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Introduction to the Issue

Introduction to the Issue

Identities in Maritime Southeast Asia:
Ethnicity and Nation-state

Victor T. King*

The six papers in this special issue were first presented at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies-Busan University of Foreign Studies (ISEAS-BUFS) International Conference, with the theme "Revisiting and Reconstructing Southeast Asian Characteristics," on 27-28 May 2016. In their own ways, these contributions by academics actively working and living in the region, address the complexities of identities in the island world of Southeast Asia. Three focus on Malaysia, with one examining issues of Bugis ethnicity in North Kalimantan, formerly part of East Kalimantan, while the other three are concerned with national and sub-national identities in Brunei Darussalam.

There is probably nowhere in Southeast Asia that discussions on identities have been so intense, as well as debates about multiculturalism so long-standing and wide-ranging as in the Federation of Malaysia, which also extends to its relationship with neighboring Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia. In these, a central concern has been the tensions between the reality of cultural and ethnic diversity and the need for the said governments to manage,

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control and police their borders, as well as to construct, develop and sustain national identity, unity, and loyalty; in other words, to build a nation. On the one hand, there is the desire to maintain, if possible, a more confined, localized identity, operating at the sub-national level, and on the other, to accommodate the demands of nation-building.

At the core of our humanity is the constant engagement in thinking about, conceptualizing and determining similarity and difference. We identify and define those who we classify as "like us" and those who are different from us, the "others". We do this in different areas of our everyday lives and we also operate with several identities, usually ranging from the more specific to the more general. We adopt different identities according to the context or circumstances (even though these may not necessarily cohere if considered to define an individual). We usually feel comfortable with those whom we see as being like us, and we adopt different modes of behavior and attitudes when we have to deal with people who are not like us. As we know sometimes this might lead to not just negative and critical views about "those others" but also to outright hostility and contention.

Governments usually want to avoid these excesses and encourage an environment of tolerance, mutual understanding, and stability. But this is not an easy task when the human tendency is to differentiate, to classify, and to assign positive and negative values to those classifications. Often, it is small differences that matter: the way one talks, one's speech and accent; how one dresses; how and what one eats; whether one operates as an individual or goes around in groups; how one behaves towards one's children in a public space; the bodily attitudes and demeanour one adopts (whether this is deemed respectful and controlled or loud and aggressive). All this is happening in an increasingly globalized world; through the media, consumption of global brands, international communications (the internet) and travel, we are constantly confronted with others, and with cultural difference; with other ways of speaking, doing, acting, behaving, thinking. How do we deal with this? There is often a tension between our desire for the familiar and for security and stability—to conduct ourselves within the world

we know on the one hand, and in another, our anxiety about others, about difference, about moving into worlds which are unfamiliar to us and into situations which carry risk. At the same time, the globalizing world also affords us the zest for excitement, and sometimes for the dangers of difference, of experiencing new things, and also perhaps, of reflecting on our identities and values by being confronted by others who are different and who do things in different ways.

In her comparative paper on translocal and transnational movements of the Bugis, from their homelands in Southern Sulawesi which date back to the seventeenth century and continued to thrive in the twentieth century in the eastern regions of Kalimantan, and in Sabah and Johor in Malaysia, Yekti Manauti discusses the issues involving migrant communities in constructing viable identities. In situations of movement, communities frequently operate with multiple identities, and switch ethnic roles as required in different situations. They do so in the context of the interventions and constructions of governments and more powerful "others." The Bugis identify themselves as Bugis, but in a Malaysian context where the constitutional status of Malay customs and language, as well as of Islam are all-important, and where national identity is framed in Malay and Islamic terms, some Bugis identify themselves as Malay, usually when they reside in Peninsular Malaysia, or (Bugis) Malay, or (Bugis) Sabah; they may also identify themselves at a national level as Malaysian or Indonesian. As we know, the Malays of Malaysia in particular are an amalgam of populations (Javanese, Minangkabau, Bugis and others) from other parts of the island world.

Jayum Jawan, in his comprehensive paper on political contestation in Malaysia, also refers to the status of being Malay in Malaysia and the formal contracts which were established between the Malay population and other constituent communities (Chinese, Indian, Orang Asli, and Borneo Dayak) in 1948, 1957, and 1963, in the context of the progressive post-war withdrawal of the British. From a period of ethnic harmony, which broke down in the "race riots" of 1969, to the establishment of order and stability by way of the direct intervention of the state from the 1970's, uncertainty

seems to be increasing. He draws attention to the recent evidence of the increase in ethnic tensions, the complexities of political party alliances, and electoral competition in a nation-state where ethnic political allegiance, the demographic composition of electoral constituencies, and shifting alliances are crucial for political outcomes. He proposes that the states of Sarawak and Sabah—where no single ethnic group is demographically dominant and where ethnic accommodation has been more evident—might take on an increasing role in forging a new era of tolerance and cooperation, and in serving as a model for the Peninsula.

There is considerable synergy between Jayum's contribution and that of Ooi Keat Gin who provides a nuanced historical treatment of Malayan/Malaysian political development from 1947 to 1991, demonstrating the difficult process of bringing together a multicultural constituency. He does this by placing Malaysia in an international Cold War context, and by examining the changing international perspectives and policies of the first four Malayan/Malaysian Prime Ministers, along with their personalities, characters, and backgrounds.

The three papers on Brunei Darussalam, all written by Brunei academics, examine different dimensions of Brunei nation-building and the ways in which the country's Constitution of 1959, supported by the Nationality Law of 1961, which specified seven indigenous or original components of the "Malay race" (Brunei, Kedayan, Tutong, Belait, Dusun, Bisaya, and Murut), has played out in practice since the nation gained its full independence from Britain in 1984. The need to define and delimit "Malayness" has obvious parallels with the Malaysian experience.

Siti Norkhalbi Haji Wahsalfelah examines the role of material culture, and the production and consumption of textiles, as both status markers and markers of identity. Although part of Brunei Malay culture, woven textiles have come to provide a more general symbol of national culture in a political and economic structure where Malays are dominant and other groups progressively absorbed. Meanwhile, Asiyah az-Zahra Ahmad Kumpoh and Noor Azam Haji-Othman consider the emerging consequences for the

non-Brunei Malay populations, particularly the Dusun, of the position of Islam, and Malay language and culture in the nation-state. Asiyah adopts a positive stance; she uses the distinction formulated by Shamsul Amri Badaruddin of “authority-defined” and “everyday-defined” identities, and proposes that elements of Dusun identity remain through everyday practices embedded in family and kinship. Noor Azam observes that the use of local languages, including Dusun, is disappearing and that indigenous monolingualism has virtually disappeared from Brunei, to be increasingly replaced by the use of Malay and English.

Therefore, the papers in this issue on Malaysia and Brunei cast light on ongoing processes of change since independence from Britain, and particularly changing ethnic identities and political trajectories. More generally, it is the process of nation-building after the establishment of politically independent states in Southeast Asia which has been a major preoccupation of political leaders in the region and a major interest of social scientists and historians in the post-war period. In Southeast Asia, states are a relatively modern creation and a product of processes of modernization set in motion by European colonial powers. They were the result of the arbitrary carving up of the region between European states and America, essentially from the nineteenth century onwards, although territories began to be occupied and administered from the sixteenth century. These were largely artificial creations, bringing peoples together, many invariably not sharing a common culture, language, or history. The former British territories were a mix of differently administered units. They were also an amalgam of communities (local and immigrant, large-scale and small-scale, state-based and tribal), with different religions, languages, histories, and customs. This is what the English scholar-administrator, John Sydenham Furnivall from his experience in colonial Burma, referred to as a “plural society.”

Articles



Translocal and Transnational Movements of Bugis and the Construction of Multiple Identities:

The Case of Bugis in North Kalimantan of Indonesia and Sabah and Johor of Malaysia*

Yekti Maunati**

[*Abstract*]

It is widely known that the Bugis people, originally from South Sulawesi, have been migrating to many places, including both the Indonesian and Malaysian sides of the borders today. The translocal and transnational movements of the Bugis people, especially to North Kalimantan of Indonesia and Sabah and Johor of Malaysia, have occurred in several waves, particularly during the 17th century, around 1965 and from 1980 to the present. The fall of the kingdom of Somba Opu in South Sulawesi and the rise Dutch colonial power have been the triggers for the early

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* This paper is based on the following: On the research "*Etnisitas, Pengembangan Sumberdaya Lokal dan Potensi Perdagangan International dalam Rangka Peningkatan Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Nunukan Kalimantan Timur*" from 2007-2009 in Nunukan and Sebatik Islands in the Regency of Nunukan, East Kalimantan (now North Kalimantan, coordinated by I Ketut Ardhana (2008-9) and Yekti Maunati (2010), with Dundin Zaenuddin, Mayasuri Presilla, and Betti Rosita Sari; on "*Kontestasi Identitas dan Diaspora Bugis di Wilayah Perbatasan Kalimantan Timur-Sabah*" in 2009, coordinated by Yekti Maunati, with I Ketut Ardhana, Betti Rosita Sari, and Amorisa Wiratri, Rucianawati; and on "*Diaspora Bugis di semenanjung Malaysia: Identitas Budaya, Kewarganegaraan dan Integrasi Nasional*" in 2011, coordinated by Dundin Zaenuddin, with Yekti Maunati, Betti Rosita Sari, Lamijo, and Rucianawati. Thank you to all the team members of the said studies.

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movement of the Bugis to both the Indonesian and Malaysian borders. This was followed by the second push of the Islamic rebellion in South Sulawesi, around 1965, creating another big wave of Bugis movement. The most recent one has been mainly due to economic reasons. These different phases of the movements, as well as the dynamic interplay of various aspects, such as citizenship, ethnic, and sub-ethnic groupings, practicing of cultural traditions and keeping the language, to mention a few, have contributed to the process of the construction of the multiple identities of the Bugis. Indeed, the Bugis people are no longer identified or identify themselves as a single group, but rather have fluid and contesting identities. This paper will discuss three main issues: the history of the translocal and transnational movements of the Bugis to North Kalimantan, Sabah and Johor; the process of adaptation to these new places; and the construction of Bugis identities.

Keywords: translocal and transnational movements, Bugis, multiple identities, Indonesia and Malaysia

Ⅰ. The history of translocal and transnational movements of the Bugis to North Kalimantan, Sabah and Johor and the processes of adaptation

The Bugis people who originally came from South Sulawesi in Indonesia have high mobility. Indeed, Bugis people have been widely known as a group which has migrated to many different places, ranging from other parts of the Indonesian archipelago to Malaysia, Australia, and Africa (Lineton 1975; Ammarell 2002; Ito 2002; Acciaioli 2004; Said 2004; etc.). Lineton (1975: 173) notes that Bugis people have been known for their migration from the late seventeenth century and says that:

> The late seventeenth century(,) carried them [Bugis of South Sulawesi] to all corners of the Malay world and beyond as traders and as conquerors of numerous petty states. This expansion of trade and political influence was accompanied by a process which

> was less spectacular but of no less significance: the emigration of large numbers of Bugis, and some Makassarese, to all parts of the Indonesian archipelago and to the Malay Peninsula. As a result of this outflow of population from South Sulawesi, sizeable Bugis colonies were—by the beginning of this century—established in eastern Kalimantan (Borneo), near Samarinda and Pasir; in southwestern Borneo, in the Pontianak region; in the Malay Peninsula, particularly in southwestern Johor; and in many other islands of the East Indies. During the twentieth century, particularly in the 1950s and early 1960s, Bugis settlements also sprang up in the coastal areas of Java and Sumatra (Lineton 1975: 173).

Besides which Ammarell (2002: 52) for example, notes:

> The first and greatest migration of the Bugis occurred in the late seventeenth century as a result of war in their homeland, establishing a pattern of migration that the Bugis describe as *massapa dalle* (*mencari rejeki* in Indonesian) (searching for good fortune) (2002: 52).

Ammarell (2002: 52) further pinpoints that by Bugis migrants residing in either big cities or border areas, connections with local noble people and authorities (both colonial and national) have been given priority since the seventeenth century. Often, local nobles and authorities have been the ones who approached the Bugis migrants and marginalized the indigenous people so that the Bugis had the opportunity to play important roles.

Another story of Bugis migration is that of them traveling to Australia prior to the twentieth century, especially "Bugis from the neighbouring kingdom of Bone" (Burton 2007: 409). Said (2004: 13) also notes that:

> The Bugis are also known as prominent sailors. Many sources inform us that the Bugis boats were often seen all over the area known today as the Indonesian archipelago, from Singapore to New Guinea and from southern Philippines to north-western Ausralia, and they even sailed across the Indian Ocean to Madagascar (2004: 13).

The same author (2004: 14) further notes that Bugis people are acknowledged for their movements to other parts of Indonesia, as well as Malaysia and Australia. In new places, the Bugis often created villages and as traders played very important economic roles in eastern Indonesia, including Kupang, Kendari, and Ambon.

In a similar vein, Kenedi Nurhan in *Kompas* (2009: 1&15) reports on the diaspora of the Bugis-Makassar from Somba Opu. He argues that since the Bongaya (1667) agreement, the migrations of Bugis-Makassar to different places were not only done by commoners, but also by noble families who led such movements. The restrictions on trade and shipping by the Dutch Colonial Power at that time were purposed to take over the Gowa power in order to weaken the royal economy. This had become the important reason for large migrations of Bugis-Makassar all over the Archipelago. The existence of Bugis migrants in turn influenced local politics with the Bugis-Makassar people playing a role in the places that now belong to Indonesia as well as Malaysia. Apart from this, they have played important parts in trading relevant up to now (Maunati et al 2010).

Acciaioli (2004: 147) also notes the mobility of the Bugis throughout the Indonesian Archipelago as traders, fishermen, or farmers. Though many argue about the economic pursuit of the Bugis as motivation to migrate, Acciaioli (2004: 149) believes that it is more than that. The continuation of the migrations of the Bugis during both economic hardships and economic prosperity, prove that the Bugis migration had to do with something else. Acciaioli (2004: 149) states:

> Thus, the task of interpreting Bugis activities requires that one consider them not simply as economic actors reacting to downturns and upturns in the homeland economy (and security) and responding to potentially lucrative opportunities in the periphery, but more complexly as cultural agents whose strategies of gaining a livelihood are inflected by values and beliefs that can even result in sometimes decidedly unprofitable courses of action (2004: 149).

Bugis migrations to the Malaysian side have been reported as

well. See, for example, this report by Noorduyn (1988):

> Though this Raja Muda family was part and parcel of the Malay state system, its members were, in the male line, also of Bugis, i.e., non-Malay extraction, and this gives the story a markedly dual structure. On the one hand, the authors were proudly conscious of the age-old tradition of the Malay kingdom in which their story was set and they thus began their chronicle from the rise of the Melaka kingdom in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. But they were equally proudly conscious of the Bugis origin of their ancestors. Raja Haji Ahmad was a grandson of the second Raja Muda of Bugis extraction, Daéng Cellak (d. 1745), who had succeeded his elder brother Daéng Maréwa after the latter's death in 1728. These brothers were Bugis immigrants, who had come from their homeland in south Celebes as leaders of large groups of seaborne followers more than a decade before Daéng Maréwa's death (1988: 63).

Noorduyn (1988) further reports the link of Raja Muda and the five noble Bugis brothers who migrated to the Malay world: “Three of the five brothers who migrated to the Malay world (Daéng Parani, Daéng Maréwa and Daéng Cellak) are mentioned in Dutch records as brothers or half-brothers”[1] (1988: 64).

Additionally, in Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur and Kuching in particular, and also in Singapore, the Bugis presence has been marked by the establishment of *Kampong Bugis* (Ardhana and Maunati 2009). This indicates the historical existence of Bugis settlements in the said places.

Indeed, from the above illustration, Bugis translocal and transnational movements can be found through historical as well as contemporary accounts.

Based on our series of studies in Johor (2011), Tawau (2009), and Nunukan and Indonesian Sebatik Islands (2008-2010), Bugis people have migrated and settled in these places. In Nunukan and Indonesian Sebatik Islands, they consisted the majority of the populations. According to *Census 2000*, the total population in

1) Noorduyn, citing from Dutch VOC letters

Nunukan Regency was 26,810 people, composed of Javanese: 3,103; Bugis, Ugi: 12,460; Banjar, Banjar Malay: 818; Kutai: 46; Pasir: 0; Dayak Kenyah: 31; Toraja: 1.760; Sundanese, Priangan: 122; others: 8,470. In 2014, the population of Nunukan was 34,83 (in millions). On the Indonesian Sebatik Island, the Bugis were also the majority. Mr. Sulaiman, during our study on Sebatik Island, claimed that some villages had certain ethnic groups. As illustration, he described it as follows: "Aji Kuning: Bugis, Timorese; Bina Lawang: Tidung, Bugis; Setabu: Bugis, Tidung; Liang Bunyu: Tidung, Bugis; Desa Sungai Nyamuk: Bugis (80%), 20% mix of Javanese, Buthon, etc.; Sungai Pancang: Bugis (90%); Tanjung Aru: Bugis (90%); Tanjung Karang: Bugis (90%), Bajau" (Maunati 2010).

The process of Bugis migration has not been a simple one. Many Bugis have been moving to different places prior to the migration and settling into Nunukan or Sebatik Islands. For example, our studies in 2008-2010 in Nunukan and Sebatik Islands found that many Bugis inhabitants who used to work in Malaysia moved to Nunukan and Sebatik because of particular problems. In Sabah, East Malaysia, the migrants moved out because of these issues: overstaying; being cheated by employers; and end of work contracts. Some of the people had been deported by the Malaysian government to Nunukan, on the border of Indonesia-Malaysia in East Kalimantan (now North Kalimantan). In the beginning, indeed, their destination was Malaysia, but due to the above reasons, they ended up staying in Nunukan or Sebatik. They did not want to return to their hometowns because they were ashamed to go back home or were simply reluctant for economic reasons, especially as it is difficult to get a job back home (Maunati 2010).

A case in point is a Bugis couple who had been working in Malaysia for a few years but due to overstaying, had to go back to Indonesia and stopped over Nunukan where they have stayed since 2000. Initially, they were assisted by a Bugis family opened up land in the area in the 1960's. They bought land in South Nunukan, then reasonably priced. The roads then were still under construction. During our initial fieldwork, the closest village that could be reached by any form of transport (like the *angkot* or vehicle) was the Tanjung Harapan village, South Nunukan. The couple said they had

to walk to reach their house in the hilly area (Maunati 2008). In 2008, the road was partly asphalted as it became very slippery during the rainy season and virtually unpassable to any vehicle for at least two days. In 2010, this road was finally fully (Maunati 2010). According to our interviews, Bugis people often have connections in Nunukan and get assistance from their networks (family, neighbors in their hometown), including information on land, jobs, and other matters. Networking is indeed very important for Bugis in the process of survival in new places. Kuncoro (2016) also finds a similar pattern on Muslim Burmese migrants in Northern Thailand where a mosque has been re-functioned as a place for community networking and even touching base with wider Muslim groups across ethnicity and nationality.

Those very successful Bugis people in Nunukan shared similar experiences. They emerged from difficulties and were able to move back and forth from Nunukan and Sabah to trade or work. Translocal and transnational movements have worked to establish networks.

This is also a pattern observable with the Bugis of Sebatik Island. Indeed, Sebatik Island was in the beginning not considered by people moving out of Malaysia, but it offered alternatives as it became home family or friends.

Another factor worth considering is how some Bugis people make translocal instead of transnational movements. According to interviewees from Nunukan Island, some Bugis people have been moving from different places in East Kalimantan, and not to Malaysia or any other countries. As mentioned previously, Bugis early settlements could be found in Samarinda (Lineton 1975) and in many other places in East Kalimantan, including Tarakan (which used to be in East Kalimantan but is now in North Kalimantan), Melak, and in coastal areas or in riverbanks. Some Bugis moved from other places in East Kalimantan or now North Kalimantan, especially when Nunukan was converted into a Regency in 1999 when regional autonomy was installed by the central government on the ground of Decision No. 22, year 1999. The Bulungan Regency area at that time was added two extensions and made into two

autonomous regions, Malinau and Nunukan. Previously, Nunukan was only one of the sub-districts of the Bulungan regency. With this extension, there have been many job and business opportunities in many sectors in Nunukan where many Bugis people already settled. According to many informants, Bugis people have added to the number of the existing Bugis populations but unfortunately, no formal records could be found to prove this.

Contemporary migrations have mostly been motivated by economic reasons. In Malaysia, the new Bugis migrants, like other Indonesian migrants, are often spoken of as Indon (Indonesian migrants, especially the *Tenaga Kerja Indonesia* (TKI) - Indonesian overseas workers).

In terms of the process of adaptation, translocal and transnational migrants go through varied experiences, depending on many factors. In addition, each country may have a different policy for migrants. Though these migrants have distinct collective experiences, experiences of translocal and transnational movements clearly function as social capital for the process of adaptation. This is partly because the networks created could easily assist the process of adaptation in the new places.

According to Ammarell (2002), Bugis people have strategies of adaptation in new places and often are able to dominate the local economy and politics. This phenomenon was observed in Nunukan, North Kalimantan, where Bugis have played important roles in economic and political matters (Ardhana et al 2010; Maunati 2010). Our series of studies show that Bugis people have generally evolved strategies to adjust in new places, whether in the Indonesian side of Nunukan or the Malaysian side of Tawau or Johor. In the translocal and transnational experiences, networking among the Bugis plays an important part.

In her study of Bugis in Tawau, Maunati (2010a) writes about how the Bugis people, having had a long tradition of migration, perform three practices when they migrate to new places, as reminded by parents or elders: *jagalah ujung lidah* (look after the tip of the tongue); *jagalah ujung badik* (look after the end of the badik or knife); and *jagalah ujung "anu"* (look after the edge of the

male genitalia). This concept has been discussed widely. Majid (2013) notes the concept of *Tellucappa* (three ends): *piso*, *lila*, and *laso*. With these three, the Bugis could show their identity and existence and influence others. The first, *cappa piso* (knife edge or sharp object edge) must be made able to cut or break something. The second, *cappa lila* (tip of the tongue) refers to be able to interact with other people by communicating and influencing well. The third, *cappa laso* (the end of the male genitalia) suggests a way to enter and influence and even control others, which basically boils down to marrying a girl from a family as a way of entering a family and her larger society. This concept of adaptation is rather similar to that of a well-known Minangkabau concept of "*dimana bumi dipijak di situ langit dijunjung*" (where the earth is stepped on, the custom is obeyed/followed). For the Bugis, cultural negotiation could work in this process of adaptation, where on the one hand they attempt to integrate with mainstream, while on the other, they also keep their tradition for certain matters, like language, wedding rituals, and so forth.

The types of migrations also depend on whether they are permanent or temporary. Based on our interviews with informants and the stories told by the Bugis from Nunukan, Tawau, and Johor, Bugis people tend to settle down in the new places. The stories of the Bugis of Nunukan, as well as those in the frontiers of Tawau and Pontian, Johor, show that the Bugis people have settled well in new places, from generation to generation. A showcase of this is the settlement of the Bugis in Johor. Indeed, Maunati (2010a) notes that Bugis people tend to settle down when they migrate to a new area. Mr. Hambali, a Bugis informant, for example, told us that both in Tawau and Nunukan, unlike Javanese who often return to their homeland, the Bugis have settled and built families there. Mr. Hambali viewed this is a positive point because the Bugis could thrive in new places, as seen in Nunukan and Tawau. He also told us that the descendants of Bugis people used to be headmen (*penghulu*) and played important roles in developing Tawau. The concept of the three ends worked for the Bugis in the process of adaptation.

Information gathered from our fieldwork in Tawau show that

at the beginning of the settlement there, Bugis were placed in positions as headmen and received land which their descendants still own in some cases. There were times when they rent it to Chinese traders. In Tawau, many Bugis informants who have successfully adapted to local traditions and cultures (*budaya tempatan*) own land and houses. Nevertheless, they also preserve their traditions. In terms of adaptation, the Bugis could also hold double positions: supporting the national identity of Malaysia while holding Indonesian citizenship (Ardhana and Maunati 2009). Again, this shows a cultural negotiation where there is an attempt to integrates into the cultural mainstream as a way to adjust smoothly. Besides, the experiences of translocal as well as transnational movements have added to the widening of social and economic networks among the Bugis.

In Nunukan, the Bugis people not only own land but many have become landlords. Tidung people who moved to the outskirts of Nunukan City report that they sold their lands to Bugis people who used to rent their houses. In the past, Tidung people owned land in the city, but today many of them have moved to the outskirts having sold their lands. In Nunukan, Bugis people are not only religious and economic leaders, but are also political figures in the local level. Essentially, they are active not only in social and cultural arenas but also in politics (Maunati 2009). There have been many Bugis descendants who have held structural positions in the Nunukan Regency during our fieldwork in 2008-2010, including the head of the Regency (Maunati 2010). Based on our interview in Nunukan, many Bugis are of noble lineage and brought their own capital to Kalimantan.

Some Bugis in Tawau and Johor have been incorporated as Malays. This has been a strategic way to benefit economically and politically. Being Malay could get them more opportunities in terms of trade, economics, and politics.

Bugis people have certain strategies to survive in new places, whether in Nunukan and Sebatik in the Indonesian side or Tawau and Johor in the Malaysian side. The Bugis concept of three ends have worked to provide a spirit of survival for the Bugis outside

their homeland. Another important feature that has been argued by Ammarell is the ability of the Bugis to establish connections with important figures in the new places, as seen in Nunukan where they been dominating politically and economically.

This also is closely linked with their construction of identity. Bugis people have never been passive but have always been active in the process of identity construction. Nevertheless, Bugis people have always sported multiple identities and often contested ones depending on certain situations and contexts, making Eriksen's argument on this issue is still relevant (Eriksen 1993).

Ⅱ. The Construction of Bugis Identities

It has been widely discussed that identity is socially constructed (Hall 1992; Kahn 1995; Eller 1999; Wang 2007; Maunati, 2011; Maunati 2012; Maunati and Sari 2014, etc.), fluid and contested (Maunati 2000; Kivisto 2001; Vertovec, 2001; Ito 2002; Yu and Jing 2015; Eisen 2016). Eisen (2016: 856), reviewing *Multiple Identities: Migrants, Ethnicity, and Membership*, edited by Paul Spickard, and published in 2013 by Indiana University Press, notes that "...the contributing authors effectively demonstrate that identity construction and belonging are fluid and contextual and that the two operate interdependently" (Eisen 2016: 856). Glick Schiller et al.[2], believe that historically, there is a different perspective between contemporary immigration and that of perspective by the end of 19th and the early 20th centuries. It is said that in contemporary times, immigration is always related to a homeland, while in the past, there was none. Therefore, migrant identity is always deemed multiple and fluid, according to Kivisto (2001: 554).

According to Yu and Jing (2015), the national identity of the Miao/Hmong people in the Vietnam-China border is a result of

2) Cited by Kivisto (2001), Glick Schiller, Nina, Basch, Linda and Szanton Blanc, Christina. 1922. Transnationalism: a new analytic framework for understanding migration. *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered,* Glick Schiller, Nina, Basch, Linda and Szanton Blanc, Christina, eds. 1-24. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.

political, economic (especially land resources) and cultural factors. For example, the policy on the restriction on the number of children in China influenced the movement of people from China to Vietnam. The Miao people value having sons to bring family names, thus such a strict policy became a grave cultural issue, and led to the return of some of them to Vietnam (Yu and Jing 2015: 118). Yu and Jing (2015) also argue that the construction of national identity has been firstly assumed to relate to merely political matters, to be later on affected by economic and cultural aspects. They further believe that globalization has also shaped this construction of national identity (Yu and Jing 2015). Aside from national identities, people are also expected to hold some form of ethnic identities. Indeed, identity is often not a single matter but a gamut of other components depending on contexts.

The question is, if identity is a social construction, who then has the power/authority to do such construction? This is an important point that needs to be understood. There have been many arguments for this issue (King 1982; Barth 1989; Said 1993; Eriksen 1993; Kahn 1995, King and Wilder 2003, etc.). For example, Barth (1989) argues that there are many representations which have contributed to the construction of Balinese identity. In Vietnam, the classification of ethnic groups has been influenced by the colonial power. Stokhof and Salemink (2009: 157) mention that the colonial administration in Vietnam often lumped many different groups into one, like the Malais who were from Malais (from the Malay world) and the Cham. Indeed, there are many representations involved in the construction of identity, like in the case of Balinese, the Malais, or other groups. Maunati (2000) notes that in the case of the Dayak, people are not passive recipients in the construction of their identity but are involved in such construction.

The question now is, what is the reason behind such construction and who contributes to it for the Bugis? Have the Bugis also contributed in their identity construction? As mentioned earlier, historical accounts have been very important in the process of the construction of the Bugis identity. The historical context has been argued to make a significant contributions in the construction of cultural identity (Eriksen 1993; Kahn 1995; etc). Citing from Shelly

Errington, Acciaioli (2004: 148) reports that the Bugis in their homeland follow a hierarchical social order where the noble family takes the highest level by virtue of being descendants of the "spirit of the upperworld." Commoners obey their orders. Accioaioli (2004: 148) further notes that the depictions of Bugis migrants have been somewhat different to those of the Bugis of their homeland. In this case, Bugis migrants have been portrayed to be more egalitarian and have mostly become "economic actors." This is just one depiction of the Bugis involved in translocal and transnational movements.

The depiction of Bugis migrants have been various. According to Ammarell, over centuries Bugis migrants have been able to play important roles in local economies (Ammarell 2002:51). He further states that Bugis migrants in Eastern Indonesia, for example, were able to forge close connections with important individuals or parties, like noble families, local government officials, and so forth. This argument has been somewhat relevant to the Bugis of Nunukan where Bugis people have dominated local politics and economy (Maunati 2010). By using certain elements of the Bugis traditions, Bugis migrants were able to succeed politically and economically. This seems to be still related with the concept of the three aforementioned ends. Besides, the Bugis translocal and transnational movements have paved away for Bugis social, economic, and political networks both within and without. In new places, Bugis have established and joined several social organizations (see for instance, Ito, 2002, for Bugis in Sabah).

