of Chiang Mai is extended from the results of the architectural survey and the creation of point cloud images based on the existing condition of the Grand Stupa. Intriguingly, the reconstruction of the pre-collapse superstructure form of the Grand Stupa has been controversial for a long time, resulting in great curiosity in our society.

Consequently, the process of the Grand Stupa's reconstruction of its pre-collapse form can be performed through the analogy of the stupa with its multitiered superstructure by comparing three great stupas in Chiang Mai City <Fig. 8>; the principal stupa of Wat Chiang Man, the stupa of Phra Meang Ket Klao in Wat Lok Moli and the stupa of King Tilokaraj in Wat Chet Yot. Admittedly, these stupas bear different strengths and weaknesses to be employed as

guidelines to reconstruct the complete architectural form of the Grand Stupa.

This study employs the new technology of survey with the 3D laser scanner to yield the most precise data, to generate point cloud images effectively and to create BIM for analyzing the volume of form and for evaluating the derived forms of the Grand Stupa.




<Fig. 8> A satellite image showing the location of selected stupas -Wat Chet Yot, Wat Lok Moli and Wat Chiang Man- for the reconstruction of the pre-collapse superstructure form of the Grand Stupa

Remarkably, this research proposes that the stupa of Wat Chiang Man and the stupa of King Tilokaraj in Wat Chet Yot should be carefully examined as a simultaneous construction. That is, the Grand Stupa was greatly renovated during the reign of King Tilokaraj in the 15th century, simultaneously with the main stupa of Wat Chiang Man during the reign of King Tilokaraja in 1471. The stupa of King Tilokaraj in Wat Chet Yot (Wat Maha Photaharam) was built after his death; the stupa of Phra Meang Ket Klao in Wat Lok Moli was built 50 years later, marking irrelevant time to influence art on the Grand Stupa <Fig. 9>.


Notably, this study argues that the stupa of Wat Chiang Man marks the most relevance in terms of the architectural form and proportion to the Grand Stupa. Therefore, the architectural form of the stupa of Wat Chiang Man is employed as the basis of the reconstruction of the pre-collapse superstructure form of the Grand Stupa.

According to the architectural survey of the current condition of the Grand Stupa using the 3D laser scanner, the process of its reconstruction is created by the Architectural H-BIM and is based on the architectural form of the stupa of Wat Chiang Man.


The completion of this process yields the total height of the Grand Stupa, which approximately measures 80 meters from the base to the top <Fig. 10>. After the creation of the H-BIM model of the Grand Stupa, its volume can be calculated by the weight and




<Fig. 9> Size and proportion of point cloud images and 3D architectural models comparing the Grand Stupa of Wat Chedi Luang, the stupa of King Tilokaraj in Wat Chet Yot and the stupa of Phra Meang Ket Klao in Wat Lok Moli



<Fig. 10> Reconstruction of the pre-collapse superstructure form of the Grand Stupa of Wat Chedi Luang, employing the superstructure of the stupa of Wat Chiang Man as the basis of reconstruction



<Fig. 11> A total volume of the Grand Stupa, Wat Chedi Luang



<Fig. 12> A 3D image illustrating the walkway tunnels inside the Grand Stupa, Wat Chedi Luang

size of a single brick, which measures 15 cm in width, 30 cm in length, 5 cm in height and 3 kg in weight <Fig. 11>.

That is, the H-BIM model of the Grand Stupa can yield a total volume of approximately 47,000 cubic meters, which comprises 19 million bricks; its total weight is 59,000 tonnes.

VI. Cause of the great collapse

From the fieldwork, the construction of the first part of the staircase tunnel near the entrance features an elaborate work, but the inner part shows less delicacy. Walking to the deep inner tunnel enables us to clearly identify that the tunnel's height becomes relatively low that no one can walk further. Moreover, the tunnel is not practically functional for walking up to the circumambulatory terrace above the outside of the stupa.

Thus, either assuming that the process of design and construction was not performed or the chief engineer who initiated this massive construction found difficulties due to lack of engineering knowledge and skilful experience to accomplish this unusual architecture is reasonable; thereafter, the chief engineer changed the construction plan and suspended the further construction of the tunnel.

This failure may be congruent with the political realms in the court of King Tilokaraja that mark the pressured historic event as the king forced Lampang Town to obtain the Emerald Buddha to be enshrined in Chiang Mai. King Tilokaraja might have realized that the east niches of the Grand Stupa suit to enshrine the Emerald Buddha as the latest restoration and for the elegance of the stupa. Therefore, the staircases at the east were built as a way to connect to the circumambulatory terrace. Meanwhile, other directions feature only the ramp without ladders, and thus may be the reason why

such complicated walkway tunnels were gradually ignored and finally suspended.

Another reason is that the limited engineering knowledge of the artisan in Chiang Mai had not been developed through such advancement, as opposed to the skill and sophisticated knowledge of the artisan in Bagan. That is, the Grand Stupa was unlikely durable as expected. Thus, its superstructure shook and entirely collapsed after the earthquake.

On the basis of this study, one can further assume that the reason why a heap of remains exist at the east, south and west of the Grand Stupa is because of the great collapse of its superstructure oriented southward.

Partially, the ancient chief engineer, who was in charge of following restoration, might have well recognized that a significant cause of the great collapse was the scant stability of the bases of the Grand Stupa as the alignment of the walkway tunnels.

Consequently, the further restoration of the Grand Stupa requires the strengthening of the tunnels beneath it. However, the spaces in the south, east and north are covered with rubble; the north tunnel is therefore the main way to reach the inner area of the Grand Stupa and is evidently observed as a compacted tunnel, but this process had not been finished yet or it was probably suspended by various difficulties <Fig. 12>. For example, since 1558 or 13 years after the great collapse, Chiang Mai had not been as prosperous as before for its kingdom was ruled by the royal court of the Irrawaddy Basin.

VII. Conclusion

The remarkable inspiration of a typical religious building was transmitted from Bagan to Chiang Mai. Unfortunately, the accurate

knowledge in design, calculation and construction had not been conveyed, resulting in an unused tunnel, which is an important weakness of the Grand Stupa. This defect was substantially activated by the great earthquake, causing the superstructure of the Grand Stupa to collapse in a southward direction. In their effort to restore the foundation of the Grand Stupa, it was compacted. The north tunnel became the main entrance since then as its least deterioration. Apparently, this great restoration was possibly suspended because of overload and the partially lacking freedom of the resource management from the political difficulties of the Lanna Kingdom ruled by the Burmese. This factor explains why the tunnels were incompletely compacted and the north tunnel was left, giving the authors opportunities to conduct this research further.

Above all, this article contributes the plausible reconstruction of the Grand Stupa, the Lanna's largest stupa, marking the spiritual and physical center of Chiang Mai. Despite the Grand Stupa's superstructure collapsed and resulted in the irreparable damage in 1545, employing the comparative art history, the new survey technology and the heritage building information modelling (H-BIM) arguably yield a significant reference, which other architectural heritage buildings can be applied for the purposes of conservation and reconstruction. Moreover, the outcome of this article can be applied in the architectural heritage interpretation to promote the cultural tourism in the future.

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