The strengthening of Bugis identity has also worked to support economic and political gains. This phenomenon has not been exactly the same in different places. There have been complex processes in the construction of identity for Bugis people, like in Tawau and Johor where like blended identities emerged between the Bugis and the Malays in the second or later generations. A migrant community strengthens its identity by way of economic, political, and cultural gains, among others. In addition, identity is not fixed, depending on the situation. In the case of the Bugis people, there have been many markers of identity taken from their religion, language, and cultural traditions, etc. Said (2004: 14) argues that maintaining language, traditional festivals, and customs to mention

a few, are components of upholding cultural heritage.

Said (2004) notes that today, Islam has become an important asepct of Bugis. The process of Islamization for the Bugis had taken a long time, but Islam was later on recognized by the Bugis kingdoms as their formal religion at the beginning of the 17th century (Said 2004: 15). Later on, Islamic teachings were incorporated into Bugis life (Said 2004: 15).

As adherents of Islam, Bugis people could blend with the Malays of Malaysia in many ways. Historically, Said (2004: 12) notes that at the end of the 16th century, Islam came to the Bugis of South Sulawesi and later on "Islam has become a fundamental aspect of the Bugis culture." Being Muslim has become associated with being Bugis (Said 2004: 12). In addition, Pelras (1996: 4) also argues that in Bugis culture, religion has been very important. Therefore, in terms of Bugis identity, Islam is an important marker, the way it shapes Malay and other Moslem cultures (Musa 2000; etc). Kahn (1995) argues the existence of a grey area in identity construction in the shared elements of markers of identity. Markers of identity could be taken from many aspects of a culture, depending on selection. This is also the reason why identity could be fluid depending on the context and situation.

Despite practicing Islam, Bugis people continue to preserve the cultural values of their ancestors, like the concept of "siri", which means "honor, dignity or courtesy" (Said 2004: 16). This concept of Siri could be explained as composed of five cores:

1. Ada Tongeng (truthful wording);
2. Lempuk (honesty);
3. Getteng (steadfastness);
4. Sipakatau (mutual respect);
5. Mappesona ri dewata seuwe (submission to the will of God) (Said 2004: 18).

Said further argues that basically, this concept establishes a harmonious life for the Bugis community (2004: 20). Of course, some elements may be used for the Bugis markers of identity but at other times different elements may be utilized. A process of

negotiation may take place in selecting the elements for the markers of identity. Below, I will discuss in detail the construction of contested identity in the cases of the Bugis in Nunukan, Tawau, and Johor.

My discussion about the Bugis in the Nunukan Regency will be limited to the Bugis on the Islands of Nunukan and Sebatik. As mentioned earlier, the Bugis people consist of the majority of the populations in both islands. Based on our many years of studies in Nunukan North Kalimantan (which used to be East Kalimantan)[3], the Bugis people on the Island of Nunukan have been residing there for a long time, especially since the Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia around 1963 to 1966. At that time, there were many Bugis people on the Malaysian side who migrated to the Indonesian side, particularly to Nunukan Island located near Tawau in Malaysia. The population of the Island of Nunukan at that time was small and the land uncultivated yet abundant. In the beginning, the Bugis people engaged in fisheries and agriculture. In Kalimantan, there is tradition where the ones who cultivated land earned it (Maunati 2009). This tradition is practiced by the Dayak group in East Kalimantan especially after abundant lands have been left by logging companies (Maunati 2000)[4].

Since it is located near Tawau of Sabah, Nunukan has been a strategic and attractive place serving as a transit area for those who want to leave or return to Malaysia. Riwanto Tirtosudarmo (2005) argues that Nunukan is a kind of transit spot. People who intend to return to their hometowns but did not have sufficient funding often stayed in Nunukan and attempted to get a job and settle there. There have been many Bugis people who succeeded in business after engaging in economic activities in the locality (Maunati 2009).

Our studies in Nunukan (2008-2010) showcase how Bugis businessmen succeeded and preserved traditions. Mr. Haji Baha (not

3) North Kalimantan established in November 16, 2012 under Decision No. 20, 2012. It was in April 22, 2013 when the first governor was installed.

4) This became a problem when the price of land increased due to the rise of coal mining. Some migrants encountered problems when the indigenous people claimed the land they were cultivating (Siburian and Maunati 2013).

his real name) was one of the successful businessmen in Nunukan—and even assumed to be the most successful of all. His lives in a huge and luxurious residence. He followed his uncle who was already in Nunukan and moved there in 1971. He only studied and was not able to complete in primary school. He was forced to migrate outside South Sulawesi. He worked very hard to fulfil his basic needs. When he was asked by his uncle to come to Nunukan from South Sulawesi on November 18, 1971, he travelled on a sailboat for 5 days and 5 nights. In Nunukan, he opened a cassava garden with his uncle. At that time, he had to get basic necessities from Malaysia and Tarakan in Indonesia. Ships from Surabaya only operated regularly after regional autonomy was installed in 2001 (Maunati 2009).

He become a full-pledged businessman after the Regency of Nunukan, which used to be a sub-district, was set up in 2000. To succeed, he had to work very hard. He started out as a plantation laborer. He “used to work in Malaysia for a wage.” He faced trouble when his passport expired while working in the Malaysian plantation. During our fieldwork, he had already become a contractor. He thought that the change in status of Nunukan was a starting point for economic progress. He used this opportunity to open a business for building infrastructure. He received a loan from a local bank (*Bank Pembangunan Daerah*) to open his construction business. He also told us that he was able to collaborate well with the local government and businessmen, so he can engage in business. Jobs/projects from local government are aplenty (Maunati 2009).

Apart from becoming a contractor, he has extended his business by opening up a palm oil plantation in the Nunukan Regency. Palm oil plantations had become a new industry at that time in Nunukan, and it still depended on Malaysia to sell the plantation’s products because of limited Crude Palm Oil (CPO) in Nunukan. He hoped that there will be more CPO in Nunukan as palm oil plantations already thrived there. He opened up land of around 20,000 hectares for palm oil in Sebuku and another 2,000 hectares was planted for a year. Problem is, the area of palm oil plantations overlapped with the *Kawasan Budidaya Kehutanan*

(KBK). At that time, a master plan for spatial planning was adopted due to varying interests (Maunati 2009).

Many Bugis people residing in border areas between Nunukan and Tawau have been successful in business. If Nunukan had Pak Baha, Tawau had Hj Imran, who owned a ship to served the Nunukan-Tawau route. Hj Imran has a Malaysian Identity Card (IC), and thus could easily open a business in Tawau. His co-owns his ship with a Bugis friend in Nunukan (Maunati 2010).

The success stories of Bugis people in both Nunukan and Tawau are often associated with the religious following of the concept of the three ends passed on from generation to generation. The practice of the three ends marks Bugis identity, which respects and preserves its traditions, even outside their homeland. This is true for both the Bugis of Nunukan and the Bugis of Tawau.

Also important in constructing Bugis identity is the establishment and strengthening of networks among Bugis. The strong networking among the Bugis in translocal and transnational movements provided space for them to strengthen their economic activities. For Bugis people, social organizations has been very important, especially away from the homeland. Social organizations maintained cultural traditions and provided a genuine bond among Bugis outside the homeland. In practicing traditions or performing certain rituals, as in wedding ceremonies or other events, they are able to express their being uniquely Bugis. Organizations have also helped Bugis face challenges, even problems with other ethnic groups.

Maunati (2009) notes that in Nunukan, Bugis people usually joined the organization called Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan (KKSS), with headquarters in Samarinda, the capital city of East Kalimantan, and with offices in many areas. According to informants, the KKSS helped create close bonds among members and mediated to resolve internal or external conflicts. People from different ethnic groups join this organization, like the Bugis, Toraja, Makassar, Mandar, and so forth. In addition, Haba (2005) also claims that the Bugis have established a social organization in Nunukan which has various functions, including resolving conflicts.

In our interviews with Bugis and Tidung informants in Nunukan, we learned about a slight misunderstanding between the Bugis and the Dayak (mostly the Tidung) due to competitions for local government projects (Maunati 2009). At that time, the Bugis people were not reacting to avoid a repeat of the conflict between the Dayak and the Madurese in West Kalimantan[5] and also in Central Kalimantan. According to the Bugis informants, during the night when the Dayak Tidung and other Dayaks rallied along the main road of the city, the Bugis just kept quiet. The conflict was settled when organizations, including the KKSS, intervened, which led to the Bugis paying traditional fines. The KKSS, the Dayak organizations, some public figures, and the local government officials made an effort to maintain peace in order in Nunukan during that time (Maunati 2009).

A Communication Forum was established in 2008 in Nunukan as a platform for organizations to talk and avoid potential conflicts. According to information gathered during our fieldwork in Nunukan in 2009, this Forum is one of the branches of a similar Forum in Samarinda (Maunati 2009), established to avoid potential conflicts in East Kalimantan after the riot between the Dayak and the Madurese in Central Kalimantan (Ju-lan and Maunati 2004).

When the Bugis people experience any threat, their bonds grow stronger and they collectively show their identity. However, in different contexts, they also sport contested identities as they also originate from sub-groups like Bone, Pinrang, Wajo, and so forth. These sub-groups have also established organizations in Nunukan. For instance, a Bone organization member reports that his group tries to solve internal problems, but relies on the KKSS for issues of communal concern. Sub-group identities have also appeared in certain contexts and situations. In terms of a larger national identity, we can also delineate Bugis identity as a collective from the Bugis of Indonesia or the Bugis of Malaysia. This is also true with the Lun Dayak and Lun Bawan in the Indonesia-Malaysia border, which

5) For information on conflicts see Effendy, Chairil (1999), Solusi Tragedi Sambas. *Forum Keadilan*, 11 April, (01): 38; MacDougall, John A. 1999. Classes on Indonesian Borneo Kill 114. *Nos. 1563-1565, May 4, 1999*. John A Macdougall ed. Maryland USA: Indonesian Publications, Indonesian News Service.

acquired differing identities because of the geographic demarcation (Maunati 2007; Ardhana, et. al., 2004).

The organizations of sub-groups like Bone, Pinrang, and Wajo, to mention a few, generally limit their functions by focusing on social and cultural aspects. For example, in dealing with wedding ceremonies, circumcisions, or funerals, they assist each other—a way of upholding shared traditions and connecting with the past (Maunati 2010).

In Tawau, Bugis people also join several organizations. Ito (2002) explains that Bugis people usually participate in organizations that also open to Moslem Malays. Ito (2002: 27-28) lists down five organizations under this category: (1) Persatuan Sahabat Pena Melayu, established in 1936 in Tawau; (2) Persatuan Kebangsaan Melayu Tawau, established in 1946, reformed in 1992, and renamed Persatuan Kemasyarakatan Melayu Tawau. Old generation Bugis joined this organization, while the young associated with the Persatuan Kebajikan Bugis Sabah; (3) Persatuan Keluarga Sulawesi, established in 1976. This organization is composed of Bugis, Mandar, Makassar, and Toraja or Menado peoples. It closed down in 1984 due to protests by the Indonesian Embassy regarding the use the name of Sulawesi; (4) Perhimpunan Keluarga Indonesia Sabah dan Sarawak, established in 1978 under the control of the Indonesian Consulate in Kota Kinabalu. It closed down in 1990. Its branches could be found in Tawau and Sandakan. In Tawau, members were mostly people from Sulawesi; (5) Persatuan Kebajikan Bugis Sabah, established in 1985 (Ito 2002: 27-28).

Other forms of Bugis networking are closely linked to business. Bugis residing in Nunukan engage in business with other Bugis in Tawau. They share traditional culture, which gives them common ethnic identity, but differ because of their national identities. There has been a dynamic interplay between integrating cultural mainstream and keeping the Bugis tradition because of the translocal and transnational movements. These movements strengthened the networking among Bugis of different nationalities. This strong network showcased in the stories of Mrs. Ani and Mr. Amir, two subjects of our previous studies. Mrs Ani, a Bugis lady of

Nunukan, has close relations with other Bugis in Tawau, especially because she has siblings who live there. She always buys goods from Tawau. In the beginning, it was her sister who introduced her to buying goods in Tawau. She eventually knew how to trade with people from Tawau well and has since expanded her business networks.

On the other hand, Mr. Amir, a young fish collector, has 5 Bugis bosses in Tawau. In Nunukan, he works with his father, and contacts a boss who employs 15 Bugis fishermen to catch tuna, and another 5 Bugis to catch shrimps. Catchers of shrimp collect around 3 to 5 times a month, while fishermen collect twice a month. He pays the fishermen prior to their setting on the sea. At that time, tuna was paid for at Rp20,000/kg. Mr. Amir owns a ship which cost up to Rp100 million. In Tawau, Mr. Amir sells fish to Bugis people and his "bosses" who originate from the same hometown in South Sulawesi. The Yamaker market in Nunukan and the fish market in Tawau are usually populated with Bugis people who trade and collect (*pengepul*) (Maunati 2009).

Business networking with other Bugis is also important for the Bugis of Sebatik, Nunukan Regency. Many Bugis people stay in Sebatik Induk. They moved here in several stages. Many of them used to stay in Malaysia prior to settling down in Sebatik. Bugis in Sebatik Island have engaged in fishing but have largely depended on Tawau, as may be seen in the pattern of trade between Tawau-Sebatik Island. In the evening, when the water starts flowing upstream to the river in the local river port, small boats return from Tawau bringing many goods. The boats await the tide to flow so they can move towards the port where customs officers calculate the charges. The traders, porters, and boat owners are usually Bugis. Traders usually bring Sebatik crops like bananas, vegetables, and fish to Tawau (Maunati 2010). Networking with the Bugis of Tawau has been very important for the Bugis fishermen.

The Bugis have also been classified as noble or common people, as could be found among the Bone people. According to an informant from Nunukan, Bugis people recognize the stratification in their groups. Noble families have specific traditions. In marriage,

women are not allowed to marry men from a lower class. The Bugis in Nunukan and Tawau still follow Bugis wedding traditions. According to several informants, the Bugis still follow the most important traditions marking milestones in life like weddings and the *sunatan* (circumcision) for young boys, as they used to do it in South Sulawesi. Mr. Masrun is from South Sulawesi, but he grew up in Tawau, where most of his family reside. Today, he lives in Nunukan, but often attends wedding ceremonies in Tawau. He told us that in Tawau, Bugis people still practice traditional wedding ceremonies, only shortened so people can go back to their responsibilities. In Tawau, his family members work in offices, thus it is hard to leaves and spend time for full wedding ceremonies as in South Sulawesi. Despite the shortened ceremonies, the essential rituals remain, including the proposal, as well as the use of the Bugis language and wearing of traditional Bugis clothing. Bugis dances are also performed and the bridesmaids wear special Bugis clothes. However, not all guests wear traditional Bugis clothes as they usually come from different ethnic groups. According to Bugis informants, these practices are kept despite their being away from the homeland (Manunati 2010).

In Nunukan, traditional Bugis weddings have been important markers of identity. Bugis weddings in Nunukan usually put up traditional platforms decorated with very colourfully, according to preserved their traditions. Relatives from everywhere, including South Sulawesi, are invited, upholding customs and traditions, and maintaining relations with the homeland (Maunati 2010).

In Nunukan, Bugis can be called Bugis by outsiders but they themselves refer to their sub-groups, like Bone, Wajo, and so forth. In Tawau, Bugis people come in different names, like Bugis Malay, Bugis Sabah, and Bugis Indonesian or Malaysian. Of course, these could be contested. For example, Bugis Sabah refer to themelves as Bugis Sabah, especially when dealing with the local government. At different times, they claim to be Bugis Indonesian when disputes in the Malaysia-Indonesia border arise. In Tawau, Bugis who hold Malaysian Identity Card refer to themselves as Bugis Sabah. Descendants of early migrants usually refer to themselves as Bugis Malay (Ardhana and Maunati 2009).

The Bugis in Tawau, considered to be Bugis Malay, are the descendants of early migrants to Malaysia. Those Bugis who migrated during the 1960's and obtained Malaysian IC are often considered Bugis Sabah. The so-called Bugis Sabah, according to informants, obtained their ICs during the process of clarifying their status. This group has been using the Bugis language for communication with fellow Bugis and still maintains Bugis traditions. It is only their citizenship that makes distinguishes them from the Bugis of Nunukan who used to stay in Malaysia and finally settled in Nunukan. Often, they are family. This group has different benefits from those of the so-called Bugis Indonesia, contemporary migrants in Malaysia (Ardhana and Maunati 2009).

As mentioned earlier, many Bugis have been successful in business. For instance, a Bugis family is known to own public transport buses as well as a restaurant. People often talked about Bugis as dominating public transportation in Tawau. Bugis people who hold ICs have the opportunity to get loans from banks to engage in business. Apart from transportation, the Bugis also dominate the fish market in Tawau. Historically, Bugis people played an important role in developing Tawau. While interviewees claim that the Chinese still hold fort in certain economic activities, the Bugis have already significantly taken part in the economic life of Tawau (Ardhana and Maunati 2009).

In Nunukan, we may find contested identities, like Indonesian Bugis and Bugis belonging to sub-groups like Bone, Enrekang, or Wajo. In Sabah, we may encounter Bugis Malay, Bugis Sabah, and Bugis Indonesia. In Johor, there may also be found multiple identities for Bugis people. The identity of Bugis in Johor, Malaysian Peninsula, also shows fluidity and contestation. The Bugis in Johor often identify themselves as Bugis but in different contexts and situations they claim to be Malay. Bugis is also not a single identifying term, but may include other terms such as "*Bugis Totok*", "*Bugis Ancur*", *Bugis Sabah*, *Bugis Indonesia,* and so forth. In addition, the Bugis are also a stratified community, composed of noble families and commoners. Bugis is not the only an identity presented by the community. In certain situations, Bugis identity reemerges in Johor when there are a good number of Bugis around.

Some informants say that this is related to the rise of the Prime Minister of Malaysia who is of Bugis descent. Those who have so far referred to themselves as Malay, at some point also admit to be originally descended from a Bugis family.

The Malaysian Peninsula is known as the home of many different migrants; from India, China, Indonesia, and Cambodia, to mention a few. Minangkabau, Bugis and Javanese have been inhabitants of the Malaysian Penisula for a long time. The Malaysian Peninsula has been thriving in multiculturalism and identity has always been one of its major concerns. The Bugis have become an important group in the development of the multicultural society in the Malaysian Peninsula since the Bugis arrived. The Bugis' different times of arrivals in history have been associated with the contestation of the identity. It is important to have an in-depth understanding of it, as to be illustrated below.

In the Malaysian Peninsula, three groups have been known as the important inhabitants: the Malay, Chinese, and Indian. The Malay compose the majority of the population. Chinese and Indians migrated to Malaysia over a long time. In 1991, Malays in the peninsula compose 58.3% of the total population, while the Chinese had 29.4% and the Indians (including Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans) around 9.5% (Andaya and Andaya 2001). In terms of work, Malays usually engaged in government jobs, as well as the military and police, although today, they expanded to other industries. Citing from Information Malaysia (1998)[6], Musa (2000:144) reports that Malaysia is a multi-ethnic state, with a population of 59% Malay and other indigenous peoples, 32.1% Chinese, 8.2% Indian, and 0.7% others. Identification of Malay in Malaysia could differ from other countries which is also home to Malays. In Malaysia, to be Malay is to be Moslem, a similar formulation offered by Andaya and Andaya (2001).

Those who have been categorized as Malay are not fixed if we look at the Census. According to Hirschman (1987), in a Census during the colonial times, the Malay constituted many groups, with

6) Cited from Information Malaysia (1998), *Year Book*. Berita Publishing Sdn.Bhd. Malaysia, 1998.

the Bugis often included. Meanwhile, in the Census of 1911, the Bugis were included in the category of Malay and allied races. However, the Census of 1931 categorized Malaysians by race, thus the Malays and the Bugis were split. After Malaysian Independence, the Census of 1970 and 1980, the old categories of Malays and Indonesians were used, but the category of Bugis was taken out. It is also important point out that during colonial times, the Malay category was at the bottom of the list. After independence, it has emerged to be the first (Hirschman 1987).

Bugis identity is really multiple and contested identity. In Sabah, Malaysia, Ito (2002) argues that Bugis are composed of three groups: Malay Bugis, Sabah Bugis, and Indonesian Bugis. In our study in Sabah, we also found similar categorizations, but the Bugis Malay is usually refered to as one who resides in the Malaysian Peninsula (Maunati 2010a). This also explains why the Bugis who have been residents of Sabah before migrating to the Malaysian Peninsula were referred to as Bugis Sabah. There have been many waves of Bugis migration in Malaysia. As mentioned, Nurhan notes that (2009) Bugis people have migrated to many places, including the Malaysian Peninsula since the fall of Somba Opu and during colonial times. The contemporary movements have also been identified. Those who have been in Malaysia for a long time and succeeding generations often blended with the Malay people through intermarriage, but often refer to themselves as Bugis Malay or even as Malay in certain situations. This also applied in terms of citizenship. In the Malaysian Peninsula, especially in Johor, the Bugis people referred to themselves as Malay Bugis, *Bugis Ancur*, *Bugis Totok*, Bugis Sabah, and Bugis Indonesia.

The incorporation of Bugis in the Malay category has been supported by the data from the Census in the colonial period. Based on interviews, the equal treatment of Bugis and other Malays during the colonial period brought a feeling of unity with the other Malays. Participation in the struggle for independence assisted the process of integration of the Bugis with the Malays. This made them and their descendents Malay.

This story is different from that of contemporary migrants.

Contemporary migrants are often referred to as Indonesian Bugis. Unlike the Bugis in Sabah who are often categorized into three categories—Malay Bugis, Sabah Bugis and Indonesian Bugis—in Johor, the Bugis have often been combined with Malays, with and their Malay identity often dominating, except in circumstances when Bugis identification is necessary. Some Bugis refer to themselves, and are referred to as "*Bugis Ancur*" because they have been incorporated into Malay ways of life and do not practice Bugis traditions in a proper way. Some of them do not even not speak Bugis language any more. Some of the Bugis are categorized as "Bugis Totok," or those who still use the Bugis language and practice Bugis traditions and culture. They mostly live in the Johor area, especially Pontian[7]. In interviews with several Bugis informants, we learned that the Bugis of Pontian, Johor, referred to as Totok Bugis, are indeed "pure Bugis" as they have been very active in Bugis activities.

Bugis people in the Malaysian Peninsula have a long history and the Sultan Muda of Johor is known to be of Bugis descent (Noorduyn 1988).

An interviewee in Pontian, Johor, told us that his ancestors moved to Pontian in 1915. Since his ancestors belonged to nobility, they did not come empty handed. They were able to own large areas of land and passed them on to their children. There were other stories of Bugis arriving in Johor from other informants. Some also say that most noble Bugis families migrated to Johor. Because of their social status, they had knowledge, leadership, and property from South Sulawesi. They had social and economic capital to start up in Johor. One Bugis descendant reported that his ancestors first stayed in a small island, Pulau Pisang, near Pontian town. This island used to be bigger in size but subsequently diminished due to sea water erosion. The family's lands subsequently shrank along with the process of erosion. Being Bugis, he attempts to maintain traditions and culture in order despite living in a different country. He collects Bugis customary clothing, ceramic jars, agricultural equipment and so forth as to reiterate his Bugis identity in the host

7) Some live in Selangor and Klang.

country.

Interviews with the Bugis of Pontian tell of how they arrived in the locality and how they succeeded in economically. The Bugis of Pontian are proud of their heritage because of their affinity with Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, who is of Bugis descent, as well as several other sultans, including the Sultan of Johor. Bugis organizations maintain traditions and promote social and cultural interests. Organization meetings would always be a feast of traditional Bugis food. There are also efforts from the Bugis community to preserve Bugis arts and dance.

As mentioned, many Bugis in Pontian came from noble families and had an upper hand in things, as well as resources that could be passed on to the next generation. This enabled them to settled down easily and thrive economic conditions. They have also been entrusted leadership by the community. In an interview, one informant's grandfather, who is of noble descent, was asked to lead in many occasions as he was among the "haves" in Pontian area.

The Bugis nobles have also been concerned with upholding culture and traditions, passed on from generation to generation. Traditional wedding rituals are still practiced by many Bugis of Pontian, though it is not as long as it used to be in Sulawesi. The adjustment was done to accomodate people's current lifestyles. For the Bugis, being Malay in Malaysia is simply a matter of being Moslem. Identity comes in several layers, and their ethnic identity connects them to Bugis ancestral traditions.

Maintaining tradition may be illustrated in several ways. For instance, among the most important Bugis traditions is the complex wedding ritual. Abdul Hadi bin Ambok Ing Tang (2009) reports that there have been variations in the traditional wedding processes of the Bugis based on being a member of nobility or "*Anak Arung* (descendants with specific names like Datu, Petta, Bauk, Keraing, Aung, Ufu, and Andik) or mid-level nobility or "*Tau Deceng*" (descendants with specific names like Daeng, Ambok, and Indoki). For these two groups, wedding ceremonies require certain rituals. The first one, "*Mapasek –Pasek/ Mammanuk – Manuk/ Mabbajah laleng / Mattiroh,*" concerns finding out whether the girl is single,

whether the proposal is accepted, and whether there is *kasiratang* or *sikappuk,* or equality in terms of rank and status between the parties. In "*Maddatah/Massuroh,*" a proposal or wooing ritual is performed with readings of *pantun* and offering of 7 strings of betel leaf, 7 betel nuts, 7 *gambir* seeds, 7 packs of chalk, 7 packs of tobacco, 1 ring, a pair of clothes and a woven sarong. In "*Mappetuh Adah,*" relatives wearing traditional Bugis clothing gather and share *barongkoh* as decide on the wedding date, as well as the marriage goods dowry in accordance with social status. There are also the "*Mengantarak Passiok,*" "*Mappadak/ Mattompah,*" "*Macce onrak Falaming,*" "*Mappisauh,*"; "*Mappaccih/ Tuang Pennih,*" and the "*Mattaduk Majjajjarang; tenth, Mappareh Dewatah*." During the wedding ceremony, the rituals are as follows: "*Mattagauk/ Mappigauk,*" "*Maddupah botting,*" "*Mattaluttuk*" (the ritual climing of stairs by the bride and groom), "*Kawing*" (wedding ceremony), "*Ipasikarawai*" (ritual of holding for the newly-weds), "*Mappalluang*" (ritual for race stands), the banquet ceremony, "*Mappameccok*" (ritual for giving money as gift to the bride's family, the best men staying overnight for 3 days, "*Mapparolah/ Marolah*" (ritual for bringing the bride to the house of the groom), and "*Mappasewah Adah*". After the wedding ceremony, there are three rituals: "*Mappassilih,*" "*Marolah Wekkeduah,*" and the visit.

Bugis informants from Pontian report that parts of these rituals are still practiced by descendants of high and middle ranking noble families in Johor. One informant told us that his family still practices certain rituals to reiterate his family's nobility and value traditions. His mother had to study at home with teacher to avoid her mixing with people of lower status. It is customary for Bugis women from noble families to not marry men from lower classes. Fortunately, this tradition is no longer practiced in Pontian.

Bugis traditions have easily marked Bugis identity and descent. In the case of Mr. Rachman, a laudable effort to preserve Bugis traditions was his establishment of a Bugis Museum in Johor. As manager of the museum, Mr. Rachman has paid serious attention to Bugis culture. The museum displays several items, including newspaper articles with headlines like "Preserving the Bugis culture," "Abdullah bina museum Bugis pertama," "Integrating into

the mainstream," and "Najib, Rosmah dirai penuh adat kebesaran diraja Gowa." Photographs of Prime Minister Najib and Najib wearing traditional clothes also appear in the articles. Several photographs of traditional Bugis houses are also on display, as well as other artifacts like musical instruments, pottery, household equipment, ceramic plates, agricultural implements, traditional wedding clothes, silver jewelry, a traditional bed, Bugis woven sarongs, and so forth.

He has also attempted to write the life stories of Bugis people and emphasize on their journey to Johor. He has also created a tree connecting several important Bugis people, as well as collected precious materials that are important for the Bugis.

He admits his anxiety when he thinks about the future of the Bugis Museum. He told us that it will be hard to find a successor since working in the museum needs passion. However, his family does not waver in upholding Bugis traditions. His own house in Pontian is designed in the tradition; Bugis way. It is decorated with Bugis cultural artifacts like traditional wedding clothes. He is married to a lady from South Sulawesi, who is still an Indonesian citizen though they already live in Pontian Johor.

Bugis identity may also be observed in the way the Bugis come together in social organizations. This became strong marker since Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak was appointed Prime Minister. In Johor, Bugis people have not always shown their Bugis identity, especially those who have been blended in with the Malay mainstream. Nevertheless, many Bugis people refer to themselves as Bugis and have joined Bugis social organizations. Other people also refer to the Bugis of Johor, especially those who reside in Pontian, as "real Bugis."

Identity is fluid and not fixed. Many people of Bugis descent embody Malay identity and Malaysian citizenship but maintain their Bugis identity in certain contexts. Cultural negotiation happens here for the Bugis people who have performed translocal and transnational movements and this has influenced the construction of fluid and multiple identities.

Ⅲ. Conclusion

The long history of Bugis migrations to different parts of the world, including Australia, Africa, Malaysia, and parts of the Indonesian Archipelago have been widely discussed. Bugis movements have come in many waves, which contributed to the construction of multi-identities. Aside from this, the three ends of the Bugis people who migrate shaped the construction of the contested identities. It had become important to care for culture and traditions in order to survive. Networking among the Bugis has also gone beyond national boundaries, due to translocal and transnational movements. As they moved to different locations, they upheld Bugis traditions and thus continuously marked their distinct identity.

In Nunukan, the Bugis reiterated their identity by preserving Bugis wedding traditions and creating solidarity in groups. Sub-groups like Bone, Wajo, Enrekang, and so forth also forged additional social organization. Social stratification has also enabled the upholding of different traditions. Meanwhile, the association of the Bugis of Nunukan with the Bugis of Tawau has lent an interesting facet of Indonesian national identity. The Bugis were seen in this paper as fluidly playing with multi-identities depending on contexts and situation, which may easily remind of Eriksen's (1993) relevant argument.

In Tawau, Ito (2002) has categorized Bugis into three groups: the Malay Bugis, Sabah Bugis, and Bugis Indonesia. In our studies, we also found similar categorizations, but the Bugis Malay were usually those who reside in Peninsular Malaysia, while the Bugis who have an IC from Sabah, Malaysia were referred as Sabah Bugis. Historically, Malaysian census lumped Bugis together with the Malay and allied races (Hirschman 1987). Hirschman (1987) further notes that in the Census of 1970 and 1980, the Bugis were not distinguished but were included with Malays, Malaysians, or Indonesians. The descendants of the Bugis who migrated in the seventeenth century have blended well with the Malays, thus they were often thought to be Bugis Malay or simply Malay, as in the case of Johor Bugis, which benefitted economically because of being Malay. The current Prime Minister's Bugis background has inspired Bugis organization,

as per our fieldwork in 2011. This has also brought Bugis pride in further preserving cultural traditions. Also, in Johor, we found "real Bugis," "Bugis totok," or "Bugis ancur" who did not speak the Bugis language, unlike many Bugis totok.

Bugis Totok have been upholding Bugis traditions and have even maintained family heirlooms. They have also kept in touch with fellow Bugis in South Sulawesi and often attended ceremonies like weddings and circumcisions. If in the past, experts often argued that immigrants did not connect with their homeland, today, a lot of re-connections have been made. Kivisto (2001) notes that contemporary migrants are now closely connected with the homeland. In the case of Bugis in Johor, as well as those in Tawau and Nunukan, advanced communication and transportation systems have enabled touching base with the homeland. Translocal and transnational movements have compelled Bugis to strengthen and widen their networks among Bugis of different groups. These movements did not erode certain cultural traditions that mark Bugis identity. Cultural negotiation has been at work as the Bugis integrates with the mainstream, widen and strengthen social network, and preserve important elements of their culture.

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Understanding Political Contestation in Malaysia

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[*Abstract*]

This paper argues and shows how ethnic dimension is still very important in understanding political contestations in Malaysia. To do this, the paper reviews the political as well as population demography to back its assertion. And it is not necessarily improper to continue to use this ethnic lens, although the continued use of this approach has come under heavy criticism both within and from outside Malaysia. Raging debates in Malaysia and by Malaysians are still very much shaped by ethnicity and increasing regional differences. This is further compounded by other factors such as religion, language, and education. In fact, these tools have been more intensely used of late compared to any period before in history as they easily politicize and attract followers.

Keywords: Malaysia, ethnic relations, regionalism, national integration

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Ⅰ. Introduction

For more than fifty years, the ethnic lens has continued to be important in understanding and deciphering contestation in Malaysia’s politics and society. It has steadily intensified. As a matter of fact, this approach of explaining political antagonism propagated by insecure elements within Malaysian society is rising whether or not the latter concern is founded or otherwise. In the last 10 years, increasing ethnic tension have been flaring up and many sides do not appear too keen to a resolution; instead, parties ride on these divisions to further popularity within their respective communities.[1)]

To explore further what is stated above, this paper will first discuss the basis of power relations between competing groups that are based along ethnic and religious lines. While this may provide the first layer of understanding in unraveling Malaysia’s politics, there are also constructed alliances between ethnic communities and regions negotiated in 1948/1957 and 1963 respectively. However, they do not always take center stage in the analysis of competing ethnic demands. Nevertheless they remain the basis by which Malayan and later Malaysian nation-state was formed and therefore should also be understood. Then, this paper will explore the constructed axis of power between ethnic groups that gave birth to the social contract between Peninsular Malays and Chinese in particular, and the Malaysia Agreement that brought together four

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1) Public display of increasing ethnic divides can be seen in ethnic clashes in the urban settlement of Kampong (village/ settlement) Medan in 2001 that involved Indians and Malays. Since the 1969 ethnic riots, many potential ethnic clashes have been successfully averted through swift and firm action by authorities. But lately, this leadership appears to have waned and thus what previously would have been merely wars of words have come out to be open conflicts and confrontation. In 2015 alone, several clashes that are ethnic in character have been reported: the Taman Medan incidents in April 2015 revolving around a protest by Malays/Muslims against the public display of a cross in a church building; the ethnic clashes between Malays and Chinese in the Low Yat (shopping complex) in July 2015, and the Kota Raya (shopping complex) incident in December 2015. All later incidents are well documented/ reported and could be easily accessed on the web. All these have also happened in the Peninsular region and in the capital, Kuala Lumpur.

formerly disparate regions into the larger Federation of Malaysia in 1963[2]. After which, this paper will discuss how the nurturing of the 1 Malaysia concept by Prime Minister Mohd. Najib might be promoted against the rise of ethnic separatism and the seeming sidelining of the basis of nation-state building that was laid down by the founding fathers of Malaya/Malaysia. The paper will conclude with the argument that "when the storm passes, calm returns" and that all these inter-ethnic and regional contestations will give way to long term peace and stability through the return of moderation that has characterized plural Malaya/Malaysia.

Ⅱ. Traditional Basis of Power

Politics is a numbers game. Malaysian politicians have proven that they understand this and are quite adept at using it to their political advantage. Strange as it may sound, it is in Malaysia that the majority needs to be protected and not the other way around. How did this come about? How did Malaysia justify this odd logic when in many countries, it is the minorities that needed protection from being overwhelmed by the majority?[3]

Malaysia comprises the following main ethnic groups, namely Malay, Chinese, Indian and the aborigines (or the Orang Asli) in the Peninsular, and the Indigenous of Sabah and Sarawak (Table 1). In the latter two states, indigenous peoples number to about forty in each state but the more common ethnic classifications referred to or used in the two states are as follows: in Sabah, the Kadazan/Dusun, Bajau, Murut, Chinese, Malay and other bumiputera[4] (to represent

2) Federation of Malaya, British colonies of Sabah and Sarawak, and the Straits Settlement of Singapore.

3) In the United States, the increasing need of this could be seen in the promotion of the diversity policies that spell out how institutions would be required to promote and sustain diversities by ensuring that racial/ ethnic minorities are included in all phases of life in an organization. Diversity is a program that must be cascaded in institutions such as universities.

4) Literally, "bumi" is earth (land) and "putera" is prince; hence, prince (i.e. sons) of the soil; indigenous. The term "bumiputera" was obviously used to refer to the indigenous of Sabah and Sarawak in order that they enjoy the same privilege of the Malay with regards to the latter's special position in the Malayan Constitution.

and classify much smaller ethnic groups), and in Sarawak, the Dayak or sometimes separately, the Iban, Bidayuh, and Orang Ulu,[5] Malay/ Melanau and Chinese.

Table 1: Population & Parliament Seats

Ethnic / Regions	Population (2012)*		Parliament (2008)**	
	'000	%	N	%
Peninsular Malay	14,322	53	126	57
Peninsular Chinese	6,340	23	39	17
Peninsular Indian	1,925	9	0	0
Sarawak	2,214	7	31	14
Sabah	2,317	8	26	12
TOTAL	27,118	100	222	100

Sources: Rounded and adjusted from *(Malaysia 2013: 13 & 24) and **(Elections Commission, various reports) & local newspapers, 2008.

The *2012 Statistics Yearbook Malaysia* reported that Malaysia's population was 26.6 million (Malaysia 2013: 24). In the Peninsular region, the population break down may be seen in Table 1.

In the Peninsular area, Malays comprise the majority. They make up about 53% of the total citizenry, while the Chinese comprised about 23%, and the Indians, 9%. A very small percentage comprises the Orang Asli and many other smaller ethnic minorities such as the Baba/Nyonya, Portuguese, and Siamese communities. While the population composition of Malaysia may seem to be diverse, they are not all reflected in the federal legislative structure. Of 165 parliamentary constituencies based in the Peninsula, 126 have been voted in by Malays as majority voters while the remaining 39 have been elected by the Chinese. The smaller ethnic minorities mentioned earlier do not present themselves as electorally important, except perhaps in the case of Indians in few constituencies where they may have become a deciding bloc in cases where a split have to be made between Malay and Chinese voters.

As bumiputera, the non-Malays of Sabah and Sarawak are extended the Malay's "special position" first codified in the Constitution of Malay and later of Malaysia.

5) Literally, "interior people" or "upriver people" (i.e. ulu = upriver or interior; orang = people).

Sarawak and Sabah national legislative numbers are comparable to the Peninsular Malay and Chinese blocs as the two states are seen as electoral blocs, though not always voting as a bloc (Table 1). Nevertheless, their political inclinations do not always follow the peninsular pattern and are thus sometimes considered as shaping factors in national politics. Furthermore, the diverse and radically plural character of Sarawak and Sabah set the two states part from 11 states in the Peninsula.[6)]

The demographic profile of Sarawak is presented in Table 2. From the population distribution, it may be seen as a truly plural state in that no one ethnic community dominates, as is the case in the Peninsula where Malays form absolute majority both in terms of their population as well as in the federal legislative structure, the parliament. In Sarawak, the largest ethnic group is the Iban, which forms about 32% of the state population.[7)] Together with the Bidayuh which forms about 9% and the Orang Ulu, which comprises 7%, these three ethnic groups form the largest ethnic community of about 48%; collectively these ethnic are also known as the Dayak group.

The Malay/Melanau comprise 26% of the total population. The classification of these two ethnic groups as one is not founded on any strong basis other than the fact that half of the Melanau are Muslims and that prominent Muslim Melanau have risen to be important political figures in the early days of Sarawak and Malaysia's formation.[8)] In fact, in colonial history, Melanau has also

6) In the Peninsula, there are the nine Malay Sultanates plus the former straits settlements of Penang and Melaka. With the exception of Penang, all 10 are Malay majority states where Malay population outnumber Chinese and Indian populations combined. In some states such as Kelantan and Terengganu, Malays numbers may be as high as 90%. Penang on the other hand is the only state where the numbers of Malay and Chinese are about the same.

7) Percentage total of the state's citizen population.

8) There are some who have argued that the Muslim Melanau aligned themselves to the Malay group to strengthen their claim to the state leadership where together they form 26% of the state population. With favorable federal Muslim leadership on their side, the Muslim Melanau stood a good chance to sustain their grip over the state. Melanau Muslim dominated the state leadership from 1970 to 2013, through the chief ministerships of Abdul Rahman Yacob (19790-1981) and Abdul Taib Mahmud (1981-2013).

been classified within the Dayak group.[9] The Chinese comprises about 26%.

Table 2: Sarawak: Population, Parliament & State Seats

Ethnic	Population 2012		Parliament 2015		State Seats 2011			
					2011		2015	
	'000	**%**	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**
Iban	713	32	10	32	21	30	24	29
Bidayuh	199	9	3	10	6	8	8	10
O/Ulu	156	7	3	10	4	6	6	7
Malay/Melanau	568	26	9	29	27	38	30	37
Chinese	578	26	6	19	13	18	14	17
TOTAL	**2,214**	**100**	**31**	**100**	**71**	**100**	**82**	**100**

Sources: Sarawak (2012); (Malaysia, Election Commission, various reports); & various issues of local newspapers between 2011 & 2015.

In the Malaysian parliament, Sarawak has 31 seats (14%). The distribution of these seats based on the composition of voters by ethnic background is shown in Table 2. The size of the parliamentary seats may not be indicating the dominant role that Sarawak plays in national politics. But clearly, the character of local politics at the state level will influence how these 31 state seats may be used to pursue the state's interests in national level political processes. Numerically, it is clear that political contestation boils down to two large indigenous groups, namely the Dayak and the Muslim Malay/Melanau. The Dayak comprising the Iban, Bidayuh, and Orang Ulu have 31 seats out of the 71 seats in state assembly. In contrast, the Malay/Melanau has 27. But the Malay/Melanau[10] is

9) In Sarawak, the classifications of ethnic communities are rather fluid; outsiders could be easily confused as the following dichotomies have been used: (a) Iban*, Bidayuh*, Orang Ulu*, Malay /Melanau and Chinese; (b) Dayak*, Malay/Melanau and Chinese; (c) Muslim bumiputera, non-Muslim bumiputera, and Chinese; (d) bumiputera and non-bumiputera. See Jayum Jawan (1987).

10) The Muslim Melanau and the Malay are politically dominant because they have been unwavering in their unity, unlike the Dayak which only appears monolithically united like the Iban, Bidayuh, or Orang Ulu. Iban, the largest population in the state, is further divided into membership in various political parties. This reduces their claim to numerical dominance that remains merely

the largest single number for any ethnic group, surpassing even the Iban's by six, although the latter's population is much bigger than the former. In such a situation, the Chinese reaped the political advantage of being the "kingmaker" as it did in 1970 when political contestation for the state leadership boiled down to the Dayak versus Malay/Melanau; the Chinese support had determined the winner.[11]

In Sabah, a more complex classification exists because the diverse groups are a lot smaller in number than those in Sarawak. For example, the largest indigenous groups are the Kadazan/Dusun, which has a population of about 25% of the state (Table 3). This is followed by the Bajau at about 19%, the Chinese at about 13%, and the Malay at about 8%. The seemingly large group is the "Other indigenous" or "other bumiputera"[12] which is a summation of many smaller ethnic minorities comprising the largest at 28%. However, this is a statistically convenient lumping together into a category rather than as an ethnic group; although they may share some similarities in certain socio-cultural characteristics as category "Orang Ulu" for the many small ethnic groups of Sarawak.

In Sabah, the appearance of political dominance follows the classification used to further re-categorize the many ethnic groups. For example, it is common to see these ethnic groups in terms of the religious and ethnic divide, being non-Muslims, Muslim indigenous peoples, or bumiputera. In this way, the former comprises predominantly the Kadazan/Dusun ethnic groups while the latter comprises the Bajau, Murut and the "Other Bumiputera" that are predominantly Muslims.

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perception as a powerhouse.

11) For examples, read Jayum Jawan (1991) and Michael B. Leigh (1974).

12) For example, this can comprise the Kedayan, Bisaya, Irranun, Rungus, Kimarang, Kwijau, Lundayeh, Ubian, Binadan, Orang Sungai, Tatana, Tagaas, Brunei, and Suluk. See Department of Information: website: www.penerangan.gov.my.

Table 3: Sabah: Population

Ethnic	Population, 2012	
	'000	%
Kadazan/Dusun	569	25
Malay	184	8
Bajau	450	19
Murut	102	4
Other Bumiputera	660	28
Chinese	296	13
Indian	7	0.3
Other	49	2
TOTAL	**2,317**	**99.3**

Source: Sabah (2012: Table 3.4).

Table 4 re-tabulates the various ethnic groups into three main categories as recently used in political analysis. Based on the profile of these indigenous ethnic group which placed them under either the categories of Muslim and non-Muslim, there are about 30 state constituencies that have majority Muslim voters.[13)] This represents about a half of the total 60 seats in the state assembly. The second largest number with about 22 state seats has non-Muslim majority voters.[14)] In the remaining 8 constituencies, the Chinese form the majority of voters.[15)]

Table 4: Sabah: Legislative Seats

Ethnic	Parliament, 2015		State Assembly, 2013	
	N	%	N	%
Bumiputera: Non-Muslim	7	27	22	37
Bumiputera: Muslim	17	65	30	50
Chinese	2	8	8	13
TOTAL	**26**	**100**	**60**	**100**

Sources: Adapted from various reports from the Election Commission and statistics as reported by local newspapers during strategic elections periods.
Note: *Bumiputera, non-Muslim (or Kadazan/Dusun). Bumiputera, Muslim: Malay, Bajau and Murut, and other bumiputera.

13) In two state seats (Gum-Gum and Tanjong Kapor), Muslim voters are about 50%, making them the largest group, compared to the other two, namely the non-Muslim and the Chinese voters.

14) In one state constituency, Inanam, non-Muslim voters form the largest percentage compared to Muslim and Chinese voters.

15) In two state constituencies, Chinese voters comprised of the largest but do not constitute the majority.

When the Muslim-Non-Muslim divide is used, the Muslim group appears to dominate based on the fact that there are about 17 parliament seats (65%) in Sabah in which they form the majority of the voters. Similarly, they would also be the majority voice in the state assembly with about 30 seats and also claim majority Muslim voters. Nevertheless, the second claim is not as strong as the 50% plus 1 numerical requirement is not reached. However, because the other 30 seats are further divided between the Non-Muslim (22) and Chinese (8), this claim of 30 state seats is strengthened as it only takes one of the other community's support to land power in the hand of the Muslim group.

It has been clearly shown through statistical data that Sabah and Sarawak are plural states. No one ethnic group can lay claim to absolute majority—not even in Sabah where Muslim might use the religious label to lay claim to being the dominant group. This conjecture, even if made, is not sustainable because the majority is based on a loose merger of many small ethnic groups.

The analysis above contrasts sharply with the Peninsula where Malay may lay a valid claim to dominance in all but one state, Penang. In Penang, both in terms of population and legislature, Malay and Chinese number almost equally.[16] In some states such as Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis, Malay dominance becomes more pronounced where Malay population rose to as high as 95%. In states such as Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis, all parliamentary and states seats have overwhelming Malay majorities. For example, a Muslim Chinese won Kota Lama state constituency in Kelantan because he had ridden on PAS's and Malay votes, and not because there were enough Chinese votes to carry him through.[17]

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16) Penang is also a state in which the leadership of the government has always been allocated by the ruling National Front (NF) to its Chinese partner, Gerakan (Parti Gerakan Rakyat). Gerakan is a component of the national ruling coalition, the NF, which is led by the United Malays National Organization [UMNO]). This was the case since the 1960's until the coalition lost the state in the 2008 general elections to a Chinese-led DAP (Democratic Action Party), the opponent of MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association)/Gerakan in NF.

17) Anuar Tan Abdullah is the only non-Malay (Muslim Chinese) who won in Kelantan and a member of the state executive council. See www.kelantan.gov.my.

In any final analysis, the quantity of participation must at some point be judged against the quality of participation as well. Mere presence gives appearance of participation but do not necessarily guarantee quality involvement and real sharing in governance.

Ⅲ. Axis of Power

Any attempt to explain political contestations in Malaysia is incomplete without understanding how two important socio-political developments shaped the nation-state. They remain important documents as the foundation of modern Malaysia. These are, first, the "Social Contract" drawn in 1948 among various parties but specifically shaped to enhance relations between Malays and non-Malays, i.e. Chinese and Indians;[18] second, the Malaysia Agreement that brought together the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak in 1963 (Hanna 1964). Singapore left the Federation in 1965.

Both documents are sparingly referred to in contestation and this is not enough because the totality of the matters and agreements in both documents must be seen together and in their entirety. One portion or aspect cannot be argued independently of the others, as Malaya, and later on, Malaysia, was formed from all agreements contained therein.

3.1. The Social Contract

The Social Contract is premised on the need to ensure that Malay polity and political dominance remain in Malay hands in post-British Malay states. This developed after the end of the Second War World when the British devised a plan for the transition of power to locals. In return for that assurance, there were concessions to the Chinese and Indians. The latter comprised those who had initially migrated as laborers who had since either become naturalized,

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18) The history of the emergence of this contract can be read from Mohamed Noordin Sopiee (1974).

and who had been born of either naturalized parents or migrant workers.

When the British proposed the Malayan Union plan in 1946, citizenship for the new nation-state was very liberal to the extent that the Malayan Union would have a population proportion which is half Malay and half Chinese and Indian. The Malay saw this as a threat, as it resulted in their losing political authority/power in the homeland "Tanah Melayu".[19] The Malay response was to organize opposition to the British idea. They were able to convince their Sultans to take their side, as well as some prominent British Colonial officers sympathetic to their claim. As a result, negotiation led to what was then termed as a contract that contained terms acceptable to many stakeholders, chiefly the Malays, Chinese, Indians, the Malay Sultans, and the British government (Noordin Sopiee 1974).

In place of the Union, the Federation of Malaya was formed in 1948. The agreement to the new form of the nation-state was also accompanied by several terms agreed upon by various stakeholders. First, citizenship was made more stringent with terms such as: (1) continuous, uninterrupted residency to specific years before applying for citizenship; (2) the pledge of allegiance to the Malay rulers; (3) ability to speak the Malay language. This new term of citizenship substantially reduced Chinese and Indian citizenship population to less than 40% then, and thereby restored Malay political superiority or dominance.[20]

Second, Malay was to be the official/ national language of the Federation while other languages may also be spoken and

19) Tanah Melayu is also the term used to refer to Malaya and which means "Malay land". With two ethnic populations that are almost equal in number, there is no majority and neither group can claim superiority or dominance. The majority would be fluid and based on a shifting balance that may oscillate among the Malay, Chinese, and Indian.

20) Contestation in Malaysia and between Peninsular Malays and Chinese centers on the term political dominance that is translated into Malay as "ketuanan", meaning dominance but further suggests a relations between a Master (tuan) and his slaves/servants. Thus the resentment when the term is used as it suggests that Malays are Masters and Chinese slaves/servants.

promoted. The latter specifically referred to Mandarin and Tamil. Both Mandarin and Tamil are languages of instructions in Chinese and Indian schools and these have raised many issues related to nation-state building. Since then, schools have three languages of instructions, namely Malay, Mandarin and Tamil.[21] Third, the special position of the Malay is to be recognized while at the same time the legitimate interests of other communities are to be protected. This special position is clearly spelled out in terms of provisions for Malay like the number or proportion of scholarship, business licenses, and membership in the civil service, land/land reserve. Fourth, the position of the Malay rulers in the Federation is also an integral part of this social contract. Fifth, Islam is to be the religion of the Federation and that other religions may also be practiced in peace.

The above terms were written into the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya 1948. They were carried over into the new constitution of the Federation of Malaya that gained independence in 1957. Thus, the Constitution of Malaya 1948/1957 had restored Malay political supremacy and defined how relations are to be constructed thereafter between the Malays, Chinese, and Indians in the new nation-state.

3.2. Malaysia Agreement

The Malaysia Agreement is another important document. It defined many important roles for players within the enlarged federal nation-state called the Federation of Malaysia. It assigned power and gave exceptions as well as exclusions to states.[22] As a consequence, Malaysia is not the normal federal nation-state explained by the theory of federalism but an imperfect one.[23] The Federation of

21) Discourses on nation-state building have focused on the problem of having three streams of education, namely the Malay (as national stream), the Mandarin, and the Tamil. Before Malaya's independence, this posed a serious problem as curriculum was made following the needs of the three streams. The Chinese and Indian argument in post-Malaya is that the Malay (national) school has a thrust in Malay and Islam and therefore it is not nationally-driven.

22) The process of the formation of the Federation of Malaysia is well-documented and explained by Willard A. Hanna (1964).

23) For a general review and refresher of what federalism and the federal state are,

Malaysia came into being through the coming together of four regions, namely the independent Federation of Malaya, the Straits Settlement of Singapore, and the British Colonies of Sabah and Sarawak. All states in the federation were given the same list of power enumerated in the State List,[24] but in addition to that extra items were assigned only to the states of Sabah and Sarawak; some of these are enumerated under "Additional Protection for States of Sabah and Sarawak".[25]

Hanna (1964) and Noordin Sopiee (1974) have provided detailed accounts of this political processes and explained many provisions that were built into Malaysia. First, there is the need to understand what Sabah claimed to be a "20-Point" demand that the state put forward as conditions for it to join the Federation. There is also a similar demand from Sarawak for about 18 items. Some of the salient features of the Malaysia Agreements that may from time to time inflame relations between the federal and state governments are as follows:

1) Religion (Article 3, Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia):

Borneo states were plural, comprising many ethnic communities with different ways of life and faith. In Sabah, Malays who are generally Muslim form a small percentage of the total population. It probably comprised of no more than 5% of the total population then, although in terms of the number of Muslims, the percentage would probably jump to about 40%.[26] In Sarawak, Malays and Muslims are about 21%, then and now (Table 2). Thus, it was not surprising that both states requested not be subjected to having Islam as religion. However, it was reported that both states do not object to Islam being the religion of the federation, and that it should apply only to states in the Peninsula. The Borneo concern and objection was therefore recorded.

This issue has of late yielded discussions. There is the issue on

see Wheare (1966).

24) Ninth Schedule, *Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia*, 2010.

25) Article 161, Part XII A, *Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia*, 2010.

26) For example, the Kadazan/Dusun are generally Christian and pagan, while the Bajau, Murut and other smaller ethnic minorities are mostly Muslims. See Table 3.

the use of the term "Allah" that Muslims claim are exclusive to them, including a host of other Arabic terms that Christians may not use. Conflicts over the importation of Bibles in Indonesian language has fanned schism between Christians and Muslims and so too the public display of crosses or cross-like images that some Muslims take offense.[27)]

2) Language (Article 152, Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia):

Both Borneo states agreed that Malay will be the official language and that the use of English should also be allowed. This was recorded in the constitution and both states were given 10 years to consider whether they would wish to continue to use English or adopt the Malay as the official language. As it turned out in 1974, the Federal Minister of Education, Abdul Rahman Yacob, who was from Sarawak, campaigned for the acceptance of Malay as the official language. Malay was therefore adopted as the official language in the whole of Malaysia beginning in 1974.

3) Immigration:

The power and rights to grant entry into the states of Sabah and Sarawak were placed in both states. The initial idea for requesting this provision was to ensure Sabah and Sarawak had time to "catch up" with the state of economic development of the more advanced states. This power meant to prevent the exploitation of Sabah and Sarawak by peoples from the economically advanced states in the Federation, including Singapore.

Thus, while there is free movement of people within and

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27) See for examples, Niluksi Koswanage. 2014. "Malaysia's Islamic Authority Seize Bibles as Allah row deepens", http://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-religion - idUSBREA010C120140102. (Accessed December 29, 2015); "Taman Medan Rep says cross sign protest politically motivated, http://english.astroawani.com/malaysia-news/taman-medan-rep-says-cross-sign-protest-politically-motivated-58239. (Accessed December 29, 2015); Sophie Brown. 2014. "Malaysian Court to Christians: You can't say 'Allah'", http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/24/world/-asia/malaysia-allah-ban/. (Accessed December 29, 2015); "http://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-religion-idUSBREA010C120140102cross-shaped air well", http://www.thestar.com.my/-news/nation/2015/12/29/developer-begins-repainting-crossshaped-air-wells/. (Accessed December 29, 2015).

between all states in the federation, peoples from outside Sabah and Sarawak may be prevented from entering either states by authorities. Both states are not required to furnish reason to deny them entry.[28)] The court has in the past upheld Sabah and Sarawak's power under this provision to deny people from other states to enter Sabah or Sarawak.[29)]

4) Borneonization:

The state civil services were to be filled by locals, and while locals were being trained to take over these positions, British officers were to be retained for the time being. But this was not quite acceptable to the federal leadership. Federal officers from the Peninsula were used to fill positions left vacant by British officers while waiting for locals to be trained and therefore take over these positions. This issue remains contentious to this day for the state and federal governments. States have complained that there are too many federal officers taking up positions that could have been given to locals. Compounding this is the accusations that have surfaced that federal officers have come to do more than what was intended. Some federal officers from the Peninsular region have been accused of transgressing on local customs and tradition and cause ill feelings among the multiethnic society of Sarawak by preaching their narrow approach to politics and society ingrained by their parochial Peninsular experience.[30)]

5) Special Position of Indigenous Races:

The article on the Special position of the Malays was amended

28) See for the latest ban, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/-asiapacific/nurul-izzah-banned-from/2324150.html, accessed December 29, 2015; http://www.theantdaily.com/Main/Sabah-and-Sarawak-s-right-to-say-Sorry-no-entry (Accessed December 29, 2015).

29) "Court denies Ambiga leave to appeal Sarawak ban", http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/court-denies-ambiga-leave-to-appeal-sarawak-ban. (Accessed February 1, 2016) & "Ambiga fails in challenge against ban on entering Sabah", https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/313784. (Accessed February 2, 2016).

30) Doubtful conversions have made rounds in may local papers and social media, where rural inhabitants are supposedly "tricked." Converting out is made tedious by bureaucratic procedures. For cases, see Sibon & Ling (2014) and Fernandex (2014).

and extended to the indigenous of Sabah and Sarawak.[31] For the purpose of enjoying this privilege, indigenous peoples in both states are defined as follows: in Sarawak, they comprise the Iban, Bidayuh, Orang Ulu, Malay, and Melanau[32]; in Sabah, "… a person indigenous to Sabah".[33] Again, this controversial, as both states have in the past made claims that they do not feel part of the federation as the special provision has not been effective in giving them access to many areas promised therein.

The above documents discussed in brief are important in the political and economic contestations in the country. They should be the total basis of discourses and not just selected provisions that fit narrow arguments that skew the whole picture. Until discourses are made more impartial and willing to look at contestations from the holistic perspective, a new consensus on how to move forward may not be immediately tenable.

Singapore left the Federation in 1965 after many spats concerning how relations between Malays and non-Malays should be shaped. Singapore was not able to accept the fact that the "new" Malaysia entity is a Malay-dominated nation-state and that Chinese should play second fiddle to the former. This meant that it has no particular liking for the social contract that were devised earlier by Malaya and were to govern relations between Malays and non-Malays. Towards this end, Singapore, a state which has a Chinese majority, was more assertive about equality and promoted a Malaysian Malaysia approach compared to the more tamed Malayan Chinese. The clash was inevitable and before the "fire" spread to others, Singapore was out of the federation.

31) Article 153, *Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia*, 2010. Before 1963, this was meant for Malays of then Malaya.

32) A complete list may be viewed in Article 161A (7), *Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia*, 2010.

33) See Article 161A (6), *Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia*, 2010; it was more open and not listed in detail.

Ⅳ. Nation-State Building

Whatever the process of nation-state building is called, its ultimate aim is to create a nation-state where citizens subscribe to its shared symbols and constructed national identity. The big question is: does Malaysians have these? And what are they?

Malaya and Malaysia have gone through various processes in building the nation-state as the former sought to construct shared values, symbols, and identity. The processes have at different time periods were called by different names such as "bangsa Malaysia" and "1 Malaysia".[34] What all the processes have in common is that they have promoted diversities, although their inherent aim was to mold a common Malaysian culture which would give the country a definitive identity.

A brief review of history will show that the processes were pursued in contradiction from the start. The Malayan "social contract" and the Malaysia Agreement allowed and promoted diversities, and that the molding of the Malaysian national identity was to be based on the state's diverse peoples, cultures, and ways of life. Many of these processing guidelines for building of the nation-state were coded in national policies entrenched in diversity and contradictions.[35] Discussion on some of these may illustrate the above points.

The national education policies launched before Malaya attained independence in 1957 promoted diversity and sustained four educational systems, namely the Islamic, Malay, Mandarin, and Tamil.[36] The policies distinguished conscious (mind) development into four compartments, namely, Islamic Malaysians, Malay Malaysian (national), Chinese Malaysians, and Indian Malaysians; later, the content of Malay (national), Mandarin, and Tamil

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34) For some discussions, see for example, Shamsul AB. (1996).

35) These policies are as follows: the language provision of the social contract that stipulates Malay as the official language while other languages are allowed to prosper without hindrance; the national cultural policy that lists all major components of national culture despite the fact that not all populations readily embrace them as "national." It may be inferred that Malaysia cultures must be a composition of all existing ethnic cultures.

36) Briefs of these policies may be read from Jayum A. Jawan (2003).

education shared "Malayan/ Malaysian" content. Division based on the four systems persisted and further compounded by the fact that non-Malays (i.e. Chinese and Indian) are not part of the national education structure that constructs the education policy for the country especially after Malaya/ Malaysia.[37)]

It does not help that religious polemic permeates the national school system where non-Malay, non-Muslim parents are concerned about their children being subjected to religious proselytization by overzealous teachers. This has not only encouraged the sustainability of national-type schools (e.g. Mandarin and Tamil) but also gave rise to the mushrooming and popularity of international schools that subscribe to international curricula, either British or American. Thereby the process of nation-state building is further eroded with the new school of thought molding Malaysians in another "direction".[38)]

Until many important elements in the Malaysian multi-ethnic society are brought together to devise a "Malaysia" policy on education, education policies and blueprints are not going to get the support of the multi-ethnic society. It will continue to be viewed as a one-sided policy promoting the interest of only one community.

The National Cultural Policy launched in 1971 is another policy that had a good motive but failed to generate the desired

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37) In the Malaysian education system, non-Malays do not get appointed in the hierarchy; they also do not get strategic positions in the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Education Malaysia, the highest education policy-making and implementing institutions. For example, out of 30 directorship positions in the Ministry of Education, only one is held by an Indian who heads the Sports Division. The rest is held by Malays; the two deputies ministers are P. Kalamanathan, an Indian, and Chong Sin Woon, a Chinese; see www.moe.gov.my, accessed December 29, 2015. The same situation also exists in the Ministry of Higher Education, where directorships are given to Malays; the ministry's only deputy minister post is held by a Chinese, Mary Yap of Sabah, www.mohe.gov.my. (Accessed December 29, 2015).

38) Malaysians are cautious of speaking on this issue as one can be hauled up under laws governing discussing "sensitive" issues. Hopefully, the subject can be deliberated more openly following Johor's Sultan comment, see "Johor Sultan slams Malaysia's multi-stream schools", http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/johor-sultan-slams-malaysias-multi-stream-schools. (Accessed December 29, 2015).

outcome and that was to mold Malaysia's national cultural identity. According to the policy, the molding of Malaysia culture is to be based on Malay culture and Islamic values, as well as cultural elements from Malaysia's diverse ethnic communities, as long as the latter's values do not conflict with Islam.[39] On policy, this sounds very good. But when it comes to the identification of what cultural elements from all communities are to be "adopted" as Malaysia's cultural identity, these elements are easily identifiable but are not readily adoptable by all. Thus, after all efforts are made, the process just returns to where it all began, with each community tending to its own cultural enclave. There is therefore no agreement on what constitutes national symbols, values, and identity. What are the values and cultural manifestation that constitute and identify Malaysia and therefore distinguish it from another nationality?

At best, the identification of these "shared" values and cultural artifacts centers on secondary indicators of nationalistic symbols, values, and cultural manifestation, such as cuisine like *nasi lemak* (rice cooked in coconut milk), *roti canai* (Indian pancakes), *teh tarik* (pulled tea). The effort had not gone beyond gathering all cultural artifacts and values that cut across ethnic groups to be accepted by all. Thus, for example, when a minister attends an official function, the Malay minster is welcomed by a *kompang* beating group, a Chinese minister by a lion dance, an Indian minister by a huge flower garland, and a Dayak minister by a dayak war dance accompanied by either gong playing or a *sape* music. These are not examples of shared culture values that have been developed, although all cultural elements of all ethnic groups have been preserved but are not embraced by all within the context of building a "shared" national culture.[40] At best, when a prime minister attends official functions, he has on occasions been welcomed by a combination of the said parties.

In the final analysis, what belongs to each ethnic group are

39) To appease all communities, specifically mentioned are the cultural values and civilization of the Chinese and Indian as well as the cultural and ways of lives of the indigenous peoples of Sarawak and Sabah.

40) A classic discourse on this issue may be read from Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba's (1963; 1989).

held dearly by that particular ethnic group, but not similarly held by others. This low level of acceptance may also extend to national symbols that are considered "national" symbols, cultures, and values because they have not been developed and derived together in a consensual manner.

The failure to generate this feeling of "sharing" of nationals symbols, values, and artifacts are due to the failure to involve all groups in the process of nation-state building. National institutions are still heavily dominated by one or another ethnic group to the exclusion of many others.[41] This exclusive policy does not contribute to the inclusiveness the government has been promoting in seeking to mold "shared" values and vision in education towards creating a "bangsa" Malaysia that Mahathir envisioned or the "1 Malaysia" that Najib Razak is attempting to promote. It is also probably why the education policy and its implementation are increasingly becoming more controversial as both ministries do not have the benefit of wisdom from other communities in the formulation processes. Far from moving the nation-state towards realizing "shared" values as in the rise of a "bangsa" Malaysia or "1 Malaysia", education has divided ethnic communities due to many issues that cannot be resolved unilaterally.

It has been easy to address political representation as NF has done when Sabah and Sarawak were accordingly rewarded after helping the coalition win in the general elections of 2008 and 2013. Never before had Sabah and Sarawak been given 6 seats each in the federal cabinet as both states were given especially after the 2013 general elections.[42] More transparency could have also followed this

41) See and check all the departments, divisions or units of the ministry, www.moe.gov.my. (Accessed December 29, 2015).

42) The six federal ministers from Sarawak did not include Idris Jala, who was brought into the government to spearhead economic reforms after his successful stint in turning the financially losing Malaysia Airlines into profitability. He was drafted into Malaysia Airlines in 2005 by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi and drafted into the federal cabinet by Mohd. Najib in 2009, the same year the latter took over the premiership from Abdullah. See http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/leading_in_the_21st_century/turning_around_a_struggling_airline_an_interview_with_the_ceo_of_malaysia_airlines, http://www.economistinsights.com/speaker/4189, both (Accessed December 31, 2015).

political sharing of cabinet posts and the same formula could have been adopted by UMNO instead of dominating the senate with its members and allies that have not helped it in the last general elections.[43]

Ⅴ. The Role of Sabah/ Sarawak

Ethnic contestation is on the rise. In the 1970's, the reason for this was blamed on socio-economic and political imbalances between the Malays and Chinese.[44] To address this imbalance, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched in 1971. More than forty years later, this contestation is even much more intense and has resulted in the emergence of many more dimensions to the ethnic conflicts and competitions. Today, it is now no longer merely about the economic and political imbalances between Malays and Chinese; the divide is shaped by various factors such as education, language, religion, economic, and region. Although the "social contract" or the Malaysia Agreement were supposed to resolve many of these issues considered sensitive then, they have failed to bring together the Malay and Chinese as well as the indigenous of Sabah and Sarawak. The old premise that any resolution must be based on an everyone wins scenario appears to have given way to victory of just one side. Accommodation, tolerance, cooperation, and the attitude of give-and-take are now seen as a display of weaknesses. Politicization of these issues by politicians who ride on them to generate popular appeal does not help either.

43) For example, out of the 41 members nominated by the ruling party, 22 are from UMNO, 6 MIC, 6 MCA and two others held those associated with the Malayan parties. Sarawak and Sabah were given only 2 each despite their significant contribution to winning the parliamentary majority compared to the decimated MCA and MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) that clearly did not "politically" deserve the number of their senatorial seats based on electoral performance in 2013. For the numbers of nominated members of the senate and their affiliations, see www.parlimen.gov.my. (Accessed December 29, 2015).

44) The issue might be reduced to: the few held too much economic wealth at the expense of the many. Furthermore, the many were then deemed "migrant" in contrast to the locals who were seen as economically displaced in their own home.

The above scenario develops against the backdrop of a failing Malay unity in UMNO[45] that has been seen as the standard bearer for the Malays. The old premise is that UMNO is Malay and Malay is UMNO, and therefore when UMNO lost substantial political support to Islamic/ Malay PAS[46] and the new Malay-led PKR[47] in two previous general elections, the balance of power was deemed to have tilted against the Malays.[48] The heightened conflicts between ethnic groups are not at all helping when there is public perception that the institutions of government are seen to be taking sides.[49] For example, the Malay dominated police force has been seen to be

45) UMNO: "United Malays National Organization" has always won majority Malay support in the Peninsula, and when UMNO, with the help of its partners such as MCA [Malaysian Chinese Association], did not get enough seats to pass the majority threshold to form the federal government in 2008 and 2013, Malays deemed power had slip from their hands once again. This may have prompted a more "nationalistic" approach to politics that put non-Malays into a state of "worry".

46) PAS: Pan Islamic Party is basically a Malay party and the main UMNO opponent for Malay support. It has won and is the ruling party in the Malay state of Kelantan, which has more than 95% Malay population.

47) PKR: Anwar Ibrahim formed Parti Keadilan Rakyat in the 1990's after the former was removed as Deputy Prime Minister and as UMNO member. In the 2008 general elections, PKR won Selangor state when it partnered with Chinese-dominated DAP (Democratic Action Party) and Malay/Muslim PAS. DAP won the Penang state government in 2008 and retained the same in 2013, as did PKR in Selangor as well.

48) But the total Malay seats continued to be held by Malays who are members of the three political parties.

49) Recent indications and incidents that undermine public perception of political and government institutions are the following: the neutrality of the police force (for example, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/igp-denies-bias-sedition-arrests-says-act-bn-074800320.html; "Police bias betrays public trust", https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/8134; the appearance that there is no legal/constitutional recourse for non-Muslims when their interests collide with Muslims, especially regarding conversion and religious issues;. For examples, see "Appeals Court: Not for us to hear Muslim conversion cases", http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2015/12/31/appeals-court-not-for-us-to-hear-muslim-conversion-cases/. (Accessed December 31, 2015). For instance, Mohamed Hanipa Maidin asked: "Can non-Muslims get justice from a Muslim court" after civil court says its not within their jurisdiction to hear cases about conversion", http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2015/12/31/can-non-muslims-get-justice-from-a-muslim-co urt/. (Accessed December 31, 2015); and appearance of tilted actions of national leaders that portray taking sides, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/at-low-yat-2-opening-ismail-sabri-calls-on-minorities-to-support-all-malay.

slow in taking action against Malays accused of making offending remarks against the beliefs of Christians; it is also perceived as often quick to act against non-Malays when Malays complained that Islam is subverted. This negative perception of government extended to Malay cabinet ministers who have been seen in the same light especially in the confiscation and importation of Bibles written in the Malay (Indonesia) language. It is against this backdrop that PAS and PKR rode to moral electoral victory and took substantial portion of Malay support in the 2008 and 2013 general elections, and winning a number of important states such as Selangor and keeping Kelantan, as well as yielding Penang, and for a short while Perak in 2008 through their partner, the DAP. Before these general elections, UMNO enjoyed overwhelming support from the Malays. With the solid support from the Peninsular Chinese, the Alternative Front (BA [Barisan Alternatif])[50] was almost swept to power at the federal level. With the party's strong wins in 2008 and 2013, it had denied the ruling National Front (NF) the usual two-thirds majority the latter had taken for granted before 2008. Since the 1960's, the NF has won the general parliamentary elections with a two-thirds majority and kept intact all states, except one or two states, such as Kelantan, Terengganu, or Sabah.

Sabah and Sarawak may be the last chance to improve inter-ethnic relations that have been reneged from in the Peninsular region because of the Malay-Chinese contestation. Both states cannot be swayed by ethnic bigotry emanating from the Peninsular, as the experiences of Sabah and Sarawak are different. Both states are plural with many small ethnic communities. Life in these two states has been about cooperating and accommodating each other unlike in the Peninsular region where Malays are dominant and therefore do not feel need to accommodate Chinese and Indians. But the Malay accommodation of the Chinese and Indians in the early 1940's and 1950's speaks volumes of the generosity, leadership, and wisdom of past leaders, and this must be remembered by the successors.

Towards thwarting declining inter-ethnic relations, Sabah and

50) Opposition alliance of PKR, DAP and PAS.

Sarawak need to put their foot down. They have to leverage their 58 parliamentary seats to put up a strong message to their coalition partners and the leader, UMNO. It must advocate the need to bring sense to the deteriorating state of affairs in relation to ethnic and religious ties, governance, and managing increasing openness, and bureaucratic paralysis currently gripping the country, its leaders and institutions. Sabah and Sarawak have a strong mandate that may be used to get the necessary leverage from the federal leadership, as the sustainability of the ruling NF government is dependent upon them. Without the number of seats won from Sabah and Sarawak by NF component, the NF would not have enough parliamentary majority to claim the right to form the federal government after the 2013 general elections. Although they have been generously rewarded with increased posts in the federal cabinet, Sabah and Sarawak have a moral obligation and duty to ensure a more stable and peaceful Malaysia. Because Sabah and Sarawak are non-Malay majority states, they can leverage on their combined parliamentary numbers to moderate the Malay majority from the Peninsular region. In recent years, Sabah and Sarawak regional sentiment is growing stronger. In Sarawak, this sentiment was strongly shown in support of the new Chief Minister, Adenan Satem, who secured a two-third majority in the Sarawak Assembly. He was given the strong mandate due to his campaigning on the state's right that he promised to bring up in national politics.[51)]

Ⅵ. Conclusion

The founding fathers showed that Malaysia was formed from a consensus built through negotiation, co-operation, compromise, give-and-take, and above all, justice and fair play. In this they had shown statesmanship. Malaya was granted independence from Britain in 1957 because Malay, Chinese, and Indian leaders came together to forge an alliance that convinced the British that they could work together. And later, Malaysia was formed through many

51) Adenan Satem took over as Chief Mnister of Sarawak in 2014 from the longest reigning chief minister, Abdul Taib Mahmud (1981-2014). The May 2016 was a state election in which he received his own mandate to rule.

negotiations, compromises, and assurances that the new nation-state would benefit all parties. To assure concerns expressed by some parties, many special provisions were built into the federal constitution.

Contemporary Malaysian leaders need to go back and re-visit these values that had made it possible for the birth and independence of Malaya and the formation of Malaysia. The nation-state needs to continue to promote these values and its leaders must realize that this is the only way forward. The population and legislative majorities are not licence to bulldoze and cow minorities to accept what are determined by majority without consultation from the minorities. The lop-sided public bureaucracy needs to be improved and the balance that may be required in the private sector to offset the change to the former must also be considered. This approach has been used before to address socio-economic imbalance found in the early 1970's and the same approach could still be adopted successfully to reform the same structure that heavily favors a few ethic communities over many others.

Above all there is a need to review and strengthen the Malaysia Agreement in order to fix gaps that appeared since Malaysia was formed in 1963. Provisions of the Malaysia Agreement cannot be viewed in isolation. They must be seen and reviewed collectively as each provision are part of the total agreement. The issues are still very much the same although the dimensions have been enlarged and have yielded new perspectives. Leaders from the major and various majority groups must show the lead and wisdom to collectively overcome excessive demands of each ethnic community and rise above these parochialisms to restore peace and order in order. Everyone must strive to move forward as one state with many nations.

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

Borne of the Cold War: Malaya/Malaysia from a Historical Perspective, c. 1950’s-c.1990’s

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[*Abstract*]

Malaya attained independence on August 31, 1957 from Britain. However this new nation faced a communist insurgency known today as the “Malayan Emergency” (1948-1960). Then in 1961, Tunku announced a wider federation of “Malaysia”, viz. Malaya, British Crown Colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo, and the protectorate of Brunei. Countering communism was a principal motive for “Malaysia”. Sarawak’s leftist elements were rejected with an armed opposition. Malaysia was formed excluding Brunei. Amidst its birth pangs, Malaysia faced hostile neighbors Indonesia and the Philippines; the former objected by way of *Konfrontasi* (1963-1967) while the latter laid claim to Sabah (formerly North Borneo). Malaya/ Malaysia was borne in the midst of the Cold War (1947–1991), a bipolar world between the US and the USSR. Malaya/Malaysia is utilized as a case of analysis and evaluation in the context of the twin trends of continuities and transformations in tracing the historical developments from the 1950’s to the 1990’s. The risks, motives, and challenges that prompted the shift in foreign relations reveal as much of the personality of the political

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leadership, the prevailing situations, and conditions from within and circumstances from without.

Keywords: Malaya/Malaysia, Cold War, non-alignment, foreign relations, political leadership

Ⅰ. Introduction

Malaya attained independence on August 31, 1957, finally unshackling the peninsular Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Johor, and the crown colonies of Penang and Melaka from British colonial rule. Despite the joys of achievement, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman[1] and his deputy Tun Abdul Razak remained troubled as the communist insurgency ("Malayan Emergency") continued unabated in the tropical jungle since 1948. There was literally a "hide and seek" situation between the Malay Regiment and Commonwealth forces (UK, Australia, and New Zealand) and the guerrillas of the Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP). It was not until 1960 that the Emergency was lifted. Fresh from this victory, Tunku announced in 1961 the proposed wider federation of "Malaysia" comprising Malaya, the three British Crown Colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo, and the British protected Malay Muslim Sultanate of Brunei. Countering communism was a principal contributor, if not the exclusive, motive behind "Malaysia." Leftist elements in Sarawak vehemently rejected "Malaysia," and subsequently launched an armed opposition. Nonetheless, on September 16 , 1963, Malaysia was inaugurated, excluding Brunei from its boundaries. Inauspiciously, amidst its birth pangs, Malaysia faced hostile neighbors Indonesia and the Philippines; the former objected with military force in launching *Konfrontasi* (1963-1967) while the latter laid claim to Sabah (formerly North Borneo). Within two years Singapore seceded owing to ideological incompatibility and economic issues.

1) Prime minister of Malaya, 1957-63, and of Malaysia, 1963-70.

Malaya/Malaysia was borne in the midst of the Cold War (1947 – 1991), a bipolar world between the US allying with the democracies of Western Europe and the USSR with its East European socialist satellite states. Understandably, colonial Malaya was allied to Washington. Post-independent Malaya remained steadfastly pro-Anglo-American, as exemplified by the staunchly anti-communist Tunku. But a shift in foreign relations was initiated by Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak (t. 1971-6) in embracing non-alignment and neutrality from 1969, notwithstanding that only two years prior to that, Malaysia together with anti-communist Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). By 1971, ASEAN also adopted a stance of non-alignment and neutrality working towards the realization of a Zone of Peace, Friendship and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). As prime minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (t. 1981-2003) further shifted Kuala Lumpur's stance away from the Washington-London axis. In the later part of 1981, he launched his "Buy Britain Last" campaign; the following year (1982), the "Look East" policy, emulating Japan, was adopted. The 1990's saw Malaysia emerging as a "leader" of the South, especially of African nations, and the annual Langkawi International Dialogue was inaugurated in 1995, aimed at nurturing Malaysia-Africa relations. Meanwhile Malaysia was instrumental in securing ASEAN membership for the communist-governed Vietnam (1995) and Laos (1997), and the military-ruled Myanmar (1997), and later on, Cambodia (1999).

Malaya/Malaysia is utilized as a case of analysis and evaluation in the context of the twin trends of continuities and transformations in tracing the historical developments from the 1950's to the 1990's in the midst of the five-decade Cold War period. It shall be argued that the risks, motives, and challenges that prompted the shift in its foreign relations reveal as much of the personality of the political leadership, the prevailing situations and conditions from within as well as circumstances from without.

Ⅱ. *Merdeka* and *Darurat* (1945-1960)

Between 1945 and 1960, British Malaya underwent developments that portrayed continuities and transformations. It was a tumultuous period for Malaya, then under British colonial rule that had emerged from the brief but significant period of Japanese occupation (1941-5) into unprecedented political developments, a full-blown insurgency aimed at toppling the government of the day, and constitutional steps towards eventual independence (*merdeka*). The advent of the Cold War figured in Malaya's post-war developments. Since the establishment and consolidation of British colonial administration in the last quarter of the nineteenth century over the peninsular Malay states and earlier over the Crown Colonies of Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), and Melaka (1824), Malaya had not faced dramatic political and military upheavals, economic dislocations, and social distress than the decades of the 1940's and 1950's (Andaya and Andaya 2001).

The outbreak of the Pacific War (1941-1945) that witnessed the invasion and military occupation of Malaya by Imperial Japan was the first sampling of modern warfare to most of the multi-ethnic inhabitants (Malay, Chinese, and Indians) (Kratoska 1998). The one-sidedness and swift invasion and occupation impressed significantly on the minds of the peoples who witnessed what was first thought as impossible: Japanese (Asian) superiority over British (Western/European) military might. Moreover, the three years and eight months of Japanese military administration was a rude and horrific period compared to the pre-war era of salubrious and peaceful times. The myth of British superiority was forever shattered, an irreparable damage to the image of respectability and quiet cleverness of the "Tuan" and the ever-fastidious "Mem." Inside internment camps, British military personnel and European civilian internees appeared no more human than the commoner Malay, Chinese, or Indian; the fair-skinned British colonials too also appeared dishevelled, jostled over food, indeed very vulnerable, weak, and frightened in the presence of the harsh Japanese military. It was not uncommon for local peoples to witness the inhumane and humiliating treatment of a Tommy (British soldier) at the hands

of a Japanese private. Japanese cruelty, harshness, and brutality did not endear them to either Malays, Chinese, or Indians. Wartime shortages of practically everything from matches to rice, soap and cooking oil and a host of daily consumables made life for everybody difficult. But much more than the physical deprivation was the mental anguish of enduring uncertainties, the all-enveloping fear, and the shudder and missed heartbeat whenever there was a knock on the door or the ringing of the telephone. The *sook ching* (cleansing, purification) campaigns to weed out anti-Japanese elements within the Chinese community literally consumed many lives (Hara 2004b). While male Chinese feared being impressed into labor gangs, females cut their locks, dirtied their face, donned baggy clothing, and hid in attics to avoid the military brothels. Failure to bow to a Japanese earned the recalcitrant a slap or two. Real, perceived, or suspected anti-Japanese elements faced the wrath of the Kempeitai (military police) which adopted the modus operandi of torture-first-questioned-later procedure (Hara 2004a). Few "guests" survived Kempeitai "hospitality."

The end of the war and the British return were undoubtedly celebrated by the multi-ethnic inhabitants of Malaya. But the fortnight interregnum (between the Japanese surrender in mid-August and the arrival of Allied re-occupation forces in early September) witnessed guerrillas of the Chinese-dominated Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) emerging from jungles and claiming victory over the Japanese. The Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was the backbone of the MPAJA. Sino-Malay armed clashes hitherto unheard of broke out, sparked by MPAJA personnel and/or instigating punishing Malay wartime collaborators resulting in scores of fatalities in rural bazaars and *kampung* (village) (Cheah 2012). No doubt there were collaborators among the Malays, and likewise within Chinese and Indian communities, but the overall Chinese perception was that the Malays appeared to not have suffered much under Japanese rule as shown by their continuation as civil servants and police personnel. It simply meant that they worked with the enemy and deserved to be punished. Malay retaliation exacerbated inter-ethnic clashes. Communal leaders rushed to temper the situation, and their

respected status, mediating abilities, and courage arrested further escalation.

Following the brief British Military Administration, British colonial civil authorities put in place a new administrative framework known as the Malayan Union (1946) (Harper 1999; Lau 1991). The new Union was to replace the cumbersome Straits Settlements (SS, since 1826), the protectorates of the Federated Malay States (FMS, since 1895) and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS, since 1909, 1914) that collectively referred to as British Malaya, a politico-administrative entity that formally did not exist. The pre-war arrangements of protectorates and crown colonies to some extent contributed to the failure in defense measures in the last war. The post-war geopolitical situation of a bi-polar world undoubtedly had an impact on Malaya. The proposed Union comprised all the Malay states (FMS and UMS), and Penang and Melaka, two of three SS. For strategic priority, Singapore, with its naval base, was retained as a crown colony. For the Union to be realized, new treaty agreements needed to be negotiated with the respective Malay sultans who hitherto remained the sovereign ruler of their respective domains to transfer their sovereignty (*kedaulatan*) to the British Crown. A British officer carried out this task in a whirlwind visit to secure the signature of all the Malay rulers. Applying various degrees of persuasion, practical arguments, threats, and coercion, Sir Harold MacMichael succeeded in his mission (Harper 1999: 84-5). Hence on June 1, 1946 the Malayan Union was formally inaugurated with a British Governor and a bureaucracy at Kuala Lumpur overseeing its administration.

Conspicuously absent in the installation ceremony of the Malayan Union Governor were the Malay sultans. Unanticipated by the Colonial Office (CO) mandarins, stripping off the sovereignty of the Malay rulers was tantamount to eliminating these royals altogether. The sultan, from the Malay viewpoint encompassed the *negeri* (state) and *bangsa* (people), hence without the sultan, there is likewise no *negeri* and no *bangsa* (Mohamad Noordin Sopiee 2013). Was it not that the Malay legendary heroic figure of Hang Tuah had forewarned: *Tak Melayu hilang dari bumi* [Forbid that Malays are extinct from the world]. Hence the slogan *Hidup Melayu*

[Malay Survive] reverberated at anti-Union gatherings of Malays. Having realized the implications of their signing over their sovereignty to the British monarch, the nine Malay sultans lent their royal ascent to the peaceful but vociferous protests. Under the leadership of Dato' Onn bin Jafaar, the chief minister of Johor, the various Malay organizations and associations gathered in Johor Bahru in 1946 to establish the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in order to spearhead the anti-Union protest (Abdul Rahman Haji Ismail 2004: 1365).

The British were caught off-guard in not anticipating such widespread Malay opposition, both from the sultans and the *rakyat* (masses). It was an unprecedented show of unity, organization, and single-mindedness of a hitherto mild-mannered community fighting for its very survival. Although in the pre-war period, the sultan had in fact lost all semblance of political and administrative powers that had been passed to the hands of his British Resident/Advisor, in the eyes of the *rakyat*, the sultan remained the sovereign ruler where all legislations were enacted, sanctioned, and implemented in his august name, *Seri Paduka Baginda* (His Majesty).

Within two years following negotiations among the British colonial authorities, the Malay rulers, and UMNO, another governance framework was proposed as an alternative, namely the Federation of Malaya (1948) (Stockwell 1984). The territorial components remained, the sovereignty of the nine sultans were untouched, and the citizenship of the Federation was extended to Chinese and Indians on the principle of *jus soli* and other liberal requirements. The Federation, inaugurated on February 1, 1948 was much more amiable to all quarters, and there was much compromise on the part of the Malay rulers in sanctioning thousands of immigrant Chinese and Indians to be recognized as full-fledged citizens. But before celebrations could commence, tragic news of the murder of several British planters in Perak by jungle terrorists forced the colonial government to declare a state of Emergency (*Darurat*) in June 1948.

Constitutional steps like the Federation of Malaya (1948) were considered long drawn out and hinder full independence as alleged

by the MCP; armed revolution appeared to be the only means to rid the country of British colonialism. The increasing victorious advances of the Communists in the Chinese mainland in pushing back Nationalist forces inspired the MCP. MCP's strategy was to cripple the commodities-based economy of Malaya (rubber and tin), and in the dislocated chaos, to seize the rein of power through military means (Stockwell 1993). Rubber trees were savagely slashed, the Tamil Indian estate workers intimidated, tin mines and machinery were destroyed, and Chinese coolies threatened and beaten. Utilizing the carrot-and-stick approach the communist terrorists (CTs) were persuaded to surrender (with leaflets dropped in the jungle) and at the same time troops were poured into the jungle to seek out and destroy CTs (Stubbs 1989).

Meanwhile, apart from the psychological warfare and direct military operations against the jungle guerrillas, the colonial government launched an ambitious plan to resettle thousands of squatter communities to the jungle fringes. The bulk of these settlements were created by refugee Chinese fleeing to remote areas bordering the jungle to escape perceived Japanese oppression. The wartime MCP-MPAJA jungle guerrillas relied on these squatter Chinese farming communities for recruits, supplies (medical and food), and intelligence through a combination of coercion and persuasion that drew on ethnic affinity (Chapman 2014). Therefore, in the post-war period, when the MCP launched its armed revolution to seek independence and establish a communist state, it turned to its former supply line. By relocating these squatter Chinese farming communities into "New Villages" with all amenities (electricity, piped water, schools, clinics, etc.), it severed the CTs supply line, cutting off their survival chain and in turn forced them to retreat further into the jungle interior narrowing their survival rate and influence on the wider society (Hack 2015). An alternative to the MCP for the Chinese community was the Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) established in 1949 to assist the "New Villages" in settling in and overcoming teething problems. Commencing as a welfare organization, the MCA assumed political roles to promote Chinese interests thereby undermining MCP propaganda that the Chinese were neglected and marginalized

(Heng 1988).

By 1960, the MCP appeared to be a wasted force; a handful of hard-core members had moved into the deep jungle striding the Thai-Malaysian borderlands. Five years earlier, the Baling Talks (1955) sought to find a solution to the impasse as the MCP tried to convince the political leadership of the then self-ruled Malaya under Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to recognize the MCP as a legitimate political organization free to participate in local and federal elections, as they in turn would lay down arms. The staunchly anti-communist Tunku outrightly rejected this proposition, and reiterated his offer to MCP Secretary General Chin Peng and his comrades to give up communism and return to society (Anuar Nik Mahmud 1998).

Some might argue that the Emergency hastened Britain's granting independence for Malaya on August 31, 1957 (Barber 2013). The British undoubtedly wanted to prevent the communists from gaining any more popularity, and thus sought to hasten the speed to decolonization to win over the masses. In the absence of the Emergency, there was the possibility that the British might slow down the decolonization process. Whitehall would only consider handing over independence to a political leadership that could not only defeat the MCP insurgency but could also able to crucially unite the multi-ethnic inhabitants. The inter-ethnic clashes of the immediate post-war period provided the tragic scenario of such racial strife if independence was to be handed over to a weak Malayan government. Tunku's ability to oversee an UMNO-MCA alliance won the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Elections in February 1952. The Alliance Party (UMNO-MCA-MIC) repeated this electoral triumph in the First Federal General Elections in July 1955. It won all but a single seat, a convincingly concrete demonstration of a united front of multi-ethnic political partnership (Khong 2003). In the Cold War context, Britain would want to be convinced that its successor in Malaya was a pro-Western democratic government and not a socialist or communist state that would have serious implications for the geopolitical situation in the region. The Anglophile anti-communist Tunku was the appropriate candidate to head independent Malaya.

Continuities and transformations could be discerned in the post-war historical developments. The brief Japanese interregnum could be seen as merely a rude interruption for once the war was concluded, Malaya resumed its position as a British colonial territory. The Malayan Union that wanted to transform the peninsular Malay states into British colonies was rejected. Its replacement, the Federation of Malaya, was a continuity of British colonial rule with preparations towards self-rule and subsequently full independence. The MCP's armed revolution, a radical departure from the constitutional path towards independence proved to be a transformation. If the MCP had succeeded to overthrow the colonial regime of Malaya, it would establish in its place a communist state, quite likely a satellite state of the People's Republic of China (PRC) considering the support (mainly moral and some material) that the MCP received from Beijing throughout its armed campaign.

Ⅲ. "Malaysia" and *Konfrontasi* (1961-1967)

When Tunku made his announcement of the establishment of "Malaysia" to the Foreign Correspondents' Association of Southeast Asia in Singapore on May 27, 1961, it was a lull between Dien Bien Phu (1954) that ended French colonialism over Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin incident in early August of 1964 that subsequently sparked the Vietnam War (1964-75). It was a time of uncertainties where the communist threat from North Vietnam appeared to be "intruding" into Southeast Asia.

Tunku's suggestion of an expanded federation in combining Malaya, Singapore, and British Borneo, viz. Crown Colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo, and the protectorate of the sultanate of Brunei, would be an anti-communist bulwark. While the capitalist sector of the Chinese community of Sarawak and North Borneo was partial to the proposed wider federation, considering the expanded trade and commerce hitherto a Chinese preserve, the majority of the indigenous peoples were to a large extent oblivious of developments and scant inkling of "Malaysia." The low literacy among the native population of Iban, Malay, Orang Hulu, Melanau, Kadazandusun,

Murut, and Bajau made people unable to grasp the consequences and implications of the formation of "Malaysia.". However, British colonial officials, including Governor General Malcolm MacDonald (1946-1955), successfully persuaded native leaders to accept "Malaysia".

Hurriedly native leaders constituted political parties in order to safeguard the interests of their respective communities vis-à-vis others (Faisal S. Hazis 2011; Chin 1996; Luping 1994). Subsequently, North Borneo's Tun Datu Haji Mustapha bin Datu Harun (1918-1995) established the United Sabah National Organization (USNO), and Tun Muhammad Fuad Stephens (1920-1976) the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO).Tan Sri Datuk Amar Ong Kee Hui (1914-2000) and Tan Sri Datuk Amar Stephen Yong Kuet Tze (1921-2001) constituted the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) while Datu Patinggi Abang Haji Mustapha and Tan Sri Datuk Amar Stephen Kalong Ningkan (1920-1997) initiated the Parti Negara Sarawak (PANAS; Sarawak National Party).

Meanwhile Tunku's "Malaysia" plan faced a fast-emerging and anti-Western Indonesia under President Sukarno (Tan 2008). By the early 1960's internal developments were pointing towards the increasing powers of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesia Communist Party) that actively sought the president's support. On the other end of the scale was the Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian National Armed Forces), likewise jockeying for Sukarno's favor. The consummate Javanese *dalang* president was playing a balancing game, and deftly trying to play one off another. Both the PKI and the TNI were formidable forces. Any misstep by Sukarno would be disastrous for himself, Indonesia, and the wider region of Southeast Asia.

Destabilizing forces were actively at work in the Malaya-Indonesia region. Leftist elements created much havoc with numerous labor actions and strikes in Singapore. Also, anti-colonial agitation was increasingly gaining grassroots support. A worrying situation developed across the South China Sea in the British crown colony of Sarawak. Recruiting from the Sarawak Chinese vernacular schools, the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO), later, as the

Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO), was gaining influence among Chinese youths where many with unrecognized Middle school certificates were seeking new avenues to channel their frustrations towards the British colonial government (Ooi 2012). These Chinese youth were used by Communist agitators seeking recruits, sympathizers, and supporters. Emphasizing the ethnic and patriotic preference, the PRC attracted Sarawak Chinese youth and other members of the community by making them feel the filial obligation to the fatherland, initially introduced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Illiterate parents of peasant stock had little influence over their Middle school graduate sons and daughters who looked towards a "New China" that needed them to further rise. Consequently scores of Sarawak Chinese youths joined the SCO.

Not unlike other communist organizations then, the SCO adopted the united front strategy that called for infiltrating bona fide labor unions and political parties (Porritt 2004.). Such infiltration was primarily aimed at ultimately seizing control over the legitimate organization, and thereafter to pursue the SCO agenda of establishing a communist state. SCO failed in infiltrating neither peasant/farmer organizations nor labor unions in Sarawak. Some semblance of success was achieved on the part of the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), a predominantly Chinese-based moderate political party (Ooi 2012). The moderate leadership of President Ong Kee Hui (t. 1959-82), a respected entrepreneur, and Secretary-General Stephen Yong Kuet Tze (t. 1959-82), a highly regarded solicitor of the underdog, underestimated SCO elements in seizing control over key positions within SUPP.

SUPP opposed "Malaysia," and instead preferred independence first for Sarawak, en route to joining this wider federation (Ooi 2012). The extent SCO elements influenced SUPP's stance is hard to ascertain but this anti-Malaysia position played into SCO's plan. It was SCO's intention to urge for Sarawak's independence from Britain, and having unshackled it from colonial grasp, a communist seizure of power through SUPP with Chinese backing would be a coup to savor. In the event that Sarawak opted for directly joining "Malaysia," SUPP's Chinese support would be defeated by the predominantly Malay federal government in Kuala Lumpur.

Understandably, SCO, through SUPP, at all cost opposed any attempts of Sarawak participating in "Malaysia" (ibid.).

In line with other anti-Malaysia groups, SUPP joined forces with the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB, Brunei People's Party) and the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO) of North Borneo. Sheikh Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud (t. 1947-62), founder-president of PRB harbored other designs, viz. setting up a Negarabagian Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (NKKU, Unitary State of North Kalimantan) comprising Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo. Expecting the blessings of Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III (1950-67) to act as the head of state, and Azahari as prime minister (Tan 2008; Ooi 2012). Azahari possessed grandiose visions of resurrecting Brunei's past glory; this Malay Muslim kingdom of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries held sway over an empire that extended as far north as Manila, much of the Philippine archipelago, and most of the island of Borneo (Ooi 2016).

Although PRB won the majority of contested seats—all 16 elected seats in the State Legislative Council, and 54 out of 55 seats in the district councils, thereby dominating all four local councils-the palace refused to hand over power.

The inaugural meeting of the State Legislative Council was scheduled for December 5, 1962 where the PRB submitted three written motions for the agenda:

> (1) a motion rejecting the concepts of the Federation of Malaysia;
> (2) a motion asking the British Government to restore the sovereignty of the Sultanate of Brunei over the former territories of Sarawak and North Borneo; and
> (3) a motion urging the British Government to federate the three territories of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo under the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara with Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin [III] as its constitutional and parliamentary Head of State and the granting of complete and absolute Independence to this new State not later than 1963 (Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad n.d.: 198).

The Speaker of the State Legislative Council declined to

address all three motions citing that it was beyond its jurisdiction. A disillusioned Azahari who invested on a constitutional approach to gain political power in the kingdom turned to revolutionary means of armed rebellion to achieve his ends.

The chance discovery in Sarawak's Lawas district of two military training camps and 35 uniforms of the Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU, National Army of North Kalimantan), and the detention of ten people disrupted PRB's plan. As a pre-emptive measure, the uprising initially planned for December 24 was moved earlier to December 8, 1962.

SUPP's collusion in PRB's revolt was but a whisker. Secretary-General Yong led a delegation to travel together with Azahari to the United Nations Decolonization Committee in New York to present their joint opposition to "Malaysia." Owing to the delayed arrival of the Miri delegate, the SUPP delegation was held up at Kuching Airport on December 7, which delayed their arrival in Manila the following day when the revolt broke out. Meanwhile in Manila, Azahari was denied a visa to enter the United States. Consequently, the PRB-SUPP joint opposition to Malaysia failed to be voiced at the UN.

On December 8, 1962, armed PRB members managed to seize the greater part of the sultanate as well as some adjacent territories of North Borneo and Sarawak. But PRB gains were brief. British forces flown in from Singapore swiftly re-took the main urban areas with minimal casualties. Neither the sultan nor the all-important oil installations were harmed. The PRB rebellion had clearly failed (Bijl 2012).

In the aftermath, British authorities in neighboring Sarawak came hard on subversive elements. Suspected SCO members within SUPP were expelled and deported; others escaped across the border to Kalimantan. Likewise, many TNKU personnel crossed into Kalimantan. These ragtag political refugees were received by the TNI and given military training. Expulsion from SUPP turned the SCO to move into its revolutionary phase of its struggle (Ooi 2012). Hence, scores of Chinese youths, including young women who staunchly believed in the SCO cause, endured the hardships of the jungle and

rough treatment of TNI instructors.

On September 16, 1963, Tunku once again achieved another feather to his cap in inaugurating the birth of Malaysia. This realized vision of Tunku comprised Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (formerly North Borneo). Brunei stayed out. But Malaysia was not well received by its southern neighbors. Indonesia's President Sukarno labelled this new federation a "neo-colony" of Britain. Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal (t. 1961-5) laid claims to Sabah, alleging that it was part of the Sulu sultanate that has been an integral part of the Republic of the Philippines (Amer 2004). Kuala Lumpur and Singapore later on engaged in daily wordwars that made the headlines on both sides of the causeway (Tan 2008; Kadir Mohamad 2015).

While the war of words raged between Kuala Lumpur and Manila, and Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, Jakarta launched military actions across the Sarawak-Kalimantan border in what Sukarno called the *Konfrontasi*, or confrontation, an undeclared war characterized by violent military clashes between 1963 and 1966. Sukarno, the consummate orator, called on the Indonesian military and people to "Ganyang Malaysia," literally, to "Crush Malaysia" (Poulgrain 1997).

Notwithstanding the public brinkmanship and bravado of Sukarno, internally he was struggling to stave off the PKI and the TNI, both increasingly pressuring him for more power and influence. The PKI demanded that a people's militia be formed, in other words, an army of the masses whom the PKI could call upon for support. Konfrontasi was supported by the TNI as it could demand more public funds to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the PKI (Daves 2013). Sukarno thought that he could play one off the other. As the consummate *dalang*-orator, he thought he could still control all parties as well as the *republik* (Hughes 2015).

In sensing that Sukarno was increasingly being partial towards the PKI, mid-rank military officers decided to take the initiative. Still clouded in mystery, the Thirtieth of September Movement or Gerakan 30 September (acronym Gestapu for "Gerakan September Tiga Puluh") witnessed the brutal killings of six Indonesian Army

generals in an abortive *coup d'état* in the early dawn of October 1, 1965 (Cribb 2004). President Sukarno was alleged to be under the organization's custodial protection. But by the day's end in Jakarta, it was apparent that the coup had failed.

This Gestapu Affair saw the TNI putting the blame on the PKI that sanctioned the wholesale slaughter of communists and their sympathizers:

> Suharto's forces ... quickly claimed that the coup had been masterminded by the PKI, and on this basis, he launched a campaign of extermination against the party (Cribb 2004: 545).

Annihilation campaigns and pogroms were carried out; East Java suffered the worse where entire villages were wiped out; Bali too suffered. The Chinese community were singled out and many became victims of mass killings. General Suharto emerged as the benefactor of all the developments-overcoming the coup, blaming the PKI on the mass purging, and side-lining President Sukarno. Suharto subsequently became president (1967), terminated Konfrontasi (1966), and normalized relations with Malaysia (1967).

Singapore's brief stay within the wider federation of Malaysia was troubled by ideological differences and economic issues (Lau 1998). The UMNO-led Alliance, the coalition party in power in the Federal Government at Kuala Lumpur, favored a pro-Malay affirmative program to narrow the economic disparity amongst the ethnic groups. The People's Action Party (PAP), the socialist-based ruling party of Singapore subscribed to the concept of "Malaysian Malaysia" that demanded equal treatment of all citizens regardless of ethnicity, and that the nation and state should "not [be] defined with the supremacy, well-being and the interests of any one particular community or race" (Malaysian Solidarity Convention 1982). In the economic sphere, Singapore faced trading restrictions despite prior agreement for a common market. As a result, Singapore renegaded on agreed on loans to Sabah and Sarawak for economic development. Seeing no avenue for manoeuvre, Prime Minister Tunku succeeded in a vote to the Federal Parliament for Singapore's expulsion on August 7, 1965.

Meanwhile, in late July 1963, Manila hosted a meeting among Indonesian President Sukarno, Philippines President Diosdado Macapagal, and Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. The result of the meet, the Manila Accord, stipulated that the inclusion of North Borneo as part of Malaysia would not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder by the Philippines to the territory. Three days prior to the inauguration of Malaysia on September 16, 1963, President Macapagal claimed the territory of North Borneo, and the full sovereignty, title and dominion over it were "ceded" by the heirs of Sultan of Sulu, Muhammad Esmail E. Kiram I, to the Philippines (Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila 1962). Malaysia's inauguration proceeded accordingly, with the Philippines breaking off diplomatic relations.

Furthermore Republic Act 5446, effective September 18, 1968, declared:

> Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around *the territory of Sabah*, situated in North Borneo, over which the *Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty* (Republic Act No. 5446 1968. Emphasis added.).

Nonetheless Kuala Lumpur appears to regard the Sabah claim by Manila as a non-issue, and accordingly rejected any calls by any quarter to settle the matter in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Continuities could be discerned in "Malaysia" while transformations were seen in Leftist activities of the SCO in Sarawak and the PRB in Brunei. The latter two elements attempted to effect major transformations. The SCO's main agenda was to ultimately create a communist state out of Sarawak, perhaps to be a satellite of the PRC. PRB had more traditionalist tendencies in trying to resurrect Brunei's "Golden Age" of the sixteenth century. "Malaysia" was the combining of two former British colonial possessions, British Malaya and British Borneo, which further strengthens Britain's influence in the region through the pro-British Tunku. Britain,

however, regretted to witness Singapore's ejection from this wider federation. But Lee Kuan Yew's anti-communist stance, his strategy of outmaneuvering Leftist elements within the PAP, and the defeat of the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) no doubt convinced London that there was continuity in post-Malaysia Singapore in the Western camp. The regime change in Indonesia following the Gestapu Affair and the end to Konfrontasi brought some stability in the geopolitical landscape of the region. Sukarno was obviously a loose cannon, and his anti-Western rhetoric, Bandung (1955) notwithstanding, at times made him appear to lean towards the PKI and the communist camp. Manila's protest over Sabah had so far, been a war of words.[2]

Ⅳ. Non-Alignment and Neutrality

Throughout his premiership, the anti-communist Tunku maintained a pro-Western, Anglo-American stance, hence independent Malaya and thereafter Malaysia was solidly in Washington's camp. It was an understandable position considering that much of Malaya/Malaysia's commodities (tin and rubber) were exported to the Western allies of the United States, United Kingdom, and Western Europe. The Malayan Emergency, that compelled much military support from Britain and Commonwealth countries, notably Australia and New Zealand, strengthened the anti-communist stance. Nonetheless Malaya did not relate the insurgency to international communism, although it was apparent that the MCP did receive tacit support from Beijing.[3] Kuala Lumpur then did not have any diplomatic ties with Moscow, the Eastern European states, or Beijing.

Notwithstanding its explicit pro-Western stance, Malaya did

2) But recent developments led to a series of kidnappings for ransom and military intrusion into Sabah. By far, the most serious was that of the 2013 Lahad Datu standoff, which brought much instability to the region. In response, Malaysia created the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) and Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE), and had deployed more assets to the state.

3) American direct involvement in Vietnam was believed to be based on the notion that international communism (Moscow and/or Beijing) were supporting communist North Vietnam. This resulted in Washington aiding non-communist South Vietnam to allay the Domino Theory. It was a fallacy. See Zimmer (2011).

not participate in any United States-dominated military organizations. For instance, when the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was set-up in 1954, Malaya, then under British colonial rule, was not inducted as a member despite Britain's participation alongside Australia, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. But having attained independence, Malaya participated in the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) in 1957 and accommodated the military presence of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. AMDA allowed the dispatch of ground troops from these countries in combating the insurgency (Pham 2010; Chin 1983).

Malaysia was one of the founding-members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Convened on August 8, 1967, ASEAN initially comprised Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. ASEAN's focus was regional cooperation in economic, social, cultural, technical, and educational aspects, as well as the promotion of regional peace and stability (Haacke 2003: 16-31).

Following the May 13, 1969 tragedy, when Malaysia was engulfed in Sino-Malay racial clashes, then Deputy Premier Tun Abdul Razak assumed control of the government (Badriyah Haji Salleh 2004). Parliament was suspended and Tun Razak as chairman of the National Operations Council (NOC) acted as Director of Operations and ruled through decrees. Amid these trying times, Tunku retired, and Tun Razak assumed the premiership in September 1970. After five months, parliamentary rule was re-established on February 1971.

Unlike Tunku, Tun Razak harbored pragmatic views of Malaysia's place in the world. Rather than be identified with Washington or London, he preferred a neutral stance for Malaysia. Even during Tunku's premiership, as deputy holding the foreign affairs portfolio, Tun Razak strived to position Malaysia as a non-aligned state despite AMDA. When the Bandung Conference (1955) was underway in championing the cause of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Malaya then was still a colonial state. During the 1960s independent Malaysia under Tun Razak's direction, Wisma

Putra (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) sent diplomatic missions to various newly-independent Asian and African nations to win over friends and promote influence (Saravanamuttu 2010). Malaysia's efforts paid off when in 1970, it was granted a seat at the NAM Conference in Lusaka, Zambia.

Tun Razak championed the guiding principles of Malaysia's foreign relations by establishing friendship with all nations irrespective of their ideological orientation, maintaining neutrality with regards to superpower rivalry, and promoting regional cooperation (Saravanamuttu 2010). Participation in NAM enabled Malaysia to successfully re-negotiate AMDA in 1968-9; subsequently, in 1971, it signed the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) involving United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. Consequently, British and Australian military forces withdrew from Malaysian territory (Chin 1983).

Both NAM and ASEAN enabled Malaysia to promote one of its pivotal foreign policy agenda, namely the pursuit of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (Hamzah 1992; Hanggi 1991). The Indochina conflict, however, was a major obstacle to realizing ZOPFAN. Unperturbed, Malaysia persistently pushed the ZOPFAN vision. Malaysia utilized ASEAN to ensure peace and stability in the region, thereby also ensuring that its domestic economic development could progress without threats and hindrance from destabilizing forces from without. Always weary of the Indochina conflict, Malaysia, to some extent, took solace with the end of the Vietnam War (1975), notwithstanding the reality of the emergence of communist regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Burma had since 1962 been ruled by a military dictatorship (Taylor 2015). Despite these developments, Malaysia and ASEAN welcomed the peace that reigned over mainland Southeast Asia.

Besides the global superpowers of the United States and Soviet Union, China and Japan were major players in East and Southeast Asia. Malaysia advocated the position that big powers, instead of attempting to establish hegemony over nations and regions, should play a stabilizing role and thereby ensuring peace and stability. In line with this expectation, Tun Razak journeyed to Beijing in 1974,

a first by a Southeast Asian non-communist leader.

This visit to China was a coup for Malaysia. Apart from establishing diplomatic relations with a communist state, Tun Razak resolved the issue of 200,000 stateless Chinese inhabitants in Malaysia. China relinquished its claims on the overseas Chinese population in Malaysia, and they subsequently acquired residential status. Moreover, he secured Beijing's commitment in dropping its tacit support for the MCP.

Following his predecessor's pragmatism and openness, Prime Minister Dato' Hussein Onn (1976-81) raised Malaysia's presence overseas in expanding its diplomatic network over a broad range of countries. Forging friendly relations across the globe proved advantageous to Malaysia in the long run. For instance, South Pacific islands such as Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Micronesia helped Malaysia at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973 that led to the enactment of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (Henningham and Kovac 1995: 103-5). With support from the South Pacific islands, Malaysia managed to secure rights to its rich undersea oil reserves vis-à-vis Indonesia that also wanted to claim all waters separating its 13,000 islands' archipelagic realm.

The shift to neutrality as well as rapprochement with communist countries, notably China, transformed Malaysia's pro-West stance to one of non-alignment. At the same time, it also cultivated friendly relations with all nations irrespective of ideological stance. This transformation benefited Malaysia after it extended a hand of friendship to all countries. Further changes were to follow in the next decades.

Ⅴ. The Mahathir Era (1981-2003)

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad's premiership which spanned 22 years, between 1981 and 2003, took Malaysia to unprecedented levels and unorthodox realms (Wain 2009: 85-123). Economically Dr. Mahathir transformed the country with a series of policy initiatives that

created a model of capitalism that had a two-prong push of wealth creation as well as wealth distribution (Jomo 2003). In fostering an entrepreneurial mind-set, particularly among the majority of the *bumiputera* (lit. "sons of the soil", indigenous), he nurtured the growth of an urban Malay middle-class. His "Vision 2020" propounded in 1990 envisioned the country to attain a developed nation status by the year 2020. It became a rallying call to further energize strategic economic policies and programs that were underway, viz. "Malaysia Inc." (1983), National Agricultural Policy (1984), the Industrial Mater Plan (1985), Promotions of Investment Act 1986, the National Development Policy (1990), and the National Vision Policy (2001). As part of his vision of a modern industrialized nation, infrastructure development was carried out in earnest with the iconic Petronas Twin Towers, the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), and the new administrative center of Putrajaya, among others. The Multimedia Super Corridor launched in 1996 aimed at creating an information and communications technology hub with Cyberjaya being linked to KLIA and Putrajaya (Bunnell 2004).

On the international arena, Dr. Mahathir was far removed from his predecessors and in a class of his own (Dhillon 2009). Outspoken and critical, he openly criticized the political and economic domination of the Western democracies, notably the United States and Western Europe. He also disapproved of the United Nations that upheld the veto powers of its permanent members of the Security Council, and argued for a more equitable system of representation. He was widely regarded as the champion of the South, poor and less developing nations, particularly in Asia and Africa. He was instrumental in establishing a South-South Commission at the Non-Aligned Movement conference in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1986. The following decade saw Malaysia emerging as a "leader" of the South notably among African nations (Hamidin Abdul Hamid 2003; Ahmad Faiz Hamid 2005). In nurturing Malaysia-Africa relations, Dr. Mahathir convened the annual Langkawi International Dialogue in 1995.

Despite Tunku's pro-Western orientation, he was party to the 1969 formation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and

held its inaugural secretary generalship (1971-1974).[4] Owing to domestic priorities, Tun Razak and Dato' Hussein Onn did not play significant roles in the OIC. Dr. Mahathir, however, possessed a higher profile within the OIC. He stood up for Islamic causes and Muslim nations, viz. the plight of the Palestinians, the Bosnian tragedy of ethnic cleansing (mid-1990s), and opposition to the American invasion of Iraq (2003). Moreover, his stature was enhanced when Malaysia held the tenth chairmanship in 2003, where Dr. Mahathir played host to OIC delegates in Putrajaya. One of his most prominent contributions was introducing the common trade area (Shaikh Mohd Saifuddeen 2013). At the same time, Malaysia's contribution in terms of political stance, economic assistance, and trade within the OIC were commendable (Shahidah bt Abdul Razak 2008). The OIC was only second to ASEAN in Malaysia's foreign policy priorities. Following the September 11, 2001 incident, Dr. Mahathir played an active part in the restructuring of the OIC, to improve its manner of facing the challenges of an increasingly globalized twenty-first century.

Complementing his international stance on Islam and the Muslim world, Dr. Mahathir's domestic Islamization program that aimed at infusing Islamic principles in the administration sought to strengthen Malaysia's credentials and identity as a moderate Islamic nation championing humanitarian principles (Mahathir bin Mohamad 1993, 1995). The Islamization program that began in earnest from the mid-1980's introduced Islamic banking, strengthened the *syariah* judicial system, encouraged modest dressing among Muslims, and stepped up moral policing by religious authorities. More importantly, Malaysia emphasized a moderate brand of Islam that fought for social justice, struggled against all forms of discrimination, promoted peaceful co-existence among people in a multicultural country, political stability, equity in the sharing of the economic pie, and uplifting morality among Muslims.

Dr. Mahathir was innovative in proposing the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) (1990), aimed at fostering closer ties

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4) On 28 June 2011 during the 38th Council of Foreign Ministers meeting (CFM) in Astana, Kazakhstan the organisation changed its name from Organization of the Islamic Conference to the current Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

between ASEAN and Northeast Asia. Opposition from Washington subsequently led to the ASEAN + Three, the latter being China, Japan, and South Korea in 1997. That same year witnessed another of his innovative ideas by way of the creation of the Commonwealth Business Council to encourage greater private participation in the promotion of trade and investment.

In an unprecedented move, shortly after he assumed office as prime minister in October 1981, Dr. Mahathir launched the "Buy Britain Last" campaign. Apparently, a disagreement between Kuala Lumpur and London over differences on aircraft landing rights and British university tuition prompted Dr. Mahathir to overreact and insist on a boycott of British goods. Because of this spat, as well as his stance alleging that the West practices double standards towards less developed nations, he literally turned to the East for worthwhile development models. The following year, in another unparalleled move, he launched the "Look East" policy that focused on Japan's economic model as a sterling example for Malaysia (Jomo 1985). Japanese work ethics and management styles were encouraged to be guiding principles in both the public and private sectors (Furuoka 2007). From the mid-1980's, Malaysia sent droves of students to Japan for technical training as well as for tertiary education.

The end of the Cold War (1947-91) witnessed a shift in the balance of power that increasingly leaned towards the United States as the sole superpower. Tactfully, Kuala Lumpur maintained friendly relations with both Moscow (economic ties) and Washington (economic and educational relations).

Dr. Mahathir was vocal in warning of the phenomenon of neo-colonialism where big powers, the Western developed nations, exert undue influence through the mass media and international institutions, imposing their values, way of life, and ideology (brand of democracy and capitalism) on less developed countries. The unilateral actions of the United States in dealing with other sovereign states like Panama (1989-90), Afghanistan (2001-14), and Iraq (2003) were seen as a response to threats to its interests. These actions worried and were roundly criticised by Malaysia.

Closer to home, Dr. Mahathir was instrumental in securing

ASEAN membership for the socialist states of Vietnam (1995) and Laos (1997), as well as the military-ruled Myanmar (1997). Two years later, in 1999, Cambodia too became a part of the ASEAN fold. During his tenure as Malaysia's premier, ASEAN launched several initiatives, viz. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (1994), Asian-European Meeting (ASEM) (1995), and the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) (1995). ARF offered a platform for addressing conflicts, initiating dialogues, and encouraging collaboration with the major global powers. ASEM formalized dialogue between ASEAN and the European Union (EU). SEANWFZ was the culmination of Malaysia's tireless efforts over the years to realize ZOPFAN within the Southeast Asian realm. In all the aforementioned ASEAN initiatives, Dr. Mahathir had a hand, if not a significant role, in the conceptualization, formulation, and implementation phases.

Rounding up the Mahathir years, transformation was the key factor in Malaysia's development from within and without. The Petronas Twin Towers in central Kuala Lumpur showcased Malaysia's economic transformation in pursuit of its Vision 2020 as a developed nation. On the global stage, Malaysia, once a quiet nation state, was literally transformed, through Dr. Mahathir's brave positions on major issues of concerns. He became a voice for Third World nations, a champion of Islamic causes. He also initiated the revamping of the Commonwealth in 1990, called for reforms in the United Nations, and consolidated the voice of the Third World and Islamic nations in protest over the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Dr. Mahathir transformed Malaysia and in turn changed the perception of the world towards this once relatively unknown and small nation state of some 28.3 million (2010). His "Buy Britain Last" campaign and "Look East" policy literally broke away with past practices. Mahathir's Malaysia bravely ventured on unchartered paths and in unorthodox ways, and succeeded to be one of the most progressive and wealthiest nations in the region.

Ⅵ. Conclusion

Malaya (1957), and later Malaysia (1963), were indeed borne amidst the Cold War environment. Britain's decision to decolonize, firstly, through Malaya, and later on through Malaysia, considered the Leftist movement, as well as other factors like the Brunei Rebellion. Against this backdrop, the thread of continuities and transformations were intact, with regards to Malaya/Malaysia's international stance.

The personality of the political leadership was pivotal in fashioning Malaya/Malaysia's positioning vis-à-vis the situations from within and from without. Tunku, owing to his background, assumed a pro-West stance, an Anglophile Malay prince favoring Britain at all levels. It was Tunku the British colonial authorities trusted to hand over the reins of political leadership of an independent Malaya after having witnessed his proven capability of being steadfastly anti-communist and establishing an inter-ethnic political partnership, namely the UMNO-MCA alliance that was favored in the elections (1952 and 1955). Tunku stayed on the Anglo-American camp throughout his tenure as Malayan (1957-63) and Malaysian (1963-70) prime minister. Tunku settled for continuity with Britain and the Western democracies.

Tun Razak, although sharing similar background as Tunku in being trained in Britain in law and from a Malay nobility background, was a pragmatist that rightly read the global scenario of choosing neutrality for Malaysia's survival in the bipolar world of big power struggles. While heeding the traditional Malay saying, "Gajah sama gajah berjuang; pelanduk mati di tengah-tengah" ("While elephants fought; the mousedeer dies in between"), Tun Razak steered away from either Washington or Moscow to increasingly seek non-alignment and neutrality. Malaysia's admittance into the NAM family of nations in 1970 was a milestone. Realizing that "Red China", the third power in the Cold War equation, traditionally played a significant role over the Southeast Asia region, Tun Razak took the unprecedented step in initiating rapprochement with Beijing in 1974. Symbolically, the portrait of the historic handshake between Tun Razak and Mao Zedong was "worth [more than] a thousand words", projecting Malaysia's stance in being

friendly with all nations irrespective of ideological differences.

During the premierships of Tun Razak and Dato' Hussein Onn, Malaysia shifted from a pro-West position to non-alignment and neutrality, which promoted friendly relations with a wide spectrum of countries regardless of ideological orientation, economic level of development, geographical stature and location, religion, and creed. It proved a worthwhile policy change.

Further transformations could be discerned during the long era of Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. There was the thread of continuity with his predecessor in nurturing ties with Asian and African nations, but he took it to another level. Establishing a South-South Commission in 1986, he offered a platform and a voice for poor, less and/or undeveloped countries on the African continent. Furthermore, the Langkawi International Dialogue, inaugurated in 1995, added another forum for Malaysia-Africa interactions and cooperation.

While Tunku once held the office of inaugural secretary general of the OIC in 1969 and made Malaysia partly instrumental in the organization's establishment, Dr. Mahathir again took the country's participation in the organization to another level. He became the voice of Islamic causes criticizing the United States and Western democracies of being biased against Islamic countries. He spoke against the suffering of Bosnian Muslims because of ethnic cleansing. He also made sure that Malaysia sent personnel to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping operations in 1995. He led Third World and Islamic countries in protest against the United States for its invasion of Iraq. It criticized its "war on terror" campaign, which was carried out without any specific jurisdiction of a United Nation's resolution.

But Dr. Mahathir broke with Malayan/Malaysian tradition in his "Buy British Last" campaign despite the long ties with this past colonial power, the Commonwealth, and trade and educational relations in the post-independent period. In the same vein his "Look East" policy radically contrasted with past practices that turned to the West for guidance and assistance.

Dr. Mahathir's public censure of the United States and the Western European democracies broke new ground, as well as his sharp criticism of the United Nations. No leader from the developing world ever pronounced such critical remarks against the aid-giving Western nations. He was indeed a maverick, and Malaysia stood out on the global stage. Photoshoots of Dr. Mahathir shaking hands with world leaders against the backdrop of a giant image of the Kuala Lumpur city view speaks volumes of how far Malaysia has advanced and progressed towards his Vision 2020.

Therefore it was as much of the personality, background, and character of the political leadership, as well as the prevailing environment from within and from without, that determine continuities and transformations in a country's historical development. Malaysia had shown, from Tun Razak's premiership to Dr. Mahathir's tenure, that going beyond a nation's self-interest was indeed commendable as well as profitable to other countries through articulating matters and issues of mutual concern and striving for a better world that is equitable for big and small nations.

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Brunei Culture through its Textile Weaving Tradition

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[*Abstract*]

Brunei Darussalam is a Malay Islamic Monarchy practicing and upholding traditional heritage. Brunei Darussalam is rich with tangible and intangible cultural heritage shaped by its way of life. One of the traditions maintained and preserved in the country is traditional textile weaving. The tradition covers both consumption and production. In the context of consumption, traditional textiles have multiple roles and symbolic meanings. In the context of production, the tradition showcases great skills and the distinctive cultural, social, intellectual, spiritual, and emotional values of the people of Brunei. This paper will explicate the distinctive values and characteristics of Brunei people from the practices of textile weaving.

Keywords: Traditional Textiles, consumption, production, identity, social values

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Ⅰ. Introduction

Brunei Darussalam is a Malay Islamic Monarchy practicing and upholding -traditional heritage. Brunei Darussalam is rich with tangible and intangible heritage shaped by its way of life. One of the traditions that Bruneians maintained and preserved is traditional weaving. Traditional textile is one practice of material culture that people of Brunei are proud of. Material culture is defined manifestations of culture through material productions. Material culture can be used to understand culture, and discover beliefs, values, ideas, attitudes, and assumptions of a particular community or society at a given time. The underlying premise is that human made objects reflect, consciously or unconsciously, the beliefs of the individuals who commissioned, fabricated, purchased, or used them and, by extension, the beliefs of the larger society to which these individuals belong (Prown 1993: 1).

In Brunei Darussalam, there has been much emphasis on the sustainability and continuity of material cultures, especially on traditional textiles. In the context of consumption, traditional textiles have played multiple roles and symbolic meanings. In the context of production, the tradition showcases great skills and the distinctive characteristics of Brunei culture. In addition, the production and consumption of traditional textiles are also seen as important initiatives to generate economy and express identity (Siti Norkhalbi 2007). This paper will discuss the consumption and production of traditional textiles as reflective of the identity and characteristics of Brunei culture.

Ⅱ. Historical Background

Evidence indicates that weaving has been existing in Brunei since the ninth century (Pengiran Karim 2000). This is according to artifacts derived from archaeological excavations in Kota Batu led by Tom Harrison in 1952-1953, where different parts of weaving implements have been found. Radiocarbon dating indicates that the implements may be dated to 800-850 AD (Pengiran Karim 2000).

Early accounts on the consumption of traditional textiles were noted by foreign travellers. Chau Jua Kua, the Chinese traveller who visited Brunei in 1225, noted that women from rich families wore sarongs of brocade and silk (Mohammed Jamil 2000). It was also noted that a Brunei envoy paid homage to Chinese Emperor Yung Lo (1402-24) and brought native products, including cloths (Mohammed Jamil 2000).

When Pigafetta visited Brunei in 1521, he was impressed by the imposing splendor and ceremonial order of the courts. He noted that the dignitaries wore traditional woven cloths. Palace men had worn clothes of gold and silk to cover their privates. They also carried daggers with gold hafts adorned with pearls and precious gems, and worn many rings (Nicholl 1975). However there was no mention of the color and motifs of the clothing. Pigafetta also noted that traditional textiles were used as curtains in the halls of the palace. Textiles were also used as gifts to foreign guests and were seen as a significant factor in establishing and strengthening relationships between two parties (Siti Norkhalbi 2007). Andaya (1992: 411) asserts that such display of affluence was a major reinforcement on the claims made about the Brunei ruler as the region's overlord.

In the genealogy of Brunei rulers recorded by Datu Imam Aminuddin during the coronation ceremony of Sultan Muhammad Jamalul 'Alam in 1919, the Pengiran Bendahara (one of the viziers) wore a white suit, including a white jong sarat *sinjang*, whereas the Pengiran Shahbandar (one of the *Cheteria*) wore a black jong sarat *sinjang* (Sweeney 1998: 124).

Ⅲ. Textiles and Identity

In the book, *The World of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption*, Douglas and Isherwood (1979) argue for the need to see "goods as an information system"; goods are needed for making visible and stable the categories of culture. They stress that such an approach emphasizes the double role of goods: providing subsistence and drawing lines of social relationships. To my mind, textiles in

Brunei have been consumed according to cultural categories which respond to cultural logics (Douglas and Isherwood 1979). Such textiles are being utilized in different spaces and rituals to show how society is structured around certain restrictions in order to maintain their value and enhance the rank of the people who control them. Textiles are used to distinguish social and political status. Types, patterns, designs, motifs, and colors of textiles are used as markers of status. At the royal court, there are specific codes of conduct. Forms of dressing are prescribed according to the status of the people in attendance. Only people of certain social and political affiliation are allowed to wear specific colors and designs of traditional woven textiles. Such codes of conduct and dress reflect the social and political structure of Brunei society.

Ⅳ. The Process of Identification

In exploring the consumption and production of traditional textiles, it is necessary to consider the elements of identity in Brunei Darussalam: religion and ethnicity, social stratification, and social values and virtues. According to Abdul Latif (2001), the construction of social identity in Brunei Darussalam is governed by several characteristics, all of which are inter-related. First, social identity is influenced by religion. Islam is the official state religion, although other faiths are allowed to be practiced as well. The Muslims in Brunei Darussalam are mostly from the Brunei, Kedayan, and Tutong ethnic groups, and the majority of the Belait have converted to Islam as well. Substantial numbers of Dusun and Bisaya have also converted to Islam. Many of them continue to practice traditional beliefs (pagan) while some converted to Christianity. The majority of Murut have become Christian, although there are also small numbers who have converted to Islam. Since Islam is the official religion of the state, its adherents are positioned at a higher status than followers of other religions. Adherence to Islam is one of the criteria to be the Sultan, and the Prime Minister in Brunei Darussalam must be a Sunni Muslim of the Shafi'i school of thought.

The other significant element in the construction of identity in Brunei Darussalam is ethnicity. The Brunei Constitution constitutes seven ethnic (*puak*) groups - Brunei, Belait, Bisaya, Dusun, Kedayan, Murut, and Tutong, which are also classified into one category, Malay. These groups are also known as *puak jati* (genuine ethnic groups of Brunei Darussalam). However, among these, *puak Brunei* is the predominant ethnic group and has higher social and political status. The Sultan belongs to this group, as do most of the state's dignitaries, traditional and modern. While other ethnic groups are politically peripheral, some members of these groups are conferred with titles by the Sultan and designated to be representatives of their ethnic group. Such conferment therefore grants them a higher status socially and politically.

Different kinds of textiles may indicate affiliation to certain ethnic groups, although it is not known whether this role is age-old or recent-the consequence of a nineteenth and twentieth century explosion of design possibilities associated with the availability of industrial yarn and dyestuff, and of modern political strategies to manipulate ethnicity (Schneider 1987: 413). The production of traditional textiles is predominantly the work of women from the *puak* Brunei. Although other Malay ethnic groups also consume traditional textiles, their use of these cloths is not as prominent as it is among the *puak* Brunei.

Social identity is also constructed through social stratification and status. Social stratification and status can be expressed, and are especially manifested in royal customs, such as the system of titles conferment, clothing, royal gifts, and regalia, as well as the seating arrangement in the royal court. Social stratification in Brunei Darussalam is pyramidal, with the Sultan at the top followed by high ranking nobles. High ranking non-noble officials and their descendants make up the middle ranks followed by low ranking non-noble officials, including non-Muslim Malay representatives of their local communities. The lowest rank is the commoner, comprising of ordinary citizens and residents of Brunei Darussalam. The skill of weaving is associated with women of high, non-noble status (Zaini 1960, in Brown 1974: 58). Furthermore, the privilege of wearing traditional cloths at certain occasions was granted only to

members of the higher social classes.

Education has provided an avenue for social mobility in recent years, especially among the commoners. Education has thus become one of the elements in status construction. Knowledgeable and well-educated people are not only respected, but usually also have high positions within the society, such as in government administration and in the traditional and modern political systems. Holding high positions in either the traditional or modern political systems also grants officials the right to be invited to certain functions, such as events in the royal court; there they are privileged to wear ceremonial dresses of traditional cloths signifying their position in the hierarchy.

Brunei identity is not limited to religious, ethnic, social, political, and educational status. It also includes *nilai jatidiri* or the "essence of character," a model of ethno-personality grounded in values and virtues which are drawn from a notion of culture based on wisdom and knowledge (Wan Zawawi 2003). Such character traits include loyalty, unity, cooperation, and solidarity, courtesy, politeness, honor, and respectfulness. This notion of a Malay "essence of character" has been perceived as a significant attribute of Brunei society (Hashim 1999).

Ⅴ. Traditional Textiles and reflection of Religious Identity

Religion, as a system of ultimate beliefs and cosmologically grounded practices, plays a great role in all cultures (Layton 1981). In the west coast of Borneo, Brunei was recorded as being one of the earliest centers of Islam in Southeast Asia (Maxwell 1990: 299). Islamic teaching had a great impact on the community. It has continued to exercise the strongest cultural influence; the strength of Islamic beliefs and the degree to which Islamic religious practices have absorbed older customs and traditions are clearly evident.

Most of the traditional textile weavers are Muslims. In addition, such textiles are mainly utilized by Muslims, although they are also consumed by non-Muslims. Geometrical and floral shapes,

as well as environments, have characterized traditional textile pattern and designs. Furthermore, plaids and striped designs are also widely used. As a later development, the use of the Roman alphabet and Arabic calligraphy have been adopted exclusively for gifts and decorative items. The adaptation of animal and human figures is not common, especially among Muslim weavers and designers, as Islamic teaching does not permit the employment of animal and human figures in the creation of art. This indicates that Islamic teaching has had a significant impact upon the creators of the traditional textiles, reflecting their religious belief.

Islamic principles have always played an important role in influencing motifs among Muslim artists to beautify, since this conforms with Islamic teaching and is strengthened and supported by the saying of the Prophet, "God is beautiful and He loves beauty" (Burckhardt 1967: 161). Within the spiritual universe of Islam, symbolism is a dimension that is used as a catalyst for contemplation directed towards the presence of Allah and the unity of the universe (Mohammed Sharif 2001).

In the early times, the animal motifs in crafts were seen in Brunei. However, once the Islamic influence became stronger, motifs that portrayed animals were abandoned among the Muslim craftsmen. Islam has had a strong influence on the imagery and production, not only in traditional textiles, but generally in Brunei's arts and architecture. The concept of art in Islam encourages the expression of beautiful visuals, but must be bound by the fundamental faith system of Islam based on the belief that "There is no Divinity other than Allah" (Mohammed Sharif 2001). Islam forbids creation resembling human beings and animals in its visual art. The prohibition of such images in Islam is based on the principle that it could lead to idolatry. However, designers still use animals as inspiration for motifs. They take some part of the animal's body such as wings and scales of the animal and adaptation of their shape. As long as the motif does not display the exact figure of the animal, it may be tolerated. The designer may also modify the motif to conform to Islamic values. Examples of animal motifs that have been adapted in weaving motifs are *sisik tenggiling* (the scale of scaly ant-eater) and *siku keluang* (the wing

of the flying-fox).

Although Islam forbids the use of human and animal images in the creation of arts, floral and geometric motifs are acceptable. Connors (1996: 25) suggests that geometric designs, such as the hook and rhomb, were ascribed to the Dong Son culture. The patterns used in Brunei are also widely used by other Malay peoples in the region, and many of these may also be traced to Dong Son culture. However, there are also some instances where patterns were adopted from Moslem sources. Although it can be argued that the continued use of such patterns was inspired by Dong Son culture, the prohibition on the use of human and animal images in the Islamic faith to a certain extent promoted the widespread and enduring use of geometric and floral motifs which conform to the religion's aesthetic requirement (Morrell 1997). The use of these motifs is a visual analogy to the religious rules of behavior by Muslims.

Flowers and fruits, such as *teratai* (lotus or water lily), *bunga matahari* (sun flowers), *bunga melur* (jasmine), *bunga keramunting* (rose myrtle), and fruits, such as *buah manggis* (mangosteen), *buah nonah* (custard-apple), and *buah pedada* (fruits of seaside tree, sp. *sonneratia acida*), are popular motifs that have been incorporated into weaving designs. Motifs inspired by parts of fruits or flowers, such as the stalk, seed, skin, and calyx are also used (Siti Norkhalbi 1999). Motifs such as the *biji buah timun* (cucumber's seeds), *seri kelapa* (coconut's shoot), *tampok manggis* (a stalk of mangosteen), among others, are also utilized. The *pucuk rebung* (bamboo shoot) motif, inspired by the triangular-shaped shoot of a giant bamboo, is commonly used to decorate the center of woven cloth. This motif is also commonly found in fabrics produced in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

The use of vegetal ornaments or arabesques, which are characterized by a continuous stem that splits regularly, producing a series of counterpoised, leafy, secondary stems that in turn split or return to be reintegrated into the main stem, are commonly used in designing the borders of the traditional cloths. The arabesque has two basic elements, the interlacement derivative of geometrical and

plant motifs, which represent a graphic formulation of rhythm, expressed in spiraloid designs. According to my informants, the motifs are believed to be inspired by both the plants and waves of the sea or river. Specific names are given to motifs depending on their composition. An example of vegetal arabesque is the vine-like (*daun menjalar*) motifs of interlacing leaf scrolls and branches winding back on themselves that are stylized in an undulating and spiraloid form (Bantong 1989). Another example is the continuous series of spirals twining and untwining like waves in the sea locally known as *air mulih* (Metusin 1995; Masnah 1996). These motifs are commonly found on the upper and lower parts of the horizontal borders and as vertical decoration on either side of the center of traditional cloths. The shapes, which move smoothly and constantly in one direction, have been interpreted by the designers as coming back to its roots and according to them, as Muslims, we are urged to go back to the root of our existence according to Islamic teaching. Such designs connote a conscious return towards the fundamental teaching of Islam as the primordial religion [*din al-fitrah*] (Burckhardt 1967: 109).

Geometric motifs are popular among Islamic artists and designers in all parts of the Muslim world, and the spread of Islam has extended the influence of such motifs. In Brunei Darussalam, geometrical motifs such as the circle, rhombus, triangle, square, and hexagon are combined, duplicated, interlaced, and arranged in intricate combinations. In conformity with the Islamic teachings which insist that its followers act in balanced fashion in order to gain blessings from Allah, the symmetry of the motifs symbolizes balance. Furthermore, the composition of the geometrical forms and the absence of figurative images have proven that there is no obstacle to artistic fertility which expresses creative joy (Burckhardt 1967: 104).

Critchlow (1976) suggests that all Islamic geometrical patterns originate from the circle and its center which is an apt symbol of a religion that emphasizes one God. It also connotes unity. In Malay, the circle means "*bulat*" and expressions derived from such word such as *sebulat suara* (one voice) and *sebulat hati* (one heart) are common to express unity. In Islam, great unity is reflected in

facing Mecca in prayer where the Kaaba is located (Morrell 1997). The circle has always been regarded as a symbol of eternity, without beginning and end. It is also the perfect expression of justice and equality (Critchlow 1976).

Not only has Islam exercised influence on the patterns and designs of traditional textiles. It has also influenced the use of raw materials in the production. Most of the traditional textiles in Brunei Darussalam are made of cotton, as the major consumers of such textiles are men. Some currents of Islamic teaching indicate that men are not permitted to wear silk. Although this teaching is not stated in the Quran, it is elaborated in the traditions of the Prophet Mohammad. However, silk textiles may be produced for female consumers and for other purposes that do not involve clothing for men.

Ⅵ. Textiles and Social Hierarchy

The representation of social status is objectified through the act of consumption of traditional woven textiles. Traditional textiles have also been adopted and assimilated as parts of the ceremonial dress at state functions and in the royal court where they have become part of "official attire." The textiles' patterns and colors are important in the dress codes for royal court ceremonies. Motifs and colors indicate status and political allegiance. They show ceremonial and political importance, and rights are earned to wear particular patterns and colors. Conformity to the customary dress code shows homage, and it follows that disrespect for these codes is to be seen either as ignorance, or at worst, an act of rebellion.

In a complexly organized society, there is a need to express political legitimacy in a symbolic form (Geertz 1983). Such expression justifies the existence of the governing elite and orders its actions in terms of ceremonies, insignia, formalities, and appurtenances that may be inherited or even invented (Geertz 1983). The ideas of sovereignty and power in Brunei Darussalam are embodied and symbolized in the Sultan's body (Lomnitz 2001). The Sultan's freedom to select and wear clothes of his own choosing indicates

that he has supreme power and expresses his sovereignty. He stands not only at the top of hierarchy, but also outside of the system, which confirms his being "above the law." In addition, the employment of traditional woven textiles as a ceremonial dress and part of regalia in the royal court, especially among dignitaries, plays an important role in emphasizing the tangible expression of status and power.

At all court events, the color of the dress is specified according to the status of the wearer, as well as the time when the function is held. Generally, all guests are required to wear black for day functions and white for evening ones. Malay guests are directed to wear the national costume *baju cara Melayu*, whereas non-Malays may wear formal Western-style clothing. For males, the national dress consists of a tunic, a pair of trousers, *sinjang* of traditional woven cloth, and headgear. The headgear may be a black velvet cap known locally as *kopiah* or *songkok, dastar* (especially folded headgear from traditional woven cloth), *ketayap* (white skullcap with a piece of white cloth bound around the head), or *serban* (turban). Other forms of male head dress are not acceptable. For females, the national dress is either *baju kurung* or *baju kebaya*. The wearing of a head scarf (*tudung*) is encouraged, especially for Muslims.

Traditional or royal dignitaries wear different types, pattern, designs, motifs, and colors of traditional woven *sinjang, arat* (belt), and *dastar,* according to rank. Each male dignitary carries a kris. Among the traditional noble dignitaries, only the *Cheteria* are provided with ceremonial uniforms for court functions. The traditional textiles for the C*heteria* have the same pattern and design for all levels of wearers. However, rank may be distinguished by way of the color differences. The cloth has a *Jong Sarat* design decorated with *bunga cheteria bersiku keluang* (the wing of flying fox motif). The color for the chief *Cheteria* is dark purple. Light purple is for *Cheteria* 4. Additional *Cheteria* under *Cheteria* 4 would wear green with red stripes, while *Cheteria* 8 would wear orange. *Cheteria* 16 would wear blue, and additional *Cheteria* under *Cheteria* 16 are tasked to wear black with red stripes. *Cheteria* 32 wears magenta.

Non-noble, traditional officials can be divided into three categories. The levels of offices can be distinguished through the colors and motifs of their ceremonial *sinjang, arat*, and *dastar*. Different colors and motifs are used to decorate their ceremonial costume. Higher non-noble traditional officers are also ranked to four, eight, sixteen, and thirty-two. However, unlike the noble office of *Cheteria*, there are no distinctions in the color and designs of uniforms for this office. The only color is magenta. The design for the traditional cloth uniform is a scattered pattern arrangement decorated with *bunga butang arab gegati* (rhombus and button floral motifs).Lower ranking non-noble, traditional officials include the *Manteri Istana* (officials of the palace), *Manteri Agama* (traditional religious officials), *Manteri Dagang* (officials of foreigners), *Manteri Hulubalang* (officials of defense), and *Manteri Pedalaman* (officials of the home affairs). The traditional cloth for the *Manteri Istana* and *Manteri Hulubalang* is similar in color and design. The color of the cloth is purple with a scattered pattern arrangement decorated with *bunga tampuk manggis* (the calyx of mangosteen flower) motif. The *Manteri Pedalaman* uniform is blue with a scattered pattern arrangement decorated with *bunga kembang setahun* (year round blooming flower) motif. The base color for the costumes is scarlet. Traditional religious ministers and officials have been prescribed an Arabic-style long dress known as a *jubah* and a headdress known as a *serban* (turban). The color of the *jubah* depends on the time - black for day functions and white for evening functions.

The state dignitaries or modern administrative ministers, deputy ministers, and other senior officials must wear ceremonial costumes prescribed for them. The colors, as well as the designs of ceremonial dresses, vary according to position and rank. The ministers and deputy ministers of the cabinet wear woven cloths of similar designs and motifs for their *sinjang*, *arat*, and *dastar*, which is of *si lubang bangsi* design decorated with *bunga berputar kembang bertatah* (rotating bloom with multi colored motif). The color of the cloth for the ministers is golden olive. Deputy Ministers wear silvery olive colored supplementary weft cloth. Senior officials in the government sector wear the traditional cloth of *jong sarat* design decorated with *bunga teratai* (lotus motif). The color of the

cloth is maroon. Traditional cloth of similar design and color is attached to the lapel and the sleeves of the costume and for the *kain kapit* worn by the female senior officers.

Ⅶ. Textiles and Social Values

Abdul Latif (2008) suggests that production of arts and handicrafts can be seen as one way of conserving and reflecting cultural identity. The core social values for the people of Brunei is dictated by the Malay Islamic Monarchy. Abdul Aziz (1993: 14) noted that Brunei values include ways of thinking, ethics, attitudes, and attributes such as diligence, thoroughness, and tolerance. In addition, Islamic values have also strengthened the Brunei social values such as honesty, trustworthiness, helpfulness, cooperation, and determination. These values are integrated and demonstrated in the production of traditional textiles.

Traditional textiles consist of certain designs, patterns, and motifs. In order to produce attractive traditional textiles, designers must be smart, creative, and innovative. The designer's ability to create such designs and patterns demonstrate creativity and innovation. For instance, one of the designers, Dayang Hajah Kadariah, has reproduced about thirty six older patterns which were handed down to her from her grandparents. In addition, she has also come up with new designs, some used for official attires. Apart from designs and patterns, she also invented the names of the designs which sounds congenial and unique. Hajah Kadariah told me that in naming her designs, she was inspired by the stories she read when she was young, as well as her environment.

The production of traditional textiles consists of a systematic process which requires meticulous effort and patience. It is also important for weavers to remain focused when conducting their tasks. The tasks include the preparation of heddles, preparing the warp and weft, selecting pattern and creating design, and finally, the weaving process. Some tasks require more than one weaver to work. Teamwork is essential to ensure that the tasks can be done properly. For instance, at least three weavers are needed to transfer the warp

to warp beam. The warp is rolled around the warp beam and at the same time, the warp has to be combed constantly so that the threads will be arranged properly. This task reflects team spirit and cooperation among weavers producing fine quality materials.

One of my weaving informants, Datin Hajah Azizah, emphasized that it took motivation and determination to complete the weaving tasks. Although there are many tasks that can be done collaboratively, there are also that are done individually, such as threading, *mengani* (preparing the yarn for warp), and weaving the fabric. To be able to complete the task perfectly, a weaver need to be thorough and persevering. In the process, a weaver might face certain challenges such as broken yarns and miscalculations of threads for the warp. Such challenges, if not addressed accordingly, will affect the quality of the fabrics.

Commercialization has exerted significant impact on the production of traditional textiles. Not only has it provided an economic orientation, but it has also reflected the characteristics of weavers and the entrepreneurs. To ensure a lasting relationship between suppliers and consumers, there must be a certain degree of trust. Consumers put importance to the quality of the products, but significantly, consumers also want the products to be delivered in a very timely manner. According to my informant, producers/ weavers must be trustworthy in delivering commissioned fabrics. They must also have negotiation skills shaped by much tolerance (*tolak ansur*) and courtesy (*sopan santun*).

As an entrepreneur, Datin Hjh Azizah said that it is crucial for her to look after the welfare of her employees. She looks after their needs and ensures excellent working conditions by providing air-conditioned rooms, hygienic restrooms, a kitchen, and comfortable living quarters. She does this to retain her weavers and attract new employers. She reported that she treats her employees as family. She believes that providing a comfortable working environment for her weavers enhances the quality of her products. Colleagues from University of Philippines Open University attest to this recently after they visited the weaving workshop.

Ⅷ. Conclusion

For centuries, traditional woven textiles have always been part of Brunei traditions and are commonly utilized in many cultural and social events especially among the Malays. The production and consumption of traditional textiles not only demonstrate their instrumental usage in the society but more interestingly, their symbolic meanings rooted in historical and sociocultural conditions and processes, which distinctively reflect the characteristics and identity of Brunei, based on the national concept of the Malay Islamic Monarchy.

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Defining Dusun Identity in Brunei

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[***Abstract***]

This qualitative study was designed to explore the definition of ethnic identity of the Dusuns in Brunei Darussalam from the perspective of Shamsul A.B.'s (1996) "everyday-defined" social reality. The purpose of this study was twofold. Firstly, by employing Phinney's (1996) formulation of ethnic identity, this study examined the existence of core components of ethnic identity, namely, ethnic self-identification, ethnic involvement, positive attitude towards ethnic group, and sense of belonging in the life of the Dusuns. Secondly, by utilizing Phinney's (1996) three-stage model of ethnic identity formation, this study investigated the relationship between core components and the formation process of ethnic identity. Twenty-six Dusun informants ranging in age from 8 to 80 years old were interviewed for the purpose of this study. The analysis of the interview data revealed that all core components exist and evolve in the life of the Dusuns. Different perspectives towards core components can also be identified across different age groups. Adult informants contested the relevance of ethnic involvement in view of socio-cultural transformations that occurred within

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the ethnic group, whereas younger Dusuns were not able to extend sense of belonging outside their family. These findings lead to the identification of family and historical contexts as influential factors that shape the ways the informants experienced the ethnic identity components. Further, the findings of this study indicate the relationship between core components and the formation process of ethnic identity. Sense of belonging and community is only evident in the experience of older informants, sufficient to help them reach the stage of achieving ethnic identity. This also shows a positive sequential relation between the stages in Phinney's ethnic identity model and the age of the informants. Interestingly, evidence on internalized sense of belonging reveals the fact that an individual could still attain ethnic identity achievement even without experiencing all components of ethnic identity. Once again, this study suggests contextual factors play a role in the stage progression of the Dusuns' ethnic identity.

Keywords: Brunei Darussalam, Brunei Dusuns, Malaynization, ethnic identity

Ⅰ. Introduction

In recent years, there have been studies examining the ethnic identity of Brunei people. The studies report an indication that, despite the legal recognition of the seven ethnic groups, the Brunei people have become increasingly homogeneous due to the adoption of and integration to dominant Brunei Malay ways of life. The studies also suggest the compatibility between the Malay Muslim way of life and that of the non-Muslim ethnic groups (King 1994; Berstein 1997; Abdul Latif 2001; Yabit 2007). The dimensions of homogeneity and compatibility existed in Brunei society are primarily the result of state formation processes and the ensuing socio-economic transformations underwent by Brunei in the twentieth century. The early phase of the state formation processes began with the promulgation of the 1959 Constitution which places Islam as the official religion of the country, besides *Bahasa Melayu*,

or Malay Language, as the national language. In relation to the Constitution, Nationality Law was passed in 1961 which apart from recognizing the status of the seven ethnic groups as the indigenous people of Brunei, the Law also spelled out a new classification where all ethnic people were to be considered Malays. This means all ethnic groups now belonged to a larger ethnic framework of Malay identity despite social, religious, and cultural differences among them. Accordingly, state efforts that can be identified by the Malaynization strategy (Asiyah az-Zahra 2011) were coordinated to homogenize the seven ethnic groups into the mainstream Malay society and build an image of a cohesive nation. King (1994) argued that the ethnic boundaries of the dominant Brunei Malay ethnic group softened, allowing the integration of the other ethnic groups into mainstream society.

On the other hand, recent studies on the Brunei Dusuns reveal distinctive sociocultural characteristics of the Dusuns (Ramazah 2007; Norrizah 2011; Nurhamizah 2011; Ronnie 2012) that set them apart from other ethnic groups. There are also studies on the efforts within the community to reconstruct and preserve Dusun culture and traditions for posterity (Kershaw and Kershaw 2011; Pudarno 2014, Fatimah and Najib 2015). Equally significant is the fact the Dusuns themselves confidently stand by their ethnic identity. This fact was revealed when the author interviewed a number of Dusuns for her PhD fieldwork in 2009 and 2010. The Dusuns argued that their ethnic identity remains solid despite substantial social and cultural transformations occurring within ethnic circle. Even the Muslim Dusuns themselves did not think their conversion to Islam have changed them ethnically.

The Dusun perception towards ethnic identity fits into Shamsul's (1996) "two social reality" framework of "authority-defined" and "everyday-defined" reality. The "authority-defined" social reality, as the name suggests, is "authoritatively defined by those who are part of the dominant power structure," whereas "everyday-defined" reality is "experienced by the people in the course of their everyday life" (Shamsul 1996: 477). To relate the binary social reality to Brunei context, the "authority-defined" identity geared the people towards the identity of Malayness through the promotion of the

mainstream societal ideals, values, attitudes, and behaviors. The opinion that Brunei society has become homogeneously Malay is a result of the observation from the authoritative side of the social reality. On the other hand, the Dusun notion of ethnic identity, as stated earlier, is framed by the "everyday-defined" reality based on their actual lived experiences, personal, and collective. The definition of Dusun identity from this angle may not be politically correct as it reflects a personal and communal inclination to remain ethnically distinct (Trigger and Siti Norkhalbi 2011: 78-79). Also, the meaning of ethnic identity may evolve due to the changing contexts within which their experience unfolds.

For a balanced understanding of identity formation in a society, the two sides of social reality should be properly examined (Shamsul 1996: 479). Thus, this paper aims to develop a critical analysis from the "everyday-defined" social reality perspectives to balance the existing literature on the issues of ethnicity and ethnic identity in Brunei. This mode of analysis also allows the author to examine the formation of ethnic identity across different age groups. This accordingly defines the sampling process of this study, as to be discussed later.

The main research subject of this study is the Dusun ethnic group. Because the Malay ethnicity framework encompasses all seven ethnic groups, the exact number of Dusuns from the 65.8% of Malays in the 2014 National Census it is not known (Economic Planning and Development 2016). The Dusuns mostly live in Tutong District where this study was primarily conducted. The Dusuns identify themselves as "*Sang Jati*" (native people) or "*Iddeh Kitah*" (our people). They are close-knit, with family and kinship as core values of the community. The Dusuns traditionally are animists with *Derato* as the main god in their cosmology. As the Dusuns are traditionally rice farmers, they believe that *Derato* provides them with good harvest and to show appreciation, the *Temarok* ceremony is conducted by the Dusuns at the end of a harvesting season. A *belian*, a female Dusun who possesses special knowledge about the supernatural world, takes the role as the mediator between human beings and *Derato*. *Temarok* also acts as a healing medium for the ethnic group as *Derato* is seen as having the divine strength to cure

illnesses. Linguistically, the Dusuns use their own native languages which belong to the Austronesian language family (Yabit 1994: 3).

Ⅱ. Theoretical Background

An ethnic group is generally defined as a group of people which believe in a common history, ancestry, and kinship, speak the same language or dialect, observe ancestral religion, and live in a common territory (Mackerras 2003: 11; Cokley 2007: 225). Existing research however revealed the multidimensionality of ethnicity and it is challenging to construct a generic theory that can be applied across ethnic groups differing in ideological orientation, political experiences, historical context, and values (Cokley 2007).

Phinney (1996) also noted the diverse elements of ethnicity and its flexible boundaries. In constructing the meanings of ethnicity, Phinney suggested the examination of three fundamental dimensions of difference intricately linked to ethnicity: ethnicity as culture, ethnicity as identity, and ethnicity as minority status. The examination of ethnicity as culture focuses on distinctive cultural behaviors and practices that characterize an ethnic group. Whereas embedded in the construct of ethnicity as identity are four core components, namely, ethnic self-identification, a sense of belonging, positive attitudes and involvement in ethnic practices and activities. The concept of ethnicity as minority status implies the experience of an ethnic group of color whose members are experiencing unequal relationship with a larger society and subjected to discrimination and negative stereotypes (Pinney 1996: 920-923).

The above formulation has significance for the discussion of ethnicity in Brunei context. The aspect of ethnicity as culture refers to the mainstream Brunei Malay culture that influence and impinge upon people's lives, including the Dusuns. As a result, the Brunei people, regardless of their ascribed ethnic identification, share similar societal ideals, values, attitudes, and behaviors with the mainstream society. This definition of ethnicity also structurally determines rights, opportunities, and distribution of resources for members of the society. This dimension of ethnicity as culture can

also be contextualized in Shamsul's (1996) "authority-defined" social reality. The adoption of mainstream culture by the Dusuns has considerably affected their language, behavior, dress and appearances, cultural practices, and ethnic knowledge that resulted in the observed cultural homogeneity.

With the above definition of ethnicity as culture in view, the meaning of ethnicity as identity thus presents itself. As stated earlier, ethnic identity is associated with four core components: ethnic self-identification, ethnic involvement, positive attitude, and sense of belonging (Phinney 1990: 503). This means ethnic identity is conceptualized at the individual level within the perspective of "everyday-defined" social reality.

In addition, based on Erikson's (1968) theory on identity formation and Marcia's (1980) empirical work on the operationalization of identity statuses, Phinney (1992; 1993) suggested that the essence of ethnic identity may change and develop over time as people explore the meaning of their ethnic identity. To illustrate such change and development of ethnic identity, Phinney proposed a three-stage model. The first stage is unexamined ethnic identity; the second is ethnic identity search; and the third is ethnic identity achievement. During the first stage, an individual lacks ethnic awareness, and observes any culture, ethnic or mainstream, without question. The exploration of ethnic identity starts at the second stage as ethnic awareness grows through experience and observation. Ethnic identity exploration eventually reaches the final stage which is characterized by a confident sense of one's identity as the individual becomes appreciative of ethnic membership.

This study employs Phinney's process approach in examining the formation process of ethnic identity of the Dusuns, primarily because the approach allows this study to examine the formation process within specific contexts where it unfolds. Umaña-Taylor, Yazedjian, and Bamaca-Gomez (2004), Cokley (2007), and Phinney and Ong (2007) all propose for future research to specifically examine the role of context in the process of ethnic identity formation. Abdul Latif (2001), Noor Azam (2005), Yabit (2007), and Asiyah az-Zahra (2011) all argue the pervasive influence of the

unique context of Brunei on many aspects of life in the country. Such findings comply well with the aims and the direction of this study.

In examining the components of ethnic identity, Phinney (1992; 1999) developed the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM), whereas Umãna-Taylor et al (2004) devised the Ethnic Identity Scale (EIS) to measure the extent at which individuals have explored their ethnicity and the extent at which they have resolved what their ethnic identity means to them (Umãna-Taylor et al 2004: 13-14). It is worthwhile to note that this study does not aim to develop a measure of ethnic identity as established by the empirical works of Phinney and Umãna-Taylor, et. al. However, the questionnaire measure developed in MEIM and EIS and relevant literature on ethnic identity formation guided the formulation of interview questions for this study. The section below further explains the methodology of this study.

Ⅲ. Methods

3.1. Aims

By employing a qualitative approach, the first aim of this paper is to examine the existence of the core components of ethnic identity in the life experiences of the Dusuns. The second is to investigate the relationship between core components and the formation process of ethnic identity. Findings from interview data are discussed within relevant socio-cultural contexts of Brunei that influence the nature of the components and identity formation process, as experienced by the Dusuns.

3.2. Procedures

This study employs a qualitative technique of analytic induction to generate quality data. Hypotheses were developed and informant selection criteria was established after a careful examination of relevant literature. The selection of the informants was based on age and educational level, as previous research also showed a strong

relationship between ethnic identity formation, adulthood, and school context (Umaña-Taylor et al 2004; Maramba and Velasquez 2012; Syed and Juang 2014). A recent study on the ethnic identity of Brunei Dusuns also demonstrates the correlation between self-awareness of the Dusuns and school environment (Faizul 2015: 25). This study also specifically recruited adult informants, based on the recommendations of previous researches that pointed out the need to include adult population in order to examine the ethnic identity formation process beyond adolescence (Ong, Fuller-Rowell, and Phinney 2010; Umaña-Taylor 2011).

Data was first collected from information-rich informants which was then coded based on Phinney's components of ethnic identity. The snowball and purposeful sampling techniques were also employed to identify subsequent informants. In view of the sampling methods and the analytical induction technique, there was no neat separation between data collection and data analysis. It was until the data collection reached its data saturation where new informants no longer provided different findings from the existing ones that the sampling was concluded.

In total, the data were gathered from 26 Dusun informants through face-to-face interviews. 5 of them were young informants aged 8 to 12 years old; 8 were youth informants attending secondary school, technical education, and university with age range between 17 to 28 years old; and there were 13 adult informants aged from 48 to 80 years old. The raw interview data were transcribed and subsequently sorted into relevant codes or themes in order to facilitate the analysis and interpretation of the data (Boyatzis 1998: 3). As Phinney's components of ethnic identity provide the theoretical framework of this study, the master codes in organizing the data are self-identification, ethnic involvement, attitudes toward ethnic group, and sense of belonging. In order to ensure the coding process is in line with the analytic induction technique, a careful scrutiny of the data is important to avoid unfortunate dismissal of data which seemingly did not fit into any of the established codes (Bodgan and Taylor 1975: 83). Consequently, the data was ready for further utilization and analysis. The outcome of the data analysis is presented in the following section.

Ⅳ. Discussion

4.1. ETHNICITY AS AN IDENTITY

4.1.1. Ethnic Self-Identification

The informants' data highlight that family and community made an impact on ethnic self-identification. The informants identified themselves correctly as a Dusun and their identification corresponds to the ethnicity of their parents. It is interesting to listen to an 8-year-old boy without any hesitation identifying himself as a Dusun. He affiliated his sense of identity with his parents as well as his place of origin, Kampong Bukit Udal in Tutong District. He talked about his grandparents who live with his family, and that they spoke to him in the Dusun language though he did not really understand. At school, he can distinguish friends who are Dusun from those who are not.

Youth informants aged between 18 to 28 years old also underwent similar experiences as they grew up. Their parents and extended family evidently contributed to the construction of their ethnic identity as a Dusun. Because of such strong influence from their personal network, they developed a stable ethnic identity although they no longer reside in their birthplace as they attend technical and higher education institutions in another district. Their ethnic identity remains salient when responding to questions on the ways they define and navigate themselves in modern Brunei society strongly imbued by Malay and Islamic influences. Many of them agreed that the Malay identity is for national purposes, but ethnically, they are essentially Dusun.

Many adult informants also indicated the influence of family institution on one's definition of ethnic identity. In a Dusun community, family-oriented values are passed down from generation to generation, especially the value of respecting family members and elders of the community. The Dusuns perceive the stability of family structure as not only serving an important cornerstone of their community but it also giving them a sense of identity through genealogical links (Chong 1996: 4). Thus, for the Dusuns, ethnic identity is an ethnic strength that allows an individual to be

accepted by one's family and community. As a 77-year-old retired municipal staff put it, "you are no one in the eyes of the people [the community] if you fail to identify yourself with your family."

This study alson convincingly found that ethnic self-identification is the result of contexts shaped by state policies. Being in a Muslim country, the population are constantly exposed to Islam. For instance, those who attended state education were introduced to religious education as national education policies since the 1950's, and even more so after 1984, needed the inclusion of the Islamic Religious Knowledge subject in the school curriculum (Asiyah az-Zahra 2014: 161). There are also Dusun parents who send their children to religious school. In 2014, there were 680 non-Muslim Dusun, Murut, and Iban children enrolled in religious schools nationwide, with 52.2 percent of them coming from Tutong District (Rabiatul Kamit 2014). While there are young Dusuns who have an undefined theological understanding of Islam as they simply studied Islamic subjects just like any other subjects (Asiyah az-Zahra 2014:168), there were informants who revealed that their schooling experience served as a means to identify themselves as ethnically distinct from their friends who are from the Malay and Muslim ethnic groups. A 58-year-old informant shared his schooling experience attending a primary school in the late 1960's where non-Muslim children were given an option to take recess during the teaching of religious subjects. From there, his awareness grew towards the fact that his ethnicity as a Dusun and a non-Muslim was different from other ethnicities. On the other hand, a 22-year-old informant who briefly attended a religious school in the 1990's talked about Quran classes where non-Muslim pupils used copies of the Quran that had Arabic scripts and a Malay translation for studying. Muslim pupils used copies of the Quran without the translation. Such simple arrangement not only signifies religious differences between the informant and his Muslim friends; it also contributed to a clearer ethnic self-identification.

Regular contact with mass media also facilitates one's ethnic self-identification. Rapid development of mass communication in Brunei resulted in regular broadcasting of Islamic programs. 10- and 12-year-old informants shared their experience of getting scolded by

their parents after being reminded r to perform Muslim prayers upon hearing the broadcast of the *azan* (call for prayer). Similarly, a 51-year-old informant spoke about his then-7-year-old son's question about fasting during the month of *Ramadhan.* His son innocently asked why the family did not fast and break the fast for *iftar* as broadcasted by radio stations. The informant simply told his son that they are Dusuns and not obliged to fast or pray.

Apart from being ethnically strong parents, many adult informants also think that it is imperative for young Dusuns to connect with their ethnic community as such connection profoundly impact on their sense of identity. For instance, engagement and involvement in communal activities provide experiences that shape the way the Dusuns see themselves as part of the ethnic group.

4.1.2. Ethnic Involvement

The most cited ethnic participation among the young and youth Dusuns is their participation in cultural events at school and those organized by communal bodies. Since the 1990's, government agencies such as Ministry of Education of Brunei have actively encouraged young people to learn and practice ethnic cultures by organizing, for instance, national traditional dance and song competitions. Outside school, many Dusun villages have their own village consultative councils or cultural bodies such as *Pakatan Sang Jati Dusun* which also aim to provide an avenue for young members to learn ethnic traditions. Such initiatives are considered effective strategies to promote and raise cultural heritage awareness (Coluzzi 2011: 19). Many young and youth informants have been part of folk dancing troupes to represent their schools in national dance competitions or their villages in annual festival celebrations for His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah and the monarch's traditional meet-the-people ceremony in Tutong District.

It can also be observed that youth informants were able to name and describe Dusun traditional dances and music as well as the stories behind the dances and music, mostly as told by their elders. In addition, two of them shared stories of how they were pushed to learn traditional musical instruments such as the *gong* and *gulintangan* after the elders in their family repeatedly expressed

concern on the difficulty in finding young Dusuns who can play traditional music.

Adult informants revealed a specific theme that can demonstrate one's involvement within the community: attendance in social gatherings, specifically wedding ceremonies and funeral feasts after burials. These gatherings have always been considered important and require financial support and time. Even relatives from far away come together to assist host families in preparing wedding ceremonies or in organizing feasts held on the seventh, fourteenth, and the fortieth day after funeral. The fulfillment of the obligation is seen as practical support to the members of family and thus, as an expression of commitment to the family and community. As highlighted by a 60-year-old informant, the way the Dusuns come together to rejoice or grieve defines the distinctive feature of the Dusun people, and this is what distinguishes them from other ethnicities.

This study also involved adult Dusun Muslims to find out whether they still engage in ethnic activities after their conversion to Islam. Evidently, they continue to participate in Dusun activities that are not in conflict with Islamic teaching. A 53-year-old Dusun Muslim believes that Dusuns who converted to Islam should continue to uphold and practice Dusun *adat* (customary law) so long as it is not in conflict with Islam:

> When there is death in this village and a funeral feast is being prepared, I still donate food to the family of the deceased. Dusuns might maintain the belief that the food being served is for family members who passed away. But for me, as a Muslim, my donation is purely to help lessen the burden of the family of the deceased in preparing the funeral feast.

This negotiation not only allows the informant to adhere to his new religion but also also maintains his supportive relationship with his Dusun family and relatives. It can also be argued that such ethnic participation is to maintain what is defined as a "tit-for-tat" relationship between family members (Clarks and Mills 1979: 17). In this kind of relationship, mutual responsiveness to the needs of

family members is crucial in order to bring the family members into a state of interdependence. The significance of the "tit-for-tat" relationship is particularly reinforced when dealing with a community, like the Dusuns, which put the highest value on familial relationship, and perceive the family as a fundamental unit of community.

There are also informants who pointed out the decline of ethnic knowledge, particularly among younger Dusuns. This inevitably leads to the decreasing frequency of ethnic involvement. The decline in ethnic knowledge, as argued by the informants, is due to Brunei's historical context. A 48-year-old teacher talked about the incompatibility between *Temarok* and modern education. According toDusun belief, it is disrespectful for a *belian* to possess secular knowledge while practicing the divine knowledge of the *Temarok* ritual and the *Derato* language (Asiyah az-Zahra 2011: 32). There is no doubt that such ritualistic taboo is incompatible with the national education policy which necessitates the attendance of nine years of compulsory education for children aged 5- to 16-years old. The failure of parents to comply to the policy could result in legal actions (Zaim 2008: 1). Thus, the incompatibility of the *Temarok* ritual practices and secular knowledge is partly the reason why it is difficult nowadays to find a young Dusun willing to commit her time and life to learn the rituals and to master the craft of mediating humans and divine powers.

In addition, a 49-year-old office assistant maintained that residential and occupational mobility has unintended consequences on ethnic involvement. Previous research has shown that occupational mobility caused the Dusuns to become geographically dispersed, with many of them residing in Brunei-Muara District, the center of government and business activities (Saxena 2007: 151). In the case of younger Dusuns, their educational needs had made them to be "brought up in boarding school(s) detached from parental guidance (and from) Dusun cultural values" (Pudarno 2005: 8). Because of this, the informant admitted that he can only be minimally involved in communal activities as he was working outside his home village.

Previous research identifies language and linguistic behavior as one of the domains of ethnic identity (Phinney 1996; Tsai, Chentsova-

Dutton, and Wong 2002; House, Stiffman, and Brown 2006; Phinney and Ong 2007). Evidently, the Dusuns also associate traditional language with ethnic identity and acknowledge the importance of preserving the language. However, this study found that only adult informants and two youth informants could converse in Dusun language fluently. Other informants do not have the adults' linguistic fluency. They admit that they can understand the language more than they can speak it.

However, to straightforwardly argue that the young and youth Dusuns fail to fulfill this particular domain of ethnic identity is not entirely accurate. Many adult informants put forward an interesting argument as to why they did not teach their children and younger Dusuns the ethnic language. Reflecting on their childhood experience, the informants remembered the difficulty they faced at school in the 1960's and 1970's, when they knew little of of *Bahasa Melayu*, the medium of teaching in schools specified by 1954 Brunei Education Policy (Asbol 2006). A 60-year-old informant spoke about a particular school experience where his classmates laughed at him when he blurted some Dusun words to answer a question from his teacher; he could not immediately recall the Malay word for "allergy". A 68-year-old housewife failed several times the class tests for Mathematics as she could not understand what her teacher taught in class. She admitted that Mathematics is itself difficult but because she was struggling to understand what was taught, it was even more distressing for her. Thus, due to the discomfort they experienced at school, many Dusuns decided to silence the linguistic aspect of their ethnicity and consciously taught *Bahasa Melayu* to their children.

The above finding enables this study to develop an understanding of the contextual influences derived from state formation processes that Brunei underwent in the 1950's and the ensuing decades and the ways the influences impact on the components of ethnic identity. Interestingly, interviews with youth informants revealed their experience of experimenting with the Dusun language. Almost all youth informants involved in this study have *Bahasa Melayu* as their home language. Two of them began to learn and acquire the ethnic language as they experienced more the ethnic culture and

communicated more frequently with other Dusuns. A 16-year-old secondary school student believed that the unified cultural environment of the Dusun association that she has joined since primary school pushed her to speak the language as the elders in the association kept talking in Dusun with her. A 23-year-old university student initially acquired the Dusun language in order to please her grandfather. She continued learning the language as she somehow felt special and proud that she now can speak what her university professors considered as an endangered language.

In all circumstances, the preference among the informants to learn the ethnic language is enhanced by their experience of ethnic involvement, which allowed them to have greater familiarity with the Dusun culture and ethnic knowledge. As a result, the ethnic identity of youth informants become more salient with the transformed linguistic behavior. They consequently developed a sense of uniqueness when comparing themselves with others. This eventually produced positive attitudes towards their ethnic community, as to be discussed below.

4.1.3. Attitudes Towards Ethnic Group

With regard to attitudes towards ethnic group, the informants' engagement in cultural events is already a reflection of the positive attitude the Dusuns developed towards their community. For instance, youth informants revealed their pride when they were selected by their school or Dusun organization to participate in national events. They used the words such as "excited," "proud," and "honored" when they talked about their experience participating in cultural events.

In addition, family relations is also a factor that triggers positive attitude. A 49-year-old office assistant, whose two sons are regularly involved in cultural events, expressed support for her children's cultural participation. According to her, her husband believes their children's involvement is not only to support school activities but also to help the children to know better their own culture. In addition, as the aim of cultural activities and exhibition is to inform outsiders unfamiliar with the Dusun culture, the informant felt that her children are fortunate to be given the

opportunity to share their culture with people of different backgrounds.

The aforementioned interview of the 23-year-old university student indicates the positive relationship between ethnic involvement and positive attitude towards ethnic group. The informant felt that her cultural participation mattered particularly when she considered the sad fact that many traditional culture and ethnic languages are on the verge of extinction. She further shared her childhood experience when she at first thought her grandfather was being unkind for pushing her to speak the difficult Dusun language. She now considers herself and her siblings as among the privileged young Dusuns who speak the language fluently. Such privilege can be interpreted not only as a clear ethnic self-identification; it also shows how she considers her identity as Dusun never inferior.

This study identifies two recurring themes among adult informants closely associated with the said positive attitude. The themes are kinship relations and community. Many informants expressed that the notion of kinship and community are highly valued by the Dusuns to the extent that family and kinship easily include Dusuns who have no ascribed kinship relations with one's family. An 80-year-old retired civil servant considered it a privilege to be a *Sang Jati*:

> If you go to the other side of the world and there are Dusuns living there, your *Sang Jati* blood will connect you with them. Don't be surprised if they welcome you as if you are part of their family.

Such extent of kinship and community means that an individual can activate the Dusun identity as useful resource in any contexts. Without doubt, kinship and community values are the sources of pride for the Dusuns. In fact, a 67-year-old retired teacher commented that the Dusun culture, by nature, is very welcoming even towards an individual who is half-Dusun, or has converted to Christianity or Islam.

The pride of being a Dusun was even made more evident when informants touched on the subject of multilinguality. Adult informants are mostly linguistically competent, fluent in speaking Dusun, *Bahasa Melayu* and to some extent, English. In addition, the

Dusuns can also understand and/or speak other native languages such as Tutong, Iban, and Kedayan (Fatimah 1996; Noor Azam 2005). The Dusun language itself has variant dialects (the standard Dusun and Metting) as well as different manners of speech according to geographical areas. All informants of this study can speak the standard Dusun and only some of them are fluent in the Metting dialect.

The informants agree that, being linguistically competent, the Dusuns not only feel secure within their own community. They have also utilized their linguistic skills as resource in creating and sustaining connections with people within and outside communities. Such view illustrates the informants' positive attitude and hence, confirms their Dusun identity.

4.1.4. Sense of belonging

This study found that the surge in positive attitude and support towards Dusun identity activates a sense of belonging particularly among adult informants. They repeatedly highlighted issues of the disappearance of linguistic and cultural identity of the Dusuns. Interview data revealed the pattern where many adult informants, after talking about pride for being multilingual, stressed the need to preserve the ethnic language. They were all of the opinion that only with the survival of language will their ethnic identity be maintained. A 58-year-old retired civil servant believed that "when the Dusun language vanishes, so does our ethnic identity." Even the informants who taught *Bahasa Melayu* to their children are also against the total abandonment of the ethnic language. They all referred to contextual factors like state policies on education to explain what influenced their judgment. They wanted the best for their children.

The obvious concern shown by the Dusuns towards the survival of the ethnic language is unmistakably a symbolic representation of their sense of belonging. The concern grew much more when they talked about Malay identity which has been imposed on the ethnic group since the 1961 Nationality Act. A 49-year-old teacher is clearly not keen on what he saw as the growing adoption of Malay-like cultural behavior among the Dusuns.

He argued that the transition towards mainstream culture in recent times has gradually wiped out what is unique about the ethnic group. If the Dusuns continue the cultural trend without a second thought, future generations will not be able to distinguish the differences between the ethnic groups anymore. He further argued that if this happens, the names of the seven ethnic groups will be read on paper only.

The Dusun Muslims are also concerned with the survival of Dusuns' ethnic identity vis-à-vis the Malay Muslim identity. In fact, their conversion to Islam put the converts in a somewhat delicate position. Conversion to Islam has always been seen as generating a subtle force onto the ethnic identity of the converts to be increasingly turned towards the ethnic identity of the Malays. In this context, the term *"Masuk Melayu"*, literally means "becoming Malay", is generally used to indicate such ethnic identity transitions (Brown 1970; Tunku Zainah 1982; Horton 1984; King 1989; Bantong 1995; Pudarno 1992; Roff 1994; Abdul Latif 2011).

Many Dusun Muslims admit that, after their conversion, there were people who threw the *"Masuk Melayu"* questions at them. They strongly felt that the notion "*Masuk Melayu"* is an inevitable assumption, simply because they now adopted Islamic lifestyle and have involved themselves more in Islamic activities and Muslim communities (Asiyah az-Zahra 2015). The Dusun Muslims however have not forgotten their ethnic roots and identity. Converts have always ensured that their family relationship remains intact and such is clearly a protective mechanism of social belonging that promotes bonds of solidarity from generation to generation (Clark and Dubash 1998: 248). It is safe to argue that Dusun Muslims are essentially still Dusun despite the change in religious belief and practice.

The increasing foregrounding of the Dusun ethnic identity can also be seen as the outcome of the positive change that has characterized developments in more recent decades. Witnessing rapid socio-cultural transformation and the increasing concern over the fact that the Dusuns face imminent cultural discontinuity and heritage loss, there were prompt responses from Dusun cultural

enthusiasts and researchers (Pudarno 2005: 11). It is this group of researchers who pioneered research on the Dusun community since the late 1980's. Accordingly, the group's research generated positive impact and a greater awareness not only among the Dusuns but also with the wider community about the survival of the increasingly endangered culture and ethnic identity of the Dusuns. Moreover, many adult informants were previously involved in research projects organized by university students, as well as initiatives of government agencies to study forgotten traditions and less spoken languages of the Dusuns. Thus, the informants have become more aware of the critical issues of survival facing their ethnic group. This explains why the adult informants expressed a clear sense of belonging more than the younger informants. Whether the difference of awareness is relevant to the development of ethnic identity, the following discussion analyzes the identity formation process among the Dusuns.

4.2. Phinney'S Stage Model of Ethnic Identity

Phinney (1990) postulates that an individual develops an achieved status with age. The findings of this study are generally consistent with such postulation. Examining the variations of themes found in the informants' responses, this study found that, while all informants have a childhood identification of their Dusun identity, young informants only associate their ethnic identity with family and friends. Youth informants explore more of their ethnic identity through regular participation in activities that allow them to acquire ethnic knowledge. Adult informants evidently have a committed sense of identity, even an internalized one, as they have reached the advanced status of ethnic identity.

4.2.1. Stage 1: Unexamined ethnic identity

This stage characterizes one's lack of exploration of ethnicity either due to a lack of interest or reliance to others' view of ethnicity (Phinney 1990; Umaña-Taylor 2011). This study classify the young informants under this stage. The informants' family and school environments provide the immediate context of their identification with the Dusun identity. As explained earlier, these young

informants identify themselves as Dusun because their family does. Moreover, the density of ethnic self-identification is primarily defined by the density of family values upheld by one's family. In addition, school environment also provides the young informants with a context which allow them to observe ethnic differences. Evidently, all young informants, except one, can identify their classmates based their ethnicity.

Ethnic involvement of the young informants is however limited. They have not grasped well ethnic history, for instance, the folklore stories behind the *Temarok* ceremony. In addition, some young informants in the past participated in cultural activities at their schools, though further investigation suggest that the reason for participation is mainly peer pressure. Predictably, they felt happy to be part of the ethnic activities because they were with their friends. Thus, such involvement and positive responses cannot be considered because the motives behind the participation and the positive feeling are not associated with ethnic identity.

The above findings illustrate that the children have not explored their ethnic identity beyond what they have gathered from their personal milieu and school setting. The family without doubt has a significant influence on the informants' sense of ethnic identity, but the informants have not invested any effort to learn about the history or culture of their ethnic group. In addition, they are yet to be aware of their neighborhood and be part of a wider community. This illustrates the fact that the young informants have not extended the connection of their ethnic identity to that of the outside world. Accordingly, their sense of belonging is limited to their families. They have not been able to relate such sense to the ethnic community.

4.2.2. Stage 2: Ethnic Identity Search

The main notion of the second stage is exploration and the search for the meaning of the ethnic identity that one has identified with (Phinney 1990: 503). Phinney and Ong (2007) also postulate that the exploration of ethnic identity requires a certain level of commitment that gets stronger when an individual intensifies the efforts to know better. All youth informants fit Phinney's description of the stage.

The informants' commitment to the Dusun identity is derived from their childhood ethnic identification, and as they attended secondary and tertiary education, they experienced relationship with peers of diverse ethnicity and were exposed to stronger Islamic environments. Such exposure highlighted ethnic and religious differences between the informants and their Muslim friends. This exposure consequently led to a parallel growth of awareness, not only towards their ethnic identity but also to the mainstream identity and culture. The growing awareness accordingly became the basis of this stage and it initiated further search for the meaning of Dusun ethnic identity among the youth informants.

As discussed earlier, government agencies and ethnic associations have played supportive roles to accommodate young people in cultural activities and advance the preservation of traditions and cultures. A study on Chinese American youth found that "cultural resources was positively related to ethnic engagement and clarity such that youth who perceived greater availability of cultural resources reported a greater involvement, understanding of, and commitment to, their ethnic group" (Juang and Nguyen 2010: 31). Similarly, this study found that the opportunities given by the aforementioned institutions allowed youth in the country to engage in cultural events. Thus, informants who experienced active ethnic involvement have better grasp of ethnic knowledge. In addition, some informants felt obliged to learn the Dusun culture as the elders in their family wanted them to learn the Dusun language and to play traditional musical instrument. Nevertheless, family obligation then became the basis for ethnic identity search for the informants that eventually resulted in a positive perception. They felt doing their part to retain cultural heritage. A 28-year-old informant saw another positive side of the experience. He has grown closer to his grandfather; they now talk to each other more about folklore, neighborhood, food, music, and other aspects of the Dusun culture.

Voluntary participation of youth Dusuns in cultural events and their alliance with ethnic organizations and knowledgeable elders are testimonies to the emergence of ethnic consciousness among the youth. The positive attitude in the form of affiliation and ethnic

pride is a legitimate sentiment grounded in the informants' ethnic involvement. However, the growing positive attitude may also turn them to become somewhat protective, if not defensive, of their ethnic identity. They started to be involved in discussing ethnic issues such as the inevitable impact of mainstream culture and the preservation of ethnic culture and language. This explains why a university student admitted that she felt offended by stereotypes that imply the Dusuns as "village people" or "backward". This situation may prompt the individual to explore further in order to gain self-confidence and a better feeling of personal worth. Such exploration efforts fit the description of the stage, and the findings are consistent with Phinney and Ong's (2007) argument that positive attitudes towards ethnic identity can also be felt by individuals who have not attained an achieved status of ethnic identity.

4.2.3. Stage 3: Ethnic Identity Achieved

Informants who have the clearest sense of themselves as Dusuns and have already developed a way of dealing with ethnic issues are considered to have reached the third and final stage of ethnic identity formation process. Interview data reveal that all adult informants have a clear understanding of their ethnic identity. Elder Dusuns are inclined to take the role of carrier of ethnic tradition, as illustrated by the experiences of the youth informants who learned the Dusun culture after their elders pushed them. Informants were obliged to follow the elders' words out of respect and reverence for them. Phinney (1990) and Tsai, et. Al. (2002) argued that younger members of an ethnic group expect elders of the group to function as carriers of ethnic identity and culture. Accordingly, the elders assume a central role in keeping family and community values in tact.

This study also found that an intensification of ethnic sentiment is more evident in the interviews with adult informants. As ethnicity plays a more positive role at the later stage of life, it provides an individual a secure sense of belonging to his or her ethnic group which is the essence of ethnic sentiment. Such mature sense of identity thus becomes a sufficient ground for committing oneself to the vitality of an ethnic community. This explains the

reason why adult informants conspicuously concerned themselves with the survival of ethnic identity, after observing the gradual disappearance of ethnic cultures, traditions, and languages.

An achieved ethnic identity can also lead to the internalization of one's ethnicity. An individual may not be seemingly too concerned with retaining ethnic language or customs and may not actively engage with ethnic activities (Phinney 1990: 503; Phinney and Ong 2005: 275-6). Internally however, the individual may have already developed a secure sense of belonging derived from strong family ties and deep feelings of family obligation. As mentioned earlier, there are two adult informants who talked about the lack of ethnic involvement and the dwindling use of the Dusun language. The emphasis on *Bahasa Melayu* in the Brunei education system since the 1950's and the dispersion of the Dusuns due to education and occupation pushed the members of the ethnic group away from caring for the Dusun language and ethnic activities respectively. Because of this, it is not fair to expect the Dusuns to embody all the components of ethnic identity. It is evident from this study that there are adult informants who are clear about their ethnic identity without advocating a proactive attitude towards the preservation of and engagement with ethnic cultures. There are also adult informants who do not use the Dusun language in their everyday interactions, or necessarily befriend with other Dusuns; however, they still consider themselves part of the ethnic group. This accounts for the internalized feeling of ethnicity which equally provide the Dusuns a sense of purpose and meaningful identity.

Ⅴ. Conclusion

The main aim of this study was to provide an understanding of the Dusun ethnic identity from the "everyday-defined" social reality. Based on the personal stories of the informants, this study provided competent evidence that the Dusun ethnic identity has not been lost. The core components of ethnic identity all exist and evolve in the life of the Dusuns.

The above discussion also showed that the core components

of the Dusun ethnic identity are influenced significantly by contextual factors. The context of family and kinship allowed the Dusuns to experience all four core components, especially ethnic self-identification. Contextual factors outside family life however pose challenges to the relevance of ethnic involvement. The findings of this study shown that ethnic involvement should not be independently taken as a measure of one's Dusun-ness, as surrounding contexts shaped by national needs and priorities affect the significance of ethnic involvement in cultural practices and language. Despite the inactive participation within community, kinship relations nevertheless continue to be functionally important in the lives of the Dusuns, particularly within the realm of immediate family, and thus defines the strength of their ethnic identity.

The analysis of the influence of contextual factors on the core components of ethnic identity is crucial in understanding the nature of the progression of ethnic identity of the Dusuns. The differences in the extent to which the core components develop and are experienced by the Dusuns reflect the stage of ethnic identity. The findings of this study are consistent with Phinney's (1996) formulation of ethnic identity formation and the description of each stage. This study also revealed sound findings where, among others, positive attitude and sense of belonging are notably absent in the first stage of ethnic identity, and an internalized sense of belonging only occurs to adult informants.

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Bilingualism and Bruneian Identity

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[*Abstract*]

This paper discusses how the concept of “bilingualism” can be used to reflect changes within Bruneian society since the 1940’s. It argues that within the context of a linguistically diverse population, the various indigenous groups of Brunei used to speak their own traditional languages, but eventually learned to speak the language of the politically dominant Malays. The Malay language became a necessary additional language, hence leading to a population which could speak their own languages, alongside the Malay language. But the rise of schools teaching in English in the 1970’s began to sow seeds of a different kind of bilingualism, encouraged by language shift processes among ethnic minority groups.

Keywords: Brunei, bilingualism, education, diversity, education

Ⅰ. Introduction

Brunei is situated in the north-west of the island of Borneo, with a northern coastline of about 161-km along the South China Sea, and

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surrounded inland by the Malaysian State of Sarawak, dividing it into two. In 2015, the total population of Brunei was 423,000 (World Bank 2015).

The eastern part is the Temburong District, home to the Murut or Lun Bawang community. The western portion consists of Brunei-Muara, Tutong, and Belait districts. The Brunei-Muara District, where the capital Bandar Seri Begawan is located, is the smallest but most populous area among the four districts. This district is significant in terms of being the center of government and commerce. The Tutong District, the third largest, is home to indigenous groups like the Tutong, the Kedayan, Dusun, and Iban. The Belait District, the center of oil and gas industries, about 100 km from the capital, is the traditional home of the Belait community.

Today, well-developed roads link Brunei-Muara, Tutong, and Belait, providing easy access across these districts. Although accessing Temburong is still primarily done through water transport, there is certainly greater movement among people residing in these districts. On the whole, traveling in Brunei has become convenient, a far cry from what it was 60 years ago. In the past, the indigenous communities of each district lived in virtual pockets of homogeneous communities, practicing their own customs and speaking their own languages. Inter-group communication was minimal due to the lack of contact between the groups, which was also caused by the lack of access to each other's communities, resulting in a high degree of "societal monolingualism" of indigenous languages. Bilinguals were not common and regarded as highly "knowledgeable people." This paper traces the evolution of "bilingualism" among the majority Malay people of Brunei as the nation transitioned into a modern state. The paper borrows the concept of "societal bilingualism" introduced by Romaine (1994), and expanded by Sebba below:

> 'Societal bilingualism' is a broad term used to refer to any kind of bilingualism or multilingualism at a level of social organization beyond the individual or nuclear family. By this definition, almost every country and region of the world has some degree of 'societal bilingualism'. Societal bilingualism by no means implies that every

> individual in the society in question is bilingual, or even that a majority are. Rather, there are many different ways in which social groupings, from extended families all the way up to federal nation-states, can be said to have the property of ‘societal bilingualism’ (Sebba 2011).

This paper argues that in Brunei, the ethnic minorities who traditionally spoke their own languages have now adopted the dominant language of Brunei Malay as their first language. As a result, over time, “bilingualism” in Brunei has been redefined from “the ability to speak an ethnic language and Malay” to “the ability to speak Malay and English,” which at the same time reflects the lowering status of ethnic languages and the prestigious status of English.

Ⅱ. Sources of Data

This paper draws its discussions and findings from a larger study on the changes to the linguistic diversity of Brunei and analyses the interviews as well as documentary data. The original study by Noor Azam Haji-Othman (2005) adopted a three-stage interview approach involving informants with various ethnic backgrounds from all four districts of Brunei. It also included interviews with the key figures in government who influenced cultural and linguistic practices in the country. The interviews were in-depth and semi-structured, which allowed a whole range of issues pertaining to language in Brunei to be probed, one of them being bilingualism. The interviews were also complemented by an analysis of official documents, such as *Brunei Annual Report*, Brunei Constitutional Letters, and government circulars.

The main findings of the study suggest that there is a shift from traditional ethnic languages to a “national language” in Brunei that is paralleled with, though not necessarily caused by, a shift from ethnic identity to national identity. This paper focuses on the language shift aspect and its role in the evolution of bilingualism in Brunei, and aims to unravel its cultural and linguistic implications.

Ⅲ. Key Concepts

Hamers and Blanc (1989) state that "bilingualism" refers to an individual's ability to communicate using two codes as well as the state of a linguistic community in which two languages are in contact, with the result that two codes can be used in the same interaction and that a number of individuals are bilingual (i.e. "societal bilingualism"). As stated above, central to the discussion is Romaine's (1994) view on "societal bilingualism" as the marker of the language shift. Romaine argues:

> Choices made by individuals on an everyday basis have an effect on the long-term situation of the languages concerned. Language shift generally involves bilingualism … as a stage on the way to eventual monolingualism in a new language. Typically, a community which was once monolingual becomes bilingual as a result of contact with another (usually socially more powerful) group and becomes transitionally bilingual in the new language until their own language is given up altogether (Romaine 1994: 45-50).

According to Romaine (1994: 45), societal bilingualism must exist at some point to impact the shift in language. Fasold (1984) defines "language shift" as a process where a community gives up a language "completely in favor of another one," and argues that "language maintenance and shift are the long-term, collective consequences of consistent patterns of language choice" (Fasold 1984).

The balance of power between languages will be affected when a new language enters a monolingual society, and makes it bilingual (Aitchison 1981; Day 1985). When individuals use two or more languages alternately, language contact occurs and the individuals involved become the "locus of the contact" (Weinreich 1968). When a substantial number of individuals in a community become bilingual, the entire community/society could be called "bilingual"—hence "societal bilingualism" (Romaine 1994).

Such societal bilingualism can ultimately lead to a language shift in a society where "one generation is bilingual, but only passes on one of the two languages to the next" (Fasold 1984: 213). Population

mobility in or out of a speech community is equally important in determining the balance of power between languages, as it affects the number of speakers of a specific language and creates a conducive environment for a language shift (Beer & Jacob 1985; Fasold 1984; Fishman 1991; Lieberson 1982). Certainly, increased population mobility caused by modernization of transportation and communication is significant in language shifts (Lieberson 1984). Fishman argues that where "social mobility is widespread, bilingualism is repeatedly skewed in favor of the more powerful language being acquired and used much more frequently than that of the lesser power" (Fishman 1977: 115).

Such changes in language choice and use will have consequences on culture in general and identity expression, in particular. Romaine (1994) views linguistic diversity as a benchmark of cultural diversity: "Language death is symptomatic of cultural death: a way of life disappears with the death of a language. The fortunes of languages are bound with those of its speakers." Similarly, although Skutnabb-Kangas concedes that "language and culture are not synonymous, nor do they exhibit a one-to-one relationship," she argues that "it seems doubtful" that linguistic diversity could go and cultural diversity could still remain (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000: 253-256). In relation to this, Gal (1979: 171) argues that one's language choice implicitly relates the speaker to social groups associated with each language: "One need not be a member of a social category…to claim that identity…But whatever reasons individuals have for presenting themselves as members of a social category, it is choice of language that symbolizes such membership…" (Gal 1979: 171).

On the national level, although ethnic and cultural identity are often discussed in relation to national identity, and national language can be regarded as the most central symbol of growing nationhood, political entities that represent a homogeneous, monolingual national group are extremely rare (Kotze 2000). Indeed, "a shared national language does not by itself generate or sustain national identity" (Apter 1981: 221, in Blommaert 1996). Nevertheless, if people of a country shared a common language and identity, through nature or nurture, then the possibility of the

emergence of a national identity would be more likely. Wodak, et. al. (1999) argue that identity can be considered as the product of a mutable process, constructed through discourses that are continuously redefined and negotiated within and outside communities. This implies that the members of the communities use their national language, usually an additional language to their first language, as a firm and self-evident identity marker (Wodak et al 1999).

Based on these theoretical perspectives, we can discuss changes within the "linguistic ecology" of Brunei, through language shift, and in relation to identity shift. Haugen used "the ecology of language" in 1970 to refer to a new ecological study of the interrelations between multiple languages in both the human mind and in multilingual communities. Haugen's (1972) definition of a language ecology is "the study of interactions between any given language and its environment," in which environment means "the society that uses a language as one of its codes" rather than the "referential world" (Fill 2001: 3). This study is ecological, in the sense that it focuses on the interrelationships between the indigenous languages of Brunei (more exactly, between the speakers of these languages), and sociohistorical factors such as national history and ideology. The ecological framework proposed by Haugen suits the purpose of this study, particularly as this paper's emphasis is on the reciprocity/ interrelationship between language and environment, noting that what is needed is not only a description of the social and psychological situation of each language, but also the effect of this situation on the language itself (Haugen 1972: 334).

Ⅵ. Language Shift in Brunei

As mentioned earlier, societal bilingualism involves a language shift to a large degree. Informants in my previous research (see Noor Azam 2005) also recognized the language shift.

[Informant16] ***Extract 1***
... the children of today [don't speak] Bisaya[1)]! They speak Malay, all Malay... they don't know how to speak Bisaya... even my

children, none of them speak Bisaya... all of them speak Malay...

[Informant 26] Extract 2
Previously the Dusun community mainly used the genuine Dusun language. When they go to school the younger generation now use Malay, so their daily language is Malay... that's the loss, a language loss... if we don't keep our language... [they will] disappear... once the elderly people are gone, even once my generation is gone, the language will disappear.

The reality of endangered traditional languages revealed in the interviews is similar to what Kershaw (1994) has coined "Terminal Heirs," which means that the current generation of speakers is the final one before the languages die with them. Many earlier studies have also identified this language shift from traditional ethnic languages to the lingua franca Malay, including Martin (1992, 1996a, 1996b), Poedjosoedarmo (1996), Sercombe (2002), and Kershaw (1994).

If language shift is an indicator of the indigenous people's shift from their own languages to the mainstream Malay language, it could also be argued that the "societal bilingualism" in Brunei has been redefined. Whereas "multilingualism" in Brunei was identified to include Malay and other minority languages like Kedayan, Belait, Bisaya, Dusun, Tutong, and Murut, today, Malay language dominates the others within the linguistic ecology.

Nothofer (1991) demonstrates that ethnic languages of the Belait, Bisaya, Dusun, Murut, and Tutong communities are not Malay dialects but are in fact separate languages in their own right. The Malay and Kedayan communities are monolingual as they speak Malay only (discounting English and other non-Bruneian languages). This means that the other five ethnic groups are mainly bilingual since they speak at least one more language (their own ethnic language) besides Malay, assuming that every member of the five non-Malay ethnolinguistic groups is brought up speaking their

1) "Bisaya" refers to one of the seven ethnic groups under the label "Malay race" in Brunei, as well as to the traditional language that they speak. Nothofer (1994) identified the Bisaya and Dusun languages to be of the same family (Dusun-Bisaya) as they are 84% cognate.

traditional languages.

And this is where the effects of language shift processes can be felt the most. An increasing number of ethnic minority children are being raised speaking Malay as their first language, instead of their parents' ethnic language/s. In such cases these children grow up to be members of a non-Malay ethnic group, but have Malay language as their mother tongue.

Language shift from different ethnic languages to the dominant national language, Malay, over the years indicate that "multilingual Brunei" today refers to a homogenized Malay-speaking nation, which also speak English and other languages such as Mandarin and Arabic, but disregards many indigenous languages which are dying.

Ⅴ. The Evolution of Multilingualism and Language Ecology of Brunei

The following model charts the evolution of multilingualism and linguistic diversity in Brunei within the last 60 years or so in relation to more specific sociohistorical developments in the country:

1) Prior to the 1950's, social contact or interaction between ethnic groups was very limited and the ethnic communities predominantly, if not exclusively, spoke their own language: Tutong people spoke Tutong, and the Brunei Malay and Kedayan groups mostly conversed in their respective dialects of Malay, because they were confined to their ethnic communities. When inter-ethnic contact occurred, Malay was used as the lingua franca. Linguistic diversity can therefore be defined by clear separation of these speech communities which were predominantly monolingual. The fragmentation of the indigenous tribes into small isolated groups "has meant much cultural and linguistic diversity for such a small country" (Jones 1994: 9).

2) By the 1950's ethnic groups who had previously been

recorded in government reports as non-Malay speakers, were now being labelled as "Malay-speaking". Rapid development of national roads began in the 1950's along the coastal line, connecting the capital city and the furthermost district, Belait. This led to the mobility, migration, and dispersal of many local residents, and increased inter-ethnic contact and mixed marriages or inter-ethnic marriage.



Figure 1: Change in Brunei's linguistic ecology (Source: Noor Azam 2005).

3) According to Jones, contact between ethnic groups was minimal prior to the development of roads in the 1950's. As contact increased, the need to communicate between different tribes forced people to use a shared language (Jones 1994: 9). Prior to the introduction of bilingual education system in 1985, Malay stream education had increased the chances of students from different ethnic backgrounds to interact with each other in the Malay language. The dominant status of Malay was reinforced in public schools as a common tool of communication and as a source of national pride. The change in Brunei's language ecology in the 1960's can be summarized as follows: Bilingualism in an indigenous language and Malay increased, while monolingualism in traditional languages evidently decreased.

The preference for the Malay language in the 1970's and 1980's increased along with the belief among ethnic parents that bringing up their children in Malay would prepare them well for schools. Therefore, competency in the Malay language became more important,

especially for those who frequently moved or migrated across the country. When people from minority communities enter mainstream society, their needs and desires for social integration and communication became greater and necessary. This was also reinforced by the increased use of Malay as a medium of instruction in the schools. While there was still a large number of those who could speak both an ethnic language and Malay now, they belonged mainly in the older age group. The linguistic scene at that time certainly saw large-scale shifts from ethnic languages to the Malay language, and as a result, there was a large increase in the number of monolingual Malay-speakers.

4) In the 1980's, there was a greater emphasis on English with the implementation of the *Dwibahasa* (bilingual) education system in the newly-independent nation. Being fluent in English in Brunei is generally perceived to be the symbol of high social status and good education, even more than being fluent in Malay. This can be attributed to the impact of the large number of graduates returning from British universities at a time when Brunei still had no university. During this period, a bilingual Bruneian could be defined as a Malay-English speaker, as ethnic language tradition was rapidly disappearing among the younger generation. In contrast, Malay-English bilingualism has been institutionalized successfully through public school education (Jones 1994: 9), where English was "valorized" (Noor Azam 2012).

5) Nowadays, it is generally difficult to find those aged below 15 to be fluent in their ethnic languages, although many would claim to have receptive abilities in their ethnic language and remain loyal to their language tradition. Noor Azam (2005) identified a shift to Malay (and to English), particularly, though not exclusively, among interethnic families from mixed-marriage parentage.

In view of the discussion above, the following trends may be discerned:

- Bilinguals who speak Malay and English outnumbering Malay monolinguals.
- Bilingual speakers of an indigenous language and Malay are

decreasing in number.

- Monolingual speakers of indigenous languages have virtually disappeared.
- Bruneians who grow up with speaking English as their first-language on the other hand are on the increase.

Ⅵ. Discussion

The link between language and identity shift in Brunei has been termed by Martin (2002) as "linguistic and cultural redefinition," and by Maxwell (1980: 189-197) as "shifts in semantic classification" of indigenous Brunei ethnic groups. Braighlinn (1992: 19) specifically highlights the consolidation of "a single national identity, born of convergence on a dominant Malay culture" in Brunei. In this regard, Noor Azam (2005) reported that Bruneians already see signs of merging of identities among the new generation of Bruneians, and that language shift processes are denotative of a parallel shift in identity too. If a parallel is to be made, a shift from ethnic languages to Malay can be reflected in a shift of emphasis from ethnic identities to a national "pan-Bruneian" identity that supersedes individual or communal ethnic identities, thus de-emphasizing ethnic differences.

Braighlinn (1992: 20), Gunn (1997), and Kershaw (2001: 124) have commonly suggested that identity shifts in Brunei are the result of deliberate political pressures or even inventions to create national identity. Noor Azam's (2005) study does not have adequate evidence to support or refute this contention, but it has shown the close link between the emergence of a "Pan-Bruneian" identity that coincides with the emergence of a "pan-Brunei Malay" language. There is a declining importance of overt expression of ethnic identity, while there is a greater emphasis on national identity instead (identity as a Bruneian citizen).

The emergence of this new "national" identity saw its beginnings in Nation-building and national-identity building trends in Southeast Asia leading up to the 1970's. These movements aimed to create a homogeneous national identity, because "diversity" was seen to be

inextricably bound up with political instability (Bourdieu 1994). Nation-building through identity-formation involves individuals being trained to subsume cultural, social and ethnic identities to a broader and more general "national identity," usually through the educational system (Bourdieu 1994: 7). This view is supported by Wodak who argues that "the state shapes those forms of perception, of categorisation, of interpretation and of memory which serves as a basis for a more or less deliberate orchestration of the habitus which forms the basis for a kind of 'national common sense', through the school and the educational system" (Wodak 2009: 29).

When Brunei achieved its independence in 1984 and declared that it "shall forever be a sovereign, democratic and independent Malay Muslim Monarchy," Brunei national identity was redefined by the attachment and/or acknowledgement of its people to a dominant Malay culture, the Muslim faith, and loyalty to the Monarch. The mantra "Malay Islamic Monarchy" became a homogenizing force through the educational system. The ability to speak Malay, the major language, "most closely delineates status gradations in profoundly hierarchical and status-ridden society" (Gunn 1997). This process of creating a national identity, including through language, can be seen to constitute what Anderson calls "official nationalism" which he defined as "the willed merger of dynastic empire and nation... a phenomenon that emanated from the state and serving the interests of the state first and foremost" (Anderson 2006: 85).

Ⅶ. Conclusion

Language shift, as shown above, has implications not just on linguistic diversity, but also on cultural diversity, or more specifically, in the diversity of identities. Whereas common facility in Malay language is perceived as an important marker of "Bruneian-ness," differences in ethnic identity are becoming less important. With modernization and greater integration among the ethnic groups of Brunei, the diverse languages and identities are concurrently converging, and a common language and national identity are emerging in turn.

Whereas in the past, monolingual speakers of ethnic languages

were still common, greater socialization and integrative processes over the recent decades have changed the linguistic acquisition trends in Brunei. Language shift processes have been the main contributor to this change in the language ecology, the redefinition of the notion of "a multilingual population" in Brunei, as well as to the reduction of linguistic and cultural diversity in Brunei. With particular reference to indigenous language speakers, those who were once linguistically diverse have steadily been incorporated into a "homogeneous" and "monolingual" national Malay speech community. It is interesting to see that only 60 years ago, Brunei's population as a whole was actually more multilingual than it is today. Previously, the Bruneian bilingual person was able to speak a traditional ethnic language as their first language and Malay as an additional language. Today, being a bilingual person most likely means one who speaks Malay as first language and English as second language.

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SUVANNABHUMI

Multi-disciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

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Sections and sub-sections should be divided by "I, 1.1., 1.1.1." And tables and figures should be numbered by <Table 1>, <Figure 1>. The Journal does not accept color figures. Figures should be submitted in black and white only.

7) References

References should be in Roman script and placed at the end of the manuscript.

2. FOOTNOTES AND CITATIONS

1) Footnotes

Notes should be kept to a minimum and numbered consecutively throughout the manuscript. Notes should be included as footnotes, and not as endnotes. Footnotes with more than 5 lines will be inserted into the text.

2) Citations in the Text

All source references are to be identified at the appropriate point in the text by the last name of the author, year of publication and pagination where needed. Identify subsequent citations of the same source in the same way as the first. Examples follow:

- If author's name is in the text, follow it with year in parentheses.
  Wong (1986)

- Pagination follows year of publication after a colon.
  James (1979: 56)

- If author's name is not in the text, insert, in parentheses, the last name and year. (Duncan 1986: 76)

- Give both last names for two authors. Give all last names on first citation in text for more than two authors; thereafter use "et al." in the text. When two authors have the same last names, use identifying initials in the text.

- Separate series of references with semi-colons and enclose them within a single pair of parentheses.
  (Edwards 1981: 43; Lee et al. 1983: 112).

- In case of daily, weekly, monthly publications and similar references, pagination follows 'dd/mm/yyyy' after a comma.
  (Korea Times 01/04/2014, 3).

- For a manuscript that is planned to be published, year of writing shall be indicated. When there is no year of writing, n.d. shall be written.
  Taylor (n.d.)

• In case of an organization as an author, information that can be identified shall be provided.
(Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security 1992)

3. REFERENCES

Detailed information on all literature mentioned in the text and footnote shall be shown in <References> at the end of the text. Literature that was not mentioned in the text and footnote shall not be included.

1) Books

• In case of one author: for author name that is Romanized, family name and first name shall be put in order.

> Jessup, Helen I. 2004. *Art & Architecture of Cambodia.* London: Thames & Hudson.

• In case of more than 2 authors: for the text and footnote, 'et al.' shall be written, but for references, all names of co-authors shall be written. However, if 'et al.' is written on the book cover from the first, it shall be as it is.

> Freeman, Michael and Claude Jacques. 1999. *Ancient Ankor*. Bangkok: Asia Books.

• In case of an edited book, it shall be written in ed.

> Steinberg, David Joel, ed. 1987. *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

• In case of translated books, it shall be in the order of original author, year of publication of translated books, name of translated book, author and publisher.

> Coed S. G. 1928. *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*. Susan B. Cowing, trans. Honolulu: An East-West Center Book. The University Press of Hawaii.

2) Journal Articles/ Monthly Magazine

- In case of papers such as journals, monthly magazine, etc, volume and number shall be in volume (number), and the relevant pages shall be definitely indicated.

> Egreteau, Renaud. 2008. India's Ambitions in Burma. *Asian Survey,* 48(6): 936-957.

3) Chapter in a Book

- In case of the text in a compilation, it shall be in the order of author, year of publication, compilation name, compiler, related page and publisher. If there is no compiler, then it can be omitted.

> King, Victor T. 2006. Southeast Asia: Personal Reflections on a Region. *Southeast Asian Studies: Debates and New Directions.* Cynthia Chou and Vincent Houben, eds. 23-44. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

4) Thesis and Dissertation

- In case of a thesis or dissertation, the following form shall be followed.

> Parker, John. 1988. The Representation of Southeast Asian Art. PhD Dissertation. Harvard University.

5) Newspaper Articles

- In case of a daily newspaper, by-line story of weekly magazine and column, the following form shall be followed.

> Peterson, Thomas. 1993. The Economic Development of ASEAN. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 22: 23.

6) Internet Sources

- In case of the internet searching, it shall be in order of author, year of production, subject and web address (Accessed Month DD, YYYY).

> Hadar, Leon. 1998. U.S. Sanctions against Burma. *Trade Policy Analysis* no. 1. http://www.cato.org/pubs/trade/tpa-001.html. (Accessed May 07, 2008).

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